1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
538 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
541 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
542 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
545 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
546 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
547 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
549 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
550 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
551 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
552 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
555 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
557 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
558 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
559 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
560 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
561 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
562 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
563 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
564 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
567 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
568 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
569 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
570 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
571 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
572 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
573 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
574 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
575 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
576 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
577 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
578 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
579 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
580 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
581 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
584 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
585 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
586 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
588 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
589 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
590 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
591 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
593 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
594 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
595 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
596 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
597 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
599 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
600 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
601 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
602 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
604 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
605 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
606 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
608 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
609 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
610 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
611 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
612 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
614 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
615 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
618 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
619 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
621 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
622 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
623 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
624 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
626 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
627 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
629 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
630 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
634 (0, update, required),
637 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
638 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
639 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
640 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
641 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
645 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
646 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
647 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
649 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
657 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
659 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
666 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
667 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
668 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
669 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
670 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
672 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
673 /// in a timely manner.
674 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
677 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
678 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
679 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
681 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
682 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
683 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
688 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
689 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
690 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
692 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
693 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
694 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
695 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
697 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
701 /// The current channel ID.
702 channel_id: ChannelId,
703 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
704 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
705 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
708 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
709 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
711 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
712 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
713 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
715 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
716 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
717 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
718 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
721 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
723 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
725 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
726 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
727 destination_script: Script,
729 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
730 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
731 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
733 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
734 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
736 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
737 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
738 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
740 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
741 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
742 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
743 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
744 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
745 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
747 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
749 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
750 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
751 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
753 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
754 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
755 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
756 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
757 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
758 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
759 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
761 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
762 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
763 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
765 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
766 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
767 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
768 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
769 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
770 /// outbound or inbound.
771 signer_pending_funding: bool,
773 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
775 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
776 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
777 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
778 // HTLCs with similar state.
779 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
780 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
781 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
782 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
783 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
784 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
785 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
786 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
787 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
790 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
791 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
792 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
794 update_time_counter: u32,
796 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
797 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
798 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
801 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
803 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
806 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
807 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
808 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
809 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
811 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
812 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
814 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
816 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
818 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
819 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
820 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
821 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
822 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
824 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
825 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
827 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
828 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
829 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
831 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
832 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
833 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
834 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
835 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
836 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
837 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
838 channel_creation_height: u32,
840 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
843 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
845 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
848 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
850 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
853 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
855 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
857 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
858 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
861 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
863 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
865 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
866 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
868 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
870 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
871 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
872 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
874 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
876 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
877 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
878 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
880 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
881 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
882 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
884 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
886 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
888 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
889 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
890 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
891 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
893 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
894 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
895 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
897 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
898 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
899 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
901 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
902 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
903 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
904 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
906 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
907 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
908 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
910 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
911 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
912 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
913 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
914 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
916 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
917 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
919 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
920 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
921 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
922 /// unblock the state machine.
924 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
925 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
926 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
928 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
929 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
930 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
933 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
934 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
935 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
936 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
937 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
938 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
939 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
941 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
942 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
944 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
945 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
946 // the channel's funding UTXO.
948 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
949 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
950 // associated channel mapping.
952 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
953 // to store all of them.
954 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
956 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
957 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
958 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
959 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
960 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
962 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
963 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
965 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
966 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
968 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
969 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
970 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
972 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
973 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
974 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
977 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
978 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
979 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
980 self.update_time_counter
983 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
984 self.latest_monitor_update_id
987 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
988 self.config.announced_channel
991 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
992 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
995 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
996 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
997 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
998 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1001 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1002 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1003 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1006 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1008 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1009 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1010 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1013 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1014 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1015 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1016 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1018 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1019 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1021 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1022 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1024 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1025 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1027 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1030 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1031 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1032 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1033 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1034 self.channel_state &
1035 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1036 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1037 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1038 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1041 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1042 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1043 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1044 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1045 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1048 // Public utilities:
1050 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1054 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1056 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1057 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1058 self.temporary_channel_id
1061 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1065 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1066 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1067 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1071 /// Gets the channel's type
1072 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1076 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1078 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1079 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1080 self.short_channel_id
1083 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1084 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1085 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1088 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1089 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1090 self.outbound_scid_alias
1093 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1095 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1096 return &self.holder_signer
1099 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1100 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1101 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1102 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1103 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1104 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1107 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1108 /// get_funding_created.
1109 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1110 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1113 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1114 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1115 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1118 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1119 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1120 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1121 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1125 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1128 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1129 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1132 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1133 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1136 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1137 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1138 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1141 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1142 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1145 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1146 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1147 self.counterparty_node_id
1150 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1151 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1152 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1155 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1156 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1157 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1160 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1161 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1163 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1164 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1165 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1166 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1168 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1172 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1173 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1174 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1177 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1178 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1179 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1182 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1183 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1184 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1186 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1187 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1192 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1193 self.channel_value_satoshis
1196 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1197 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1200 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1201 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1204 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1205 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1206 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1208 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1209 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1210 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1211 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1212 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1214 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1218 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1219 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1220 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1223 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1224 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1225 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1228 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1229 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1230 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1233 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1234 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1235 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1238 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1239 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1240 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1243 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1244 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1245 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1248 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1249 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1250 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1251 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1252 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1255 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1257 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1258 self.prev_config = None;
1262 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1263 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1267 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1268 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1269 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1270 let did_channel_update =
1271 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1272 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1273 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1274 if did_channel_update {
1275 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1276 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1277 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1278 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1280 self.config.options = *config;
1284 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1285 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1286 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1287 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1288 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1291 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1292 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1293 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1294 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1295 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1297 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1298 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1299 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1300 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1301 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1302 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1303 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1305 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1306 where L::Target: Logger
1308 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1309 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1310 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1312 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1313 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1314 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1315 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1317 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1318 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1319 if match update_state {
1320 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1321 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1322 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1323 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1324 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1326 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1330 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1331 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1332 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1334 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1336 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1337 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1338 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1340 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1341 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1342 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1343 transaction_output_index: None
1348 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1349 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1350 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1351 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1352 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1355 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1357 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1358 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1359 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1361 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1362 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1365 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1366 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1369 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1371 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1372 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1373 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1375 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1376 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1382 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1383 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1384 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1385 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1386 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1387 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1388 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1392 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1393 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1395 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1397 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1398 if generated_by_local {
1399 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1400 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1409 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1411 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1412 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1413 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1414 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1415 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1416 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1417 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1420 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1421 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1422 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1423 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1427 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1428 preimages.push(preimage);
1432 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1433 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1435 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1437 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1438 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1440 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1441 if !generated_by_local {
1442 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1450 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1451 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1452 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1453 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1454 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1455 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1456 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1457 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1459 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1461 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1462 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1463 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1464 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1466 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1468 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1469 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1470 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1471 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1474 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1475 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1476 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1477 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1479 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1482 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1483 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1484 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1485 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1487 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1490 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1491 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1496 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1497 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1502 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1504 let channel_parameters =
1505 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1506 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1507 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1514 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1517 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1518 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1519 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1520 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1522 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1523 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1524 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1532 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1533 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1539 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1540 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1541 /// our counterparty!)
1542 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1543 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1544 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1545 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1546 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1547 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1548 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1550 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1554 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1555 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1556 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1557 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1558 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1559 //may see payments to it!
1560 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1561 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1562 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1564 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1567 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1568 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1569 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1570 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1571 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1574 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1575 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1578 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1582 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1583 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1584 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1585 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1586 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1587 // which are near the dust limit.
1588 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1589 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1590 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1591 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1592 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1594 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1595 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1597 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1600 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1601 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1602 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1605 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1606 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1608 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1609 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1610 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1611 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1612 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1613 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1614 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1617 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1620 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1621 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1622 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1624 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1625 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1626 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1627 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1628 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1629 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1631 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1632 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1638 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1639 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1641 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1642 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1643 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1644 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1645 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1646 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1647 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1650 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1653 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1654 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1655 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1657 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1658 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1659 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1660 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1661 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1662 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1664 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1665 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1669 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1670 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1671 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1672 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1673 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1674 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1675 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1677 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1678 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1680 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1687 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1688 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1689 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1690 /// corner case properly.
1691 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1692 -> AvailableBalances
1693 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1695 let context = &self;
1696 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1697 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1698 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1700 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1701 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1702 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1703 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1706 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1708 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1709 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1711 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1713 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1715 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1716 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1720 if context.is_outbound() {
1721 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1722 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1724 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1725 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1727 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1728 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1729 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1730 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1733 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1734 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1735 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1736 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1737 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1738 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1739 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1742 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1743 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1744 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1745 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1746 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1747 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1748 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1749 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1750 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1751 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1752 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1754 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1757 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1758 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1759 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1760 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1761 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1764 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1765 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1767 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1768 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1769 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1771 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1772 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1773 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1774 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1778 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1780 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1781 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1782 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1783 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1784 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1785 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1786 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1788 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1789 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1791 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1792 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1793 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1795 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1796 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1797 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1798 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1799 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1802 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1803 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1804 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1805 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1806 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1807 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1810 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1811 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1812 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1814 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1818 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1819 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1821 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1822 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1826 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1827 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1828 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1829 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1831 outbound_capacity_msat,
1832 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1833 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1838 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1839 let context = &self;
1840 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1843 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1844 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1846 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1847 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1849 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1850 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1852 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1853 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1854 let context = &self;
1855 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1857 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1860 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1861 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1863 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1864 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1866 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1867 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1869 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1870 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1875 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1881 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1882 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1883 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1886 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1887 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1888 included_htlcs += 1;
1891 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1892 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1896 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1897 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1898 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1899 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1900 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1901 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1906 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1908 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1909 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1914 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1915 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1919 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1920 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1921 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1924 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1925 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1927 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1928 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1929 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1931 total_pending_htlcs,
1932 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1933 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1934 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1936 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1937 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1938 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1940 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1942 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1947 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1948 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1950 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1951 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1953 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1954 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1956 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1957 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1958 let context = &self;
1959 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1961 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1964 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1965 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1967 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1968 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1970 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1971 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1973 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1974 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1978 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1979 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1985 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1986 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1987 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1988 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1989 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1990 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1993 included_htlcs += 1;
1996 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1997 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2000 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2001 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2003 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2004 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2005 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2010 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2011 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2012 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2015 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2016 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2018 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2019 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2021 total_pending_htlcs,
2022 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2023 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2024 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2026 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2027 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2028 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2030 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2032 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2037 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2038 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2039 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2040 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2047 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2049 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2050 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2053 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2055 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2056 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2057 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2061 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2062 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2063 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2066 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2068 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2069 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2072 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2073 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2074 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2075 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2076 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2077 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2078 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2079 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2080 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2081 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2082 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2084 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2085 // return them to fail the payment.
2086 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2087 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2088 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2090 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2091 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2096 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2097 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2098 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2099 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2100 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2101 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2102 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2103 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2104 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2105 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2106 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2107 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2108 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2112 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2114 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2115 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2118 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2119 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2123 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2124 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2125 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2126 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2127 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2128 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2129 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2130 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2131 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2135 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2136 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2137 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2140 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2141 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2142 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2143 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2146 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2148 next_local_nonce: None,
2152 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2153 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2154 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2155 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2157 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2158 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2159 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2160 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2162 match &self.holder_signer {
2163 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2164 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2165 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2166 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2167 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2170 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2174 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2175 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2176 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2177 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2178 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2179 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2182 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2183 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2189 // Internal utility functions for channels
2191 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2192 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2193 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2195 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2197 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2198 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2199 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2201 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2204 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2206 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2209 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2210 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2211 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2213 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2215 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2216 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2217 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2218 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2219 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2222 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2223 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2224 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2225 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2226 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2227 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2228 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2231 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2232 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2234 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2235 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2238 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2239 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2240 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2241 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2242 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2243 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2246 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2247 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2248 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2249 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2252 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2253 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2255 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2256 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2257 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2261 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2262 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2263 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2265 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2266 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2267 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2268 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2270 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2271 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2272 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2273 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2274 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2275 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2276 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2278 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2279 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2284 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2285 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2287 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2289 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2290 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2291 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2292 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2294 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2295 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2305 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2306 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2307 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2308 // outside of those situations will fail.
2309 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2313 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2318 1 + // script length (0)
2322 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2323 2 + // witness marker and flag
2324 1 + // witness element count
2325 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2326 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2327 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2328 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2329 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2330 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2332 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2333 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2334 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2340 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2341 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2342 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2343 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2345 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2346 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2347 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2349 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2350 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2351 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2352 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2353 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2354 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2357 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2358 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2361 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2362 value_to_holder = 0;
2365 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2366 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2367 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2368 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2370 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2371 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2374 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2375 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2378 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2381 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2382 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2384 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2386 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2387 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2388 where L::Target: Logger {
2389 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2390 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2391 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2392 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2393 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2394 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2395 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2396 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2400 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2401 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2402 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2403 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2405 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2406 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2408 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2410 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2411 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2412 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2414 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2415 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2416 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2417 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2418 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2419 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2420 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2422 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2423 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2424 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2426 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2427 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2429 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2432 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2433 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2437 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2441 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2442 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2443 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2444 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2445 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2446 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2449 // Now update local state:
2451 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2452 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2453 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2454 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2455 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2456 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2457 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2461 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2462 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2463 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2464 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2465 // do not not get into this branch.
2466 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2467 match pending_update {
2468 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2469 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2470 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2471 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2472 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2473 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2474 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2477 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2478 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2479 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2480 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2481 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2482 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2483 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2489 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2490 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2491 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2493 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2494 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2495 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2498 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2501 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2502 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2504 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2505 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2507 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2508 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2511 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2514 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2515 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2516 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2517 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2522 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2523 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2524 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2525 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2526 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2527 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2528 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2529 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2530 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2531 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2532 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2533 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2534 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2535 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2536 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2538 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2539 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2540 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2541 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2542 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2545 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2546 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2547 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2553 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2554 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2556 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2560 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2561 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2562 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2563 /// before we fail backwards.
2565 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2566 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2567 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2568 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2569 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2570 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2571 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2574 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2575 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2576 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2577 /// before we fail backwards.
2579 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2580 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2581 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2582 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2583 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2584 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2585 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2587 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2589 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2590 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2591 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2593 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2594 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2595 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2597 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2598 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2599 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2601 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2606 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2607 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2613 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2614 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2615 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2616 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2617 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2621 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2622 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2623 force_holding_cell = true;
2626 // Now update local state:
2627 if force_holding_cell {
2628 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2629 match pending_update {
2630 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2631 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2632 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2633 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2637 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2638 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2639 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2640 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2646 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2647 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2648 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2654 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2656 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2657 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2660 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2661 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2662 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2667 // Message handlers:
2669 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2670 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2671 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2672 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2673 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2677 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2680 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2683 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2684 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2685 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2686 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2689 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2691 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2692 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2693 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2694 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2696 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2697 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2699 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2700 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2702 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2703 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2704 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2705 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2706 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2711 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2712 initial_commitment_tx,
2715 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2716 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2719 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2720 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2723 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2724 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2725 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2726 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2727 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2728 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2729 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2730 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2731 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2732 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2733 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2734 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2736 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2738 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2739 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2740 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2741 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2742 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2743 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2744 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2746 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2747 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2748 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2750 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2752 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2753 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2755 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2757 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2758 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2762 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2763 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2764 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2765 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2766 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2767 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2768 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2771 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2772 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2774 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2775 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2776 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2777 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2779 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2782 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2783 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2784 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2787 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2788 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2789 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2790 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2791 // when routing outbound payments.
2792 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2796 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2798 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2799 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2801 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2802 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2804 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2805 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2806 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2807 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2808 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2809 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2810 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2811 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2812 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2814 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2815 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2816 let expected_point =
2817 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2818 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2820 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2821 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2822 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2823 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2824 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2825 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2827 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2828 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2829 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2830 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2831 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2833 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2841 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2842 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2844 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2846 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2849 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2850 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2851 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2852 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2853 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2854 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2856 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2857 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2858 if local_sent_shutdown {
2859 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2861 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2862 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2863 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2866 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2869 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2872 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2875 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2879 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2880 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2881 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2884 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2888 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2889 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2890 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2891 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2892 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2893 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2894 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2895 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2896 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2897 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2898 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2900 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2901 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2902 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2903 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2904 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2905 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2909 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2910 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2913 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2914 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2915 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2917 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2918 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2919 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2920 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2921 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2922 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2923 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2927 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2928 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2929 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2930 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2931 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2932 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2933 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2937 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2938 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2939 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2940 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2941 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2945 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2946 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2948 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2949 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2950 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2952 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2953 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2957 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2960 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2965 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2966 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2970 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2971 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2972 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2973 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2974 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2975 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2976 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2977 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2978 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2980 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2981 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2982 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2983 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2984 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2987 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2988 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2989 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2990 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2994 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2997 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3001 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3002 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3003 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3007 // Now update local state:
3008 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3009 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3010 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3011 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3012 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3013 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3014 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3019 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3021 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3022 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3023 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3024 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3025 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3026 None => fail_reason.into(),
3027 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3028 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3029 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3032 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3036 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3038 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3039 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3041 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3047 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3050 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3051 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3054 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3058 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3061 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3062 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3065 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3069 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3073 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3074 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3077 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3081 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3085 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3086 where L::Target: Logger
3088 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3091 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3094 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3098 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3100 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3102 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3103 let commitment_txid = {
3104 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3105 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3106 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3108 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3109 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3110 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3111 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3112 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3117 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3119 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3120 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3121 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3122 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3125 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3126 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3127 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3133 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3134 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3135 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3136 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3137 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3138 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3139 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3140 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3141 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3142 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3143 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3149 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3153 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3154 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3155 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3156 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3157 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3158 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3159 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3160 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3161 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3162 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3163 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3164 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3165 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3168 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3169 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3170 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3171 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3172 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3173 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3174 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3176 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3177 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3178 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3179 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3180 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3181 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3182 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3185 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3186 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3189 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3191 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3192 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3193 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3196 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3199 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3200 commitment_stats.tx,
3202 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3203 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3204 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3207 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3208 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3210 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3211 let mut need_commitment = false;
3212 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3213 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3214 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3215 need_commitment = true;
3219 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3220 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3221 Some(forward_info.clone())
3223 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3224 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3225 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3226 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3227 need_commitment = true;
3230 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3231 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3232 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3233 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3234 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3235 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3236 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3237 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3238 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3239 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3240 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3241 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3242 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3243 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3245 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3247 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3248 need_commitment = true;
3252 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3253 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3254 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3256 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3257 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3259 nondust_htlc_sources,
3263 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3264 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3265 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3266 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3267 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3269 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3270 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3271 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3272 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3273 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3274 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3275 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3276 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3277 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3278 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3279 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3280 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3281 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3282 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3284 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3285 &self.context.channel_id);
3286 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3289 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3290 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3291 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3292 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3293 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3294 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3295 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3296 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3297 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3301 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3302 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3303 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3304 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3307 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3308 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3309 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3310 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3311 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3312 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3313 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3315 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3316 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3317 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3318 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3321 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3322 /// for our counterparty.
3323 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3324 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3325 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3326 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3328 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3329 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3330 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3331 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3333 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3334 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3335 updates: Vec::new(),
3338 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3339 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3340 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3341 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3342 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3343 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3344 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3345 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3346 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3347 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3348 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3349 // to rebalance channels.
3350 match &htlc_update {
3351 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3352 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3353 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3355 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3356 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3358 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3361 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3362 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3363 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3364 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3365 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3366 // into the holding cell without ever being
3367 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3368 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3369 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3372 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3378 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3379 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3380 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3381 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3382 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3383 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3384 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3385 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3386 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3387 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3388 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3389 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3391 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3392 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3393 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3394 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3395 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3396 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3397 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3398 // for a full revocation before failing.
3399 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3400 update_fail_count += 1;
3403 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3405 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3412 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3413 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3415 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3416 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3421 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3422 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3423 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3424 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3425 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3427 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3428 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3429 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3431 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3432 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3438 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3439 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3440 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3441 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3442 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3443 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3444 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3445 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3446 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3448 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3451 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3454 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3458 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3460 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3461 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3466 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3467 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3468 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3469 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3470 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3471 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3472 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3473 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3477 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3479 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3480 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3483 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3484 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3485 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3486 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3488 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3492 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3493 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3494 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3495 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3496 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3497 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3498 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3499 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3503 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3504 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3505 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3506 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3507 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3508 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3509 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3510 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3511 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3513 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3514 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3517 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3518 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3519 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3520 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3521 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3522 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3523 let mut require_commitment = false;
3524 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3527 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3528 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3529 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3530 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3532 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3533 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3534 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3535 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3536 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3537 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3539 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3543 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3544 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3545 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3546 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3547 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3549 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3550 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3551 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3556 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3557 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3559 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3563 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3564 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3566 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3567 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3568 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3569 require_commitment = true;
3570 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3571 match forward_info {
3572 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3573 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3574 require_commitment = true;
3576 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3577 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3578 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3580 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3581 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3582 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3586 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3587 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3588 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3589 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3595 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3596 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3597 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3598 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3599 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3601 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3602 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3603 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3604 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3605 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3606 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3607 require_commitment = true;
3611 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3613 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3614 match update_state {
3615 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3616 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3617 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3618 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3619 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3620 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3622 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3623 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3624 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3625 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3626 require_commitment = true;
3627 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3628 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3633 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3634 let release_state_str =
3635 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3636 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3637 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3638 if !release_monitor {
3639 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3640 update: monitor_update,
3642 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3644 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3649 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3650 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3651 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3652 if require_commitment {
3653 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3654 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3655 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3656 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3658 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3659 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3660 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3661 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3662 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3664 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3666 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3667 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3668 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3671 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3672 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3673 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3674 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3675 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3676 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3678 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3679 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3681 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3682 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3684 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3685 if require_commitment {
3686 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3688 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3689 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3690 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3691 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3693 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3694 &self.context.channel_id(),
3695 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3698 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3699 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3701 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3702 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3704 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3705 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3711 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3712 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3713 /// commitment update.
3714 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3715 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3716 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3718 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3719 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3722 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3723 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3724 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3725 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3727 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3728 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3729 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3730 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3731 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3732 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3733 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3735 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3736 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3738 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3739 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3741 if !self.context.is_live() {
3742 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3745 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3746 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3747 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3748 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3749 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3750 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3751 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3752 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3753 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3754 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3758 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3759 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3760 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3761 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3762 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3763 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3766 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3767 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3771 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3772 force_holding_cell = true;
3775 if force_holding_cell {
3776 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3780 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3781 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3783 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3784 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3789 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3790 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3792 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3794 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3795 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3796 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3797 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3801 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3802 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3803 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3807 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3808 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3811 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3812 // will be retransmitted.
3813 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3814 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3815 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3817 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3818 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3820 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3821 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3822 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3823 // this HTLC accordingly
3824 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3827 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3828 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3829 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3830 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3833 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3834 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3835 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3836 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3837 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3838 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3843 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3845 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3846 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3847 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3848 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3852 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3853 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3854 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3855 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3856 // the update upon reconnection.
3857 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3861 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3863 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3864 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3868 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3869 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3870 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3871 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3872 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3873 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3874 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3876 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3877 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3878 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3879 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3880 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3881 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3882 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3884 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3885 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3886 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3887 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3888 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3889 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3890 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3893 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3894 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3895 /// to the remote side.
3896 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3897 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3898 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3899 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3902 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3904 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3905 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3907 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3908 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3909 // first received the funding_signed.
3910 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3911 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3912 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3914 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3915 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3916 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3917 funding_broadcastable = None;
3920 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3921 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3922 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3923 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3924 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3925 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3926 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3927 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3928 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3929 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3930 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3931 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3932 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3933 next_per_commitment_point,
3934 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3938 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3940 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3941 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3942 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3943 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3944 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3945 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3947 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3948 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3949 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3950 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3951 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3952 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3956 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3957 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3959 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3960 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3962 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3963 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3966 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3967 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3968 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3969 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3970 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3971 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3972 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3973 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3974 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3978 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3979 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3981 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3984 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3987 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3988 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3990 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3991 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3992 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3993 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3994 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3995 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3996 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3997 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3998 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3999 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4000 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4001 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4003 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4005 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4007 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4013 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4016 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4017 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4018 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4020 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4021 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4023 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4024 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4026 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4027 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4030 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4031 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4032 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4033 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4034 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4036 SignerResumeUpdates {
4044 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4045 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4046 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4047 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4048 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4049 per_commitment_secret,
4050 next_per_commitment_point,
4052 next_local_nonce: None,
4056 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4057 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4058 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4059 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4060 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4061 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4063 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4064 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4065 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4066 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4067 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4068 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4069 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4070 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4071 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4072 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4077 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4078 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4080 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4081 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4082 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4083 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4084 reason: err_packet.clone()
4087 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4088 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4089 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4090 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4091 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4092 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4095 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4096 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4097 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4098 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4099 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4106 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4107 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4108 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4109 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4113 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4114 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4115 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4116 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4117 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4118 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4119 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4123 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4124 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4125 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4129 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4130 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4135 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4136 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4137 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4138 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4139 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4140 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4141 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4146 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4147 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4149 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4150 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4151 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4152 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4153 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4154 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4155 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4156 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4159 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4161 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4162 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4163 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4164 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4168 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4169 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4173 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4174 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4175 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4176 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4177 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4180 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4181 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4182 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4183 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4184 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4187 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4188 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4189 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4190 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4191 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4192 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4193 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4194 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4198 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4199 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4200 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4201 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4203 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4207 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4208 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4209 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4210 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4212 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4214 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4216 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4217 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4218 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4219 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4220 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4223 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4224 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4225 channel_ready: None,
4226 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4227 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4228 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4232 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4233 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4234 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4235 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4236 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4237 next_per_commitment_point,
4238 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4240 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4241 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4242 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4246 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4247 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4248 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4250 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4251 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4252 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4255 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4261 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4262 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4263 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4264 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4265 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4266 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4267 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4269 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4271 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4272 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4273 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4274 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4275 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4276 next_per_commitment_point,
4277 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4281 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4282 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4283 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4285 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4288 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4289 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4290 raa: required_revoke,
4291 commitment_update: None,
4292 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4294 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4295 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4296 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4298 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4301 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4302 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4303 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4304 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4305 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4306 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4309 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4310 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4311 raa: required_revoke,
4312 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4313 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4317 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4321 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4322 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4323 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4324 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4326 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4328 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4330 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4331 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4332 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4333 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4334 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4335 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4336 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4337 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4339 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4340 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4341 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4342 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4343 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4345 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4346 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4347 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4348 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4351 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4352 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4353 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4354 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4355 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4356 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4357 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4358 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4359 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4360 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4361 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4362 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4363 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4364 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4365 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4367 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4370 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4371 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4374 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4375 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4376 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4377 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4378 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4379 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4382 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4383 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4384 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4385 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4386 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4387 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4390 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4396 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4397 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4398 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4399 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4401 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4402 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4403 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4404 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4405 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4406 return Ok((None, None, None));
4409 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4410 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4411 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4413 return Ok((None, None, None));
4416 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4417 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4418 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4419 return Ok((None, None, None));
4422 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4424 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4425 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4426 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4427 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4429 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4430 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4432 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4433 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4435 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4436 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4437 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4438 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4440 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4441 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4442 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4449 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4450 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4452 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4453 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4456 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4457 /// within our expected timeframe.
4459 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4460 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4461 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4464 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4467 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4468 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4472 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4473 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4475 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4478 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4479 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4480 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4481 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4484 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4485 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4489 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4491 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4492 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4495 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4496 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4500 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4503 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4504 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4505 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4506 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4508 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4511 assert!(send_shutdown);
4512 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4513 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4514 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4516 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4519 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4524 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4526 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4527 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4529 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4530 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4531 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4532 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4533 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4534 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4537 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4538 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4540 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4541 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4542 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4543 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4547 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4548 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4549 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4550 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4551 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4552 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4554 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4555 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4562 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4563 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4565 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4568 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4569 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4571 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4573 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4574 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4575 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4576 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4577 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4578 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4579 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4580 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4581 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4583 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4584 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4587 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4591 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4592 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4593 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4596 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4599 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4602 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4603 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4605 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4609 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4613 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4614 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4615 return Ok((None, None, None));
4618 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4619 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4620 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4621 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4623 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4625 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4628 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4629 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4630 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4631 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4632 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4636 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4637 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4642 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4643 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4644 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4645 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4646 monitor_update: None,
4647 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4648 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4650 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4651 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4652 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4653 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4657 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4659 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4660 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4661 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4662 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4664 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4667 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4668 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4670 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4671 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4672 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4673 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4674 monitor_update: None,
4675 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4676 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4678 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4679 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4680 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4681 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4686 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4687 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4688 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4689 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4691 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4692 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4693 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4695 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4701 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4702 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4705 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4706 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4708 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4709 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4712 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4713 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4714 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4715 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4716 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4718 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4720 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4722 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4723 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4726 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4727 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4728 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4729 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4730 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4731 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4732 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4733 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4738 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4739 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4740 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4741 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4743 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4747 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4748 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4749 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4750 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4752 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4758 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4759 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4760 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4761 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4762 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4763 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4764 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4766 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4767 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4770 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4772 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4773 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4779 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4780 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4781 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4782 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4783 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4784 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4785 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4787 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4788 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4795 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4796 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4799 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4800 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4803 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4804 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4808 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4809 &self.context.holder_signer
4813 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4815 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4816 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4817 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4818 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4819 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4820 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4822 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4824 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4832 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4833 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4837 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4838 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4839 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4840 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4843 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4844 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4845 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4846 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4849 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4850 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4851 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4852 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4853 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4854 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4857 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4858 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4859 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4860 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4861 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4862 if !release_monitor {
4863 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4872 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4873 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4876 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4877 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4878 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4880 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4881 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4882 if self.context.channel_state &
4883 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4884 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4885 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4886 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4887 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4890 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4891 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4892 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4893 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4894 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4895 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4897 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4898 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4899 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4901 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4902 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4903 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4904 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4905 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4906 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4912 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4913 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4914 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4917 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4918 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4919 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4922 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4923 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4924 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4927 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4928 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4929 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4930 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4931 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4932 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4937 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4938 self.context.channel_update_status
4941 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4942 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4943 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4946 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4948 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4949 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4950 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4954 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4955 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4956 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4959 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4963 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4964 // channel_ready yet.
4965 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4969 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4970 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4971 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4972 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4973 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4975 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4976 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4977 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4979 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4980 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4983 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4984 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4985 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4986 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4987 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4988 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4989 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4990 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4991 self.context.channel_state);
4993 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4997 if need_commitment_update {
4998 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4999 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5000 let next_per_commitment_point =
5001 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5002 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5003 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5004 next_per_commitment_point,
5005 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5009 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5015 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5016 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5017 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5018 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5019 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5020 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5021 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5023 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5026 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5027 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5028 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5029 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5030 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5031 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5032 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5033 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5034 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5035 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5036 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5037 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5038 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5039 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5040 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5041 // channel and move on.
5042 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5043 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5045 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5046 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5047 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5049 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5050 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5051 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5052 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5053 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5054 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5055 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5056 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5061 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5062 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5063 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5064 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5065 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5068 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5069 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5070 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5071 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5072 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5073 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5076 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5077 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5078 // may have already happened for this block).
5079 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5080 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5081 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5082 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5085 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5086 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5087 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5088 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5096 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5097 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5098 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5099 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5101 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5102 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5105 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5107 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5108 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5109 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5110 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5112 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5115 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5118 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5119 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5120 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5121 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5123 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5126 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5127 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5128 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5130 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5131 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5134 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5135 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5143 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5145 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5146 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5147 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5149 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5150 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5153 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5154 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5155 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5156 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5157 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5158 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5159 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5160 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5161 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5164 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5165 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5166 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5167 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5169 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5170 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5171 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5173 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5174 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5175 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5176 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5178 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5179 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5180 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5181 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5182 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5183 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5184 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5187 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5188 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5190 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5193 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5194 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5195 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5196 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5197 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5198 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5199 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5200 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5201 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5202 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5203 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5204 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5205 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5206 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5207 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5208 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5209 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5215 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5220 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5221 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5223 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5224 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5225 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5226 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5228 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5231 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5233 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5234 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5235 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5236 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5237 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5238 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5240 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5241 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5244 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5245 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5246 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5247 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5248 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5249 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5251 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5252 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5255 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5256 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5257 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5258 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5259 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5265 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5266 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5267 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5268 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5270 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5273 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5277 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5281 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5282 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5286 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5290 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5291 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5294 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5298 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5300 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5305 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5306 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5307 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5309 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5314 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5316 None => return None,
5319 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5321 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5322 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5324 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5325 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5331 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5333 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5334 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5335 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5336 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5337 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5338 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5339 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5341 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5342 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5343 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5344 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5345 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5346 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5347 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5348 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5349 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5350 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5351 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5352 contents: announcement,
5357 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5361 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5362 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5363 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5364 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5365 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5366 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5367 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5368 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5370 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5372 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5374 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5375 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5377 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5378 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5379 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5380 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5383 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5384 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5385 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5386 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5389 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5392 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5393 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5394 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5395 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5396 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5397 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5400 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5402 Err(_) => return None,
5404 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5405 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5410 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5411 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5412 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5413 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5414 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5415 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5416 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5417 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5418 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5419 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5420 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5421 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5422 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5423 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5424 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5425 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5428 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5431 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5432 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5433 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5434 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5435 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5436 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5437 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5438 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5439 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5441 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5442 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5443 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5444 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5445 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5446 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5447 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5448 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5449 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5451 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5452 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5453 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5454 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5455 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5456 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5457 next_funding_txid: None,
5462 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5464 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5465 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5466 /// commitment update.
5468 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5469 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5470 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5471 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5472 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5473 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5474 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5477 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5478 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5479 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5481 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5482 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5487 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5488 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5490 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5492 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5493 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5495 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5496 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5497 /// regenerate them.
5499 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5500 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5502 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5503 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5504 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5505 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5506 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5507 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5508 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5510 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5511 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5513 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5514 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5518 if amount_msat == 0 {
5519 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5522 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5523 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5525 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5528 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5529 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5530 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5533 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5534 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5535 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5536 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5537 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5538 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5539 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5540 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5543 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5544 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5545 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5546 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5547 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5548 else { "to peer" });
5550 if need_holding_cell {
5551 force_holding_cell = true;
5554 // Now update local state:
5555 if force_holding_cell {
5556 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5561 onion_routing_packet,
5567 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5568 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5570 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5572 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5577 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5578 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5579 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5583 onion_routing_packet,
5586 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5591 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5592 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5593 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5594 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5596 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5597 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5598 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5600 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5601 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5605 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5606 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5607 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5608 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5609 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5610 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5611 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5614 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5615 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5616 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5617 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5618 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5619 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5622 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5624 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5625 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5626 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5627 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5628 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5630 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5631 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5634 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5635 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5636 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5637 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5638 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5639 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5640 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5641 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5642 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5643 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5644 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5647 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5651 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5652 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5653 where L::Target: Logger
5655 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5656 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5657 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5659 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5661 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5662 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5663 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5664 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5665 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5666 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5667 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5668 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5669 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5670 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5671 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5677 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5680 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5681 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5682 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5683 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5684 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5685 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5687 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5688 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5689 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5691 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5692 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5693 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5696 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5697 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5701 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5702 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5704 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5706 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5707 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5708 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5709 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5711 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5712 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5713 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5714 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5715 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5716 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5720 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5721 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5725 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5726 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5731 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5732 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5734 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5735 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5736 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5737 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5738 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5739 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5740 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5741 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5743 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5744 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5745 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5748 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5749 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5750 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5756 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5758 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5759 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5760 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5761 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5762 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5764 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5766 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5772 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5773 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5775 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5776 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5777 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5778 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5779 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5781 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5782 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5783 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5786 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5787 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5790 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5791 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5794 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5795 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5797 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5798 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5799 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5802 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5803 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5804 let mut chan_closed = false;
5805 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5809 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5811 None if !chan_closed => {
5812 // use override shutdown script if provided
5813 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5814 Some(script) => script,
5816 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5817 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5818 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5819 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5823 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5824 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5826 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5832 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5833 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5834 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5835 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5836 monitor_update: None,
5837 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5838 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5840 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5841 Some(shutdown_result)
5843 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5846 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5848 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5849 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5850 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5851 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5852 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5853 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5856 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5857 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5859 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5860 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5861 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5864 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5865 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5866 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5867 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5868 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5870 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5871 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5878 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5879 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5881 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5884 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5885 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5886 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5888 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5889 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5893 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5897 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5898 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5899 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5900 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5903 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5904 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5905 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5906 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5907 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5908 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5909 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5910 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5912 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5913 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5914 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5915 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5917 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5920 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5923 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5924 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5927 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5930 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5931 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5932 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5933 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5937 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5938 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5940 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5941 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5943 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5945 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5947 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5948 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5949 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5953 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5954 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5956 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5957 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5958 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5959 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5963 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5964 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5965 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5969 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5970 Ok(script) => script,
5971 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5974 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5977 context: ChannelContext {
5980 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5981 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5982 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5983 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5988 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5990 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5991 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5992 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5993 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5995 channel_value_satoshis,
5997 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5999 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6000 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6003 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6004 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6007 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6008 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6009 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6010 pending_update_fee: None,
6011 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6012 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6013 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6014 update_time_counter: 1,
6016 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6018 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6019 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6020 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6021 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6022 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6023 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6025 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6026 signer_pending_funding: false,
6028 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6029 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6030 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6031 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6033 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6034 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6035 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6036 closing_fee_limits: None,
6037 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6039 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6040 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6041 short_channel_id: None,
6042 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6044 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6045 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6046 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6047 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6048 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6049 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6050 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6051 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6052 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6053 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6054 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6055 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6057 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6059 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6060 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6061 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6062 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6063 counterparty_parameters: None,
6064 funding_outpoint: None,
6065 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6067 funding_transaction: None,
6068 is_batch_funding: None,
6070 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6071 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6072 counterparty_node_id,
6074 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6076 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6078 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6079 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6081 announcement_sigs: None,
6083 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6084 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6085 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6086 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6088 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6089 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6091 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6092 outbound_scid_alias,
6094 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6095 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6098 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6103 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6105 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6109 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6110 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6111 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6112 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6113 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6114 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6115 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6116 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6117 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6118 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6119 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6121 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6122 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6124 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6125 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6126 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6127 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6130 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6131 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6133 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6135 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6136 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6138 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6139 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6140 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6141 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6142 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6143 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6146 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6147 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6149 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6150 if funding_created.is_none() {
6151 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6152 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6153 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6157 let channel = Channel {
6158 context: self.context,
6161 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6164 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6165 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6166 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6167 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6168 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6169 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6170 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6171 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6172 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6173 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6176 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6177 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6178 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6179 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6180 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6181 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6187 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6188 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6189 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6190 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6191 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6192 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6194 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6196 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6197 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6198 // We've exhausted our options
6201 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6202 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6205 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6206 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6207 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6208 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6210 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6211 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6212 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6213 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6214 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6215 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6217 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6219 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6220 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6223 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6224 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6225 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6227 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6228 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6231 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6232 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6235 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6236 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6240 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6241 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6242 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6243 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6244 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6245 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6246 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6247 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6248 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6249 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6250 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6251 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6252 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6253 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6254 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6255 first_per_commitment_point,
6256 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6257 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6258 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6259 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6261 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6266 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6267 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6269 // Check sanity of message fields:
6270 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6273 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6276 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6279 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6282 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6285 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6287 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6289 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6290 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6293 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6294 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6297 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6300 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6304 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6305 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6308 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6311 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6314 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6317 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6320 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6323 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6327 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6328 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6331 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6332 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6334 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6335 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6338 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6339 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6342 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6343 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6344 &Some(ref script) => {
6345 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6346 if script.len() == 0 {
6349 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6352 Some(script.clone())
6355 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6362 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6363 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6364 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6365 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6366 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6368 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6369 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6371 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6374 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6375 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6376 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6377 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6378 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6379 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6382 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6383 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6384 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6387 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6388 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6390 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6391 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6397 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6398 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6399 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6400 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6403 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6404 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6405 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6406 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6407 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6408 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6409 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6410 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6411 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6412 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6416 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6418 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6419 // support this channel type.
6420 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6421 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6425 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6426 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6427 // `static_remote_key`.
6428 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6431 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6432 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6435 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6438 channel_type.clone()
6440 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6441 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6447 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6448 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6449 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6450 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6451 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6452 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6453 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6454 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6455 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6458 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6459 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6462 // Check sanity of message fields:
6463 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6466 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6467 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6469 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6472 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6473 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6476 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6477 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6479 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6482 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6484 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6485 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6488 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6491 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6495 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6496 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6497 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6499 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6502 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6505 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6508 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6511 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6514 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6518 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6520 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6521 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6522 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6526 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6527 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6528 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6529 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6530 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6532 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6535 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6536 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6537 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6539 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6540 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6543 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6544 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6545 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6546 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6550 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6551 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6552 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6556 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6557 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6558 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6559 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6563 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6564 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6565 &Some(ref script) => {
6566 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6567 if script.len() == 0 {
6570 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6571 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6573 Some(script.clone())
6576 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6583 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6584 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6585 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6586 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6590 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6591 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6596 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6597 Ok(script) => script,
6598 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6601 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6602 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6604 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6607 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6611 context: ChannelContext {
6614 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6615 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6617 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6622 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6624 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6625 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6626 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6627 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6630 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6632 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6633 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6636 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6637 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6638 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6640 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6641 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6642 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6643 pending_update_fee: None,
6644 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6645 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6646 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6647 update_time_counter: 1,
6649 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6651 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6652 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6653 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6654 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6655 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6656 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6658 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6659 signer_pending_funding: false,
6661 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6662 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6663 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6664 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6666 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6667 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6668 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6669 closing_fee_limits: None,
6670 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6672 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6673 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6674 short_channel_id: None,
6675 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6677 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6678 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6679 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6680 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6681 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6682 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6683 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6684 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6685 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6686 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6687 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6688 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6691 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6693 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6694 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6695 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6696 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6697 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6698 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6699 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6701 funding_outpoint: None,
6702 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6704 funding_transaction: None,
6705 is_batch_funding: None,
6707 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6708 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6709 counterparty_node_id,
6711 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6713 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6715 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6716 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6718 announcement_sigs: None,
6720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6721 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6722 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6723 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6725 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6726 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6728 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6729 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6731 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6732 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6734 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6735 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6740 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6742 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6748 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6749 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6751 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6752 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6753 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6754 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6756 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6757 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6759 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6760 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6763 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6766 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6767 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6768 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6770 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6771 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6772 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6773 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6775 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6776 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6777 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6778 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6779 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6780 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6781 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6782 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6783 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6784 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6785 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6786 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6787 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6788 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6789 first_per_commitment_point,
6790 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6791 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6792 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6794 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6796 next_local_nonce: None,
6800 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6801 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6803 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6805 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6806 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6809 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6810 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6812 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6813 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6814 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6815 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6816 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6817 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6818 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6819 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6820 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6821 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6822 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6824 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6827 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6828 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6829 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6833 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6834 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6836 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6837 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6838 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6840 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6842 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6843 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6844 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6845 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6848 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6849 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6850 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6851 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6852 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6854 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6856 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6857 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6858 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6861 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6862 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6863 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6867 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6868 initial_commitment_tx,
6871 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6872 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6875 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6876 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6879 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6881 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6882 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6883 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6884 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6886 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6888 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6889 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6890 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6891 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6892 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6893 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6894 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6895 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6896 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6897 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6898 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6900 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6902 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6903 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6904 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6905 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6906 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6907 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6909 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6910 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6912 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6913 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6914 let mut channel = Channel {
6915 context: self.context,
6917 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6918 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6920 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6924 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6925 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6927 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6933 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6934 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6935 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6936 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6937 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6939 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6940 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6941 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6942 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6948 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6949 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6950 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6951 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6952 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6953 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6958 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6959 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6960 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6961 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6963 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6964 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6965 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6966 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6971 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6972 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6973 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6974 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6975 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6976 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6981 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6982 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6983 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6986 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6988 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6989 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6990 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6991 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6992 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6994 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6995 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6996 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6997 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6999 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7000 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
7001 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7003 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7005 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7006 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
7007 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
7008 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
7009 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
7010 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
7011 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
7013 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7014 // deserialized from that format.
7015 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7016 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7017 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7019 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7021 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7022 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7023 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7025 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7026 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7027 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7028 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7031 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7032 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7033 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7036 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7037 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7038 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7039 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7041 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7042 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7044 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7046 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7048 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7050 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7053 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7055 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7060 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7061 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7063 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7064 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7065 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7066 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7067 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7068 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7069 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7071 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7073 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7075 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7078 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7079 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7080 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7083 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7085 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7086 preimages.push(preimage);
7088 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7089 reason.write(writer)?;
7091 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7093 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7094 preimages.push(preimage);
7096 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7097 reason.write(writer)?;
7100 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7101 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7102 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7104 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7105 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7106 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7110 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7111 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7112 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7114 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7115 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7119 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7120 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7121 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7122 source.write(writer)?;
7123 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7125 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7126 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7127 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7129 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7130 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7132 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7134 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7135 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7139 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7140 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7145 match self.context.resend_order {
7146 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7147 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7150 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7151 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7152 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7154 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7155 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7156 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7157 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7160 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7161 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7162 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7163 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7164 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7167 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7168 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7169 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7170 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7172 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7173 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7174 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7176 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7178 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7179 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7180 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7183 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7184 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7185 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7186 // consider the stale state on reload.
7189 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7190 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7191 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7193 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7194 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7195 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7197 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7198 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7200 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7201 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7202 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7204 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7205 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7207 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7210 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7211 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7212 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7214 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7217 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7218 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7220 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7221 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7222 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7224 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7226 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7228 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7230 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7231 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7232 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7233 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7234 htlc.write(writer)?;
7237 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7238 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7239 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7241 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7242 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7244 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7245 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7246 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7247 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7248 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7249 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7250 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7252 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7253 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7254 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7255 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7256 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7258 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7259 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7261 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7262 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7263 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7264 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7266 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7268 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7269 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7270 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7271 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7272 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7273 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7274 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7276 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7277 (2, chan_type, option),
7278 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7279 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7280 (5, self.context.config, required),
7281 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7282 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7283 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7284 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7285 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7286 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7287 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7288 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7289 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7290 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7291 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7292 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7293 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7294 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7295 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7296 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7297 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7298 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7299 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7306 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7307 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7310 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7312 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7313 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7314 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7316 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7317 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7318 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7319 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7323 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7324 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7330 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7334 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7337 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let mut keys_data = None;
7341 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7342 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7343 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7345 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7346 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7347 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7348 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7349 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7350 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7354 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7355 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7356 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7359 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7361 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7362 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7368 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7369 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7370 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7371 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7372 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7373 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7374 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7375 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7376 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7377 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7378 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7379 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7384 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7386 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7387 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7388 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7389 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7390 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7391 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7392 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7393 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7394 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7395 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7397 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7398 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7401 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7405 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7406 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7408 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7410 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7414 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7415 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7416 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7417 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7418 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7419 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7420 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7421 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7422 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7423 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7424 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7426 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7427 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7428 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7430 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7431 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7432 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7438 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7439 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7440 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7441 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7444 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7450 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7451 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7454 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7456 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7457 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7460 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7469 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7470 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7471 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7472 // consider the stale state on reload.
7473 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7476 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7483 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7492 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7493 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7495 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7496 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7504 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7505 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7507 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7508 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7513 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7514 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7515 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7516 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7518 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7521 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7522 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7524 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7526 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7527 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7529 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7530 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7532 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7535 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7536 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7538 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7540 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7544 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7545 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7546 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7548 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7554 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7555 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7556 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7557 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7558 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7559 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7560 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7561 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7562 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7563 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7565 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7566 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7567 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7568 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7569 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7570 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7571 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7573 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7574 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7575 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7576 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7578 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7580 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7581 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7583 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7585 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7586 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7587 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7588 (2, channel_type, option),
7589 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7590 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7591 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7592 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7593 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7594 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7595 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7596 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7597 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7598 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7599 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7600 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7601 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7602 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7603 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7604 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7605 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7606 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7607 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7608 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7609 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7610 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7613 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7614 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7615 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7616 // required channel parameters.
7617 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7618 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7619 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7621 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7623 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7624 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7625 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7626 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7629 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7630 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7631 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7633 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7634 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7636 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7637 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7642 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7643 if iter.next().is_some() {
7644 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7648 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7649 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7650 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7651 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7652 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7655 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7656 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7657 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7659 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7660 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7662 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7663 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7664 // separate u64 values.
7665 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7667 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7669 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7670 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7671 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7672 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7674 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7675 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7677 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7678 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7679 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7680 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7681 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7684 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7685 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7689 context: ChannelContext {
7692 config: config.unwrap(),
7696 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7697 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7698 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7701 temporary_channel_id,
7703 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7705 channel_value_satoshis,
7707 latest_monitor_update_id,
7709 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7710 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7713 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7714 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7717 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7718 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7719 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7720 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7724 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7725 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7726 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7727 monitor_pending_forwards,
7728 monitor_pending_failures,
7729 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7731 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7732 signer_pending_funding: false,
7735 holding_cell_update_fee,
7736 next_holder_htlc_id,
7737 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7738 update_time_counter,
7741 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7742 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7743 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7744 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7746 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7747 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7748 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7749 closing_fee_limits: None,
7750 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7752 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7753 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7755 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7757 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7758 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7759 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7760 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7761 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7762 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7765 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7768 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7770 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7771 funding_transaction,
7774 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7775 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7776 counterparty_node_id,
7778 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7782 channel_update_status,
7783 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7787 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7788 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7789 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7790 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7792 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7793 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7795 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7796 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7797 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7799 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7800 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7803 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7805 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7808 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7817 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7818 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7819 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7820 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7821 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7823 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7824 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7825 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7826 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7827 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7828 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7829 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7830 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7831 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7832 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7833 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7834 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7835 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7836 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7837 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7838 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7839 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7840 use crate::util::test_utils;
7841 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7842 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7843 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7844 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7845 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7846 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7847 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7848 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7849 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7850 use crate::prelude::*;
7852 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7855 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7856 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7862 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7863 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7864 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7865 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7869 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7870 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7871 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7872 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7873 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7874 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7875 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7876 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7880 signer: InMemorySigner,
7883 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7884 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7887 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7888 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7890 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7891 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7894 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7898 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7900 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7901 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7902 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7903 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7904 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7907 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7908 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7909 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7910 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7914 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7915 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7916 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7920 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7921 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7922 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7923 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7925 let seed = [42; 32];
7926 let network = Network::Testnet;
7927 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7928 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7929 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7932 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7933 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7934 let config = UserConfig::default();
7935 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7936 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7937 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7939 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7940 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7944 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7945 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7947 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7948 let original_fee = 253;
7949 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7950 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7951 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7952 let seed = [42; 32];
7953 let network = Network::Testnet;
7954 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7956 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7957 let config = UserConfig::default();
7958 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7960 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7961 // same as the old fee.
7962 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7963 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7964 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7968 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7969 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7970 // dust limits are used.
7971 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7973 let seed = [42; 32];
7974 let network = Network::Testnet;
7975 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7976 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7977 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7979 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7980 // they have different dust limits.
7982 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7983 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7984 let config = UserConfig::default();
7985 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7987 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7988 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7989 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7990 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7991 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7993 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7994 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7995 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7996 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7997 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7999 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8000 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8001 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8002 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8004 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8005 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8006 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8008 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8009 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8011 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8012 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8013 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8015 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8016 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
8017 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8018 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8021 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8023 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8024 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
8025 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8026 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8027 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8028 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8029 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8030 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8031 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8033 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8036 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8037 // the dust limit check.
8038 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8039 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8040 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8041 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8043 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8044 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8045 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8046 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8047 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8048 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8049 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8053 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8054 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8055 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8056 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8057 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8058 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8059 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8060 let seed = [42; 32];
8061 let network = Network::Testnet;
8062 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8064 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8065 let config = UserConfig::default();
8066 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8068 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8069 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8071 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8072 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8073 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8074 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8075 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8076 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8078 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8079 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8080 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8081 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8082 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8084 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8086 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8087 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8088 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8089 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8090 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8092 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8093 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8094 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8095 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8096 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8100 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8101 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8102 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8103 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8104 let seed = [42; 32];
8105 let network = Network::Testnet;
8106 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8107 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8108 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8110 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8112 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8113 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8114 let config = UserConfig::default();
8115 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8117 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8118 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8119 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8120 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8122 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8123 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8124 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8126 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8127 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8128 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8129 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8131 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8132 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8133 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8135 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8136 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8138 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8139 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8140 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8141 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8142 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8143 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8144 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8146 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8148 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8149 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8150 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8151 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8152 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8156 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8157 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8158 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8160 let seed = [42; 32];
8161 let network = Network::Testnet;
8162 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8163 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8164 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8166 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8167 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8168 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8169 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8170 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8171 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8172 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8173 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8175 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8176 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8177 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8178 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8179 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8180 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8182 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8183 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8184 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8185 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8187 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8189 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8190 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8191 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8192 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8193 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8194 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8196 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8197 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8198 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8199 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8201 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8202 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8203 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8204 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8205 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8207 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8208 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8210 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8211 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8212 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8214 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8215 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8216 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8217 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8218 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8220 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8221 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8223 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8224 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8225 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8229 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8231 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8232 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8233 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8235 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8236 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8237 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8238 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8240 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8241 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8242 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8244 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8246 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8247 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8250 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8251 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8252 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8253 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8254 let seed = [42; 32];
8255 let network = Network::Testnet;
8256 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8257 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8258 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8261 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8262 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8263 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8265 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8266 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8268 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8269 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8270 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8272 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8273 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8275 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8277 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8278 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8280 // Channel Negotiations failed
8281 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8282 assert!(result.is_err());
8287 fn channel_update() {
8288 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8289 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8290 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8291 let seed = [42; 32];
8292 let network = Network::Testnet;
8293 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8294 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8295 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8297 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8298 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8299 let config = UserConfig::default();
8300 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8302 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8303 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8304 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8305 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8306 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8308 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8309 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8310 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8311 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8312 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8314 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8315 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8316 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8317 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8319 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8320 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8321 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8323 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8324 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8326 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8327 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8328 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8330 short_channel_id: 0,
8333 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8334 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8335 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8337 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8338 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8340 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8342 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8344 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8345 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8346 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8347 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8349 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8350 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8351 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8353 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8356 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8359 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8361 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8362 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8363 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8364 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8365 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8366 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8367 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8368 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8369 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8370 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8371 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8372 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8373 use crate::sync::Arc;
8375 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8376 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8377 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8378 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8380 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8382 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8383 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8384 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8385 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8386 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8388 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8389 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8395 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8396 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8397 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8399 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8400 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8401 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8402 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8403 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8404 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8406 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8408 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8409 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8410 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8411 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8412 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8413 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8415 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8416 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8417 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8418 selected_contest_delay: 144
8420 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8421 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8423 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8424 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8426 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8427 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8429 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8430 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8432 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8433 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8434 // build_commitment_transaction.
8435 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8436 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8437 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8438 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8439 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8441 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8442 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8443 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8444 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8448 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8449 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8450 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8451 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8455 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8456 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8457 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8459 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8460 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8462 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8463 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8465 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8467 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8468 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8469 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8470 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8471 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8472 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8473 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8475 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8476 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8477 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8478 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8480 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8481 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8482 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8484 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8486 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8487 commitment_tx.clone(),
8488 counterparty_signature,
8489 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8490 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8491 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8493 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8494 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8496 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8497 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8498 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8500 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8501 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8504 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8505 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8507 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8508 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8509 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8510 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8511 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8512 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8513 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8514 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8516 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8519 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8520 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8521 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8525 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8528 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8529 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8530 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8531 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8532 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8533 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8535 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8536 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8537 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8538 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8540 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8541 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8542 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8543 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8544 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8546 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8547 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8548 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8549 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8550 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8551 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8553 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8557 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8558 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8559 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8560 "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", {});
8562 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8563 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8565 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8566 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8567 "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", {});
8569 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8570 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8571 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8572 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8574 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8575 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8577 amount_msat: 1000000,
8579 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8580 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8582 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8585 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8586 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8588 amount_msat: 2000000,
8590 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8591 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8593 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8596 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8597 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8599 amount_msat: 2000000,
8601 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8602 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8603 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8604 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8606 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8609 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8610 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8612 amount_msat: 3000000,
8614 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8615 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8616 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8617 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8619 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8622 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8623 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8625 amount_msat: 4000000,
8627 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8628 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8630 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8634 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8635 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8636 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8638 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8639 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8640 "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", {
8643 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8644 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8645 "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" },
8648 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8649 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8650 "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" },
8653 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8654 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8655 "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" },
8658 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8659 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8660 "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" },
8663 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8664 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8665 "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" }
8668 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8672 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8673 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8674 "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", {
8677 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8678 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8679 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8682 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8683 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8684 "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" },
8687 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8688 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8689 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8692 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8693 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8694 "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" },
8697 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8698 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8699 "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" }
8702 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8703 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8704 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8706 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8707 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8708 "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", {
8711 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8712 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8713 "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" },
8716 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8717 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8718 "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" },
8721 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8722 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8723 "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" },
8726 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8727 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8728 "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" }
8731 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8732 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8733 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8734 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8736 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8737 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8738 "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", {
8741 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8742 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8743 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8746 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8747 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8748 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8751 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8752 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8753 "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" },
8756 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8757 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8758 "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" }
8761 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8762 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8763 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8764 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8766 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8767 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8768 "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", {
8771 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8772 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8773 "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" },
8776 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8777 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8778 "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" },
8781 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8782 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8783 "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" },
8786 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8787 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8788 "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" }
8791 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8792 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8793 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8795 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8796 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8797 "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", {
8800 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8801 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8802 "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" },
8805 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8806 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8807 "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" },
8810 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8811 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8812 "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" }
8815 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8816 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8817 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8819 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8820 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8821 "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", {
8824 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8825 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8826 "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" },
8829 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8830 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8831 "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" },
8834 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8835 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8836 "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" }
8839 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8840 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8841 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8843 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8844 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8845 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8848 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8849 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8850 "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" },
8853 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8854 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8855 "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" }
8858 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8859 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8860 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8861 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8862 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8863 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8865 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8866 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8867 "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", {
8870 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8871 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8872 "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" },
8875 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8876 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8877 "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" }
8880 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8881 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8882 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8883 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8884 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8886 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8887 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8888 "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", {
8891 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8892 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8893 "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" },
8896 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8897 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8898 "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" }
8901 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8902 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8903 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8905 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8906 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8907 "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", {
8910 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8911 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8912 "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" }
8915 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8916 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8917 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8918 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8919 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8921 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8922 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8923 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8926 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8927 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8928 "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" }
8931 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8932 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8933 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8934 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8935 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8937 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8938 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8939 "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", {
8942 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8943 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8944 "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" }
8947 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8948 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8949 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8950 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8952 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8953 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8954 "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", {});
8956 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8957 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8958 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8959 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8960 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8962 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8963 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8964 "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", {});
8966 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8967 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8968 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8969 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8970 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8972 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8973 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8974 "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", {});
8976 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8977 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8978 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8980 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8981 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8982 "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", {});
8984 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8985 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8986 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8987 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8988 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8990 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8991 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8992 "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", {});
8994 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8995 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8996 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8997 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8998 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9000 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9001 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9002 "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", {});
9004 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9005 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9006 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9007 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9008 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9009 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9011 amount_msat: 2000000,
9013 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9014 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9016 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
9019 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9020 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9021 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9023 amount_msat: 5000001,
9025 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9026 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9027 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9028 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9030 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9033 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9034 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9036 amount_msat: 5000000,
9038 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9039 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9040 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9041 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9043 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9047 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9048 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9049 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9052 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9053 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9054 "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" },
9056 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9057 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9058 "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" },
9060 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9061 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9062 "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" }
9065 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9066 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9067 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9068 "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", {
9071 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9072 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9073 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9075 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9076 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9077 "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" },
9079 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9080 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9081 "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" }
9086 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9087 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9089 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9090 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9091 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9092 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9094 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9095 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9096 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9098 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9099 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9101 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9102 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9104 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9105 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9106 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9110 fn test_key_derivation() {
9111 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9112 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9114 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9115 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9117 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9118 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9120 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9121 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9123 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9124 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9126 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9127 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9129 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9130 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9132 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9133 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9137 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9138 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9140 let seed = [42; 32];
9141 let network = Network::Testnet;
9142 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9143 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9145 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9146 let config = UserConfig::default();
9147 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9148 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
9150 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9151 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9153 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9154 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9155 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9156 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9157 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9158 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9159 assert!(res.is_ok());
9163 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9164 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9165 // resulting `channel_type`.
9166 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9167 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9168 let network = Network::Testnet;
9169 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9170 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9172 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9173 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9175 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9176 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9178 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9179 // need to signal it.
9180 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9181 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9182 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9185 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9187 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9188 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9189 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9191 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9192 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9193 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9196 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9197 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9198 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9199 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9200 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9203 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9204 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9208 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9209 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9210 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9211 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9212 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9213 let network = Network::Testnet;
9214 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9215 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9217 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9218 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9220 let config = UserConfig::default();
9222 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9223 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9224 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9225 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9226 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9228 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9229 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9230 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9233 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9234 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9235 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9237 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9238 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9239 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9240 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9241 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9242 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9244 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9248 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9249 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9251 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9252 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9253 let network = Network::Testnet;
9254 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9255 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9257 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9258 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9260 let config = UserConfig::default();
9262 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9263 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9264 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9265 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9266 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9267 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9268 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9269 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9271 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9272 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9273 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9274 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9275 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9276 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9279 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9280 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9282 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9283 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9284 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9285 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9287 assert!(res.is_err());
9289 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9290 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9291 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9293 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9294 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9295 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9298 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9300 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9301 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9302 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9303 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9306 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9307 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9309 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9310 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9312 assert!(res.is_err());
9316 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9317 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9318 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9319 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9320 let seed = [42; 32];
9321 let network = Network::Testnet;
9322 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9323 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9324 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9326 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9327 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9328 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9329 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9331 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9332 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9333 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9338 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9347 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9348 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9349 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9354 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9355 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9361 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9364 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9365 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9366 &accept_channel_msg,
9367 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9368 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9371 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9372 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9373 let tx = Transaction {
9375 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9379 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9382 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9385 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9386 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9391 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9392 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9393 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9397 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9398 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9406 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9407 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9408 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9409 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9414 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9421 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9422 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9423 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9424 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9426 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9427 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9428 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9431 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9432 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9433 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9441 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9442 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9443 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9444 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9447 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9448 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9450 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9451 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9452 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9454 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());