1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
818 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
819 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
820 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
821 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
822 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
823 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
824 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
825 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
826 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
827 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
828 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
829 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
830 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
833 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
834 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
835 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
836 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
837 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
838 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
839 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
840 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
841 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
842 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
843 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
844 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
845 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
846 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
847 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
849 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
850 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
851 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
852 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
854 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
855 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
856 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
857 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
859 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
860 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
861 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
862 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
863 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
865 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
866 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
867 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
868 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
870 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
871 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
872 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
874 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
875 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
876 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
877 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
878 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
880 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
881 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
884 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
885 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
887 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
888 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
889 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
890 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
892 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
893 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
895 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
896 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
899 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
900 (0, update, required),
903 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
904 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
905 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
906 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
907 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
911 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
913 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
915 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
917 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
923 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
925 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
932 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
933 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
934 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
935 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
936 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
938 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
939 /// in a timely manner.
940 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
943 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
944 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
945 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
947 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
948 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
949 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
950 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
954 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
955 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
956 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
958 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
959 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
960 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
961 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
963 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
967 /// The current channel ID.
968 channel_id: ChannelId,
969 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
970 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
971 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
972 channel_state: ChannelState,
974 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
975 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
977 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
978 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
979 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
982 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
983 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
984 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
986 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
987 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
989 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
991 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
992 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
993 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
995 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
996 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
997 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
999 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1000 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1001 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1002 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1003 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1004 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1006 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1007 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1008 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1009 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1010 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1011 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1013 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1015 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1016 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1017 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1019 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1020 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1021 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1022 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1023 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1024 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1025 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1027 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1028 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1029 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1031 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1032 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1033 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1034 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1035 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1036 /// outbound or inbound.
1037 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1039 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1041 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1042 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1043 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1044 // HTLCs with similar state.
1045 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1046 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1047 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1048 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1049 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1050 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1051 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1052 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1053 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1054 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1056 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1057 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1058 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1060 update_time_counter: u32,
1062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1063 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1064 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1065 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1066 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1067 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1069 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1070 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1072 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1073 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1074 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1075 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1077 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1078 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1080 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1082 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1084 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1085 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1086 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1087 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1088 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1090 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1091 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1093 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1094 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1095 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1097 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1098 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1099 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1100 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1101 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1102 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1103 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1104 channel_creation_height: u32,
1106 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1111 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1114 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1119 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1121 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1123 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1124 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1127 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1129 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1131 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1132 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1134 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1136 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1137 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1138 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1140 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1142 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1143 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1144 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1146 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1147 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1148 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1150 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1152 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1154 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1155 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1156 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1157 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1159 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1160 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1161 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1163 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1164 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1165 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1167 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1168 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1169 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1170 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1172 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1174 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1176 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1177 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1178 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1179 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1180 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1182 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1183 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1185 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1186 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1187 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1188 /// unblock the state machine.
1190 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1191 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1192 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1194 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1195 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1196 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1199 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1200 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1201 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1202 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1203 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1204 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1205 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1207 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1208 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1210 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1211 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1212 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1214 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1215 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1216 // associated channel mapping.
1218 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1219 // to store all of them.
1220 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1222 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1223 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1224 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1225 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1226 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1228 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1229 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1231 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1232 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1234 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1235 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1236 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1238 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1239 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1240 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1243 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1244 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1245 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1246 self.update_time_counter
1249 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1250 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1253 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1254 self.config.announced_channel
1257 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1261 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1262 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1263 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1264 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1267 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1268 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1269 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1272 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1273 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1274 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1275 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1276 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1277 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1278 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1281 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1282 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1283 match self.channel_state {
1284 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1285 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1286 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1287 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1288 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1289 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1290 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1292 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1294 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1295 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1299 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1300 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1301 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1302 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1303 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1304 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1307 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1308 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1309 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1313 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1314 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1315 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1316 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1317 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1320 // Public utilities:
1322 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1326 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1328 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1329 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1330 self.temporary_channel_id
1333 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1337 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1338 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1339 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1343 /// Gets the channel's type
1344 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1348 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1350 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1351 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.short_channel_id
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1357 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1361 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1362 self.outbound_scid_alias
1365 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1367 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1368 return &self.holder_signer
1371 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1372 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1373 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1374 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1375 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1376 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1379 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1380 /// get_funding_created.
1381 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1382 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1385 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1386 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1387 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1388 if conf_height > 0 {
1395 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1397 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1400 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1401 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1402 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1403 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1407 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1410 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1411 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1414 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1415 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1418 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1419 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1420 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1423 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1429 self.counterparty_node_id
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1434 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1438 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1439 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1442 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1443 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1445 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1446 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1447 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1448 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1450 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1456 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1459 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1460 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1461 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1464 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1465 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1466 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1468 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1469 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1474 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1475 self.channel_value_satoshis
1478 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1479 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1482 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1483 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1486 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1487 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1488 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1490 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1492 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1493 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1494 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1496 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1500 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1501 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1502 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1505 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1507 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1515 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1517 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1520 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1522 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1525 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1526 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1527 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1530 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1531 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1532 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1533 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1534 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1537 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1539 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1540 self.prev_config = None;
1544 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1545 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1549 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1550 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1551 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1552 let did_channel_update =
1553 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1554 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1555 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1556 if did_channel_update {
1557 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1558 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1559 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1560 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1562 self.config.options = *config;
1566 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1567 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1568 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1569 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1570 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1573 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1574 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1575 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1576 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1577 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1579 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1580 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1581 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1582 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1583 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1584 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1585 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1587 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1588 where L::Target: Logger
1590 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1591 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1592 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1594 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1595 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1596 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1597 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1599 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1600 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1601 if match update_state {
1602 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1603 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1604 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1605 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1606 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1608 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1612 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1613 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1614 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1616 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1618 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1619 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1620 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1622 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1623 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1624 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1625 transaction_output_index: None
1630 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1631 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1632 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1633 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1634 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1637 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1639 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1640 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1641 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1643 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1644 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1647 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1648 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1651 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1653 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1655 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1657 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1658 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1664 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1666 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1667 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1668 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1669 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1670 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1671 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1672 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1676 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1677 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1679 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1681 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1682 if generated_by_local {
1683 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1684 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1685 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1695 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1697 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1699 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1700 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1701 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1702 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1706 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1707 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1709 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1713 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1714 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1718 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1719 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1721 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1723 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1724 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1726 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1727 if !generated_by_local {
1728 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1736 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1737 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1738 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1739 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1740 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1741 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1742 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1743 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1745 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1747 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1748 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1749 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1750 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1752 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1754 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1755 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1756 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1757 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1760 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1761 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1762 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1763 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1765 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1768 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1769 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1770 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1771 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1773 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1776 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1777 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1782 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1783 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1788 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1790 let channel_parameters =
1791 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1792 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1793 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1800 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1803 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1804 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1805 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1806 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1814 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1815 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1816 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1817 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1822 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1823 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1824 /// our counterparty!)
1825 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1826 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1827 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1828 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1829 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1830 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1831 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1833 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1837 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1838 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1839 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1840 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1841 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1842 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1843 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1845 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1849 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1850 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1851 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1852 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1855 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1856 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1859 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1863 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1864 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1865 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1866 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1867 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1868 // which are near the dust limit.
1869 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1870 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1871 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1872 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1873 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1875 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1876 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1878 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2320 match self.channel_state {
2321 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2322 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2323 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2324 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2334 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2336 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2337 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2340 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2342 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2343 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2344 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2348 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2349 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2350 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2353 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2355 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2356 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2359 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2360 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2361 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2362 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2363 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2364 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2365 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2366 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2367 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2368 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2369 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2371 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2372 // return them to fail the payment.
2373 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2374 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2375 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2377 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2378 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2383 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2384 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2385 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2386 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2387 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2388 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2389 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2390 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2391 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2392 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2395 if generate_monitor_update {
2396 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2397 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2398 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2399 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2404 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2405 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2407 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2408 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2412 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2413 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2414 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2415 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2416 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2417 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2418 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2419 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2423 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2424 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2425 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2426 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2428 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2429 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2430 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2431 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2433 match &self.holder_signer {
2434 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2435 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2436 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2437 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2438 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2441 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2445 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2446 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2447 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2449 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2450 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2451 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2453 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2454 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2455 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2458 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2459 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2461 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2468 // Internal utility functions for channels
2470 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2471 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2472 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2474 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2476 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2477 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2478 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2480 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2483 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2485 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2488 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2489 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2490 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2492 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2494 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2495 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2496 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2497 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2498 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2501 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2502 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2503 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2504 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2505 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2506 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2507 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2510 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2511 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2513 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2514 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2517 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2518 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2519 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2520 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2521 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2522 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2525 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2526 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2527 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2528 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2531 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2532 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2534 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2535 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2536 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2540 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2541 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2542 trait FailHTLCContents {
2543 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2544 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2545 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2546 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2548 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2549 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2550 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2551 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2553 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2554 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2556 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2557 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2560 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2561 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2562 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2563 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2566 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2567 failure_code: self.1
2570 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2571 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2573 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2576 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2577 failure_code: self.1
2582 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2583 fn name() -> &'static str;
2585 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2586 fn name() -> &'static str {
2590 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2591 fn name() -> &'static str {
2592 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2596 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2597 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2598 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2600 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2601 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2602 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2603 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2605 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2606 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2608 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2610 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2611 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2612 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2613 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2615 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2616 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2626 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2627 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2628 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2629 // outside of those situations will fail.
2630 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2634 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2639 1 + // script length (0)
2643 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2644 2 + // witness marker and flag
2645 1 + // witness element count
2646 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2647 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2648 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2649 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2650 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2651 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2653 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2654 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2655 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2661 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2662 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2663 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2664 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2666 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2667 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2668 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2670 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2671 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2672 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2673 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2674 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2675 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2678 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2679 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2682 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2683 value_to_holder = 0;
2686 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2687 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2688 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2689 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2691 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2692 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2695 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2696 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2699 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2702 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2703 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2705 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2707 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2708 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2709 where L::Target: Logger {
2710 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2711 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2712 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2713 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2714 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2715 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2716 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2717 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2721 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2722 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2723 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2724 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2726 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2727 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2730 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2731 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2732 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2734 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2735 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2736 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2737 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2738 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2739 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2740 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2742 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2743 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2744 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2746 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2747 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2749 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2752 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2753 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2757 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2761 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2762 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2763 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2764 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2765 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2766 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2769 // Now update local state:
2771 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2772 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2773 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2774 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2775 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2776 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2777 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2778 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2782 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2783 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2784 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2785 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2786 // do not not get into this branch.
2787 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2788 match pending_update {
2789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2790 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2791 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2792 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2794 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2795 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2798 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2799 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2801 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2802 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2803 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2804 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2805 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2806 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2812 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2813 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2814 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2817 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2818 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2821 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2824 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2825 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2827 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2828 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2830 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2831 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2834 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2837 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2838 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2839 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2840 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2845 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2846 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2847 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2848 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2849 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2850 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2851 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2852 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2853 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2854 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2855 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2856 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2857 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2858 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2859 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2861 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2862 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2863 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2864 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2865 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2868 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2869 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2870 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2876 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2877 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2879 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2883 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2884 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2885 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2886 /// before we fail backwards.
2888 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2889 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2890 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2891 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2892 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2893 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2894 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2897 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2898 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2900 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2901 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2902 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2903 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2904 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
2905 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2908 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2909 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2910 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2911 /// before we fail backwards.
2913 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2914 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2915 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2916 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2917 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2919 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2920 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2921 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2924 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2925 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2926 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2928 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2929 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2930 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2932 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2933 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2934 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2936 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2941 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2948 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2949 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2950 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2951 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2952 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2956 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2957 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2958 force_holding_cell = true;
2961 // Now update local state:
2962 if force_holding_cell {
2963 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2964 match pending_update {
2965 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2966 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2968 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2972 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2975 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2976 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2983 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2984 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2988 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2989 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2991 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2992 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2995 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2998 // Message handlers:
2999 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3000 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3001 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3002 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3003 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3004 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3005 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3008 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3010 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3012 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3013 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3014 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3015 debug_assert!(matches!(
3016 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3018 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3019 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3022 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3023 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3025 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3026 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3027 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3028 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3030 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3033 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3034 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3038 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3039 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3040 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3041 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3042 // when routing outbound payments.
3043 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3047 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3048 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3049 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3050 match &self.context.channel_state {
3051 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3052 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3053 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3054 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3055 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3056 check_reconnection = true;
3057 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3058 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3059 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3060 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3061 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3063 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3064 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3067 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3068 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3069 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3071 if check_reconnection {
3072 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3073 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3074 let expected_point =
3075 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3076 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3078 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3079 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3080 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3081 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3082 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3083 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3085 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3086 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3087 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3088 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3089 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3091 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3097 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3098 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3100 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3102 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3105 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3106 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3107 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3108 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3109 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3110 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3112 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3115 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3116 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3117 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3119 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3120 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3123 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3126 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3129 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3132 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3136 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3137 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3138 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3141 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3145 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3146 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3147 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3148 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3149 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3150 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3151 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3152 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3153 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3154 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3155 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3157 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3158 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3159 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3160 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3161 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3162 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3166 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3167 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3170 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3171 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3172 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3174 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3175 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3176 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3177 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3178 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3179 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3180 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3184 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3185 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3186 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3187 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3188 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3189 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3190 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3194 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3195 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3196 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3197 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3198 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3202 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3203 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3205 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3206 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3207 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3209 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3210 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3214 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3217 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3222 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3223 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3227 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3228 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3229 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3230 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3231 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3232 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3233 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3234 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3235 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3237 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3238 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3239 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3240 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3241 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3244 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3245 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3246 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3247 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3251 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3254 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3258 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3259 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3260 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3264 // Now update local state:
3265 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3266 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3267 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3268 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3269 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3270 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3271 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3276 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3278 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3279 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3280 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3281 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3282 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3283 None => fail_reason.into(),
3284 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3285 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3286 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3289 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3293 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3295 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3298 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3304 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3307 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3308 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3311 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3315 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3318 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3319 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3322 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3326 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3330 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3331 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3334 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3338 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3342 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3343 where L::Target: Logger
3345 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3348 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3351 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3355 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3357 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3359 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3360 let commitment_txid = {
3361 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3362 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3363 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3365 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3366 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3367 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3368 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3369 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3374 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3376 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3377 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3378 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3379 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3382 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3383 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3384 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3390 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3391 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3392 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3393 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3394 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3395 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3396 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3397 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3398 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3399 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3400 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3406 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3410 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3411 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3412 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3413 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3414 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3415 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3416 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3417 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3418 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3419 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3420 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3421 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3422 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3425 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3426 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3427 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3428 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3429 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3430 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3431 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3433 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3434 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3435 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3436 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3437 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3438 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3439 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3442 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3443 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3446 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3448 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3449 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3450 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3453 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3456 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3457 commitment_stats.tx,
3459 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3460 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3461 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3464 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3465 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3467 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3468 let mut need_commitment = false;
3469 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3470 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3471 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3472 need_commitment = true;
3476 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3477 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3478 Some(forward_info.clone())
3480 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3481 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3482 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3483 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3484 need_commitment = true;
3487 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3488 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3489 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3490 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3491 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3492 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3493 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3494 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3495 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3496 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3497 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3498 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3499 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3500 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3502 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3504 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3505 need_commitment = true;
3509 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3510 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3511 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3512 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3513 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3514 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3515 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3517 nondust_htlc_sources,
3521 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3522 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3523 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3524 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3525 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3527 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3528 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3529 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3531 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3532 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3533 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3534 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3535 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3536 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3537 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3538 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3539 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3540 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3542 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3543 &self.context.channel_id);
3544 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3547 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3548 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3549 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3550 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3551 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3552 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3553 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3554 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3555 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3560 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3561 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3562 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3565 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3566 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3567 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3568 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3569 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3570 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3571 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3573 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3574 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3575 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3578 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3579 /// for our counterparty.
3580 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3581 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3582 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3583 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3585 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3586 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3587 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3588 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3590 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3591 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3592 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3593 updates: Vec::new(),
3596 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3597 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3598 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3599 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3600 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3601 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3602 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3603 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3604 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3605 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3606 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3607 // to rebalance channels.
3608 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3609 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3610 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3611 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3613 match self.send_htlc(
3614 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3615 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3617 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3620 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3621 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3622 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3623 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3624 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3625 // into the holding cell without ever being
3626 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3627 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3628 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3631 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3639 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3640 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3641 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3642 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3643 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3644 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3645 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3646 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3647 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3648 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3649 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3652 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3653 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3654 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3656 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3657 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
3658 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3661 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
3663 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
3664 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3665 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3666 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3667 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3668 // for a full revocation before failing.
3669 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
3670 update_fail_count += 1;
3672 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
3674 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3679 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3680 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3682 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3683 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3688 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3689 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3690 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3691 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3692 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3695 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3696 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3698 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3699 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3705 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3706 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3707 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3708 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3709 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3710 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3711 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3712 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3715 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3718 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3721 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3725 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3727 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3728 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3733 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3734 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3735 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3736 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3737 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3738 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3739 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3740 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3746 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3747 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3750 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3751 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3752 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3753 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3755 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3757 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3762 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3763 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3764 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3765 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3766 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3767 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3768 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3769 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3770 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3774 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3775 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3776 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3777 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3778 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3779 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3780 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3781 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3782 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3784 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3785 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3788 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3789 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3790 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3791 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3792 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3794 let mut require_commitment = false;
3795 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3798 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3799 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3800 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3801 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3803 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3804 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3805 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3806 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3807 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3808 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3810 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3814 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3815 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3816 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3817 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3818 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3820 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3821 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3822 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3827 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3828 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3830 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3834 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3835 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3837 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3839 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3840 require_commitment = true;
3841 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3842 match forward_info {
3843 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3845 require_commitment = true;
3847 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3848 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3849 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3851 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3852 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3853 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3857 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3858 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3859 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3860 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3866 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3867 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3868 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3869 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3870 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3872 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3873 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3874 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3875 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3876 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3877 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3878 require_commitment = true;
3882 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3884 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3885 match update_state {
3886 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3887 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3888 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3889 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3890 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3891 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3893 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3894 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3895 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3896 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3897 require_commitment = true;
3898 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3899 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3904 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3905 let release_state_str =
3906 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3907 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3908 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3909 if !release_monitor {
3910 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3911 update: monitor_update,
3913 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3915 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3920 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3921 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3922 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3923 if require_commitment {
3924 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3925 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3926 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3927 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3929 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3930 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3931 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3932 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3933 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3935 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3936 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3937 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3939 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3942 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3943 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3944 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3945 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3946 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3947 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3949 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3950 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3952 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3953 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3955 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3956 if require_commitment {
3957 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3959 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3960 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3961 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3962 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3965 &self.context.channel_id(),
3966 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3969 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3970 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3972 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3973 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3975 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3976 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3982 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3983 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3984 /// commitment update.
3985 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3986 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3987 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3989 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3990 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3993 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3994 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3995 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3996 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3998 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3999 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4000 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4001 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4002 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4003 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4004 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4006 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4007 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4009 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4010 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4012 if !self.context.is_live() {
4013 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4016 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4017 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4018 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4019 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4020 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4021 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4022 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4023 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4024 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4025 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4029 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4030 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4031 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4032 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4033 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4034 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4037 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4038 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4042 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4043 force_holding_cell = true;
4046 if force_holding_cell {
4047 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4051 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4052 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4054 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4055 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4060 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4061 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4063 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4065 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4066 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4067 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4068 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4072 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4073 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4074 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4078 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4079 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4082 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4083 // will be retransmitted.
4084 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4085 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4086 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4088 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4089 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4091 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4092 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4093 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4094 // this HTLC accordingly
4095 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4098 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4099 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4100 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4101 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4104 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4105 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4106 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4107 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4108 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4109 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4114 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4116 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4117 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4118 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4119 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4123 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4124 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4125 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4126 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4127 // the update upon reconnection.
4128 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4132 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4134 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4135 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4139 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4140 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4141 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4142 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4143 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4144 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4145 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4147 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4148 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4149 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4150 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4151 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4152 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4153 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4155 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4156 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4157 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4158 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4159 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4160 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4161 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4164 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4165 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4166 /// to the remote side.
4167 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4168 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4169 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4170 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4173 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4175 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4176 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4178 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4179 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4180 // first received the funding_signed.
4181 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4182 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4183 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4184 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4186 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4188 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4189 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4190 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4191 funding_broadcastable = None;
4194 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4195 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4196 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4197 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4198 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4199 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4200 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4201 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4202 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4203 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4204 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4205 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4206 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4207 next_per_commitment_point,
4208 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4212 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4214 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4215 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4216 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4217 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4218 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4219 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4221 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4222 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4223 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4224 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4225 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4226 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4230 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4231 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4233 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4234 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4236 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4237 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4240 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4241 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4242 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4243 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4244 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4245 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4246 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4247 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4248 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4252 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4253 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4255 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4258 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4261 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4263 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4264 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4265 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4266 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4267 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4268 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4269 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4270 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4271 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4272 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4274 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4276 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4278 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4284 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4286 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4287 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4288 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4289 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4291 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4292 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4294 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4295 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4298 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4299 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4300 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4301 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4303 SignerResumeUpdates {
4310 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4311 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4312 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4313 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4315 per_commitment_secret,
4316 next_per_commitment_point,
4318 next_local_nonce: None,
4322 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4323 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4324 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4325 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4326 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4327 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4329 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4330 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4331 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4332 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4333 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4334 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4335 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4336 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4337 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4338 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4339 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4344 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4345 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4347 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4348 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4349 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4350 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4351 reason: err_packet.clone()
4354 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4356 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4357 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4358 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4359 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4362 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4363 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4364 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4365 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4366 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4373 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4374 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4376 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4380 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4381 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4382 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4383 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4384 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4385 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4386 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4390 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4391 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4393 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4394 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4395 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4396 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4401 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4402 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4407 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4408 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4409 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4410 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4411 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4412 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4413 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4418 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4419 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4421 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4422 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4423 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4424 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4425 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4426 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4427 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4428 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4431 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4433 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4434 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4435 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4436 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4440 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4441 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4445 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4446 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4447 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4448 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4449 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4450 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4453 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4454 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4455 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4456 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4457 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4460 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4461 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4462 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4463 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4464 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4465 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4466 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4467 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4471 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4472 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4473 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4474 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4475 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4476 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4477 our_commitment_transaction
4481 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4482 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4483 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4484 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4486 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4488 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4490 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4491 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4492 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4493 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4494 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4497 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4498 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4499 channel_ready: None,
4500 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4501 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4502 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4506 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4507 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4508 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4509 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4510 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4511 next_per_commitment_point,
4512 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4514 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4515 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4516 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4520 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4521 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4522 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4524 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4525 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4526 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4529 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4532 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4534 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4535 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4536 our_commitment_transaction
4540 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4541 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4542 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4543 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4544 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4545 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4546 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4548 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4550 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4551 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4552 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4553 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4554 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4555 next_per_commitment_point,
4556 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4560 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4561 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4562 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4564 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4567 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4568 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4569 raa: required_revoke,
4570 commitment_update: None,
4571 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4573 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4574 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4575 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4577 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4580 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4581 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4582 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4583 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4584 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4585 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4588 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4589 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4590 raa: required_revoke,
4591 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4592 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4595 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4596 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4597 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4598 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4599 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4602 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4603 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4604 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4605 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4610 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4611 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4612 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4613 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4615 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4617 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4619 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4620 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4621 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4622 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4623 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4624 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4625 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4626 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4628 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4629 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4630 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4631 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4632 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4634 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4635 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4636 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4637 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4640 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4641 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4642 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4643 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4644 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4645 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4646 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4647 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4648 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4649 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4650 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4651 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4652 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4653 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4654 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4656 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4659 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4660 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4663 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4664 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4665 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4666 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4667 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4668 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4671 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4672 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4673 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4674 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4675 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4676 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4679 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4685 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4686 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4687 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4688 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4690 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4691 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4692 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4693 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4694 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4695 return Ok((None, None, None));
4698 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4699 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4700 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4702 return Ok((None, None, None));
4705 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4706 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4707 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4708 return Ok((None, None, None));
4711 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4713 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4714 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4715 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4716 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4718 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4719 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4721 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4722 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4724 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4725 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4726 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4727 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4729 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4730 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4731 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4735 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4741 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4742 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4744 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4745 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4748 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4749 /// within our expected timeframe.
4751 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4752 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4753 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4756 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4759 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4760 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4764 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4765 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4767 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4770 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4771 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4772 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4773 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4776 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4777 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4781 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4783 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4784 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4787 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4788 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4789 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4792 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4795 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4796 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4797 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4798 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4800 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4803 assert!(send_shutdown);
4804 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4805 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4806 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4808 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4811 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4816 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4818 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4819 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4821 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4822 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4823 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4824 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4825 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4826 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4827 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4830 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4831 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4833 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4834 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4835 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4836 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4840 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4841 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4842 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4843 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4844 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4845 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4847 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4848 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4855 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4856 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4858 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4861 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4862 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4864 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4866 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4867 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4868 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4869 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4870 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4871 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4872 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4873 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4874 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4876 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4877 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4880 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4884 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4885 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4886 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4887 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4889 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4892 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4895 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4898 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4902 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4906 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4907 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4908 return Ok((None, None, None));
4911 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4912 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4913 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4916 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4918 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4921 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4922 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4923 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4924 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4925 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4929 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4930 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4935 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4936 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4937 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4938 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4939 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4940 monitor_update: None,
4941 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4942 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4943 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4944 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4945 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4946 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4947 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4948 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4950 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4951 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4952 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4953 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4957 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4959 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4960 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4961 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4962 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4964 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4967 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4968 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4970 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4971 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4972 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4973 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4974 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4975 monitor_update: None,
4976 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4977 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4978 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4979 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4980 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4981 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4982 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4983 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4985 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4986 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4987 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4988 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4993 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4994 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4995 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4996 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4998 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4999 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5000 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5002 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5004 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5011 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5012 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5015 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5016 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5018 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5019 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5022 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5023 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5024 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5025 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5026 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5028 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5030 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5032 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5033 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5036 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5037 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5038 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5039 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5040 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5041 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5042 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5043 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5048 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5049 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5050 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5051 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5057 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5058 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5059 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5060 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5062 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5068 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5069 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5070 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5071 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5072 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5073 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5074 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5076 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5077 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5080 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5082 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5083 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5089 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5090 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5091 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5092 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5093 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5094 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5095 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5097 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5098 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5105 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5106 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5109 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5110 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5113 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5114 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5118 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5119 &self.context.holder_signer
5123 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5125 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5126 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5127 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5128 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5129 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5130 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5132 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5134 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5142 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5143 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5147 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5148 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5149 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5150 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5153 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5154 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5155 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5156 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5159 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5160 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5161 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5162 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5163 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5164 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5167 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5168 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5169 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5170 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5171 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5172 if !release_monitor {
5173 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5182 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5183 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5186 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5187 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5188 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5190 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5191 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5193 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5194 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5196 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5197 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5198 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5201 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5202 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5203 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5204 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5205 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5206 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5208 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5209 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5210 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5212 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5213 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5214 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5215 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5216 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5217 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5223 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5224 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5225 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5226 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5229 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5230 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5231 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5234 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5235 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5236 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5239 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5240 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5241 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5242 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5243 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5246 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5247 self.context.channel_update_status
5250 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5251 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5252 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5255 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5257 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5258 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5259 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5263 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5264 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5265 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5268 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5272 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5273 // channel_ready yet.
5274 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5278 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5279 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5280 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5281 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5283 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5284 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5285 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5287 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5288 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5291 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5292 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5294 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5295 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5296 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5297 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5298 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5299 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5300 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5301 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5303 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5307 if need_commitment_update {
5308 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5309 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5310 let next_per_commitment_point =
5311 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5312 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5313 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5314 next_per_commitment_point,
5315 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5319 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5325 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5326 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5327 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5328 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5329 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5330 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5331 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5333 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5336 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5337 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5338 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5339 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5340 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5341 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5342 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5343 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5344 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5345 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5346 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5347 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5348 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5349 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5350 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5351 // channel and move on.
5352 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5353 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5355 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5356 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5357 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5359 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5360 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5361 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5362 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5363 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5364 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5365 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5366 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5371 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5372 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5373 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5374 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5375 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5378 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5379 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5380 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5381 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5382 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5383 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5386 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5387 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5388 // may have already happened for this block).
5389 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5390 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5391 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5392 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5395 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5396 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5397 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5398 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5406 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5407 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5408 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5409 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5411 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5412 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5415 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5417 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5418 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5419 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5420 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5422 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5425 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5428 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5429 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5430 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5431 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5433 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5436 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5437 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5438 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5440 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5441 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5443 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5444 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5445 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5453 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5455 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5456 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5457 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5459 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5460 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5463 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5464 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5465 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5466 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5467 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5468 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5469 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5470 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5473 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5474 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5475 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5476 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5478 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5479 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5480 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5482 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5483 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5484 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5485 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5487 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5488 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5489 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5490 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5491 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5492 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5493 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5496 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5497 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5499 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5502 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5503 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5504 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5505 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5506 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5507 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5508 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5509 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5510 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5511 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5512 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5513 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5514 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5515 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5516 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5517 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5518 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5524 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5529 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5530 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5532 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5533 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5534 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5535 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5537 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5540 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5542 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5543 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5544 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5545 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5546 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5547 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5549 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5550 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5553 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5554 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5555 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5556 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5557 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5558 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5560 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5561 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5564 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5565 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5566 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5567 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5568 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5574 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5575 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5576 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5577 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5579 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5582 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5586 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5590 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5591 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5595 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5599 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5600 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5603 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5607 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5609 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5614 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5615 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5616 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5618 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5623 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5625 None => return None,
5628 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5630 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5631 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5633 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5634 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5637 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5643 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5645 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5646 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5647 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5648 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5649 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5650 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5651 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5653 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5654 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5655 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5656 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5657 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5658 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5659 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5660 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5661 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5662 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5663 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5664 contents: announcement,
5667 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5672 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5676 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5677 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5678 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5679 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5680 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5681 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5682 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5683 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5685 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5687 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5689 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5690 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5692 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5694 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5695 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5698 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5699 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5700 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5701 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5704 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5707 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5708 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5709 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5710 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5711 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5712 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5715 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5717 Err(_) => return None,
5719 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5720 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5725 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5726 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5727 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5728 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5729 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5730 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5731 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5732 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5733 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5734 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5735 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5736 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5737 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5738 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5739 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5740 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5743 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5746 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5747 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5748 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5749 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5750 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5751 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5752 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5753 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5754 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5756 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5757 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5758 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5759 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5760 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5761 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5762 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5763 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5764 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5766 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5767 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5768 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5769 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5770 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5771 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5772 next_funding_txid: None,
5777 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5779 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5780 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5781 /// commitment update.
5783 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5784 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5785 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5786 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5787 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5788 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5789 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5792 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5793 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5794 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5796 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5797 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5802 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5803 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5805 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5807 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5808 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5810 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5811 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5812 /// regenerate them.
5814 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5815 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5817 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5818 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5819 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5820 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5821 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5822 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5823 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5824 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5826 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5827 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5828 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5830 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5832 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5833 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5837 if amount_msat == 0 {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5841 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5842 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5844 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5847 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5849 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5852 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5853 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5854 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5855 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5856 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5857 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5858 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5859 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5862 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5863 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5864 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5865 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5866 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5867 else { "to peer" });
5869 if need_holding_cell {
5870 force_holding_cell = true;
5873 // Now update local state:
5874 if force_holding_cell {
5875 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5880 onion_routing_packet,
5887 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5888 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5890 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5892 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5898 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5899 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5900 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5904 onion_routing_packet,
5908 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5913 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5914 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5915 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5916 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5918 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5919 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5920 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5922 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5923 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5927 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5928 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5929 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5930 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5931 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5932 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5933 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5936 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5937 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5938 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5939 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5940 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5941 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5944 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5946 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5947 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5948 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5949 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5950 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5952 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5953 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5956 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5957 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5958 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5959 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5960 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5961 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5962 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5963 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5964 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5965 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5966 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5967 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5970 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5974 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5975 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5976 where L::Target: Logger
5978 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5979 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5980 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5982 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5984 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5985 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5986 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5987 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5988 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5989 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5990 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5991 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5992 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5993 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5994 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6000 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6003 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6004 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6005 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6006 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6007 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6008 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6010 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6011 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6012 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6014 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6015 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6016 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6019 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6020 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6024 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6025 &commitment_stats.tx,
6026 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6027 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6028 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6029 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6031 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6033 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6034 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6035 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6036 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6038 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6039 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6040 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6041 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6042 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6043 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6047 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6048 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6052 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6053 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6055 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6061 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6062 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6064 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6065 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6066 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6067 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6068 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6069 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6070 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6071 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6073 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6074 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6075 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6078 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6079 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6080 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6086 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6088 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6089 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6090 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6091 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6092 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6094 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6096 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6102 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6103 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6104 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6105 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6106 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6108 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6109 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6110 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6113 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6114 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6116 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6117 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6119 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6120 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6122 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6123 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6127 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6130 // use override shutdown script if provided
6131 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6132 Some(script) => script,
6134 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6135 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6136 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6137 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6141 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6142 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6144 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6149 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6150 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6151 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6152 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6154 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6155 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6156 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6157 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6158 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6159 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6160 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6163 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6164 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6166 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6167 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6168 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6171 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6172 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6173 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6174 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6175 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6177 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6178 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6185 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6186 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6188 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6191 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6192 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6193 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6195 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6196 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6200 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6204 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6205 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6206 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6207 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6210 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6211 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6212 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6213 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6214 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6215 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6216 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6217 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6219 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6220 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6221 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6222 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6224 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6225 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6227 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6228 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6230 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6231 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6232 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6234 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6235 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6237 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6238 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6239 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6240 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6241 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6244 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6245 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6247 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6248 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6250 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6252 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6254 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6255 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6256 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6257 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6260 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6261 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6263 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6264 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6265 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6266 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6270 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6271 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6272 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6276 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6277 Ok(script) => script,
6278 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6281 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6284 context: ChannelContext {
6287 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6288 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6289 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6290 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6295 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6297 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6298 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6299 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6300 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6302 channel_value_satoshis,
6304 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6306 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6307 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6310 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6311 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6314 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6315 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6316 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6317 pending_update_fee: None,
6318 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6319 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6320 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6321 update_time_counter: 1,
6323 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6325 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6326 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6327 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6328 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6329 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6330 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6332 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6333 signer_pending_funding: false,
6335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6336 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6337 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6338 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6340 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6341 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6342 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6343 closing_fee_limits: None,
6344 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6346 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6347 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6348 short_channel_id: None,
6349 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6351 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6352 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6353 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6354 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6355 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6356 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6357 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6358 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6359 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6360 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6361 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6362 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6364 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6366 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6367 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6368 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6369 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6370 counterparty_parameters: None,
6371 funding_outpoint: None,
6372 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6374 funding_transaction: None,
6375 is_batch_funding: None,
6377 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6378 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6379 counterparty_node_id,
6381 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6383 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6385 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6386 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6388 announcement_sigs: None,
6390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6391 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6393 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6395 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6396 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6398 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6399 outbound_scid_alias,
6401 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6402 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6405 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6410 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6412 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6416 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6417 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6418 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6419 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6420 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6421 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6422 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6423 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6424 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6426 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6431 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6432 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6433 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6436 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6437 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6438 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6439 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6442 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6444 next_local_nonce: None,
6448 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6449 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6450 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6451 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6452 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6453 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6454 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6455 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6456 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6457 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6458 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6461 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6462 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6464 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6466 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6467 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6468 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6469 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6472 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6473 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6475 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6477 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6478 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6480 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6481 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6482 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6483 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6484 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6485 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6488 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6489 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6491 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6492 if funding_created.is_none() {
6493 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6494 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6496 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6497 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6498 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6499 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6507 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6508 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6509 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6510 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6511 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6512 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6513 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6514 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6515 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6516 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6519 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6520 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6521 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6522 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6523 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6524 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6530 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6531 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6532 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6533 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6534 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6535 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6537 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6539 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6541 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6542 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6547 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6548 // We've exhausted our options
6551 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6552 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6555 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6556 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6557 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6558 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6560 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6561 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6562 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6563 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6564 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6565 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6567 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6569 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6570 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6573 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6574 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6575 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6577 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6578 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6581 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6582 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6585 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6586 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6590 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6591 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6592 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6593 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6594 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6595 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6596 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6597 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6598 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6599 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6600 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6601 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6602 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6603 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6604 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6605 first_per_commitment_point,
6606 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6607 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6608 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6609 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6611 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6616 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6617 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6619 // Check sanity of message fields:
6620 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6623 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6626 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6627 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6629 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6632 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6633 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6635 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6636 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6637 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6639 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6640 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6643 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6644 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6647 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6650 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6654 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6655 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6658 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6661 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6664 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6667 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6670 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6673 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6677 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6678 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6681 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6682 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6684 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6685 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6688 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6689 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6692 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6693 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6694 &Some(ref script) => {
6695 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6696 if script.len() == 0 {
6699 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6702 Some(script.clone())
6705 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6712 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6713 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6714 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6715 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6716 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6718 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6719 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6721 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6724 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6725 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6726 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6727 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6728 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6729 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6732 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6733 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6734 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6737 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6738 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6740 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6741 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6743 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6748 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6749 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6750 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6751 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6752 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6756 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6757 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6759 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6760 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6762 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6763 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6764 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6765 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6768 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6770 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6771 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6772 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6773 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6775 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6776 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6778 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6779 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6781 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6782 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6783 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6784 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6785 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6786 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6790 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6791 initial_commitment_tx,
6794 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6795 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6799 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6800 if validated.is_err() {
6801 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6804 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6805 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6806 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6807 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6808 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6809 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6810 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6811 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6812 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6813 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6814 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6815 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6817 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6818 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6819 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6820 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6821 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6822 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6823 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6824 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6826 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6827 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6828 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6830 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6832 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6833 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6835 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6837 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6839 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6840 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6841 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6844 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6846 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6847 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6848 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6849 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6850 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6855 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6856 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6857 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6858 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6861 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
6862 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
6863 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
6864 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6865 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
6866 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
6867 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6868 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6872 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6873 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6874 // `static_remote_key`.
6875 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6878 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6879 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6882 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6883 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6886 Ok(channel_type.clone())
6888 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6889 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6896 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6897 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6898 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6899 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6900 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6901 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6902 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6903 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6904 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6905 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6906 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6909 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6910 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6912 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6913 // support this channel type.
6914 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
6916 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6917 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6918 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6919 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6920 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6921 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6922 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6923 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6924 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6927 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6928 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6931 // Check sanity of message fields:
6932 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6933 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6935 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6938 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6941 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6942 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6943 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6945 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6948 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6951 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6953 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6954 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6957 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6960 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6964 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6965 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6968 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6971 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6974 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6977 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6980 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6983 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6987 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6989 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6990 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6995 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6996 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6997 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6998 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7001 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7004 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7005 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7006 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7008 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7012 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7013 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7014 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7015 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7019 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7020 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7021 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7025 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7026 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7027 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7028 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7032 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7033 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7034 &Some(ref script) => {
7035 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7036 if script.len() == 0 {
7039 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7042 Some(script.clone())
7045 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7052 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7053 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7054 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7055 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7059 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7060 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7065 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7066 Ok(script) => script,
7067 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7070 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7071 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7073 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7076 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7080 context: ChannelContext {
7083 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7084 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7086 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7091 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7093 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7094 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7095 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7096 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7098 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7101 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7103 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7104 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7107 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7108 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7109 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7111 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7112 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7113 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7114 pending_update_fee: None,
7115 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7116 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7117 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7118 update_time_counter: 1,
7120 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7122 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7123 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7124 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7125 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7126 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7127 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7129 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7130 signer_pending_funding: false,
7132 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7133 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7134 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7135 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7137 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7138 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7139 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7140 closing_fee_limits: None,
7141 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7143 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7144 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7145 short_channel_id: None,
7146 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7148 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7149 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7150 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7151 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7152 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7153 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7154 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7155 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7156 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7157 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7158 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7159 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7162 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7164 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7165 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7166 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7167 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7168 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7169 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7170 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7172 funding_outpoint: None,
7173 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7175 funding_transaction: None,
7176 is_batch_funding: None,
7178 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7179 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7180 counterparty_node_id,
7182 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7184 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7186 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7187 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7189 announcement_sigs: None,
7191 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7192 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7194 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7196 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7197 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7199 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7200 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7202 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7203 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7205 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7206 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7211 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7213 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7219 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7220 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7222 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7223 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7224 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7225 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7228 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7229 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7231 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7233 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7234 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7237 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7240 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7241 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7242 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7244 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7245 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7246 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7247 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7249 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7250 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7251 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7252 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7253 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7254 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7255 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7256 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7257 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7258 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7259 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7260 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7261 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7262 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7263 first_per_commitment_point,
7264 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7265 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7266 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7268 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7270 next_local_nonce: None,
7274 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7275 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7277 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7279 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7280 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7283 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7284 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7286 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7287 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7288 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7289 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7290 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7291 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7292 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7293 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7294 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7295 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7296 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7298 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7301 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7302 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7303 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7307 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7308 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7311 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7312 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7314 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7315 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7317 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7319 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7320 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7321 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7322 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7325 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7326 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7327 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7328 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7329 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7331 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7333 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7334 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7335 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7338 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7339 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7340 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7344 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7345 initial_commitment_tx,
7348 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7349 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7352 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7353 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7356 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7358 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7359 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7360 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7361 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7363 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7365 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7366 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7367 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7368 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7369 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7370 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7371 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7372 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7373 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7374 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7375 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7377 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7378 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7379 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7380 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7381 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7382 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7383 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7385 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7386 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7388 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7389 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7390 let mut channel = Channel {
7391 context: self.context,
7393 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7394 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7396 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7400 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7401 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7409 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7410 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7411 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7412 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7413 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7415 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7416 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7417 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7418 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7424 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7425 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7426 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7427 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7428 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7429 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7434 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7435 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7436 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7437 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7439 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7440 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7441 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7442 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7447 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7448 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7449 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7450 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7451 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7452 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7457 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7458 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7459 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7462 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7464 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7465 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7466 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7467 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7468 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7470 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7471 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7472 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7473 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7475 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7477 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7478 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7479 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7481 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7483 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7485 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7487 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7488 // deserialized from that format.
7489 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7490 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7491 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7493 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7495 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7496 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7497 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7499 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7500 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7501 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7502 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7505 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7506 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7507 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7510 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7511 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7512 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7513 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7515 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7516 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7518 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7520 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7522 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7524 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7527 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7529 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7534 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7535 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7536 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7538 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7539 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7540 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7541 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7542 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7543 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7544 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7546 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7548 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7550 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7553 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7554 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7555 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7558 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7560 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7561 preimages.push(preimage);
7563 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7564 reason.write(writer)?;
7566 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7568 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7569 preimages.push(preimage);
7571 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7572 reason.write(writer)?;
7575 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7576 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7579 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7580 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7581 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7582 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7583 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7584 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7586 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7587 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7588 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7591 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7592 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7593 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7594 source.write(writer)?;
7595 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7597 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7598 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7600 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7602 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7603 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7605 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7607 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7608 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7610 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7611 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7613 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7614 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7615 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7617 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7619 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7620 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7625 match self.context.resend_order {
7626 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7627 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7630 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7631 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7632 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7634 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7635 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7636 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7637 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7640 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7641 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7642 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7643 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7644 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7647 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7648 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7649 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7650 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7652 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7653 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7654 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7656 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7658 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7659 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7660 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7661 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7663 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7664 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7665 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7666 // consider the stale state on reload.
7669 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7670 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7671 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7673 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7674 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7675 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7677 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7678 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7680 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7681 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7682 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7684 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7685 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7687 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7690 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7691 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7692 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7694 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7697 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7698 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7700 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7701 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7702 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7704 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7706 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7708 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7711 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7713 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7714 htlc.write(writer)?;
7717 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7718 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7719 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7721 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7722 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7724 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7725 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7726 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7727 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7728 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7729 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7730 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7732 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7733 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7734 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7735 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7736 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7738 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7739 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7741 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7742 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7743 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7744 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7746 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7748 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7749 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7750 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7751 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7752 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7753 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7754 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7756 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7757 (2, chan_type, option),
7758 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7759 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7760 (5, self.context.config, required),
7761 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7762 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7763 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7764 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7765 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7766 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7767 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7768 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7769 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7770 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7771 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7772 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7773 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7774 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7775 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7776 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7777 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7778 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7779 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7780 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7781 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7782 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7789 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7790 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7792 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7793 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7795 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7796 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7797 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7799 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7800 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7801 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7802 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7804 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7806 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7807 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7808 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7809 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7810 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7812 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7813 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7817 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7818 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7820 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7822 let mut keys_data = None;
7824 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7825 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7826 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7827 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7828 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7829 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7830 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7831 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7832 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7833 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7837 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7838 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7839 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7842 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7844 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7845 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7846 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7848 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7850 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7851 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7852 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7853 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7854 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7855 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7856 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7857 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7858 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7859 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7860 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7861 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7862 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7867 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7868 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7869 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7870 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7871 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7872 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7873 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7874 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7875 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7876 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7877 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7878 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7880 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7884 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7885 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7888 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7889 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7891 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7893 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7894 blinding_point: None,
7898 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7899 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7900 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7901 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7902 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7903 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7904 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7905 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7906 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7907 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7908 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7909 blinding_point: None,
7911 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7912 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7913 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7915 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7916 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7917 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7919 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7923 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7924 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7925 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7926 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7929 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7930 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7933 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7935 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7936 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7939 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7940 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7941 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7942 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7945 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7947 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7949 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7950 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7952 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7955 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7956 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7957 // consider the stale state on reload.
7958 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7961 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7962 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7963 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7965 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7968 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7969 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7970 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7972 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7973 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7974 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7975 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7977 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7978 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7980 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7981 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7983 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7984 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7985 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7987 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7989 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7990 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7992 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7993 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7996 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7998 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7999 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8000 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8001 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8003 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8006 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8007 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8009 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8011 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8012 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8014 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8015 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8017 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8019 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8020 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8021 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8023 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8024 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8025 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8029 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8030 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8031 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8033 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8039 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8040 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8041 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8042 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8043 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8044 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8045 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8046 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8047 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8048 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8050 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8051 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8052 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8053 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8054 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8055 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8056 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8058 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8059 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8060 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8061 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8063 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8065 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8066 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8068 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8070 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8071 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8073 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8075 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8076 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8077 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8078 (2, channel_type, option),
8079 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8080 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8081 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8082 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8083 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8084 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8085 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8086 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8087 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8088 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8089 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8090 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8091 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8092 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8093 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8094 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8095 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8096 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8097 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8098 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8099 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8100 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8101 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8102 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8103 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8106 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8107 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8108 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8109 // required channel parameters.
8110 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8111 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8113 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8115 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8116 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8117 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8118 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8121 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8122 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8123 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8125 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8126 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8128 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8129 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8134 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8135 if iter.next().is_some() {
8136 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8140 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8141 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8142 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8143 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8144 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8147 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8148 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8149 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8151 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8152 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8154 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8155 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8156 // separate u64 values.
8157 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8159 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8161 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8162 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8163 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8164 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8166 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8167 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8169 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8170 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8171 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8172 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8173 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8176 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8177 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8179 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8180 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8181 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8182 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8184 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8185 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8187 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8188 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8189 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8190 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8191 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8194 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8195 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8198 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8199 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8200 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8201 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8202 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8203 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8206 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8207 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8208 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8210 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8215 context: ChannelContext {
8218 config: config.unwrap(),
8222 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8223 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8224 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8227 temporary_channel_id,
8229 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8231 channel_value_satoshis,
8233 latest_monitor_update_id,
8235 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8236 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8239 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8240 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8243 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8244 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8245 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8246 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8250 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8251 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8252 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8253 monitor_pending_forwards,
8254 monitor_pending_failures,
8255 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8257 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8258 signer_pending_funding: false,
8261 holding_cell_update_fee,
8262 next_holder_htlc_id,
8263 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8264 update_time_counter,
8267 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8268 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8269 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8270 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8272 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8273 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8274 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8275 closing_fee_limits: None,
8276 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8278 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8279 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8281 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8283 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8284 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8285 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8286 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8287 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8288 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8289 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8290 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8291 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8294 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8296 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8297 funding_transaction,
8300 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8301 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8302 counterparty_node_id,
8304 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8308 channel_update_status,
8309 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8313 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8314 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8315 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8316 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8318 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8319 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8321 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8322 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8323 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8325 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8326 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8328 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8329 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8331 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8334 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8343 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8344 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8345 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8346 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8347 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8348 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8349 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8350 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8351 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8352 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8353 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8354 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8355 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8356 use crate::ln::msgs;
8357 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8358 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8359 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8360 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8361 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8362 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8363 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8364 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8365 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8366 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8367 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8368 use crate::util::test_utils;
8369 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8370 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8371 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8372 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8373 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8374 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8375 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8376 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8377 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8378 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8379 use crate::prelude::*;
8381 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8384 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8385 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8391 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8392 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8393 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8394 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8398 signer: InMemorySigner,
8401 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8402 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8405 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8406 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8408 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8410 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8411 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8414 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8418 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8420 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8421 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8422 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8423 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8424 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8427 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8428 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8429 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8430 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8434 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8435 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8436 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8440 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8441 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8442 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8443 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8446 let seed = [42; 32];
8447 let network = Network::Testnet;
8448 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8449 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8450 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8453 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8454 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8455 let config = UserConfig::default();
8456 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8457 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8458 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8460 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8461 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8465 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8466 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8468 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8469 let original_fee = 253;
8470 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8471 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8472 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8473 let seed = [42; 32];
8474 let network = Network::Testnet;
8475 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8477 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8478 let config = UserConfig::default();
8479 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8481 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8482 // same as the old fee.
8483 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8484 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8485 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8489 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8490 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8491 // dust limits are used.
8492 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8494 let seed = [42; 32];
8495 let network = Network::Testnet;
8496 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8497 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8498 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8500 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8501 // they have different dust limits.
8503 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8504 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8505 let config = UserConfig::default();
8506 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8508 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8509 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8510 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8511 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8512 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8514 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8515 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8516 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8517 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8518 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8520 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8521 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8522 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8523 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8525 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8526 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8527 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8529 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8530 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8531 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8533 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8534 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8535 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8537 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8538 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8539 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8540 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8543 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8545 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8546 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8547 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8548 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8549 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8550 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8551 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8552 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8553 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8555 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8556 blinding_point: None,
8559 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8560 // the dust limit check.
8561 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8562 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8563 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8564 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8566 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8567 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8568 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8569 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8570 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8571 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8572 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8576 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8577 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8578 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8579 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8580 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8581 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8582 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8583 let seed = [42; 32];
8584 let network = Network::Testnet;
8585 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8587 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8588 let config = UserConfig::default();
8589 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8591 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8592 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8594 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8595 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8596 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8597 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8598 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8599 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8601 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8602 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8603 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8604 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8605 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8607 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8609 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8610 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8611 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8612 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8613 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8615 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8616 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8617 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8618 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8619 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8623 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8624 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8625 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8626 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8627 let seed = [42; 32];
8628 let network = Network::Testnet;
8629 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8630 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8631 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8633 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8635 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8636 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8637 let config = UserConfig::default();
8638 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8640 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8641 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8642 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8643 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8645 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8646 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8647 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8649 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8650 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8651 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8652 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8654 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8655 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8656 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8658 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8659 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8660 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8662 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8663 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8664 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8665 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8666 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8667 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8668 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8670 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8672 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8673 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8674 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8675 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8676 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8680 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8681 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8682 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8683 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8684 let seed = [42; 32];
8685 let network = Network::Testnet;
8686 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8687 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8688 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8690 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8691 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8692 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8693 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8694 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8695 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8696 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8697 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8699 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8700 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8701 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8702 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8703 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8704 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8706 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8707 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8708 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8709 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8711 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8713 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8714 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8715 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8716 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8717 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8718 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8720 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8721 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8722 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8723 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8725 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8726 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8727 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8728 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8729 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8731 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8732 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8734 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8735 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8736 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8738 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8739 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8740 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8741 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8742 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8744 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8745 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8747 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8748 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8749 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8753 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8755 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8756 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8757 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8759 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8760 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8761 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8762 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8764 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8765 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8766 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8768 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8770 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8771 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8774 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8775 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8776 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8777 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8778 let seed = [42; 32];
8779 let network = Network::Testnet;
8780 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8781 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8782 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8785 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8786 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8787 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8789 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8790 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8792 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8793 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8794 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8796 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8797 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8799 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8801 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8802 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8804 // Channel Negotiations failed
8805 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8806 assert!(result.is_err());
8811 fn channel_update() {
8812 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8813 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8814 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8815 let seed = [42; 32];
8816 let network = Network::Testnet;
8817 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8818 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8819 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8821 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8822 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8823 let config = UserConfig::default();
8824 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8826 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8827 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8828 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8829 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8830 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8832 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8833 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8834 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8835 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8836 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8838 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8839 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8840 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8841 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8843 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8844 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8845 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8847 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8848 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8849 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8851 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8852 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8853 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8855 short_channel_id: 0,
8858 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8859 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8860 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8862 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8863 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8865 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8867 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8869 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8870 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8871 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8872 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8874 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8875 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8876 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8878 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8881 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8885 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8886 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8888 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8889 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8890 let seed = [42; 32];
8891 let network = Network::Testnet;
8892 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8894 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8895 let config = UserConfig::default();
8896 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8897 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8898 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8900 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8902 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8903 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8904 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8905 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8909 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8910 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8911 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8913 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8916 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8918 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8919 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8920 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8921 blinding_point: None,
8923 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8924 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8926 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8929 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8932 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8934 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8937 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8938 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8939 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8941 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8942 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8945 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8946 blinding_point: None,
8948 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8949 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8952 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8953 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8955 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8956 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8958 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8961 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8962 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8963 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8964 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8965 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8966 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8967 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8968 } = &mut dummy_add {
8969 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8970 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8972 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8973 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8974 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8976 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8979 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8981 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8982 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8983 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8984 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8985 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8986 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8987 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8988 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8991 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8993 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8994 use bitcoin::sighash;
8995 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8996 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8997 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8998 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8999 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9000 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9001 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9002 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9003 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9004 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9005 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9006 use crate::sync::Arc;
9007 use core::str::FromStr;
9008 use hex::DisplayHex;
9010 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9011 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9012 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9013 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9015 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9017 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9018 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9019 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9020 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9021 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9023 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9024 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9030 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9031 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9032 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9034 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9035 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9036 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9037 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9038 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9039 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9041 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9043 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9044 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9045 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9046 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9047 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9048 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9050 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9051 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9052 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9053 selected_contest_delay: 144
9055 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9056 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9058 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9059 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9061 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9062 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9064 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9065 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9067 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9068 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9069 // build_commitment_transaction.
9070 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9071 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9072 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9073 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9074 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9076 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9077 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9078 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9079 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9083 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9084 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9085 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9086 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9090 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9091 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9092 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9094 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9095 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9097 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9098 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9100 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9102 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9103 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9104 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9105 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9106 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9107 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9108 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9110 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9111 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9112 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9113 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9115 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9116 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9117 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9119 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9121 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9122 commitment_tx.clone(),
9123 counterparty_signature,
9124 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9125 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9126 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9128 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9129 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9131 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9132 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9133 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9135 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9136 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9139 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9140 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9142 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9143 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9144 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9145 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9146 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9147 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9148 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9149 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9151 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9154 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9155 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9156 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9160 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9163 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9164 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9165 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9166 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9167 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9168 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9170 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9171 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9172 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9173 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9175 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9176 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9177 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9178 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9179 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9181 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9182 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9183 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9184 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9185 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9186 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9188 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9192 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9193 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9194 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9195 "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", {});
9197 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9198 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9200 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9201 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9202 "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", {});
9204 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9205 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9206 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9207 "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", {});
9209 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9210 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9212 amount_msat: 1000000,
9214 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9215 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9217 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9220 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9221 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9223 amount_msat: 2000000,
9225 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9226 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9228 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9231 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9232 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9234 amount_msat: 2000000,
9236 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9237 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9238 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9239 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9240 blinding_point: None,
9242 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9245 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9246 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9248 amount_msat: 3000000,
9250 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9251 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9252 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9253 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9254 blinding_point: None,
9256 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9259 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9260 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9262 amount_msat: 4000000,
9264 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9265 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9267 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9271 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9272 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9273 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9275 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9276 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9277 "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", {
9280 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9281 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9282 "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" },
9285 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9286 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9287 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9290 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9291 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9292 "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" },
9295 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9296 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9297 "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" },
9300 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9301 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9302 "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" }
9305 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9306 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9307 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9309 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9310 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9311 "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", {
9314 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9315 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9316 "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" },
9319 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9320 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9321 "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" },
9324 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9325 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9326 "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" },
9329 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9330 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9331 "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" },
9334 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9335 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9336 "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" }
9339 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9340 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9341 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9343 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9344 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9345 "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", {
9348 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9349 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9350 "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" },
9353 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9354 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9355 "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" },
9358 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9359 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9360 "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" },
9363 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9364 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9365 "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" }
9368 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9369 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9370 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9371 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9373 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9374 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9375 "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", {
9378 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9379 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9380 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
9383 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9384 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9385 "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" },
9388 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9389 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9390 "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" },
9393 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9394 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9395 "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" }
9398 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9399 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9400 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9401 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9403 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9404 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9405 "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", {
9408 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9409 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9410 "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" },
9413 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9414 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9415 "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" },
9418 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9419 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9420 "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" },
9423 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9424 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9425 "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" }
9428 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9429 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9430 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9432 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9433 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9434 "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", {
9437 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9438 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9439 "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" },
9442 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9443 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9444 "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" },
9447 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9448 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9449 "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" }
9452 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9453 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9454 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9456 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9457 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9458 "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", {
9461 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9462 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9463 "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" },
9466 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9467 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9468 "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" },
9471 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9472 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9473 "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" }
9476 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9477 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9478 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9480 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9481 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9482 "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", {
9485 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9486 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9487 "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" },
9490 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9491 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9492 "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" }
9495 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9496 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9497 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9498 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9499 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9500 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9502 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9503 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9504 "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", {
9507 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9508 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9509 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
9512 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9513 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9514 "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" }
9517 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9518 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9519 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9520 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9521 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9523 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9524 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9525 "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", {
9528 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9529 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9530 "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" },
9533 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9534 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9535 "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" }
9538 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9539 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9540 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9542 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9543 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9544 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9547 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9548 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9549 "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" }
9552 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9555 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9556 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9558 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9559 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9560 "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", {
9563 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9564 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9565 "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" }
9568 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9571 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9572 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9574 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9575 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9576 "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", {
9579 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9580 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9581 "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" }
9584 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9585 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9586 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9587 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9589 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9590 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9591 "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", {});
9593 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9594 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9595 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9596 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9597 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9599 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9600 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9601 "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", {});
9603 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9604 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9605 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9606 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9607 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9609 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9610 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9611 "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", {});
9613 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9614 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9615 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9617 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9618 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9619 "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", {});
9621 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9622 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9623 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9624 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9625 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9627 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9628 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9629 "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", {});
9631 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9632 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9633 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9634 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9635 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9637 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9638 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9639 "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", {});
9641 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9642 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9643 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9644 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9645 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9646 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9648 amount_msat: 2000000,
9650 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9651 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9653 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9656 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9657 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9658 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9660 amount_msat: 5000001,
9662 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9663 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9664 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9665 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9666 blinding_point: None,
9668 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9671 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9672 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9674 amount_msat: 5000000,
9676 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9677 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9678 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9679 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9680 blinding_point: None,
9682 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9686 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9687 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9688 "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", {
9691 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9692 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9693 "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" },
9695 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9696 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9697 "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" },
9699 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9700 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9701 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
9704 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9705 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9706 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9707 "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", {
9710 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9711 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9712 "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" },
9714 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9715 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9716 "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" },
9718 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9719 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9720 "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" }
9725 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9726 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9728 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9729 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9730 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9731 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9733 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9734 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9735 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9737 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9738 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9740 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9741 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9743 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9745 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9749 fn test_key_derivation() {
9750 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9753 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9754 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9756 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9757 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9759 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9760 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9762 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9763 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9765 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9766 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9768 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9769 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9773 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9774 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9775 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9776 let seed = [42; 32];
9777 let network = Network::Testnet;
9778 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9779 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9781 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9782 let config = UserConfig::default();
9783 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9784 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9786 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9787 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9789 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9790 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9791 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9792 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9793 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9794 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9795 assert!(res.is_ok());
9799 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9800 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9801 // resulting `channel_type`.
9802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9803 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9804 let network = Network::Testnet;
9805 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9806 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9808 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9809 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9811 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9812 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9814 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9815 // need to signal it.
9816 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9817 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9818 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9819 &config, 0, 42, None
9821 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9823 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9824 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9825 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9827 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9828 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9829 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9833 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9834 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9835 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9836 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9837 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9840 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9841 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9845 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9846 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9847 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9848 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9849 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9850 let network = Network::Testnet;
9851 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9852 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9854 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9855 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9857 let config = UserConfig::default();
9859 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9860 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9861 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9862 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9863 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9865 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9866 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9867 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9871 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9872 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9873 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9875 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9876 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9877 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9878 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9879 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9880 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9882 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9886 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9887 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9889 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9890 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9891 let network = Network::Testnet;
9892 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9893 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9895 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9896 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9898 let config = UserConfig::default();
9900 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9901 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9902 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9903 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9904 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9905 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9906 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9907 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9909 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9910 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9911 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9912 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9913 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9914 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9918 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9919 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9921 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9922 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9923 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9924 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9926 assert!(res.is_err());
9928 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9929 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9930 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9932 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9933 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9934 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9937 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9939 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9940 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9941 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9942 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9945 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9946 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9948 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9949 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9951 assert!(res.is_err());
9955 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9956 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9957 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9958 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9959 let seed = [42; 32];
9960 let network = Network::Testnet;
9961 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9962 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9963 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9965 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9966 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9967 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9968 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9970 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9971 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9972 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9977 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9987 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9988 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9989 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9994 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9995 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10001 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10004 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10005 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10006 &accept_channel_msg,
10007 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10008 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10011 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10012 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10013 let tx = Transaction {
10015 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10019 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10022 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10025 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10026 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10027 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10028 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10029 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10030 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10034 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10035 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10043 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10044 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10045 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10046 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10048 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10049 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10056 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10057 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10058 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10059 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10060 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10062 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10063 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10064 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10072 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10073 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10076 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10077 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10078 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10079 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());