1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
163 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
164 /// through the following states in the state machine:
165 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
166 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
167 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
168 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
169 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
170 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
171 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
173 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
175 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
176 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
177 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
178 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
179 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
180 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
181 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
183 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
184 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
185 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
186 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
188 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
189 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
190 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
191 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
193 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
194 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
195 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
197 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
200 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
201 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
203 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
204 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
206 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
207 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
208 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
209 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
210 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
211 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
213 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
214 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
215 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
220 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
221 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
222 (2, Committed) => {},
223 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
224 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
227 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 state: InboundHTLCState,
235 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
237 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
239 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
240 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
241 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
243 /// The amount in msat.
244 pub amount_msat: u64,
245 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
246 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
247 /// The payment hash.
248 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
251 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
252 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
254 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
256 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
257 /// states may result in `None` here.
258 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
259 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
260 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
261 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
262 /// transactions as well.
264 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
265 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
268 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
269 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
273 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
274 (0, htlc_id, required),
275 (2, amount_msat, required),
276 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
277 (6, payment_hash, required),
278 (7, state, upgradable_option),
279 (8, is_dust, required),
282 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
283 enum OutboundHTLCState {
284 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
285 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
286 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
287 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
288 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
289 /// money back (though we won't), and,
290 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
291 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
292 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
293 /// we'll never get out of sync).
294 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
295 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
296 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
298 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
299 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
300 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
301 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
302 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
303 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
304 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
305 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
306 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
307 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
308 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
309 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
310 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
311 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
312 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
315 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
317 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
318 /// through the following states in the state machine:
319 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
320 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
321 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
322 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
323 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
324 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
325 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
327 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
329 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
330 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
331 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
332 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
333 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
334 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
336 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
337 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
339 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
340 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
341 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
342 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
343 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
344 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
345 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
346 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
347 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
348 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
351 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
352 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
354 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
355 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
356 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
357 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
358 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
360 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
361 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
362 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
363 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
364 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
365 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
367 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
368 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
369 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
375 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
376 (2, Committed) => {},
377 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
378 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
382 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
383 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
384 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
385 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
386 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
389 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
390 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
392 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
393 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
398 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
399 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
401 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
402 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
407 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
408 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
412 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
413 state: OutboundHTLCState,
415 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
416 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
419 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
420 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
421 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
423 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
424 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
425 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
427 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
428 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
429 /// The amount in msat.
430 pub amount_msat: u64,
431 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
432 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
433 /// The payment hash.
434 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
435 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
437 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
438 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
440 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
442 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
443 /// states may result in `None` here.
444 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
445 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
446 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
447 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
448 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
449 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
450 /// transactions as well.
452 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
453 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
456 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
457 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
462 (0, htlc_id, required),
463 (2, amount_msat, required),
464 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
465 (6, payment_hash, required),
466 (7, state, upgradable_option),
467 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
468 (10, is_dust, required),
471 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
472 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
473 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
474 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
481 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
482 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
483 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
491 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
496 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
500 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
501 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
502 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
503 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
504 struct $flag_type(u32);
509 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
512 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
514 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
517 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
520 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
521 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
524 Ok($flag_type(flags))
529 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
531 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
533 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
535 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
539 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
542 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
544 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
546 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
547 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
549 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
551 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
553 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
554 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
557 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
558 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
560 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
563 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
565 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
567 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
570 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
571 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
573 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
574 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
575 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
576 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
577 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
578 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
579 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
580 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
582 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
584 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
586 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
587 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
589 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
591 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
593 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
594 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
596 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
597 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
599 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
600 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
605 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
608 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
609 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
610 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
611 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
612 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
613 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
614 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
615 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
616 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
617 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
618 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
619 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
620 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
621 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
625 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
627 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
628 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
629 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
630 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
631 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
632 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
633 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
634 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
635 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
636 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
637 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
638 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
639 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
640 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
645 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
646 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
647 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
648 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
649 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
650 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
655 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
656 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
657 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
658 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
659 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
660 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
661 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
662 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
663 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
664 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
665 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
666 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
667 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
668 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
673 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
674 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
675 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
676 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
677 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
678 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
679 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
680 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
684 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
685 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
686 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
688 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
689 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
690 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
691 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
692 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
694 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
695 /// funding transaction to confirm.
696 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
697 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
699 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
700 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
701 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
705 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
706 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
708 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
711 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
720 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
722 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
726 fn $clear(&mut self) {
729 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
731 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
735 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
736 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
738 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
739 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
744 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
746 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
747 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
749 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
750 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
751 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
752 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
753 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
754 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
755 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
756 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
764 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
766 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
767 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
768 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
769 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
770 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
774 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
775 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
778 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
779 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
782 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
784 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
785 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
786 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
790 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
792 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
793 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
794 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
795 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
797 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
803 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
804 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
805 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
806 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
807 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
808 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
809 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
810 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
813 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
815 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
817 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
818 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
819 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
820 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
824 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
826 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
828 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
830 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
831 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
832 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
833 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
834 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
836 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
837 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
839 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
841 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
842 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
844 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
845 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
846 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
847 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
848 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
849 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
851 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
852 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
854 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
855 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
856 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
857 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
858 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
860 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
861 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
863 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
864 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
866 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
867 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
868 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
869 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
875 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
876 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
878 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
879 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
880 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
885 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
886 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
888 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
889 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
890 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
895 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
897 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
898 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
901 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
902 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
903 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
904 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
905 self.logger.log(record)
909 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
910 where L::Target: Logger {
911 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
912 where S::Target: SignerProvider
916 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
917 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
922 macro_rules! secp_check {
923 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
926 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
931 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
932 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
933 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
934 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
935 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
936 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
937 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
938 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
940 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
942 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
944 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
948 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
950 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
951 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
952 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
954 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
955 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
957 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
958 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
959 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
960 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
961 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
963 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
964 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
968 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
974 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
977 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
978 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
979 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
980 holding_cell_msat: u64,
981 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
984 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
985 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
986 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
987 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
988 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
989 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
990 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
991 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
992 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
993 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
994 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
997 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
998 struct HTLCCandidate {
1000 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1003 impl HTLCCandidate {
1004 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1012 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1014 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1016 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1017 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1018 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1023 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1024 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1025 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1026 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1027 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1029 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1030 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1031 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1032 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1034 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1035 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1039 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1040 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1041 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1042 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1043 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1044 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1045 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1046 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1047 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1048 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1049 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1052 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1054 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1055 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1056 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1057 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1060 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1061 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1062 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1063 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1064 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1065 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1066 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1067 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1070 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1072 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1073 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1074 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1075 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1076 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1077 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1078 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1079 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1080 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1081 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1082 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1083 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1084 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1085 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1086 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1089 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1090 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1091 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1092 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1093 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1094 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1095 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1096 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1097 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1098 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1099 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1100 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1101 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1102 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1103 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1105 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1106 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1107 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1108 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1110 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1111 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1112 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1113 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1115 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1116 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1117 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1118 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1119 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1121 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1122 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1123 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1124 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1126 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1127 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1128 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1130 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1131 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1132 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1133 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1134 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1136 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1137 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1140 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1141 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1143 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1144 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1145 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1146 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1148 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1149 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1151 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1152 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1155 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1156 (0, update, required),
1159 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1160 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1161 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1162 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1163 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1164 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1167 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1168 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1169 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1171 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1173 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1175 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1179 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1181 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1182 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1183 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1188 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1189 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1190 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1191 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1192 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1194 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1195 /// in a timely manner.
1196 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1199 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1200 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1201 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1203 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1204 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1205 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1206 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1210 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1211 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1212 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1214 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1215 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1216 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1217 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1219 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1223 /// The current channel ID.
1224 channel_id: ChannelId,
1225 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1226 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1227 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1228 channel_state: ChannelState,
1230 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1231 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1233 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1234 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1235 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1237 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1238 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1239 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1242 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1243 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1245 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1247 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1248 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1249 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1251 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1252 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1253 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1255 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1256 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1257 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1262 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1263 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1264 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1265 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1266 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1267 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1271 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1275 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1276 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1277 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1278 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1279 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1280 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1281 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1283 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1284 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1285 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1287 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1288 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1289 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1290 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1291 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1292 /// outbound or inbound.
1293 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1295 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1297 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1298 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1299 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1300 // HTLCs with similar state.
1301 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1302 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1303 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1304 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1305 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1306 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1307 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1308 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1309 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1310 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1312 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1313 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1314 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1316 update_time_counter: u32,
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1320 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1322 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1323 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1325 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1326 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1328 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1329 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1330 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1331 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1333 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1334 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1336 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1338 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1340 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1341 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1342 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1343 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1344 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1346 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1347 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1349 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1350 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1351 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1353 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1354 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1355 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1356 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1357 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1358 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1359 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1360 channel_creation_height: u32,
1362 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1365 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1367 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1370 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1372 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1375 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1377 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1379 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1380 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1383 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1385 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1388 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1390 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1392 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1393 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1394 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1396 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1398 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1399 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1400 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1402 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1403 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1404 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1406 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1408 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1410 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1411 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1412 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1413 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1415 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1416 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1417 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1419 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1420 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1421 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1423 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1424 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1425 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1426 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1432 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1433 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1434 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1435 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1436 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1438 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1439 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1441 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1442 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1443 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1444 /// unblock the state machine.
1446 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1447 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1448 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1450 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1451 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1452 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1456 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1457 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1458 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1459 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1460 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1461 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1463 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1464 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1466 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1467 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1468 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1470 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1471 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1472 // associated channel mapping.
1474 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1475 // to store all of them.
1476 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1478 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1479 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1480 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1481 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1482 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1484 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1485 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1487 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1488 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1490 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1491 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1493 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1494 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1496 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1498 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1500 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1501 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1502 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1505 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1506 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1507 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1508 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1509 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1510 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1511 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1513 config: &'a UserConfig,
1514 current_chain_height: u32,
1517 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1518 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1519 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1520 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1521 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1523 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1524 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1526 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1527 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1529 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1531 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1532 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1534 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1536 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1537 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1538 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1540 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1544 // Check sanity of message fields:
1545 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1547 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1548 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1549 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1551 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1554 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1555 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1557 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1558 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1561 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1562 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1564 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1567 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1569 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1570 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1571 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1573 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1576 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1580 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1581 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1584 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1585 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1587 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1590 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1591 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1593 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1594 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1596 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1599 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1603 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1605 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1606 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1611 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1612 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1613 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1616 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1619 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1620 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1621 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1623 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1627 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1628 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1629 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1630 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1634 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1635 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1636 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1640 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1641 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1642 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1643 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1647 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1648 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1649 &Some(ref script) => {
1650 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1651 if script.len() == 0 {
1654 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1657 Some(script.clone())
1660 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1667 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1668 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1669 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1674 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1675 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1680 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1681 Ok(script) => script,
1682 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1685 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1686 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1688 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1691 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1694 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1696 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1698 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1701 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1702 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1704 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1709 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1711 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1712 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1713 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1714 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1716 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1719 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1721 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1722 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1725 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1726 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1729 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1730 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1731 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1732 pending_update_fee: None,
1733 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1734 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1735 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1736 update_time_counter: 1,
1738 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1740 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1741 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1742 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1743 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1744 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1745 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1747 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1748 signer_pending_funding: false,
1751 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1752 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1753 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1754 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1756 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1757 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1758 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1759 closing_fee_limits: None,
1760 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1762 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1763 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1764 short_channel_id: None,
1765 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1767 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1768 channel_value_satoshis,
1769 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1770 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1771 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1772 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1773 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1774 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1775 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1776 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1777 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1778 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1781 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1783 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1784 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1785 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1786 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1787 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1788 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1789 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1791 funding_outpoint: None,
1792 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1794 funding_transaction: None,
1795 is_batch_funding: None,
1797 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1798 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1799 counterparty_node_id,
1801 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1803 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1805 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1806 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1808 announcement_sigs: None,
1810 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1811 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1812 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1813 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1815 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1816 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1818 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1819 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1821 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1822 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1824 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1825 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1830 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1832 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1838 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1839 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1840 self.update_time_counter
1843 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1844 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1847 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1848 self.config.announced_channel
1851 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1852 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1855 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1856 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1857 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1858 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1861 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1862 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1863 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1866 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1867 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1868 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1869 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1870 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1871 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1872 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1875 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1876 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1877 match self.channel_state {
1878 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1879 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1880 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1881 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1882 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1883 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1884 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1886 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1888 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1889 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1893 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1894 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1895 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1896 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1897 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1898 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1901 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1902 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1903 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1907 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1908 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1909 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1910 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1911 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1914 // Public utilities:
1916 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1920 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1922 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1923 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1924 self.temporary_channel_id
1927 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1931 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1932 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1933 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1937 /// Gets the channel's type
1938 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1942 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1944 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1945 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1946 self.short_channel_id
1949 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1950 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1951 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1954 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1955 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1956 self.outbound_scid_alias
1959 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1961 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1962 return &self.holder_signer
1965 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1966 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1967 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1968 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1969 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1970 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1973 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1974 /// get_funding_created.
1975 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1976 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1979 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1980 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1981 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1982 if conf_height > 0 {
1989 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1990 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1991 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1994 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1995 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1996 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1997 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2001 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2004 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2005 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2008 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2009 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2012 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2013 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2014 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2017 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2018 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2022 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2023 self.counterparty_node_id
2026 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2027 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2028 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2032 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2033 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2037 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2039 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2040 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2041 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2042 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2044 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2049 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2050 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2053 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2054 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2055 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2058 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2059 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2060 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2062 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2063 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2068 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2069 self.channel_value_satoshis
2072 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2073 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2076 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2077 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2080 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
2081 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
2082 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2084 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2085 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2086 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
2087 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
2088 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
2090 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2094 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2095 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2096 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2101 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2104 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2105 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2106 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2109 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2110 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2111 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2114 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2115 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2116 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2119 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2120 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2121 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2124 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2125 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2126 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2127 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2128 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2131 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2133 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2134 self.prev_config = None;
2138 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2139 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2143 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2144 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2145 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2146 let did_channel_update =
2147 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2148 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2149 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2150 if did_channel_update {
2151 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2152 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2153 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2154 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2156 self.config.options = *config;
2160 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2161 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2162 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2163 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2164 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2167 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2168 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2169 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2170 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2171 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2173 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2174 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2175 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2176 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2177 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2178 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2179 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2181 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2182 where L::Target: Logger
2184 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2185 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2186 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2188 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2189 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2190 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2191 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2193 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2194 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2195 if match update_state {
2196 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2197 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2198 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2199 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2200 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2202 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2206 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2207 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2208 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2210 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2212 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2213 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2214 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2216 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2217 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2218 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2219 transaction_output_index: None
2224 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2225 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2226 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2227 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2228 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2231 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2233 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2234 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2235 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2237 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2238 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2241 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2242 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2245 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2247 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2248 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2249 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2251 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2252 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2258 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2260 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2261 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2262 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2263 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2264 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2265 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2266 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2270 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2271 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2273 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2275 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2276 if generated_by_local {
2277 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2278 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2279 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2289 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2291 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2292 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2293 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2294 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2295 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2296 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2297 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2300 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2301 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2302 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2303 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2307 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2308 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2312 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2313 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2315 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2318 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2320 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2321 if !generated_by_local {
2322 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2330 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2331 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2332 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2333 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2334 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2335 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2336 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2337 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2341 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2342 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2343 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2344 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2346 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2348 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2349 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2350 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2351 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2354 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2355 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2356 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2357 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2359 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2362 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2363 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2364 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2365 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2367 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2370 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2371 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2376 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2377 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2382 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2384 let channel_parameters =
2385 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2386 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2387 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2394 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2397 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2398 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2399 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2400 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2408 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2409 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2410 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2411 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2416 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2417 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2418 /// our counterparty!)
2419 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2420 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2421 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2422 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2423 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2424 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2425 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2427 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2431 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2432 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2433 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2434 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2435 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2436 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2437 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2439 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2442 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2443 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2444 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2445 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2446 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2449 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2450 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2453 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2457 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2458 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2459 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2460 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2461 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2462 // which are near the dust limit.
2463 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2464 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2465 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2466 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2467 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2469 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2470 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2472 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2473 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2476 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2477 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2478 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2481 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2482 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2484 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2485 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2486 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2487 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2488 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2489 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2490 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2493 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2496 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2497 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2498 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2500 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2501 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2502 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2503 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2504 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2505 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2507 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2508 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2514 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2515 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2517 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2518 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2519 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2520 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2521 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2522 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2523 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2526 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2529 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2530 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2531 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2533 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2534 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2535 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2536 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2537 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2538 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2540 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2541 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2545 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2546 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2547 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2548 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2549 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2550 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2551 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2553 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2554 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2556 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2563 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2564 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2565 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2566 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2567 match holding_cell_update {
2568 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2569 holding_cell_states.insert(
2571 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2575 holding_cell_states.insert(
2577 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2580 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2581 holding_cell_states.insert(
2583 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2587 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2590 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2591 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2594 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2595 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2597 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2598 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2599 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2600 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2601 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2602 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2603 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2604 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2605 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2606 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2613 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2614 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2615 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2616 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2619 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2620 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2622 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2623 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2624 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2625 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2626 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2627 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2628 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2629 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2630 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2631 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2634 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2635 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2641 } = *holding_cell_update {
2642 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2644 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2645 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2646 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2647 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2648 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2649 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2656 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2657 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2658 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2659 /// corner case properly.
2660 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2661 -> AvailableBalances
2662 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2664 let context = &self;
2665 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2666 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2667 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2669 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2670 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2671 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2672 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2675 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2677 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2678 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2680 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2682 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2684 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2685 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2689 if context.is_outbound() {
2690 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2691 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2693 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2694 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2696 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2697 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2698 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2699 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2702 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2703 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2704 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2705 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2706 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2707 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2708 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2711 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2712 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2713 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2714 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2715 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2716 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2717 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2718 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2719 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2720 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2721 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2723 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2726 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2727 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2728 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2729 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2730 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2733 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2734 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2736 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2737 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2738 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2740 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2741 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2742 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2743 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2747 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2749 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2750 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2751 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2752 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2753 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2754 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2755 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2757 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2758 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2760 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2761 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2762 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2764 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2765 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2766 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2767 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2768 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2771 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2772 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2773 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2774 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2775 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2776 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2779 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2780 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2781 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2783 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2787 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2788 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2790 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2791 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2795 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2796 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2797 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2798 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2800 outbound_capacity_msat,
2801 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2802 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2807 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2808 let context = &self;
2809 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2812 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2813 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2815 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2816 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2818 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2819 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2821 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2822 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2823 let context = &self;
2824 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2826 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2829 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2830 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2832 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2833 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2835 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2836 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2838 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2839 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2843 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2844 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2850 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2851 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2852 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2855 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2856 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2857 included_htlcs += 1;
2860 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2865 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2866 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2867 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2868 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2869 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2870 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2875 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2877 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2878 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2883 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2884 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2888 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2889 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2893 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2894 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2896 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2897 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2898 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2900 total_pending_htlcs,
2901 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2902 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2903 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2905 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2906 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2907 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2909 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2911 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2916 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2917 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2919 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2920 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2922 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2923 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2925 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2926 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2927 let context = &self;
2928 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2930 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2933 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2934 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2936 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2937 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2939 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2940 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2942 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2947 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2948 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2954 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2955 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2956 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2957 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2958 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2959 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2962 included_htlcs += 1;
2965 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2966 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2969 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2970 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2972 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2973 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2974 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2979 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2980 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2981 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2984 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2985 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2987 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2988 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2990 total_pending_htlcs,
2991 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2992 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2993 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2995 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2996 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2997 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2999 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3001 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3006 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3007 match self.channel_state {
3008 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3009 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3010 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3011 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3021 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3023 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3024 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3027 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3029 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3030 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3031 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3035 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3036 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3037 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3040 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3042 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3043 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3046 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3047 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3048 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3049 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3050 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3051 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3052 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3053 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3054 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3055 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3056 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3058 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3059 // return them to fail the payment.
3060 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3061 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3062 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3064 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3065 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3070 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3071 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3072 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3073 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3074 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3075 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3076 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3077 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3078 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3079 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3080 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3081 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3082 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3083 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3084 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3088 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3089 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3091 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3092 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3096 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3097 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3098 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3099 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3100 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3101 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3102 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3103 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3107 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3108 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3109 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3110 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3112 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3113 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3114 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3115 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3117 match &self.holder_signer {
3118 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3119 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3120 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3121 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3122 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3125 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3129 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3130 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3131 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3133 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3134 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3135 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3137 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3139 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3142 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3143 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3145 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3152 // Internal utility functions for channels
3154 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3155 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3156 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3158 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3160 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3161 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3162 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3164 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3167 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3169 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3172 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3173 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3174 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3176 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3178 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3179 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3180 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3181 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3182 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3185 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3186 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3187 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3188 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3189 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3190 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3191 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3194 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3195 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3197 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3198 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3201 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3202 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3203 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3204 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3205 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3206 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3209 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3210 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3211 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3212 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3213 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3214 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3215 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3216 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3217 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3218 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3219 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3220 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3223 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3224 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3225 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3226 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3229 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3230 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3232 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3233 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3234 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3238 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3239 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3240 trait FailHTLCContents {
3241 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3242 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3243 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3244 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3246 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3247 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3248 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3249 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3251 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3252 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3254 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3255 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3258 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3259 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3260 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3261 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3264 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3265 failure_code: self.1
3268 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3269 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3271 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3272 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3274 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3275 failure_code: self.1
3280 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3281 fn name() -> &'static str;
3283 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3284 fn name() -> &'static str {
3288 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3289 fn name() -> &'static str {
3290 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3294 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3295 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3296 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3298 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3299 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3300 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3301 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3303 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3304 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3306 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3308 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3309 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3310 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3311 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3313 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3314 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3324 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3325 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3326 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3327 // outside of those situations will fail.
3328 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3332 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3337 1 + // script length (0)
3341 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3342 2 + // witness marker and flag
3343 1 + // witness element count
3344 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3345 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3346 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3347 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3348 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3349 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3351 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3352 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3353 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3359 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3360 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3361 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3362 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3364 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3365 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3366 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3368 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3369 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3370 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3371 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3372 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3373 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3376 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3377 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3380 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3381 value_to_holder = 0;
3384 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3385 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3386 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3387 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3389 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3390 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3393 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3394 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3397 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3400 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3401 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3403 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3405 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3406 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3407 where L::Target: Logger {
3408 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3409 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3410 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3411 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3412 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3413 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3414 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3415 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3419 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3420 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3421 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3422 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3424 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3425 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3428 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3429 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3430 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3432 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3433 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3434 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3435 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3436 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3437 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3438 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3440 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3441 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3442 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3444 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3445 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3447 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3450 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3451 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3455 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3459 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3460 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3461 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3462 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3463 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3464 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3467 // Now update local state:
3469 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3470 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3471 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3472 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3473 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3474 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3475 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3476 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3478 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3481 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3482 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3483 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3484 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3485 // do not not get into this branch.
3486 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3487 match pending_update {
3488 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3489 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3490 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3491 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3493 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3494 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3497 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3498 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3500 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3501 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3502 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3503 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3504 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3505 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3511 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3512 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3513 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3515 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3516 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3517 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3519 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3520 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3523 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3524 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3526 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3527 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3529 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3530 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3533 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3536 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3537 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3538 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3539 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3544 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3545 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3546 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3547 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3548 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3549 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3550 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3551 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3552 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3553 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3554 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3555 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3556 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3557 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3558 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3560 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3561 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3562 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3563 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3564 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3567 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3568 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3569 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3575 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3576 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3578 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3582 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3583 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3584 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3585 /// before we fail backwards.
3587 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3588 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3589 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3590 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3591 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3592 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3593 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3596 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3597 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3599 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3600 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3601 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3602 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3603 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3604 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3607 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3608 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3609 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3610 /// before we fail backwards.
3612 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3613 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3614 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3615 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3616 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3618 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3619 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3620 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3623 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3624 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3625 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3627 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3628 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3629 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3631 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3632 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3633 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3635 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3640 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3641 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3647 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3648 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3649 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3650 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3651 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3655 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3656 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3657 force_holding_cell = true;
3660 // Now update local state:
3661 if force_holding_cell {
3662 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3663 match pending_update {
3664 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3665 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3666 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3667 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3671 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3672 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3674 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3675 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3676 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3682 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3683 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3687 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3688 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3690 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3691 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3694 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3697 // Message handlers:
3698 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3699 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3700 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3701 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3702 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3703 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3704 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3707 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3709 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3711 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3712 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3713 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3714 debug_assert!(matches!(
3715 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3717 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3718 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3721 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3722 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3724 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3725 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3726 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3727 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3729 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3732 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3733 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3734 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3737 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3738 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3739 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3740 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3741 // when routing outbound payments.
3742 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3746 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3747 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3748 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3749 match &self.context.channel_state {
3750 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3751 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3752 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3753 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3754 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3755 check_reconnection = true;
3756 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3757 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3758 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3759 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3760 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3762 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3763 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3766 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3767 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3768 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3770 if check_reconnection {
3771 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3772 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3773 let expected_point =
3774 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3775 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3777 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3778 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3779 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3780 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3781 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3782 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3784 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3785 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3786 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3787 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3788 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3790 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3796 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3797 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3799 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3801 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3804 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3805 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3806 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3807 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3808 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3809 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3811 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3814 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3815 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3816 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3818 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3819 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3822 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3825 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3828 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3831 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3835 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3836 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3837 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3840 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3844 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3845 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3846 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3847 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3848 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3849 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3850 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3851 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3852 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3853 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3854 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3856 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3857 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3858 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3859 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3860 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3861 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3865 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3866 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3869 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3870 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3871 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3873 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3874 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3875 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3876 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3877 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3878 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3879 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3883 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3884 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3885 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3886 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3887 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3888 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3889 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3893 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3894 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3895 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3896 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3897 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3901 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3902 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3904 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3905 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3906 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3908 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3909 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3913 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3916 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3921 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3922 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3926 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3927 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3928 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3929 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3930 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3931 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3932 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3933 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3934 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3936 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3937 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3938 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3939 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3940 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3943 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3944 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3945 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3946 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3950 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3953 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3957 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3958 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3959 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3963 // Now update local state:
3964 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3965 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3966 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3967 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3968 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3969 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3970 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3975 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3977 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3978 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3979 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3980 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3981 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3982 None => fail_reason.into(),
3983 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3984 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3985 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3988 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3992 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3994 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3995 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3997 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4003 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4006 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4007 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4010 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4014 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4017 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4018 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4019 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4021 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4025 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4029 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4030 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4033 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4037 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4041 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4042 where L::Target: Logger
4044 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4047 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4050 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4054 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4056 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4058 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4059 let commitment_txid = {
4060 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4061 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4062 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4064 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4065 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4066 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4067 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4068 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4073 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4075 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4076 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4077 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4078 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4081 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4082 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4083 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4087 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4089 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4090 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4091 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4092 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4093 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4094 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4095 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4096 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4097 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4098 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4099 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4105 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4109 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4110 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4111 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4112 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4113 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4114 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4115 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4116 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4117 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4118 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4119 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4120 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4121 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4124 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4125 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4126 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4127 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4128 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4129 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4130 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4132 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4133 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4134 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4135 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4136 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4137 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4138 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4141 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4142 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4145 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4147 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4148 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4149 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4152 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4155 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4156 commitment_stats.tx,
4158 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4159 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4160 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4163 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4164 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4166 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4167 let mut need_commitment = false;
4168 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4169 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4170 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4171 need_commitment = true;
4175 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4176 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4177 Some(forward_info.clone())
4179 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
4180 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4181 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4182 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
4183 need_commitment = true;
4186 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4187 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4188 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4189 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4190 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4191 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4192 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4193 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4194 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4195 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4196 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4197 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4198 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4199 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4201 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4203 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4204 need_commitment = true;
4208 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4209 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4210 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4211 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4212 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4213 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4214 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4216 nondust_htlc_sources,
4218 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4221 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4222 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4223 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4224 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4225 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4227 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4228 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4229 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4230 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4231 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4232 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4233 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4234 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4235 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4236 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4237 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4238 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4239 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4240 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4242 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4243 &self.context.channel_id);
4244 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4247 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4248 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4249 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4250 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4251 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4252 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4253 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4254 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4255 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4259 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4260 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4261 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4262 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4265 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4266 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4267 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4268 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4269 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4270 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4271 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4273 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4274 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4275 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4278 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4279 /// for our counterparty.
4280 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4281 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4282 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4283 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4285 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4286 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4287 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4288 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4290 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4291 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4292 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4293 updates: Vec::new(),
4294 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4297 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4298 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4299 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4300 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4301 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4302 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4303 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4304 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4305 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4306 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4307 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4308 // to rebalance channels.
4309 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4310 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4311 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4312 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4314 match self.send_htlc(
4315 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4316 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4318 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4321 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4322 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4323 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4324 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4325 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4326 // into the holding cell without ever being
4327 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4328 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4329 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4332 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4339 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4340 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4341 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4342 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4343 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4344 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4345 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4346 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4347 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4348 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4349 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4350 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4354 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4355 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4357 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4358 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4359 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4362 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4364 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4365 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4366 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4367 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4368 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4369 // for a full revocation before failing.
4370 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4371 update_fail_count += 1;
4373 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4375 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4380 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4381 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4383 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4384 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4389 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4390 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4391 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4392 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4393 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4395 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4396 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4397 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4399 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4400 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4406 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4407 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4408 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4409 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4410 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4411 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4412 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4413 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4414 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4416 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4419 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4422 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4426 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4428 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4429 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4434 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4435 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4436 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4437 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4438 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4439 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4440 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4441 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4447 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4448 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4451 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4452 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4453 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4454 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4456 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4458 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4463 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4464 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4465 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4466 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4467 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4468 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4469 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4470 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4471 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4473 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4476 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4477 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4478 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4479 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4480 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4481 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4482 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4483 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4484 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4486 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4487 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4490 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4491 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4492 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4493 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4494 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4495 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4496 let mut require_commitment = false;
4497 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4500 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4501 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4502 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4503 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4505 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4506 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4507 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4508 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4509 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4510 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4512 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4516 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4517 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4518 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4519 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4520 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4522 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4523 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4524 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4529 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4530 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4532 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4536 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4537 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4539 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4540 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4541 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4542 require_commitment = true;
4543 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4544 match forward_info {
4545 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4546 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4547 require_commitment = true;
4549 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4550 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4551 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4553 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4554 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4555 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4559 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4560 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4561 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4562 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4568 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4569 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4570 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4571 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4572 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4574 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4575 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4576 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4577 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4578 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4579 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4580 require_commitment = true;
4584 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4586 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4587 match update_state {
4588 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4589 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4590 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4591 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4592 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4593 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4595 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4596 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4597 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4598 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4599 require_commitment = true;
4600 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4601 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4606 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4607 let release_state_str =
4608 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4609 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4610 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4611 if !release_monitor {
4612 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4613 update: monitor_update,
4615 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4617 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4622 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4623 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4624 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4625 if require_commitment {
4626 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4627 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4628 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4629 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4631 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4632 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4633 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4634 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4635 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4637 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4638 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4639 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4640 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4641 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4644 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4645 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4646 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4647 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4648 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4649 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4651 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4652 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4654 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4655 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4657 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4658 if require_commitment {
4659 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4661 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4662 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4663 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4664 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4666 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4667 &self.context.channel_id(),
4668 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4671 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4672 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4674 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4675 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4677 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4678 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4684 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4685 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4686 /// commitment update.
4687 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4688 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4689 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4691 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4692 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4695 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4696 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4697 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4698 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4700 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4701 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4702 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4703 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4704 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4705 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4706 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4708 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4709 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4711 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4712 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4714 if !self.context.is_live() {
4715 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4718 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4719 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4720 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4721 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4722 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4723 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4724 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4725 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4726 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4727 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4731 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4732 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4733 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4734 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4735 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4736 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4739 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4740 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4744 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4745 force_holding_cell = true;
4748 if force_holding_cell {
4749 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4753 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4754 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4756 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4757 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4762 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4763 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4765 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4767 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4768 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4769 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4770 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4774 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4775 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4776 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4780 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4781 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4784 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4785 // will be retransmitted.
4786 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4787 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4788 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4790 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4791 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4793 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4794 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4795 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4796 // this HTLC accordingly
4797 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4800 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4801 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4802 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4803 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4806 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4807 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4808 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4809 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4810 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4811 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4816 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4818 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4819 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4820 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4821 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4825 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4826 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4827 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4828 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4829 // the update upon reconnection.
4830 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4834 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4836 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4837 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4841 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4842 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4843 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4844 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4845 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4846 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4847 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4849 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4850 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4851 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4852 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4853 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4854 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4855 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4857 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4858 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4859 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4860 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4861 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4862 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4863 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4866 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4867 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4868 /// to the remote side.
4869 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4870 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4871 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4872 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4875 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4877 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4878 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4880 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4881 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4882 // first received the funding_signed.
4883 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4884 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4885 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4886 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4888 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4890 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4891 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4892 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4893 funding_broadcastable = None;
4896 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4897 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4898 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4899 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4900 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4901 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4902 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4903 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4904 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4905 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4906 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4907 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4908 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4909 next_per_commitment_point,
4910 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4914 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4916 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4917 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4918 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4919 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4920 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4921 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4923 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4924 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4925 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4926 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4927 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4928 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4932 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4933 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4935 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4936 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4938 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4939 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4942 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4943 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4944 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4945 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4946 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4947 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4948 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4949 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4950 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4954 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4955 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4957 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4960 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4963 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4965 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4966 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4967 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4968 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4969 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4970 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4971 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4972 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4973 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4974 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4976 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4978 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4980 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4986 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4988 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4989 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4990 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4991 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4993 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4994 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4996 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4997 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5000 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5001 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5002 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5003 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5005 SignerResumeUpdates {
5012 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5013 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5014 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5015 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5016 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5017 per_commitment_secret,
5018 next_per_commitment_point,
5020 next_local_nonce: None,
5024 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5025 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5026 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5027 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5028 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5029 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5031 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5032 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5033 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5034 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5035 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5036 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5037 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5038 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5039 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5040 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5041 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5046 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5047 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5049 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5050 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5051 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5052 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5053 reason: err_packet.clone()
5056 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5057 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5058 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5059 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5060 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5061 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5064 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5065 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5066 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5067 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5068 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5075 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5076 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5077 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5078 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5082 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5083 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5084 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5085 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5086 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5087 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5088 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5092 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5093 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5095 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5096 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5097 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5098 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5103 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5104 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5109 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5110 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5111 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5112 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5113 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5114 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5115 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5120 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5121 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5123 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5124 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5125 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5126 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5127 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5128 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5129 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5130 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5133 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5135 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5136 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5137 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5138 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5142 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5143 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5147 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5148 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5149 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5150 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5151 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5152 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5155 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5156 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5157 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5158 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5159 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5162 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5163 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5164 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5165 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5166 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5167 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5168 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5169 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5173 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5174 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5175 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5176 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5177 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5178 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5179 our_commitment_transaction
5183 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5184 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5185 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5186 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5188 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5190 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
5192 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5193 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5194 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5195 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5196 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5199 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5200 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5201 channel_ready: None,
5202 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5203 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5204 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5208 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5209 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5210 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5211 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5212 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5213 next_per_commitment_point,
5214 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5216 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5217 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5218 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5222 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5223 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5224 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5226 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5227 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5228 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5231 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5234 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5236 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5237 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5238 our_commitment_transaction
5242 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5243 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5244 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5245 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5246 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5247 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5248 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5250 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5252 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5253 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5254 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5255 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5256 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5257 next_per_commitment_point,
5258 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5262 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5263 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5264 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5266 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5269 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5270 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5271 raa: required_revoke,
5272 commitment_update: None,
5273 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5275 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5276 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5277 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5279 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5282 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5283 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5284 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5285 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5286 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5287 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5290 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5291 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5292 raa: required_revoke,
5293 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5294 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5297 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5298 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5299 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5300 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5301 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5304 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5305 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5306 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5307 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5312 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5313 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5314 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5315 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5319 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5321 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5322 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5323 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5324 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5325 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5326 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5327 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5328 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5330 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5331 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5332 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5333 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5334 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5336 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5337 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5338 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5339 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5342 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5343 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5344 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5345 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5346 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5347 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5348 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5349 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5350 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5351 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5352 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5353 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5354 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5355 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5356 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5358 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5361 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5362 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5365 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5366 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5367 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5368 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5369 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5370 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5373 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5374 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5375 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5376 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5377 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5378 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5381 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5387 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5388 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5389 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5390 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5392 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5393 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5394 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5395 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5396 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5397 return Ok((None, None, None));
5400 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5401 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5402 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5404 return Ok((None, None, None));
5407 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5408 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5409 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5410 return Ok((None, None, None));
5413 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5415 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5416 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5417 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5418 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5420 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5421 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5423 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5424 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5426 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5427 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5428 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5429 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5431 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5432 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5433 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5437 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5443 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5444 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5446 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5447 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5450 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5451 /// within our expected timeframe.
5453 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5454 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5455 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5458 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5461 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5462 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5466 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5467 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5469 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5472 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5473 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5474 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5475 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5478 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5479 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5483 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5485 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5486 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5489 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5490 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5491 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5494 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5497 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5498 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5499 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5500 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5502 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5505 assert!(send_shutdown);
5506 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5507 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5508 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5510 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5511 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5513 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5518 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5520 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5521 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5523 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5524 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5525 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5526 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5527 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5528 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5529 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5531 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5533 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5534 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5536 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5537 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5538 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5539 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5543 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5544 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5545 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5546 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5547 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5548 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5550 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5551 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5558 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5559 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5561 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5564 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5565 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5567 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5569 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5570 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5571 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5572 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5573 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5574 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5575 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5576 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5577 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5579 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5580 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5583 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5587 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5588 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5589 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5590 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5592 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5595 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5598 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5601 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5605 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5609 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5610 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5611 return Ok((None, None, None));
5614 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5615 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5616 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5619 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5621 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5624 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5625 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5626 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5627 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5628 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5632 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5633 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5638 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5639 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5641 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5644 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5645 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5646 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5647 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5649 monitor_update: None,
5650 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5651 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5652 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5653 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5654 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5655 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5656 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5657 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5659 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5660 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5661 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5662 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5666 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5668 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5669 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5670 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5671 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5673 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5676 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5677 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5679 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5680 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5681 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5682 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5684 monitor_update: None,
5685 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5686 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5687 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5688 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5689 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5690 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5691 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5692 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5694 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5695 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5696 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5697 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5702 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5703 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5704 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5705 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5707 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5708 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5709 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5711 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5713 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5720 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5721 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5722 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5724 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5725 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5727 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5728 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5731 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5732 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5733 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5734 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5735 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5737 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5739 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5741 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5742 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5745 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5746 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5747 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5748 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5749 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5750 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5751 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5752 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5757 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5758 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5759 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5760 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5762 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5766 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5767 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5768 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5769 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5771 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5777 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5778 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5779 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5780 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5781 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5782 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5783 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5785 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5786 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5789 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5791 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5792 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5798 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5799 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5800 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5801 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5802 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5803 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5804 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5806 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5807 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5814 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5815 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5818 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5819 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5822 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5823 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5827 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5828 &self.context.holder_signer
5832 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5834 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5835 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5836 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5837 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5838 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5839 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5841 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5843 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5851 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5852 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5856 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5857 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5858 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5859 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5862 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5863 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5864 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5865 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5868 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5869 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5870 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5871 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5872 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5873 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5876 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5877 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5878 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5879 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5880 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5881 if !release_monitor {
5882 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5891 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5892 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5895 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5896 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5897 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5899 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5900 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5902 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5903 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5905 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5906 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5907 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5910 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5911 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5912 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5913 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5914 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5915 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5917 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5918 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5919 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5921 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5922 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5923 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5924 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5925 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5926 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5932 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5933 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5934 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5935 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5938 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5939 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5940 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5943 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5944 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5945 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5948 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
5949 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5950 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
5953 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5954 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5955 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5956 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5957 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5960 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5961 self.context.channel_update_status
5964 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5965 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5966 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5969 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5971 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5972 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5973 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5977 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5978 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5979 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5982 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5986 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5987 // channel_ready yet.
5988 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5992 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5993 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5994 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
5995 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5997 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5998 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5999 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6001 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6002 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6005 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6006 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6008 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6009 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6010 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6011 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6012 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6013 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6014 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6015 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6017 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6021 if need_commitment_update {
6022 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6023 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6024 let next_per_commitment_point =
6025 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6026 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6027 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6028 next_per_commitment_point,
6029 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6033 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6039 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6040 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6041 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6042 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6043 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6044 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6045 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6047 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6050 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6051 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6052 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6053 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6054 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6055 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6056 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6057 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6058 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6059 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6060 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6061 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6062 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6063 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6064 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6065 // channel and move on.
6066 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6067 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6069 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6070 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6071 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6073 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6074 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6075 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6076 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6077 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6078 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6079 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6080 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6085 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6086 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6087 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6088 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6089 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6092 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6093 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6094 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6095 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6096 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6097 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6100 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6101 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6102 // may have already happened for this block).
6103 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6104 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6105 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6106 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6109 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6110 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6111 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6112 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6120 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6121 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6122 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6123 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6125 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6126 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6129 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6131 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6132 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6133 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6134 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6136 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6139 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6142 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6143 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6144 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6145 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6147 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6150 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6151 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6152 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6154 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6155 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6157 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6158 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6159 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6167 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6169 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6170 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6171 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6173 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6174 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6177 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6178 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6179 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6180 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6181 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6182 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6183 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6184 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6187 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6188 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6189 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6190 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6192 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6193 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6194 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6196 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6197 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6198 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6199 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6201 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6202 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6203 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6204 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6205 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6206 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6207 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6210 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6211 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6213 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6216 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6217 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6218 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6219 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6220 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6221 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6222 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6223 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6224 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6225 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6226 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6227 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6228 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6229 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6230 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6231 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6232 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6238 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6243 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6244 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6246 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6247 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6248 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6249 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6251 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6254 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6256 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6257 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6258 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6259 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6260 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6261 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6263 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6264 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6267 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6268 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6269 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6270 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6271 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6272 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6274 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6275 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6278 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6279 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6280 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6281 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6282 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6288 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6289 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6290 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6291 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6293 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6296 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6300 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6304 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6305 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6309 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6313 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6314 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6317 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6321 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6323 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6328 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6329 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6330 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6332 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6337 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6339 None => return None,
6342 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6344 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6345 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6347 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6348 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6351 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6357 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6359 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6360 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6361 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6362 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6363 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6365 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6367 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6368 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6369 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6370 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6371 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6372 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6373 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6374 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6375 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6376 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6377 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6378 contents: announcement,
6381 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6386 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6390 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6391 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6392 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6393 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6394 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6395 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6396 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6397 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6399 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6401 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6403 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6404 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6406 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6408 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6409 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6412 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6413 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6414 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6415 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6418 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6421 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6422 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6423 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6424 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6425 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6426 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6429 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6431 Err(_) => return None,
6433 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6434 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6439 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6440 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6441 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6442 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6443 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6444 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6445 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6446 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6447 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6448 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6449 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6450 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6451 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6452 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6453 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6454 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6457 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6460 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6461 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6462 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6463 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6464 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6465 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6466 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6467 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6468 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6470 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6471 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6472 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6473 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6474 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6475 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6476 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6477 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6478 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6480 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6481 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6482 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6483 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6484 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6485 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6486 next_funding_txid: None,
6491 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6493 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6494 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6495 /// commitment update.
6497 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6498 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6499 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6500 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6501 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6502 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6503 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6506 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6507 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6508 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6510 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6511 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6516 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6517 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6519 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6521 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6522 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6524 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6525 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6526 /// regenerate them.
6528 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6529 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6531 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6532 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6533 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6534 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6535 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6536 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6537 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6538 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6540 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6541 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6542 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6544 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6546 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6547 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6548 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6551 if amount_msat == 0 {
6552 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6555 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6556 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6557 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6558 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6561 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6562 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6563 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6566 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6567 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6568 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6569 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6570 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6571 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6572 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6573 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6576 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6577 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6578 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6579 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6580 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6581 else { "to peer" });
6583 if need_holding_cell {
6584 force_holding_cell = true;
6587 // Now update local state:
6588 if force_holding_cell {
6589 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6594 onion_routing_packet,
6601 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6602 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6604 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6606 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6612 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6613 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6614 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6618 onion_routing_packet,
6622 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6627 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6628 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6629 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6630 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6632 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6633 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6634 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6636 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6637 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6641 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6642 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6643 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6644 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6645 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6646 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6647 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6650 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6651 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6652 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6653 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6654 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6655 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6658 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6660 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6661 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6662 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6663 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6664 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6666 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6667 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6670 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6671 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6672 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6673 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6674 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6675 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6676 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6677 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6678 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6679 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6680 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6681 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6683 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6685 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6689 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6690 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6691 where L::Target: Logger
6693 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6694 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6695 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6699 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6700 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6701 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6702 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6703 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6704 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6705 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6706 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6707 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6708 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6709 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6715 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6718 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6719 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6720 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6721 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6722 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6723 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6725 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6726 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6727 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6729 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6730 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6731 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6734 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6735 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6739 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6740 &commitment_stats.tx,
6741 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6742 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6743 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6744 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6746 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6748 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6749 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6750 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6751 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6753 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6754 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6755 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6756 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6757 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6758 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6762 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6763 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6767 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6768 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6770 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6776 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6777 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6779 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6780 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6781 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6782 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6783 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6784 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6785 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6786 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6788 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6789 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6790 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6793 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6794 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6795 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6801 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6803 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6804 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6805 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6806 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6807 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6809 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6811 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6817 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6818 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6819 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6820 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6821 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6823 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6824 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6825 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6828 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6829 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6831 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6832 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6834 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6835 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6837 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6838 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6839 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6842 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6845 // use override shutdown script if provided
6846 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6847 Some(script) => script,
6849 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6850 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6851 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6852 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6856 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6857 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6859 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6864 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6865 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6866 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6867 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
6868 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6870 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6871 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6872 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6873 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6874 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6875 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6876 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6878 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6880 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6881 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6883 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6884 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6885 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6888 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6889 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6890 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6891 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6892 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6894 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6895 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6902 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6903 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6905 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6908 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6909 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6910 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6912 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6913 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6917 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6921 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6922 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6923 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6924 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6927 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6928 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6929 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6930 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6931 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6932 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6933 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6934 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6936 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6937 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6938 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6939 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6941 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6944 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6947 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6948 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6951 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6954 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6955 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6956 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6957 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6961 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6962 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6964 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6965 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6967 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6969 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6971 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6972 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6973 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6974 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6977 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6978 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6980 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6981 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6982 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6983 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6987 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6988 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6989 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6993 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6994 Ok(script) => script,
6995 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6998 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
7001 context: ChannelContext {
7004 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7005 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7006 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
7007 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7012 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
7014 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
7015 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
7016 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
7017 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7019 channel_value_satoshis,
7021 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7023 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7024 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7027 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7028 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7031 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7032 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7033 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7034 pending_update_fee: None,
7035 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7036 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7037 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7038 update_time_counter: 1,
7040 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7042 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7043 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7044 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7045 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7046 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7047 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7049 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7050 signer_pending_funding: false,
7052 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7053 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
7054 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7055 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
7057 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7058 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7059 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7060 closing_fee_limits: None,
7061 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7063 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7064 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7065 short_channel_id: None,
7066 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7068 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
7069 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
7070 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7071 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
7072 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7073 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
7074 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7075 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
7076 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7077 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
7078 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7079 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
7081 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7083 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7084 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7085 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7086 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
7087 counterparty_parameters: None,
7088 funding_outpoint: None,
7089 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7091 funding_transaction: None,
7092 is_batch_funding: None,
7094 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
7095 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7096 counterparty_node_id,
7098 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
7100 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7102 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7103 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7105 announcement_sigs: None,
7107 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7108 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7109 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7110 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7112 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7113 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7115 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7116 outbound_scid_alias,
7118 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7119 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7121 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7122 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
7127 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7128 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
7130 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7134 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7135 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7136 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7137 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7138 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7139 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7140 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7141 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7142 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7144 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7149 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7150 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7151 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7154 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7155 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7156 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7157 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7160 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7162 next_local_nonce: None,
7166 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7167 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7168 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7169 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7170 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7171 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7172 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7173 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7174 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7175 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7176 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7179 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7180 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7182 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7184 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7185 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7186 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7187 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7190 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7191 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7193 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7195 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7196 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7198 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7199 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7200 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7201 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7202 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7203 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7206 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7207 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7209 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7210 if funding_created.is_none() {
7211 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7212 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7214 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7215 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7216 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7217 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7225 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7226 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
7227 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
7228 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
7229 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
7230 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7231 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
7232 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
7233 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
7234 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
7237 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
7238 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
7239 // `only_static_remotekey`.
7240 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
7241 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7242 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
7248 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7249 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7250 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7251 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7252 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7253 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7255 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7257 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
7259 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7260 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
7265 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7266 // We've exhausted our options
7269 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
7270 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
7273 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
7274 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
7275 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
7276 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
7278 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7279 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
7280 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
7281 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
7282 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
7283 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
7285 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7287 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
7288 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7291 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7292 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7293 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7295 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7296 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7299 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7300 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7303 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7304 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7307 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7309 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7310 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7311 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7312 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7313 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7314 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7315 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7316 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7317 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7318 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7319 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7320 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7321 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7322 first_per_commitment_point,
7323 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7324 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7325 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7326 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7328 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7330 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7331 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7336 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7337 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7339 // Check sanity of message fields:
7340 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7343 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7346 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7349 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7352 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7355 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7357 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7359 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7360 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7361 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7363 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7364 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7365 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7367 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7370 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7374 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7375 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7376 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7378 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7381 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7382 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7384 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7385 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7387 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7390 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7393 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7394 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7397 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7398 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7401 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7402 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7404 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7405 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7408 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7409 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7412 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7413 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7414 &Some(ref script) => {
7415 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7416 if script.len() == 0 {
7419 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7422 Some(script.clone())
7425 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7432 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7433 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7434 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7435 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7436 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7438 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7439 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7441 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7444 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7445 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7446 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7447 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7448 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7449 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7452 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7453 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7454 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7457 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7458 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7460 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7461 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7463 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7468 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7469 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7470 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7471 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7472 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7476 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7477 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7479 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7480 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7482 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7483 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7484 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7485 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7488 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7490 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7491 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7492 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7493 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7495 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7496 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7498 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7499 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7501 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7502 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7503 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7504 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7505 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7506 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7510 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7511 initial_commitment_tx,
7514 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7515 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7519 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7520 if validated.is_err() {
7521 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7524 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7525 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7526 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7527 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7528 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7529 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7530 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7531 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7532 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7533 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7534 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7535 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7537 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7538 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7539 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7540 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7541 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7542 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7543 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7544 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7546 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7547 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7548 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7550 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7552 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7553 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7555 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7557 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
7559 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7560 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7561 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7564 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7566 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7567 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7568 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7569 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7570 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7575 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7576 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7577 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7578 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7581 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7582 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
7583 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7584 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7585 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7586 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7587 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7588 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7592 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7593 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7594 // `static_remote_key`.
7595 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7598 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7599 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7602 let announced_channel = if (msg.common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7603 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7606 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7608 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7609 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7616 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7617 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7618 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7619 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7620 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7621 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7622 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7623 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7624 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7625 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7626 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7629 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7631 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7632 // support this channel type.
7633 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7635 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7636 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7637 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7638 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7639 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7640 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7641 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7645 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7649 counterparty_node_id,
7653 current_chain_height,
7658 counterparty_pubkeys,
7660 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7661 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7663 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7665 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7670 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7671 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7673 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7674 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7675 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7676 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7679 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7680 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7682 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7684 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7685 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7688 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7691 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7692 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7693 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7695 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7696 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7697 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7698 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7700 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7701 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7702 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7703 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7704 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7705 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7706 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7707 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7708 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7709 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7710 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7711 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7712 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7713 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7714 first_per_commitment_point,
7715 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7716 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7717 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7719 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7721 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7723 next_local_nonce: None,
7727 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7728 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7730 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7732 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7733 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7736 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7737 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7739 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7740 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7741 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7742 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7743 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7744 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7745 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7746 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7747 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7748 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7749 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7751 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7754 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7755 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7756 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7760 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7761 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7764 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7765 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7767 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7768 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7770 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7772 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7773 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7774 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7775 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7778 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7779 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7780 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7781 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7782 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7784 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7786 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7787 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7788 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7791 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7792 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7793 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7797 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7798 initial_commitment_tx,
7801 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7802 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7805 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7806 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7809 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7811 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7812 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7813 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7814 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7816 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7818 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7819 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7820 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7821 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7822 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7823 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7824 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7825 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7826 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7827 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7828 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7830 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7831 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7832 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7833 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7834 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7835 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7836 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7838 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7839 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7841 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7842 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7843 let mut channel = Channel {
7844 context: self.context,
7846 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7847 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7849 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7853 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7854 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7856 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7862 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7863 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7864 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7865 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7866 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7868 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7869 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7870 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7871 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7877 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7878 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7879 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7880 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7881 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7882 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7887 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7888 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7889 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7890 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7892 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7893 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7894 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7895 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7900 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7901 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7902 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7903 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7904 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7905 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7910 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7911 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7912 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7915 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7917 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7918 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7919 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7920 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7921 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7923 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7924 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7925 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7926 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7928 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7930 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7931 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7932 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7934 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
7936 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7938 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7940 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7942 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7943 // deserialized from that format.
7944 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7945 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7946 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7948 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7950 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7951 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7952 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7954 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7955 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7956 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7957 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7960 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7961 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7962 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7965 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7966 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7967 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7968 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7970 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7971 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7973 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7975 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7977 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7979 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7982 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7984 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7989 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7990 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7991 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7993 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7994 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7995 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7996 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7997 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7998 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7999 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8001 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8003 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8005 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8008 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8009 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8010 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8013 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8015 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8016 preimages.push(preimage);
8018 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8019 reason.write(writer)?;
8021 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8023 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8024 preimages.push(preimage);
8026 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8027 reason.write(writer)?;
8030 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8031 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8034 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8035 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8036 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8037 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8038 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8039 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8041 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8042 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8043 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8046 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8047 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8048 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8049 source.write(writer)?;
8050 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8052 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8053 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8055 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8057 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8058 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8060 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8062 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8063 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8065 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8066 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8068 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8069 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8070 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8072 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8074 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8075 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8080 match self.context.resend_order {
8081 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8082 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8085 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8086 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8087 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8089 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8090 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8091 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8092 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8095 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8096 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8097 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8098 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8099 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8102 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8103 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8104 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8105 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8107 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8108 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8109 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8111 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8113 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8114 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8115 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8116 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8118 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8119 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8120 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8121 // consider the stale state on reload.
8124 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8125 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8126 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8128 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8129 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8130 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8132 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8133 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8135 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8136 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8137 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8139 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8140 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8142 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8145 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8146 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8147 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8149 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8152 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8153 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8155 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8156 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8157 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8159 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8161 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8163 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8165 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8166 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8168 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8169 htlc.write(writer)?;
8172 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8173 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8174 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8176 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8177 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8179 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8180 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8181 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8182 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8183 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8184 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8185 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8187 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8188 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8189 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8190 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8191 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8193 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8194 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8196 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8197 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8198 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8199 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8201 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8203 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8204 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8205 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8206 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8207 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8208 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8209 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8211 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8212 (2, chan_type, option),
8213 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8214 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8215 (5, self.context.config, required),
8216 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8217 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8218 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8219 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8220 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8221 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8222 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8223 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8224 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8225 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8226 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8227 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8228 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8229 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8230 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8231 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8232 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8233 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8234 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8235 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8236 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8237 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8238 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8245 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8246 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8249 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8251 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8252 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8253 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8255 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8256 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8257 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8258 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8260 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8262 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8263 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8264 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8265 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8266 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8268 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8269 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8272 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8273 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8274 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8276 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8278 let mut keys_data = None;
8280 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8281 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8282 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8283 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8284 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8285 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8286 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8287 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8288 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8289 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8293 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8294 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8295 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8298 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8300 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8301 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8302 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8304 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8306 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8307 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8308 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8309 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8310 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8311 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8312 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8313 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8314 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
8315 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
8316 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8317 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8318 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8323 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8324 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8325 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8326 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8327 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8328 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8329 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8330 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8331 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8332 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8333 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8334 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8336 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8337 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8340 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8341 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8344 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8345 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8347 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8349 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8350 blinding_point: None,
8354 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8355 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8356 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8357 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8358 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8359 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8360 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8361 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8362 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8363 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8364 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8365 blinding_point: None,
8367 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8368 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8369 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8371 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8372 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8373 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8375 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8379 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8380 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8381 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8382 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8385 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8386 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8387 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8389 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8390 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8391 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8392 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8395 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8396 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8397 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8398 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8401 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8403 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8405 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8406 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8407 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8408 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8410 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8411 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8412 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8413 // consider the stale state on reload.
8414 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8417 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8418 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8419 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8421 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8424 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8425 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8426 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8428 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8429 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8430 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8431 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8433 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8434 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8436 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8437 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8439 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8440 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8441 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8443 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8445 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8446 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8448 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8449 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8452 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8454 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8455 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8456 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8457 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8459 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8462 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8463 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8465 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8467 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8468 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8470 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8471 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8473 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8476 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8477 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8479 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8480 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8481 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8485 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8486 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8487 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8489 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8495 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8496 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8497 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8498 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8499 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8500 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8501 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8502 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8503 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8504 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8506 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8507 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8508 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8509 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8510 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8511 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8512 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8514 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8515 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8516 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8517 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8519 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8521 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8522 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8524 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8526 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8528 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8529 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8531 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8533 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8534 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8535 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8536 (2, channel_type, option),
8537 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8538 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8539 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8540 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8541 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8542 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8543 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8544 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8545 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8546 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8547 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8548 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8549 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8550 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8551 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8552 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8553 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8554 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8555 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8556 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8557 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8558 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8559 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8560 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8561 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8562 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8565 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8566 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8567 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8568 // required channel parameters.
8569 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8570 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8572 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8574 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8575 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8576 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8577 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8580 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8581 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8582 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8584 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8585 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8587 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8588 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8593 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8594 if iter.next().is_some() {
8595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8599 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8600 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8601 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8602 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8603 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8606 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8607 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8608 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8610 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8611 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8613 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8614 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8615 // separate u64 values.
8616 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8618 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8620 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8621 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8622 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8623 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8625 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8626 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8628 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8629 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8630 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8631 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8632 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8635 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8636 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8638 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8639 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8640 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8641 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8643 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8644 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8646 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8647 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8648 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8649 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8650 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8653 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8654 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8657 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8658 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8659 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8660 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8661 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8662 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8665 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8666 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8667 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8669 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8674 context: ChannelContext {
8677 config: config.unwrap(),
8681 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8682 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8683 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8686 temporary_channel_id,
8688 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8690 channel_value_satoshis,
8692 latest_monitor_update_id,
8694 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8695 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8698 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8699 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8702 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8703 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8704 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8705 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8709 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8710 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8711 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8712 monitor_pending_forwards,
8713 monitor_pending_failures,
8714 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8716 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8717 signer_pending_funding: false,
8720 holding_cell_update_fee,
8721 next_holder_htlc_id,
8722 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8723 update_time_counter,
8726 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8727 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8728 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8729 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8731 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8733 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8734 closing_fee_limits: None,
8735 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8737 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8738 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8740 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8742 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8745 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8746 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8747 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8748 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8749 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8750 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8753 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8755 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8756 funding_transaction,
8759 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8760 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8761 counterparty_node_id,
8763 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8767 channel_update_status,
8768 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8772 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8773 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8774 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8775 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8777 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8778 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8780 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8781 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8782 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8784 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8785 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8787 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8788 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8790 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8793 local_initiated_shutdown,
8795 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8804 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8805 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8806 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8807 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8808 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8809 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8810 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8811 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8812 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8813 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8814 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8815 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8816 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8817 use crate::ln::msgs;
8818 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8819 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8820 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8821 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8822 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8823 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8824 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8825 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8826 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8827 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8828 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8829 use crate::util::test_utils;
8830 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8831 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8832 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8833 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8834 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8835 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8836 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8837 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8838 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8839 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8840 use crate::prelude::*;
8843 fn test_channel_state_order() {
8844 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
8845 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
8846 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
8848 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
8849 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8850 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8851 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
8854 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8857 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8858 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8864 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8865 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8866 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8867 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8871 signer: InMemorySigner,
8874 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8875 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8878 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8879 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8881 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8883 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8884 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8887 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8891 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8893 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8895 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8896 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8897 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8900 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8901 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8902 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8903 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8907 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8908 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8909 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8913 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8914 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8915 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8916 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8919 let seed = [42; 32];
8920 let network = Network::Testnet;
8921 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8922 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8923 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8926 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8927 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8928 let config = UserConfig::default();
8929 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8930 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8931 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8933 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8934 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8938 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8939 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8941 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8942 let original_fee = 253;
8943 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8944 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8945 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8946 let seed = [42; 32];
8947 let network = Network::Testnet;
8948 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8950 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8951 let config = UserConfig::default();
8952 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8954 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8955 // same as the old fee.
8956 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8957 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8958 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
8962 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8963 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8964 // dust limits are used.
8965 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8967 let seed = [42; 32];
8968 let network = Network::Testnet;
8969 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8970 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8971 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8973 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8974 // they have different dust limits.
8976 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8977 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8978 let config = UserConfig::default();
8979 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8981 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8982 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8983 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8984 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8985 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8987 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8988 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8989 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8990 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8991 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8993 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8994 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8995 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8996 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8998 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8999 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9000 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9002 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9003 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9004 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9006 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9007 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9008 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9010 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9011 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9012 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9013 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9016 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9018 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9019 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9020 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9021 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9022 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9023 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9024 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9025 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9026 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9028 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9029 blinding_point: None,
9032 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9033 // the dust limit check.
9034 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9035 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9036 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9037 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9039 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9040 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9041 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9042 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9043 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9044 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9045 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9049 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9050 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9051 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9052 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9053 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9054 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9055 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9056 let seed = [42; 32];
9057 let network = Network::Testnet;
9058 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9060 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9061 let config = UserConfig::default();
9062 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9064 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9065 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9067 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9068 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9069 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9070 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9071 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9072 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9074 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9075 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9076 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9077 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9078 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9080 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9082 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9083 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9084 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9085 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9086 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9088 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9089 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9090 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9091 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9092 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9096 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9097 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9098 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9099 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9100 let seed = [42; 32];
9101 let network = Network::Testnet;
9102 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9103 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9104 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9106 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9108 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9109 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9110 let config = UserConfig::default();
9111 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9113 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9114 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9115 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9116 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9118 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9119 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9120 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9122 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9123 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9124 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9125 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9127 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9128 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9129 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9131 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9132 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9133 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9135 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9136 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9137 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9138 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9139 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9140 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9141 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9143 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9145 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9146 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9147 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9148 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9149 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9153 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9154 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9155 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9156 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9157 let seed = [42; 32];
9158 let network = Network::Testnet;
9159 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9160 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9161 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9163 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9164 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9165 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9166 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9167 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9168 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9169 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9170 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9172 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9173 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9174 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9175 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9176 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9177 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9179 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9180 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9181 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9182 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9184 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9186 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9187 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9188 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9189 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9190 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9191 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9193 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9194 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9195 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9196 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9198 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9199 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9200 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9201 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9202 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9204 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9205 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9207 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9208 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9209 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9211 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9212 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9213 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9214 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9215 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9217 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9218 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9220 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9221 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9222 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9226 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9228 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9229 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9230 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9232 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9233 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9234 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9235 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9237 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9238 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9239 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9241 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9243 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9244 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9247 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9248 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9249 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9250 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9251 let seed = [42; 32];
9252 let network = Network::Testnet;
9253 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9254 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9255 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9258 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9259 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9260 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9262 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9263 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9265 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9266 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9267 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9269 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9270 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9272 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9274 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9275 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9277 // Channel Negotiations failed
9278 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9279 assert!(result.is_err());
9284 fn channel_update() {
9285 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9286 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9287 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9288 let seed = [42; 32];
9289 let network = Network::Testnet;
9290 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9291 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9292 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9294 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9295 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9296 let config = UserConfig::default();
9297 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9299 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9300 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9301 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9302 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9303 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9305 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9306 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9307 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9308 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9309 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9311 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9312 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9313 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9314 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9316 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9317 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9318 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9320 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9321 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9322 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9324 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9325 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9326 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9328 short_channel_id: 0,
9331 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9332 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9333 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9335 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9336 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9338 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9340 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9342 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9343 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9344 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9345 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9347 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9348 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9349 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9351 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9354 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9358 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9359 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9361 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9362 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9363 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9364 let seed = [42; 32];
9365 let network = Network::Testnet;
9366 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9367 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9369 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9370 let config = UserConfig::default();
9371 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9372 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9373 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9375 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9376 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9377 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9379 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9380 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9381 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9383 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9384 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9385 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9386 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9387 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9390 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9392 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9393 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9394 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9395 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9399 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9400 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9401 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9403 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9406 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9408 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9409 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9410 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9411 blinding_point: None,
9413 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9414 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9416 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9419 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9422 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9424 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9427 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9428 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9429 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9431 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9432 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9435 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9436 blinding_point: None,
9438 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9439 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9442 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9443 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9445 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9446 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9448 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9451 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9452 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9453 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9454 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9455 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9456 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9457 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9458 } = &mut dummy_add {
9459 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9460 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9462 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9463 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9464 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9466 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9469 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9471 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9472 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9473 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9474 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9475 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9476 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9477 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9478 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9481 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9483 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9484 use bitcoin::sighash;
9485 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9486 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9487 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9488 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9489 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9490 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9491 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9492 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9493 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9494 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9495 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9496 use crate::sync::Arc;
9497 use core::str::FromStr;
9498 use hex::DisplayHex;
9500 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9501 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9502 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9505 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9507 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9508 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9509 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9510 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9511 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9513 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9514 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9520 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9521 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9522 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9524 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9525 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9526 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9527 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9528 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9529 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9531 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9533 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9534 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9535 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9536 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9537 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9538 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9540 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9541 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9542 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9543 selected_contest_delay: 144
9545 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9546 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9548 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9549 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9551 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9552 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9554 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9555 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9557 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9558 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9559 // build_commitment_transaction.
9560 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9561 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9562 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9563 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9564 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9566 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9567 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9568 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9569 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9573 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9574 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9575 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9576 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9580 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9581 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9582 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9584 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9585 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9587 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9588 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9590 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9592 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9593 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9594 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9595 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9596 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9597 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9598 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9600 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9601 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9602 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9603 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9605 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9606 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9607 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9609 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9611 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9612 commitment_tx.clone(),
9613 counterparty_signature,
9614 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9615 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9616 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9618 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9619 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9621 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9622 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9623 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9625 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9626 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9629 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9630 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9632 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9633 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9634 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9635 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9636 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9637 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9638 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9639 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9641 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9644 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9645 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9646 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9650 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9653 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9654 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9655 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9656 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9657 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9658 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9660 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9661 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9662 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9663 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9665 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9666 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9667 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9668 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9669 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9671 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9672 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9673 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9674 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9675 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9676 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9678 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9682 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9683 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9684 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9685 "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", {});
9687 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9688 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9690 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9691 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9692 "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", {});
9694 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9695 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9696 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9697 "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", {});
9699 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9700 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9702 amount_msat: 1000000,
9704 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9705 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9707 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9710 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9711 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9713 amount_msat: 2000000,
9715 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9716 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9718 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9721 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9722 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9724 amount_msat: 2000000,
9726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9727 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9728 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9729 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9730 blinding_point: None,
9732 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9735 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9736 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9738 amount_msat: 3000000,
9740 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9741 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9742 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9743 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9744 blinding_point: None,
9746 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9749 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9750 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9752 amount_msat: 4000000,
9754 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9755 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9757 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9761 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9762 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9763 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9765 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9766 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9767 "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", {
9770 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9771 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9772 "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" },
9775 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9776 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9777 "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" },
9780 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9781 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9782 "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" },
9785 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9786 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9787 "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" },
9790 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9791 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9792 "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" }
9795 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9796 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9797 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9799 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9800 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9801 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9804 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9805 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9806 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9809 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9810 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9811 "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" },
9814 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9815 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9816 "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" },
9819 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9820 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9821 "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" },
9824 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9825 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9826 "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" }
9829 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9830 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9831 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9833 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9834 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9835 "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", {
9838 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9839 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9840 "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" },
9843 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9844 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9845 "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" },
9848 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9849 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9850 "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" },
9853 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9854 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9855 "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" }
9858 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9859 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9860 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9861 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9863 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9864 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9865 "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", {
9868 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9869 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9870 "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" },
9873 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9874 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9875 "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" },
9878 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9879 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9880 "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" },
9883 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9884 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9885 "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" }
9888 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9889 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9890 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9891 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9893 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9894 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9895 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9898 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9899 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9900 "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" },
9903 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9904 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9905 "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" },
9908 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9909 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9910 "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" },
9913 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9914 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9915 "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" }
9918 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9919 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9920 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9922 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9923 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9924 "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", {
9927 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9928 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9929 "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" },
9932 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9933 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9934 "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" },
9937 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9938 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9939 "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" }
9942 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9943 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9944 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9946 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9947 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9948 "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", {
9951 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9952 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9953 "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" },
9956 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9957 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9958 "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" },
9961 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9962 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9963 "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" }
9966 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9967 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9968 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9970 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9971 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9972 "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", {
9975 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9976 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9977 "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" },
9980 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9981 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9982 "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" }
9985 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9986 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9987 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9988 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9989 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9990 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9992 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9993 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9994 "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", {
9997 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9998 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9999 "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" },
10002 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10003 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10004 "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" }
10007 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10008 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10009 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10010 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10011 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10013 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10014 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10015 "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", {
10018 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10019 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10020 "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" },
10023 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10024 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10025 "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" }
10028 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10029 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10030 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10032 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10033 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10034 "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", {
10037 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10038 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10039 "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" }
10042 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10043 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10044 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10045 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10046 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10048 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10049 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10050 "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", {
10053 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10054 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10055 "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" }
10058 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10059 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10060 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10061 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10062 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10064 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10065 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10066 "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", {
10069 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10070 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10071 "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" }
10074 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10075 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10076 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10077 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10079 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10080 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10081 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10083 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10084 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10085 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10086 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10087 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10089 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10090 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10091 "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", {});
10093 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10094 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10095 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10096 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10097 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10099 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10100 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10101 "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", {});
10103 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10104 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10105 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10107 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10108 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10109 "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", {});
10111 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10112 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10113 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10114 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10115 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10117 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10118 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10119 "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", {});
10121 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10122 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10123 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10124 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10125 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10127 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10128 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10129 "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", {});
10131 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10132 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10133 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10134 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10135 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10136 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10138 amount_msat: 2000000,
10140 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10141 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10143 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10146 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10147 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10148 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10150 amount_msat: 5000001,
10152 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10153 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10154 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10155 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10156 blinding_point: None,
10158 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10161 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10162 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10164 amount_msat: 5000000,
10166 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10167 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10168 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10169 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10170 blinding_point: None,
10172 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10176 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10177 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10178 "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", {
10181 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10182 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10183 "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" },
10185 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10186 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10187 "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" },
10189 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10190 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10191 "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" }
10194 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10195 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10196 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10197 "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", {
10200 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10201 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10202 "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" },
10204 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10205 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10206 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
10208 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10209 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10210 "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" }
10215 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10216 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10218 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10219 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10220 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10221 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10223 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10224 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10225 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10227 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10228 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10230 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10231 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10233 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10234 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10235 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10239 fn test_key_derivation() {
10240 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10241 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10243 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10244 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10246 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10247 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10249 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10250 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10252 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10253 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10255 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10256 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10258 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10259 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10263 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10264 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10266 let seed = [42; 32];
10267 let network = Network::Testnet;
10268 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10269 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10271 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10272 let config = UserConfig::default();
10273 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10274 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10276 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10277 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10279 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10280 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10281 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10282 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10283 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10284 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10285 assert!(res.is_ok());
10289 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10290 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10291 // resulting `channel_type`.
10292 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10293 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10294 let network = Network::Testnet;
10295 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10296 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10298 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10299 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10301 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10302 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10304 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10305 // need to signal it.
10306 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10307 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10308 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10309 &config, 0, 42, None
10311 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10313 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10314 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10315 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10317 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10318 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10319 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10323 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10324 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10325 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10326 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10327 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10330 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10331 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10335 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10336 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10337 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10338 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10339 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10340 let network = Network::Testnet;
10341 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10342 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10344 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10345 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10347 let config = UserConfig::default();
10349 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10350 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10351 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10352 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10353 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10355 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10356 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10357 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10361 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10362 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10363 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10365 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10366 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10367 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10368 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10369 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10370 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10372 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10376 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10377 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10379 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10380 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10381 let network = Network::Testnet;
10382 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10383 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10385 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10386 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10388 let config = UserConfig::default();
10390 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10391 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10392 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10393 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10394 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10395 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10396 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10397 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10399 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10400 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10401 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10402 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10403 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10404 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10408 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10409 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10411 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10412 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10413 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10414 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10416 assert!(res.is_err());
10418 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10419 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10420 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10422 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10423 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10424 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10427 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10429 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10430 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10431 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10432 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10435 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10436 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10438 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10439 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10441 assert!(res.is_err());
10445 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10446 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10447 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10448 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10449 let seed = [42; 32];
10450 let network = Network::Testnet;
10451 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10452 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10453 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10455 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10456 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10457 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10458 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10460 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10461 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10462 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10467 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10477 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10478 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10479 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10484 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10485 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10491 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10494 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10495 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10496 &accept_channel_msg,
10497 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10498 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10501 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10502 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10503 let tx = Transaction {
10505 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10509 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10512 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10515 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10516 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10517 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10518 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10519 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10520 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10524 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10525 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10533 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10534 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10535 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10536 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10538 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10539 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10546 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10547 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10548 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10549 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10550 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10552 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10553 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10554 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10562 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10563 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10566 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10567 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10568 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10569 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());