1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
598 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
600 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
601 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
605 (0, update, required),
608 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
609 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
610 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
611 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
612 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
614 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
615 /// in a timely manner.
616 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
619 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
620 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
621 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
623 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
624 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
625 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
626 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
630 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
631 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
634 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
635 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
636 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
637 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
639 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
643 /// The current channel ID.
644 channel_id: ChannelId,
645 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
646 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
647 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
650 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
651 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
653 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
654 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
655 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
657 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
658 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
659 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
660 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
662 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
663 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
665 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
667 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
668 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
669 destination_script: Script,
671 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
672 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
673 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
675 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
676 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
677 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
678 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
679 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
680 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
682 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
683 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
684 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
685 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
686 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
687 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
689 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
691 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
692 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
693 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
695 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
696 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
697 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
698 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
699 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
700 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
701 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
703 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
704 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
705 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
707 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
708 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
709 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
710 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
711 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
712 /// outbound or inbound.
713 signer_pending_funding: bool,
715 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
717 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
718 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
719 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
720 // HTLCs with similar state.
721 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
722 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
723 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
724 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
725 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
726 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
727 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
728 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
729 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
732 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
733 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
734 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
736 update_time_counter: u32,
738 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
739 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
740 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
741 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
742 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
743 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
745 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
746 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
748 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
749 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
750 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
751 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
753 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
754 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
756 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
758 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
760 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
761 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
762 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
763 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
764 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
765 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
766 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
767 channel_creation_height: u32,
769 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
772 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
774 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
777 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
779 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
782 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
784 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
786 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
787 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
790 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
792 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
794 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
795 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
797 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
799 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
800 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
801 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
803 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
805 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
806 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
808 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
809 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
810 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
812 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
814 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
816 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
817 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
818 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
819 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
821 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
822 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
823 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
825 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
826 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
827 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
829 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
830 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
831 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
832 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
833 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
834 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
835 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
836 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
838 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
839 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
840 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
841 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
842 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
844 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
845 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
847 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
848 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
849 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
850 /// unblock the state machine.
852 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
853 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
854 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
856 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
857 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
858 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
861 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
862 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
863 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
864 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
865 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
866 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
867 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
869 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
870 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
872 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
873 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
874 // the channel's funding UTXO.
876 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
877 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
878 // associated channel mapping.
880 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
881 // to store all of them.
882 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
884 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
885 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
886 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
887 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
888 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
890 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
891 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
893 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
894 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
896 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
897 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
898 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
900 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
901 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
902 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
905 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
908 self.update_time_counter
911 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
912 self.latest_monitor_update_id
915 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
916 self.config.announced_channel
919 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
920 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
923 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
924 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
925 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
926 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
929 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
930 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
931 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
934 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
935 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
936 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
937 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
938 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
941 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
942 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
943 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
944 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
946 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
947 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
949 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
950 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
952 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
953 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
955 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
958 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
959 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
960 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
961 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
963 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
964 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
965 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
966 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
969 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
970 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
971 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
972 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
973 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
978 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
982 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
984 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
985 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
986 self.temporary_channel_id
989 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
993 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
994 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
995 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
999 /// Gets the channel's type
1000 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1004 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1006 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1007 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1008 self.short_channel_id
1011 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1012 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1013 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1017 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1018 self.outbound_scid_alias
1021 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1022 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1023 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1024 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1025 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1026 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1029 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1030 /// get_funding_created.
1031 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1032 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1035 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1036 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1037 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1040 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1041 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1042 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1043 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1047 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1050 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1051 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1054 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1055 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1058 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1059 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1060 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1063 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1064 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1067 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1068 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1069 self.counterparty_node_id
1072 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1073 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1074 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1077 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1078 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1079 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1082 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1083 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1085 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1086 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1087 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1088 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1090 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1094 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1095 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1096 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1099 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1100 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1101 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1104 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1105 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1106 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1108 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1109 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1114 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1115 self.channel_value_satoshis
1118 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1119 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1122 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1123 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1126 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1127 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1128 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1130 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1131 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1132 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1133 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1134 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1136 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1140 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1141 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1142 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1145 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1146 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1147 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1150 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1151 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1152 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1155 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1156 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1157 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1160 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1161 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1162 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1165 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1166 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1167 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1170 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1171 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1172 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1173 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1174 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1177 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1179 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1180 self.prev_config = None;
1184 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1185 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1189 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1190 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1191 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1192 let did_channel_update =
1193 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1194 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1195 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1196 if did_channel_update {
1197 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1198 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1199 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1200 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1202 self.config.options = *config;
1206 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1207 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1208 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1211 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1212 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1213 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1214 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1215 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1217 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1218 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1219 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1220 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1221 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1222 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1223 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1225 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1226 where L::Target: Logger
1228 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1229 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1230 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1232 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1233 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1234 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1235 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1237 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1238 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1239 if match update_state {
1240 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1241 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1242 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1243 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1244 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1246 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1250 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1251 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1252 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1254 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1256 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1257 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1258 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1260 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1261 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1262 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1263 transaction_output_index: None
1268 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1269 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1270 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1271 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1272 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1275 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1277 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1278 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1279 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1281 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1282 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1285 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1286 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1289 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1291 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1292 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1293 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1295 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1296 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1302 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1303 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1304 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1305 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1306 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1307 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1308 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1312 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1313 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1315 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1317 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1318 if generated_by_local {
1319 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1320 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1329 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1331 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1332 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1333 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1334 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1335 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1336 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1337 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1340 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1341 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1342 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1343 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1347 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1348 preimages.push(preimage);
1352 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1353 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1357 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1358 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1360 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1361 if !generated_by_local {
1362 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1370 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1371 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1372 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1373 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1374 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1375 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1376 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1377 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1379 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1381 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1382 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1383 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1384 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1386 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1388 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1389 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1390 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1391 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1394 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1395 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1396 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1397 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1399 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1402 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1403 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1404 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1405 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1407 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1411 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1416 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1417 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1422 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1424 let channel_parameters =
1425 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1426 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1427 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1434 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1437 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1438 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1439 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1440 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1442 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1443 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1444 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1452 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1453 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1459 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1460 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1461 /// our counterparty!)
1462 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1463 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1464 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1465 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1466 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1467 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1468 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1470 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1474 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1475 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1476 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1477 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1478 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1479 //may see payments to it!
1480 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1481 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1482 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1484 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1487 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1488 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1489 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1490 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1491 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1494 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1495 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1498 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1502 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1503 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1504 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1505 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1506 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1507 // which are near the dust limit.
1508 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1509 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1510 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1511 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1512 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1514 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1515 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1517 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1520 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1521 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1522 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1525 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1526 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1528 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1529 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1530 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1531 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1532 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1533 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1534 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1537 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1540 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1541 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1542 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1544 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1545 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1546 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1547 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1548 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1549 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1551 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1552 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1558 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1559 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1561 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1562 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1563 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1564 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1565 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1566 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1567 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1570 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1573 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1574 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1575 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1577 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1578 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1579 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1580 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1582 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1584 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1585 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1590 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1591 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1592 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1593 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1594 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1595 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1597 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1598 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1600 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1607 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1608 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1609 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1610 /// corner case properly.
1611 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1612 -> AvailableBalances
1613 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1615 let context = &self;
1616 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1617 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1618 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1620 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1621 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1623 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1625 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1627 if context.is_outbound() {
1628 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1629 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1631 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1632 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1634 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1635 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1636 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1637 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1640 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1641 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1642 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1643 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1645 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1646 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1647 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1648 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1649 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1650 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1651 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1652 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1653 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1654 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1656 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1659 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1660 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1661 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1662 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1663 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1666 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1667 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1669 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1670 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1671 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1673 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1674 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1675 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1676 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1680 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1682 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1683 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1684 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1685 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1686 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1687 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1688 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1690 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1691 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1693 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1694 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1695 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1697 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1698 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1699 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1700 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1701 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1704 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1705 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1706 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1707 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1708 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1709 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1712 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1713 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1714 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1716 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1720 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1721 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1723 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1724 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1728 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1729 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1730 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1731 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1733 outbound_capacity_msat,
1734 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1735 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1739 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1740 let context = &self;
1741 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1744 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1745 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1747 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1748 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1750 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1751 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1753 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1754 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1755 let context = &self;
1756 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1758 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1761 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1762 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1764 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1765 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1767 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1768 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1770 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1771 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1775 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1776 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1782 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1783 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1784 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1787 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1788 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1789 included_htlcs += 1;
1792 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1797 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1798 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1799 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1800 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1801 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1802 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1807 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1809 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1810 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1815 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1816 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1820 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1821 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1822 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1825 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1826 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1828 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1829 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1830 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1832 total_pending_htlcs,
1833 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1834 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1835 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1837 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1838 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1839 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1841 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1843 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1848 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1849 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1851 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1852 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1854 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1855 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1857 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1858 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1859 let context = &self;
1860 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1862 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1865 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1866 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1868 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1869 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1871 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1872 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1874 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1875 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1879 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1880 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1886 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1887 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1888 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1889 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1890 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1891 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1894 included_htlcs += 1;
1897 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1898 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1901 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1902 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1904 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1905 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1906 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1911 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1912 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1913 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1916 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1917 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1919 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1920 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1922 total_pending_htlcs,
1923 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1924 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1925 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1927 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1928 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1929 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1931 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1933 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1938 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1939 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1941 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1947 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1948 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1949 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1950 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1951 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1952 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1953 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1954 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1955 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1956 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1957 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1959 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1960 // return them to fail the payment.
1961 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1962 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1963 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1965 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1966 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1971 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1972 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1973 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1974 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1975 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1976 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1977 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1978 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1979 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1980 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1981 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1982 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1983 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1988 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1989 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1990 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1994 // Internal utility functions for channels
1996 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1997 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1998 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2000 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2002 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2003 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2004 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2006 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2009 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2011 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2014 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2015 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2016 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2018 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2020 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2021 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2022 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2023 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2024 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2027 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2028 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2029 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2030 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2031 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2032 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2033 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2036 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2037 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2039 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2040 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2043 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2044 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2045 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2046 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2047 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2048 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2051 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2052 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2053 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2056 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2057 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2058 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2059 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2062 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2063 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2065 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2066 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2067 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2071 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2072 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2073 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2075 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2076 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2077 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2078 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2080 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2081 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2082 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2083 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2084 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2085 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2086 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2087 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2088 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2089 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2094 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2095 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2096 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2097 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2098 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2099 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2101 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2103 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2104 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2105 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2106 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2107 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2108 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2109 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2110 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2112 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2113 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2123 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2124 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2125 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2126 // outside of those situations will fail.
2127 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2131 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2136 1 + // script length (0)
2140 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2141 2 + // witness marker and flag
2142 1 + // witness element count
2143 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2144 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2145 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2146 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2147 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2148 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2150 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2151 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2152 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2158 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2159 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2160 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2161 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2163 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2164 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2165 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2167 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2168 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2169 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2170 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2171 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2172 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2175 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2176 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2179 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2180 value_to_holder = 0;
2183 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2184 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2185 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2186 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2188 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2189 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2192 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2193 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2196 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2199 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2200 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2202 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2204 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2205 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2206 where L::Target: Logger {
2207 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2208 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2209 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2210 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2211 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2212 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2213 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2214 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2218 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2219 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2220 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2221 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2223 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2224 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2226 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2228 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2229 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2230 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2232 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2233 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2234 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2235 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2236 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2237 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2238 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2240 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2242 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2244 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2245 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2247 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2250 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2251 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2255 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2259 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2261 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2262 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2263 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2264 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2267 // Now update local state:
2269 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2270 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2271 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2272 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2273 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2274 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2275 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2279 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2280 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2281 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2282 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2283 // do not not get into this branch.
2284 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2285 match pending_update {
2286 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2287 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2288 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2289 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2290 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2291 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2292 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2295 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2296 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2297 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2298 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2299 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2300 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2301 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2307 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2308 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2309 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2311 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2312 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2313 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2315 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2316 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2319 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2320 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2322 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2323 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2325 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2326 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2329 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2332 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2333 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2334 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2335 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2340 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2341 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2342 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2343 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2344 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2345 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2346 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2347 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2348 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2349 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2350 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2351 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2352 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2353 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2354 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2356 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2357 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2358 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2359 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2360 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2363 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2364 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2365 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2371 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2372 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2374 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2378 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2379 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2380 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2381 /// before we fail backwards.
2383 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2384 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2385 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2386 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2387 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2388 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2389 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2392 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2393 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2394 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2395 /// before we fail backwards.
2397 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2398 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2399 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2400 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2401 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2402 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2403 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2405 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2407 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2408 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2409 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2411 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2412 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2413 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2415 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2416 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2417 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2419 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2424 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2425 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2431 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2432 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2433 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2434 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2435 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2439 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2440 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2441 force_holding_cell = true;
2444 // Now update local state:
2445 if force_holding_cell {
2446 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2447 match pending_update {
2448 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2449 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2450 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2451 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2455 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2456 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2457 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2458 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2464 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2465 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2466 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2472 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2474 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2475 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2478 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2479 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2480 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2485 // Message handlers:
2487 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2488 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2489 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2490 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2491 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2495 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2496 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2498 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2501 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2502 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2503 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2504 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2507 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2509 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2510 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2511 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2512 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2514 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2515 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2517 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2518 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2520 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2521 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2522 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2523 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2524 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2525 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2529 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2530 initial_commitment_tx,
2533 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2534 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2537 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2538 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2541 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2542 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2543 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2544 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2545 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2546 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2547 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2548 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2549 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2550 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2551 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2552 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2554 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2556 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2557 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2558 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2559 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2560 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2561 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2562 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2564 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2565 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2566 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2567 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2569 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2571 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2572 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2576 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2577 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2579 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2580 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2581 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2582 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2584 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2587 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2588 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2592 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2593 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2594 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2595 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2596 // when routing outbound payments.
2597 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2601 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2603 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2604 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2605 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2606 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2607 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2608 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2609 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2610 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2611 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2613 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2614 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2615 let expected_point =
2616 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2617 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2619 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2620 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2621 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2622 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2623 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2624 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2626 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2627 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2628 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2629 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2630 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2632 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2640 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2641 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2643 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2645 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2648 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2649 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2650 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2651 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2652 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2653 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2655 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2656 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2657 if local_sent_shutdown {
2658 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2660 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2661 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2662 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2665 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2668 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2671 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2674 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2678 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2679 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2680 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2683 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2684 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2686 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2687 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2688 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2689 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2690 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2691 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2692 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2693 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2694 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2695 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2696 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2698 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2699 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2700 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2701 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2702 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2703 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2707 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2708 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2711 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2712 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2713 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2715 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2716 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2717 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2718 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2719 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2720 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2721 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2725 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2726 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2727 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2728 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2729 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2730 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2731 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2735 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2736 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2737 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2738 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2739 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2740 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2743 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2744 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2745 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2746 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2747 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2749 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2753 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2757 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2758 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2759 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2760 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2761 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2762 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2763 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2764 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2765 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2766 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2767 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2768 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2769 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2770 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2771 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2772 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2775 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2776 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2777 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2778 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2782 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2785 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2786 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2789 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2790 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2791 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2795 // Now update local state:
2796 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2797 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2798 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2799 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2800 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2801 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2802 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2807 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2809 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2810 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2811 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2812 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2813 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2814 None => fail_reason.into(),
2815 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2816 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2817 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2820 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2824 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2826 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2827 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2829 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2835 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2838 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2839 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2842 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2846 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2849 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2850 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2857 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2861 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2862 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2865 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2869 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2873 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2874 where L::Target: Logger
2876 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2879 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2882 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2886 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2888 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2890 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2891 let commitment_txid = {
2892 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2893 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2894 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2896 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2897 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2898 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2899 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2900 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2905 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2907 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2908 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2909 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2910 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2913 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2914 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2915 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2921 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2922 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2923 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2924 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2925 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2926 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2927 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2928 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2929 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2930 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2931 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2937 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2941 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2942 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2943 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2944 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2945 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2946 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2947 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2948 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2949 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2950 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2951 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2952 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2953 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2956 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2957 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2958 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2959 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2960 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2961 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2962 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2964 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2965 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2966 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2967 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2968 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2969 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
2970 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2973 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2974 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2977 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2979 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2980 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2981 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2984 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2987 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2988 commitment_stats.tx,
2990 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2991 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2992 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2995 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2996 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2998 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2999 let mut need_commitment = false;
3000 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3001 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3002 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3003 need_commitment = true;
3007 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3008 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3009 Some(forward_info.clone())
3011 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3012 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3013 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3014 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3015 need_commitment = true;
3018 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3019 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3020 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3021 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3022 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3023 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3024 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3025 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3026 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3027 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3028 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3029 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3030 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3031 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3033 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3035 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3036 need_commitment = true;
3040 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3041 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3042 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3043 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3044 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3045 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3047 nondust_htlc_sources,
3051 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3052 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3053 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3054 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3056 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3057 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3058 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3059 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3060 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3061 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3062 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3063 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3064 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3065 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3066 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3067 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3068 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3069 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3071 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3072 &self.context.channel_id);
3073 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3076 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3077 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3078 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3079 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3080 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3081 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3082 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3083 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3084 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3088 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3089 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3090 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3091 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3094 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3095 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3096 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3097 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3098 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3099 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3100 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3102 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3103 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3104 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3105 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3108 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3109 /// for our counterparty.
3110 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3111 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3112 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3113 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3115 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3116 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3117 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3118 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3120 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3121 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3122 updates: Vec::new(),
3125 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3126 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3127 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3128 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3129 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3130 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3131 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3132 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3133 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3134 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3135 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3136 // to rebalance channels.
3137 match &htlc_update {
3138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3139 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3140 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3142 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3143 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3145 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3148 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3149 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3150 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3151 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3152 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3153 // into the holding cell without ever being
3154 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3155 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3156 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3159 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3165 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3166 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3167 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3168 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3169 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3170 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3171 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3172 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3173 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3174 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3175 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3176 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3178 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3179 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3180 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3181 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3182 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3183 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3184 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3185 // for a full revocation before failing.
3186 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3187 update_fail_count += 1;
3190 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3192 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3199 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3200 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3202 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3203 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3208 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3209 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3210 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3211 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3212 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3214 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3215 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3216 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3218 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3219 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3225 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3226 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3227 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3228 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3229 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3230 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3231 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3232 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3233 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3235 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3238 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3241 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3245 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3247 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3248 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3253 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3254 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3255 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3256 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3257 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3258 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3259 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3260 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3264 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3266 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3267 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3270 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3271 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3272 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3273 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3275 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3279 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3280 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3281 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3282 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3283 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3284 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3285 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3286 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3290 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3291 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3292 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3293 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3294 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3295 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3296 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3297 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3298 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3300 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3301 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3304 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3305 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3306 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3307 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3308 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3309 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3310 let mut require_commitment = false;
3311 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3314 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3315 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3316 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3318 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3319 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3320 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3321 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3322 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3323 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3328 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3329 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3330 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3331 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3332 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3334 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3335 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3336 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3341 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3342 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3344 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3348 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3349 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3351 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3352 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3353 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3354 require_commitment = true;
3355 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3356 match forward_info {
3357 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3358 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3359 require_commitment = true;
3361 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3362 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3363 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3365 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3366 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3367 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3371 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3372 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3373 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3374 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3380 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3381 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3382 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3383 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3385 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3386 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3387 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3388 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3389 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3390 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3391 require_commitment = true;
3395 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3397 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3398 match update_state {
3399 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3400 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3401 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3402 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3403 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3405 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3406 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3407 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3409 require_commitment = true;
3410 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3411 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3416 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3417 let release_state_str =
3418 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3419 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3420 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3421 if !release_monitor {
3422 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3423 update: monitor_update,
3425 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3427 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3432 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3433 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3434 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3435 if require_commitment {
3436 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3437 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3438 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3439 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3441 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3442 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3443 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3444 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3445 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3447 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3448 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3449 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3450 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3451 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3454 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3455 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3456 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3457 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3458 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3459 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3461 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3462 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3464 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3465 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3467 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3468 if require_commitment {
3469 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3471 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3472 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3473 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3474 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3476 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3477 &self.context.channel_id(),
3478 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3481 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3482 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3484 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3485 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3487 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3488 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3494 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3495 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3496 /// commitment update.
3497 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3498 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3499 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3501 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3502 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3505 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3506 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3507 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3508 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3510 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3511 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3512 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3513 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3514 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3515 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3516 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3518 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3519 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3521 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3522 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3524 if !self.context.is_live() {
3525 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3528 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3529 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3530 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3531 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3532 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3533 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3534 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3535 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3536 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3537 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3541 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3542 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3543 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3544 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3545 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3546 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3549 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3550 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3554 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3555 force_holding_cell = true;
3558 if force_holding_cell {
3559 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3563 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3564 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3566 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3567 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3572 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3573 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3575 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3577 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3578 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3579 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3580 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3584 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3585 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3586 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3590 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3591 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3594 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3595 // will be retransmitted.
3596 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3597 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3598 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3600 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3601 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3604 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3605 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3606 // this HTLC accordingly
3607 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3610 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3611 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3612 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3613 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3616 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3617 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3618 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3619 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3620 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3621 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3626 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3628 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3629 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3630 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3631 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3635 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3636 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3637 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3638 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3639 // the update upon reconnection.
3640 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3644 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3646 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3647 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3650 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3651 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3652 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3653 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3654 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3655 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3656 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3658 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3659 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3660 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3661 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3662 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3663 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3664 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3666 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3667 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3668 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3669 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3670 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3671 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3672 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3675 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3676 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3677 /// to the remote side.
3678 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3679 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3680 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3681 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3684 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3686 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3687 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3689 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3690 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3691 // first received the funding_signed.
3692 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3693 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3694 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3696 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3697 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3698 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3699 funding_broadcastable = None;
3702 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3703 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3704 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3705 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3706 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3707 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3708 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3709 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3710 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3711 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3712 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3713 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3714 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3715 next_per_commitment_point,
3716 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3720 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3722 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3723 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3724 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3725 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3726 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3727 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3729 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3730 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3731 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3732 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3733 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3734 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3738 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3739 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3741 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3742 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3744 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3745 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3748 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3749 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3750 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3751 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3752 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3753 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3754 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3755 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3756 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3760 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3761 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3763 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3766 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3769 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3770 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3772 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3773 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3774 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3775 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3776 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3777 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3778 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3779 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3780 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3781 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3782 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3783 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3785 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3787 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3789 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3795 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3796 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3797 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3798 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3799 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3800 per_commitment_secret,
3801 next_per_commitment_point,
3803 next_local_nonce: None,
3807 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
3808 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3809 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3810 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3811 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3812 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3814 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3815 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3816 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3817 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3818 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3819 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3820 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3821 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3822 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3823 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3828 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3829 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3831 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3832 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3833 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3834 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3835 reason: err_packet.clone()
3838 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3839 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3840 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3841 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3842 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3843 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3846 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3847 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3848 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3849 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3850 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3857 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3858 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3859 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3860 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3864 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3865 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3866 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3867 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
3868 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
3871 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
3874 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3875 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3880 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3881 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3882 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3883 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3884 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3885 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3886 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3891 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3892 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3894 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3895 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3896 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3897 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3898 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3899 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3900 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3901 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3904 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3906 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3907 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3908 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3909 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3913 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3914 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3918 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3919 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3920 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3921 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3922 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3925 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3926 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3927 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3928 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3929 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3932 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3933 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3934 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3935 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3936 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3937 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3938 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3939 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3943 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3944 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3945 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3946 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3948 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3952 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3953 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3954 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3955 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3957 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3959 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3961 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3962 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3963 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3964 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3965 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3968 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3969 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3970 channel_ready: None,
3971 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3972 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3973 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3977 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3978 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3979 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3980 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3981 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3982 next_per_commitment_point,
3983 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3985 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3986 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3987 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3991 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3992 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3993 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3995 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3996 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3997 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4000 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4006 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4007 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4008 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4009 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4010 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4011 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4012 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4014 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4016 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4017 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4018 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4019 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4020 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4021 next_per_commitment_point,
4022 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4026 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4027 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4028 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4030 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4033 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4034 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4035 raa: required_revoke,
4036 commitment_update: None,
4037 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4039 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4040 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4041 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4043 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4046 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4047 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4048 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4049 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4050 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4051 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4054 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4055 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4056 raa: required_revoke,
4057 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4058 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4062 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4066 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4067 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4068 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4069 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4071 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4073 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4075 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4076 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4077 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4078 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4079 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4080 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4082 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4083 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4084 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4085 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4086 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4088 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4089 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4090 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4091 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4094 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4095 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4096 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4097 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4098 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4099 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4100 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4101 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4102 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4103 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4104 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4105 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4106 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4107 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4108 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4110 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4113 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4114 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4117 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4118 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4119 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4120 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4121 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4122 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4125 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4126 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4127 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4128 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4129 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4130 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4133 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4139 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4140 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4141 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4142 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4144 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4145 return Ok((None, None));
4148 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4149 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4150 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4152 return Ok((None, None));
4155 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4157 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4158 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4159 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4160 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4162 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4163 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4165 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4166 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4168 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4169 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4170 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4171 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4173 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4174 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4175 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4182 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4183 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4185 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4186 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4189 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4190 /// within our expected timeframe.
4192 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4193 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4194 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4197 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4200 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4201 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4205 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4206 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4208 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4211 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4212 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4213 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4214 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4217 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4218 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4222 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4224 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4225 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4228 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4229 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4230 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4233 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4236 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4237 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4238 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4239 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4241 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4244 assert!(send_shutdown);
4245 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4246 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4247 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4249 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4252 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4257 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4259 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4260 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4262 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4263 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4264 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4265 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4266 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4267 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4270 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4271 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4273 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4274 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4275 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4276 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4280 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4281 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4282 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4283 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4284 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4285 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4287 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4288 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4295 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4296 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4298 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4301 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4302 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4304 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4306 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4307 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4308 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4309 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4310 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4311 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4312 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4313 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4314 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4316 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4317 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4320 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4324 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4325 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4326 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4327 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4329 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4332 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4335 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4338 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4342 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4346 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4347 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4348 return Ok((None, None));
4351 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4352 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4353 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4354 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4356 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4358 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4361 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4362 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4363 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4364 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4365 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4369 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4370 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4375 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4376 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4377 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4378 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4379 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4380 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4381 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4385 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4387 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4388 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4389 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4390 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4392 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4395 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4396 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4398 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4399 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4401 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4402 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4403 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4404 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4408 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4409 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4410 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4411 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4413 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4414 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4415 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4423 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4424 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4427 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4430 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4434 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4435 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4436 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4437 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4438 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4440 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4441 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4442 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4444 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4445 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4448 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4449 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4450 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4451 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4452 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4453 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4454 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4455 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4457 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4460 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4461 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4462 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4463 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4469 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4470 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4471 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4472 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4474 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4480 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4481 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4482 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4483 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4484 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4485 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4486 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4488 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4489 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4492 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4494 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4495 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4501 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4502 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4503 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4504 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4505 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4506 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4507 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4509 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4510 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4517 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4518 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4521 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4522 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4525 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4526 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4530 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4531 &self.context.holder_signer
4535 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4537 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4538 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4539 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4540 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4541 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4542 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4544 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4546 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4554 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4555 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4559 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4560 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4561 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4562 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4565 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4566 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4567 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4568 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4571 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4572 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4573 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4574 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4575 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4576 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4579 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4580 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4581 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4582 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4583 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4584 if !release_monitor {
4585 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4594 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4595 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4598 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4599 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4600 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4602 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4603 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4604 if self.context.channel_state &
4605 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4606 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4607 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4608 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4609 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4612 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4613 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4614 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4615 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4616 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4617 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4619 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4620 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4621 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4623 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4624 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4625 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4626 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4627 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4628 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4634 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4635 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4636 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4639 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4640 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4641 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4644 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4645 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4646 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4649 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4650 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4651 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4652 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4653 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4654 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4659 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4660 self.context.channel_update_status
4663 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4664 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4665 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4668 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4670 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4671 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4672 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4676 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4677 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4678 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4681 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4685 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4686 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4687 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4689 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4690 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4691 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4693 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4694 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4697 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4698 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4699 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4700 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4701 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4702 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4703 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4704 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4705 self.context.channel_state);
4707 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4711 if need_commitment_update {
4712 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4713 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4714 let next_per_commitment_point =
4715 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4716 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4718 next_per_commitment_point,
4719 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4723 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4729 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4730 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4731 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4732 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4733 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4734 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4735 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4740 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4741 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4742 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4743 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4744 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4745 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4746 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4747 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4748 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4749 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4750 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4751 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4752 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4753 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4754 // channel and move on.
4755 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4756 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4758 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4759 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4760 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4762 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4763 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4764 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4765 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4766 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4767 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4768 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4769 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4774 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4775 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4776 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4777 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4778 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4781 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4782 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4783 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4784 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4785 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4786 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4789 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4790 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4791 // may have already happened for this block).
4792 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4793 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4794 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4795 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4798 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4799 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4800 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4801 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4809 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4810 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4811 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4812 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4814 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4815 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4818 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4820 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4821 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4822 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4823 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4825 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4828 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4831 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4832 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4833 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4834 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4836 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4839 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4840 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4841 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4843 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4844 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4846 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4847 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4848 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4856 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4858 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4859 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4860 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4862 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4863 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4866 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4867 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4868 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4869 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4870 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4871 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4872 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4873 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4874 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4877 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4878 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4879 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4880 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4882 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4883 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4884 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4886 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4887 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4888 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4889 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4891 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4892 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4893 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4894 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4895 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4896 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4897 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4900 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4901 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4903 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4906 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4907 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4908 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4909 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4910 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4911 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4912 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4913 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4914 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4915 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4916 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4917 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4918 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4919 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4920 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4921 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4922 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4928 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4933 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4934 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4936 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4937 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4938 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4939 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4941 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4944 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4946 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4947 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4948 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4949 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4950 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4951 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4953 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4954 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4957 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4958 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4959 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4960 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4961 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4962 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4964 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4965 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4968 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4969 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4970 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4971 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4972 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4978 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4979 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4980 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4981 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4986 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4990 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4994 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4995 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4999 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5003 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5004 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5007 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5011 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5013 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5018 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5019 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5020 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5022 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5027 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5029 None => return None,
5032 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5034 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5035 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5037 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5038 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5044 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5046 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5047 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5048 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5049 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5050 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5051 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5052 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5054 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5055 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5056 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5057 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5058 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5059 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5060 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5061 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5062 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5063 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5064 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5065 contents: announcement,
5070 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5074 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5075 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5076 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5077 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5078 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5079 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5080 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5081 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5083 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5085 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5087 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5088 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5090 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5092 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5093 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5096 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5097 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5098 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5099 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5102 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5105 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5106 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5107 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5108 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5109 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5110 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5113 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5115 Err(_) => return None,
5117 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5118 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5123 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5124 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5125 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5126 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5127 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5128 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5129 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5130 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5131 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5132 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5133 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5134 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5135 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5136 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5137 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5138 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5141 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5144 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5145 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5146 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5147 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5148 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5149 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5150 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5151 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5152 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5154 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5155 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5156 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5157 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5158 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5159 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5160 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5161 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5162 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5164 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5165 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5166 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5167 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5168 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5169 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5170 next_funding_txid: None,
5175 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5177 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5178 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5179 /// commitment update.
5181 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5182 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5183 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5184 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5185 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5186 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5187 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5190 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5191 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5192 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5194 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5195 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5200 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5201 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5203 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5205 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5206 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5208 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5209 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5210 /// regenerate them.
5212 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5213 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5215 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5216 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5217 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5218 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5219 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5220 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5221 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5223 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5226 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5227 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5228 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5231 if amount_msat == 0 {
5232 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5235 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5236 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5237 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5238 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5241 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5242 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5243 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5246 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5247 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5248 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5249 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5250 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5251 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5252 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5253 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5256 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5257 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5258 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5259 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5260 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5261 else { "to peer" });
5263 if need_holding_cell {
5264 force_holding_cell = true;
5267 // Now update local state:
5268 if force_holding_cell {
5269 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5274 onion_routing_packet,
5280 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5281 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5283 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5285 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5290 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5291 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5292 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5296 onion_routing_packet,
5299 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5304 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5305 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5306 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5307 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5309 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5310 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5311 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5313 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5318 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5319 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5320 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5321 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5322 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5323 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5324 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5327 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5328 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5329 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5330 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5331 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5332 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5335 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5337 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5338 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5339 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5340 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5341 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5343 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5344 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5347 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5348 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5349 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5350 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5351 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5352 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5353 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5354 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5355 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5356 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5357 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5360 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5364 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5365 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5366 where L::Target: Logger
5368 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5369 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5370 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5372 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5374 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5375 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5376 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5377 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5378 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5379 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5380 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5381 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5382 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5383 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5384 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5390 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5393 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5394 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5395 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5396 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5397 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5398 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5400 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5401 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5402 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5404 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5405 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5406 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5409 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5410 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5414 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5415 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5417 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5419 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5420 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5421 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5422 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5424 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5425 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5426 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5427 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5428 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5429 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5433 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5434 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5438 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5439 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5444 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5445 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5447 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5448 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5449 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5450 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5451 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5452 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5453 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5454 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5456 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5457 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5458 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5461 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5462 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5463 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5469 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5470 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5473 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5474 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5475 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5476 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5482 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5483 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5485 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5486 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5487 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5488 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5489 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5491 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5492 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5493 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5496 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5497 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5498 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5500 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5501 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5504 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5505 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5507 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5508 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5509 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5512 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5513 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5514 let mut chan_closed = false;
5515 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5519 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5521 None if !chan_closed => {
5522 // use override shutdown script if provided
5523 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5524 Some(script) => script,
5526 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5527 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5528 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5529 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5533 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5534 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5536 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5542 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5543 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5544 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5545 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5547 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5549 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5551 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5552 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5553 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5554 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5555 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5556 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5559 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5560 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5562 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5563 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5564 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5567 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5568 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5569 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5570 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5571 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5573 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5574 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5581 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5582 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5584 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5587 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5588 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5589 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5591 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5592 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5596 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5600 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5601 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5602 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5603 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5606 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5607 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5608 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5609 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5610 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5611 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5612 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5613 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5615 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5616 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5617 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5618 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5620 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5623 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5624 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5626 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5627 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5630 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5631 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5633 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5634 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5635 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5636 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5637 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5640 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5641 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5643 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5644 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5646 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5648 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5650 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5651 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5652 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5653 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5656 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5657 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5659 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5660 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5661 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5662 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5666 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5667 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5668 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5672 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5673 Ok(script) => script,
5674 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5677 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5680 context: ChannelContext {
5683 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5684 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5685 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5686 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5691 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5693 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5694 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5695 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5696 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5698 channel_value_satoshis,
5700 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5702 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5703 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5706 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5707 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5710 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5711 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5712 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5713 pending_update_fee: None,
5714 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5715 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5716 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5717 update_time_counter: 1,
5719 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5721 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5722 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5723 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5724 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5725 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5726 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5728 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
5729 signer_pending_funding: false,
5731 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5732 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5733 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5734 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5736 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5737 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5738 closing_fee_limits: None,
5739 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5741 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5742 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5743 short_channel_id: None,
5744 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5746 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5747 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5748 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5749 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5750 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5751 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5752 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5753 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5754 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5755 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5756 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5757 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5759 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5761 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5762 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5763 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5764 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5765 counterparty_parameters: None,
5766 funding_outpoint: None,
5767 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5769 funding_transaction: None,
5771 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5772 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5773 counterparty_node_id,
5775 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5777 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5779 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5780 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5782 announcement_sigs: None,
5784 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5785 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5786 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5787 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5789 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5790 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5792 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5793 outbound_scid_alias,
5795 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5796 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5799 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5804 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5806 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5810 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5811 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5812 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5813 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5814 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5815 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5816 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5817 .map(|(sig, _)| sig)
5822 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5823 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5824 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5825 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5826 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5827 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5828 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5829 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5830 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5831 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5832 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5834 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5835 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5837 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5838 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5839 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5840 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5843 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5844 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5846 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5848 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5850 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5851 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5853 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5854 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5855 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5856 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5857 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5858 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5861 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5863 let funding_created = if let Ok(signature) = self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5864 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
5865 temporary_channel_id,
5866 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5867 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5870 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5872 next_local_nonce: None,
5875 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
5879 let channel = Channel {
5880 context: self.context,
5883 Ok((channel, funding_created))
5886 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5887 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5888 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5889 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5890 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5891 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5892 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5893 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5894 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5895 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5898 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5899 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5900 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5901 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5902 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5903 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5909 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5910 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5911 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5912 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5913 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5914 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5916 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5918 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5919 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5920 // We've exhausted our options
5923 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5924 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5927 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5928 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5929 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5930 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5932 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5933 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5934 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5935 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5936 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5937 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5939 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5941 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5942 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5945 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5946 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5947 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5949 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5950 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5953 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5954 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5957 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5958 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5962 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5963 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5964 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5965 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5966 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5967 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5968 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5969 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5970 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5971 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5972 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5973 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5974 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5975 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5976 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5977 first_per_commitment_point,
5978 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5979 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5980 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5981 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5983 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5988 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5989 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5991 // Check sanity of message fields:
5992 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5995 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5998 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6001 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6004 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6007 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6009 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6011 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6012 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6015 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6016 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6019 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6022 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6026 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6027 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6030 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6033 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6036 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6039 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6042 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6045 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6049 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6050 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6053 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6054 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6056 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6057 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6060 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6061 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6064 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6065 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6066 &Some(ref script) => {
6067 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6068 if script.len() == 0 {
6071 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6074 Some(script.clone())
6077 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6084 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6085 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6086 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6087 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6088 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6090 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6091 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6093 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6096 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6097 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6098 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6099 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6100 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6101 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6104 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6105 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6106 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6109 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6110 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6112 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6113 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6119 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6120 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6121 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6122 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6125 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6126 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6127 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6128 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6129 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6130 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6131 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6132 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6133 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6134 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6135 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6138 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6140 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6141 // support this channel type.
6142 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6143 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6147 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6148 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6149 // `static_remote_key`.
6150 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6153 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6154 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6157 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6160 channel_type.clone()
6162 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6163 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6169 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6170 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6171 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6172 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6173 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6174 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6175 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6176 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6177 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6180 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6184 // Check sanity of message fields:
6185 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6188 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6194 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6195 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6198 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6201 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6204 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6206 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6207 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6210 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6213 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6217 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6218 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6221 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6224 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6227 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6230 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6233 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6236 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6240 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6242 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6243 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6248 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6249 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6250 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6251 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6254 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6257 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6258 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6259 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6261 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6265 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6266 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6267 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6268 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6269 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6273 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6274 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6275 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6276 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6280 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6281 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6282 &Some(ref script) => {
6283 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6284 if script.len() == 0 {
6287 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6290 Some(script.clone())
6293 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6300 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6301 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6302 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6303 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6307 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6308 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6313 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6314 Ok(script) => script,
6315 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6318 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6319 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6321 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6324 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6328 context: ChannelContext {
6331 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6332 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6334 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6339 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6341 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6342 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6343 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6344 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6347 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6349 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6350 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6353 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6354 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6355 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6357 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6358 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6359 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6360 pending_update_fee: None,
6361 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6362 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6363 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6364 update_time_counter: 1,
6366 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6368 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6369 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6370 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6371 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6372 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6373 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6375 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6376 signer_pending_funding: false,
6378 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6379 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6380 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6381 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6383 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6384 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6385 closing_fee_limits: None,
6386 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6388 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6389 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6390 short_channel_id: None,
6391 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6393 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6394 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6395 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6396 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6397 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6398 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6399 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6400 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6401 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6402 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6403 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6404 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6407 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6409 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6410 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6411 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6412 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6413 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6414 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6415 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6417 funding_outpoint: None,
6418 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6420 funding_transaction: None,
6422 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6423 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6424 counterparty_node_id,
6426 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6428 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6430 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6431 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6433 announcement_sigs: None,
6435 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6436 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6437 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6438 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6440 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6441 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6443 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6444 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6446 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6447 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6449 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6450 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6455 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6457 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6463 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6464 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6466 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6467 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6468 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6469 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6471 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6472 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6474 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6475 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6478 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6481 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6482 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6483 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6485 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6486 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6487 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6488 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6490 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6491 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6492 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6493 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6494 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6495 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6496 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6497 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6498 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6499 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6500 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6501 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6502 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6503 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6504 first_per_commitment_point,
6505 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6506 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6507 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6509 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6511 next_local_nonce: None,
6515 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6516 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6518 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6520 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6521 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6524 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6525 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6527 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6528 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6530 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6531 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6532 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6533 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6534 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6535 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6536 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6537 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6538 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6541 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6542 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6544 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6545 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6546 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6547 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6549 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6550 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6551 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6552 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6553 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6555 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6556 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6561 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6562 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6563 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6567 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6568 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6570 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6571 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6572 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6574 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6576 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6577 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6578 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6579 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6582 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6583 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6584 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6585 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6586 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6588 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6590 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6591 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6592 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6595 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6596 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6597 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6601 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6602 initial_commitment_tx,
6605 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6606 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6609 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6610 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6613 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6615 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6616 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6617 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6618 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6619 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6620 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6621 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6622 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6623 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6624 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6625 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6627 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6629 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6630 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6631 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6632 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6633 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6634 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6636 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6637 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6638 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6639 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6641 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6643 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6644 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6645 let mut channel = Channel {
6646 context: self.context,
6648 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6649 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6650 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6652 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6656 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6657 }, channel_monitor))
6661 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6662 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6664 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6670 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6671 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6672 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6673 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6674 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6676 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6677 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6678 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6679 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6685 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6686 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6687 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6688 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6689 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6690 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6695 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6696 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6697 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6698 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6700 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6701 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6702 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6703 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6708 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6709 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6710 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6711 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6712 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6713 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6718 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6719 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6720 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6723 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6725 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6726 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6727 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6728 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6729 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6731 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6732 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6733 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6734 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6736 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6737 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6742 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6743 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6744 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6745 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6746 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6747 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6748 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6750 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6751 // deserialized from that format.
6752 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6753 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6754 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6756 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6758 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6759 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6760 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6762 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6763 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6764 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6765 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6768 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6769 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6770 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6773 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6774 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6775 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6776 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6778 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6779 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6781 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6783 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6785 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6787 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6790 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6792 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6797 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6798 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6800 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6801 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6802 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6803 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6804 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6805 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6806 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6808 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6810 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6812 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6815 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6816 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6817 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6820 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6822 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6823 preimages.push(preimage);
6825 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6826 reason.write(writer)?;
6828 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6830 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6831 preimages.push(preimage);
6833 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6834 reason.write(writer)?;
6837 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6838 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6839 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6841 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6842 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6843 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6847 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6848 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6849 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6851 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6852 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6856 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6857 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6858 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6859 source.write(writer)?;
6860 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6862 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6863 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6864 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6866 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6867 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6869 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6871 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6872 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6876 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6877 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6882 match self.context.resend_order {
6883 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6884 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6887 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6888 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6889 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6891 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6892 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6893 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6894 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6897 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6898 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6899 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6900 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6901 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6904 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6905 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6906 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6907 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6909 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6910 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6911 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6913 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6915 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6916 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6917 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6918 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6920 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6921 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6922 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6923 // consider the stale state on reload.
6926 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6927 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6928 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6930 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6931 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6932 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6934 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6935 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6937 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6938 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6939 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6941 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6942 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6944 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6947 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6948 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6949 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6951 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6954 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6955 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6957 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6958 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6959 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6961 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6963 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6965 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6968 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6970 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6971 htlc.write(writer)?;
6974 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6975 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6976 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6978 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6979 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6981 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6982 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6983 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6984 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6985 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6986 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6987 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6989 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6990 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6991 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6992 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6993 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6995 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6996 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6998 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6999 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7000 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7001 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7003 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7005 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7006 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7007 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7008 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7009 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7010 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7011 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7013 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7014 (2, chan_type, option),
7015 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7016 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7017 (5, self.context.config, required),
7018 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7019 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7020 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7021 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7022 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7023 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7024 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7025 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7026 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7027 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7028 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7029 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7030 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7031 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7032 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7033 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7034 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7035 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7042 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7043 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7045 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7046 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7048 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7049 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7050 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7052 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7053 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7054 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7055 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7059 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7060 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7061 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7065 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7066 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7073 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7075 let mut keys_data = None;
7077 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7078 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7079 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7080 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7081 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7082 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7083 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7084 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7085 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7086 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7090 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7091 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7092 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7095 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7104 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7105 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7106 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7107 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7108 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7109 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7110 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7111 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7112 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7113 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7114 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7115 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7120 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7122 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7123 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7124 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7125 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7126 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7127 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7128 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7129 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7130 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7131 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7133 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7137 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7141 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7142 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7144 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7146 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7150 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7152 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7153 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7154 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7155 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7156 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7157 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7158 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7159 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7160 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7162 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7163 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7164 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7166 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7167 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7168 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7170 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7174 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7175 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7176 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7177 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7180 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7181 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7184 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7186 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7187 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7190 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7192 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7193 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7196 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7205 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7206 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7207 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7208 // consider the stale state on reload.
7209 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7212 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7214 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7219 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7224 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7225 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7228 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7229 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7231 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7232 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7234 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7235 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7236 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7238 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7240 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7241 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7243 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7244 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7247 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7249 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7250 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7251 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7252 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7254 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7257 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7258 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7260 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7262 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7265 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7271 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7272 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7274 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7275 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7276 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7280 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7281 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7282 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7284 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7290 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7291 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7292 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7293 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7294 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7295 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7296 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7297 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7298 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7299 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7301 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7302 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7303 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7304 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7305 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7306 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7307 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7309 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7310 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7311 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7312 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7314 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7316 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7317 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7319 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7320 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7321 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7322 (2, channel_type, option),
7323 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7324 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7325 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7326 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7327 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7328 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7329 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7330 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7331 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7332 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7333 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7334 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7335 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7336 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7337 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7338 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7339 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7340 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7341 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7342 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7343 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7346 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7347 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7348 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7349 // required channel parameters.
7350 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7351 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7352 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7354 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7356 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7357 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7358 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7359 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7362 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7363 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7364 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7367 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7369 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7370 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7375 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7376 if iter.next().is_some() {
7377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7381 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7382 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7383 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7384 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7385 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7388 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7389 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7390 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7392 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7393 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7395 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7396 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7397 // separate u64 values.
7398 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7400 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7402 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7403 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7404 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7405 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7407 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7408 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7410 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7411 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7412 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7413 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7414 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7417 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7418 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7422 context: ChannelContext {
7425 config: config.unwrap(),
7429 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7430 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7431 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7434 temporary_channel_id,
7436 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7438 channel_value_satoshis,
7440 latest_monitor_update_id,
7442 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7443 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7446 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7447 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7450 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7451 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7452 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7453 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7457 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7458 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7459 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7460 monitor_pending_forwards,
7461 monitor_pending_failures,
7462 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7464 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7465 signer_pending_funding: false,
7468 holding_cell_update_fee,
7469 next_holder_htlc_id,
7470 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7471 update_time_counter,
7474 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7475 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7476 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7477 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7479 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7480 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7481 closing_fee_limits: None,
7482 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7484 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7485 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7487 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7489 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7490 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7491 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7492 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7493 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7494 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7495 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7496 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7497 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7500 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7502 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7503 funding_transaction,
7505 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7506 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7507 counterparty_node_id,
7509 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7513 channel_update_status,
7514 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7518 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7519 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7520 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7521 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7523 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7524 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7526 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7527 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7528 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7530 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7531 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7533 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7534 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7536 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7539 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7548 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7549 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7550 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7551 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7552 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7554 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7555 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7556 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7557 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7558 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7559 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7560 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7561 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7562 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7563 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7564 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7565 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7566 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7567 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7568 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7569 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7570 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7571 use crate::util::test_utils;
7572 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7573 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7574 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7575 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7576 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7577 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7578 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7579 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7580 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7581 use crate::prelude::*;
7583 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7586 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7587 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7593 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7594 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7595 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7596 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7600 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7601 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7602 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7603 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7604 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7605 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7606 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7607 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7611 signer: InMemorySigner,
7614 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7615 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7618 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7619 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7621 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7622 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7625 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7629 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7631 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7633 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7634 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7635 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7638 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7640 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7641 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7645 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7646 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7647 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7651 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7652 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7653 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7654 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7656 let seed = [42; 32];
7657 let network = Network::Testnet;
7658 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7659 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7660 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7664 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7665 let config = UserConfig::default();
7666 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7667 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7668 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7670 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7671 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7675 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7676 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7678 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7679 let original_fee = 253;
7680 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7681 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7682 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7683 let seed = [42; 32];
7684 let network = Network::Testnet;
7685 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7687 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7688 let config = UserConfig::default();
7689 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7691 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7692 // same as the old fee.
7693 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7694 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7695 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7699 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7700 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7701 // dust limits are used.
7702 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7703 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7704 let seed = [42; 32];
7705 let network = Network::Testnet;
7706 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7707 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7708 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7710 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7711 // they have different dust limits.
7713 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7714 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7715 let config = UserConfig::default();
7716 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7718 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7719 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7720 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7721 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7722 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7724 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7725 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7726 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7727 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7728 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7730 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7731 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7732 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7733 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7735 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7736 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7737 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7739 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7740 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7742 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7743 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7744 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7746 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7747 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7748 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7749 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7752 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7754 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7755 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7756 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7757 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7758 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7759 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7760 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7761 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7762 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7764 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7767 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7768 // the dust limit check.
7769 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7770 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7771 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7772 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7774 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7775 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7776 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7777 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7778 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7779 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7780 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7784 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7785 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7786 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7787 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7788 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7789 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7790 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7791 let seed = [42; 32];
7792 let network = Network::Testnet;
7793 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7795 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7796 let config = UserConfig::default();
7797 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7799 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7800 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7802 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7803 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7804 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7805 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7806 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7807 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7809 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7810 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7811 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7812 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7813 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7815 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7817 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7818 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7819 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7820 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7821 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7823 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7824 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7825 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7826 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7827 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7831 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7832 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7833 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7834 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7835 let seed = [42; 32];
7836 let network = Network::Testnet;
7837 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7838 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7839 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7841 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7843 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7844 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7845 let config = UserConfig::default();
7846 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7848 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7849 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7850 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7851 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7853 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7854 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7855 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7857 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7858 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7859 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7860 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7862 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7863 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7864 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7866 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7867 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7869 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7870 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7871 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7872 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7873 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7874 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7875 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7877 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7879 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7880 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7881 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7882 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7883 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7887 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7888 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7889 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7890 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7891 let seed = [42; 32];
7892 let network = Network::Testnet;
7893 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7894 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7895 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7897 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7898 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7899 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7900 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7901 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7902 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7903 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7904 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7906 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7907 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7908 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7909 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7910 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7911 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7913 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7914 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7915 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7916 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7918 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7920 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7921 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7922 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7923 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7924 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7925 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7927 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7928 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7929 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7930 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7932 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7933 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7934 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7935 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7936 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7938 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7939 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7941 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7942 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7943 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7945 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7946 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7947 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7948 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7949 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7951 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7952 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7954 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7955 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7956 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7960 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7962 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7963 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7964 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7966 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7967 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7968 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7969 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7971 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7972 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7973 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7975 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7977 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7978 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7981 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7982 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7983 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7984 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7985 let seed = [42; 32];
7986 let network = Network::Testnet;
7987 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7988 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7989 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7992 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7993 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7994 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7996 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7997 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7999 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8000 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8001 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8003 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8004 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8006 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8008 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8009 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8011 // Channel Negotiations failed
8012 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8013 assert!(result.is_err());
8018 fn channel_update() {
8019 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8020 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8022 let seed = [42; 32];
8023 let network = Network::Testnet;
8024 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8025 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8026 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8028 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8029 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8030 let config = UserConfig::default();
8031 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8033 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8034 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8035 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8036 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8037 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8039 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8040 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8041 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8042 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8043 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8045 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8046 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8047 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8048 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8050 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8051 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8052 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8054 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8055 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8057 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8058 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8059 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8061 short_channel_id: 0,
8064 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8065 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8066 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8068 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8069 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8071 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8073 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8075 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8076 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8077 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8078 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8080 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8081 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8082 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8084 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8088 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8090 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8091 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8092 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8093 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8094 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8095 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8096 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8097 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8098 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8099 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8100 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8101 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8102 use crate::sync::Arc;
8104 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8105 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8106 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8107 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8109 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8111 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8112 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8113 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8114 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8115 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8117 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8118 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8124 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8125 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8126 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8128 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8129 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8130 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8131 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8132 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8133 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8135 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8137 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8138 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8139 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8140 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8141 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8142 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8144 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8145 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8146 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8147 selected_contest_delay: 144
8149 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8150 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8152 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8153 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8155 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8156 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8158 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8159 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8161 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8162 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8163 // build_commitment_transaction.
8164 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8165 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8166 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8167 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8168 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8170 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8171 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8172 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8173 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8177 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8178 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8179 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8180 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8184 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8185 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8186 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8188 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8189 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8191 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8192 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8194 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8196 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8197 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8198 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8199 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8200 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8201 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8202 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8204 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8205 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8206 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8207 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8209 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8210 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8211 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8213 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8215 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8216 commitment_tx.clone(),
8217 counterparty_signature,
8218 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8219 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8220 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8222 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8223 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8225 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8226 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8227 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8229 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8230 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8233 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8234 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8236 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8237 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8238 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8239 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8240 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8241 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8242 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8243 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8245 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8248 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8249 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8250 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8254 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8257 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8258 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8259 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8261 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8262 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8263 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8264 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8265 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8266 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8267 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8268 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8270 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8274 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8275 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8276 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8277 "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", {});
8279 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8282 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8283 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8284 "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", {});
8286 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8287 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8288 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8289 "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", {});
8291 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8292 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8294 amount_msat: 1000000,
8296 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8297 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8299 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8302 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8303 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8305 amount_msat: 2000000,
8307 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8308 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8310 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8313 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8314 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8316 amount_msat: 2000000,
8318 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8319 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8320 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8321 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8323 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8326 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8327 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8329 amount_msat: 3000000,
8331 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8332 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8333 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8334 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8336 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8339 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8340 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8342 amount_msat: 4000000,
8344 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8345 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8347 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8351 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8352 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8353 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8355 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8356 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8357 "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", {
8360 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8361 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8362 "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" },
8365 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8366 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8367 "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" },
8370 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8371 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8372 "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" },
8375 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8376 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8377 "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" },
8380 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8381 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8382 "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" }
8385 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8386 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8387 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8389 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8390 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8391 "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", {
8394 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8395 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8396 "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" },
8399 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8400 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8401 "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" },
8404 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8405 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8406 "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" },
8409 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8410 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8411 "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" },
8414 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8415 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8416 "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" }
8419 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8420 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8421 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8423 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8424 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8425 "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", {
8428 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8429 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8430 "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" },
8433 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8434 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8435 "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" },
8438 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8439 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8440 "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" },
8443 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8444 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8445 "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" }
8448 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8449 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8450 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8451 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8453 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8454 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8455 "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", {
8458 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8459 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8460 "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" },
8463 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8464 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8465 "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" },
8468 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8469 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8470 "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" },
8473 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8474 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8475 "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" }
8478 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8479 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8480 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8481 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8483 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8484 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8485 "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", {
8488 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8489 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8490 "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" },
8493 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8494 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8495 "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" },
8498 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8499 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8500 "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" },
8503 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8504 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8505 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8508 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8509 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8510 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8512 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8513 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8514 "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", {
8517 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8518 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8519 "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" },
8522 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8523 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8524 "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" },
8527 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8528 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8529 "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" }
8532 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8536 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8537 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8538 "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", {
8541 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8542 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8543 "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" },
8546 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8547 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8548 "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" },
8551 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8552 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8553 "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" }
8556 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8557 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8558 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8560 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8561 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8562 "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", {
8565 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8566 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8567 "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" },
8570 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8571 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8572 "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" }
8575 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8576 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8577 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8578 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8579 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8580 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8582 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8583 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8584 "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", {
8587 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8588 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8589 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8592 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8593 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8594 "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" }
8597 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8598 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8599 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8600 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8601 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8603 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8604 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8605 "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", {
8608 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8609 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8610 "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" },
8613 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8614 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8615 "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" }
8618 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8619 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8620 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8622 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8623 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8624 "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", {
8627 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8628 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8629 "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" }
8632 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8633 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8634 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8635 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8636 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8638 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8639 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8640 "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", {
8643 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8644 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8645 "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" }
8648 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8649 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8650 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8651 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8652 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8654 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8655 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8656 "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", {
8659 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8660 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8661 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8664 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8665 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8666 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8667 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8669 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8670 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8671 "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", {});
8673 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8674 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8675 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8676 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8677 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8679 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8680 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8681 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8683 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8684 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8685 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8686 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8687 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8689 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8690 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8691 "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", {});
8693 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8694 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8695 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8697 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8698 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8699 "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", {});
8701 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8702 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8703 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8704 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8705 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8707 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8708 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8709 "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", {});
8711 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8712 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8713 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8714 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8715 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8717 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8718 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8719 "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", {});
8721 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8722 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8723 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8724 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8725 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8726 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8728 amount_msat: 2000000,
8730 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8731 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8733 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8736 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8737 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8738 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8740 amount_msat: 5000001,
8742 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8743 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8744 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8745 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8747 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8750 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8751 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8753 amount_msat: 5000000,
8755 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8756 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8757 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8758 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8760 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8764 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8765 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8766 "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", {
8769 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8770 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8771 "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" },
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8775 "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" },
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8778 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8779 "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" }
8782 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8783 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8785 "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", {
8788 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8789 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8790 "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" },
8792 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8793 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8794 "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" },
8796 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8797 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8798 "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" }
8803 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8804 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8806 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8807 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8808 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8809 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8811 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8812 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8813 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8815 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8816 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8818 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8819 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8821 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8822 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8823 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8827 fn test_key_derivation() {
8828 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8829 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8831 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8832 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8834 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8835 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8837 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8838 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8840 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8841 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8843 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8844 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8846 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8847 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8849 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8850 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8854 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8855 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8856 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8857 let seed = [42; 32];
8858 let network = Network::Testnet;
8859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8862 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8863 let config = UserConfig::default();
8864 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8865 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8867 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8868 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8870 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8871 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8872 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8873 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8874 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8875 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8876 assert!(res.is_ok());
8880 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8881 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8882 // resulting `channel_type`.
8883 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8884 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8885 let network = Network::Testnet;
8886 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8887 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8889 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8890 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8892 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8893 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8895 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8896 // need to signal it.
8897 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8898 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8899 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8902 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8904 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8905 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8906 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8908 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8909 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8910 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8913 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8914 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8915 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8916 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8917 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8920 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8921 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8925 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8926 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8927 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8928 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8929 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8930 let network = Network::Testnet;
8931 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8932 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8934 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8935 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8937 let config = UserConfig::default();
8939 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8940 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8941 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8942 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8943 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8945 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8946 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8947 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8950 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8951 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8952 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8954 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8955 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8956 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8957 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8958 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8959 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8961 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8965 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8966 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8969 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8970 let network = Network::Testnet;
8971 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8972 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8974 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8975 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8977 let config = UserConfig::default();
8979 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8980 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8981 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8982 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8983 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8984 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8985 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8986 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8988 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8989 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8990 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8991 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8992 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8993 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8996 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8997 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8999 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9000 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9001 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9002 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9004 assert!(res.is_err());
9006 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9007 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9008 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9010 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9011 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9012 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9015 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9017 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9018 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9019 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9020 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9023 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9024 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9026 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9027 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9029 assert!(res.is_err());