1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 use core::convert::TryInto;
53 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
54 use crate::sync::Mutex;
55 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
60 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
62 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
67 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
70 pub struct AvailableBalances {
71 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
72 pub balance_msat: u64,
73 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
74 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
76 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
78 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
79 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
83 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
85 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
87 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
88 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
89 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
90 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
91 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
92 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
94 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
98 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
99 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
100 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
101 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
104 enum InboundHTLCState {
105 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
106 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
107 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
109 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
110 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
111 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
112 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
113 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
114 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
115 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
116 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
117 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
118 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
119 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
121 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
125 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
126 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
127 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
128 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
129 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
130 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
131 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
132 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
133 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
134 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
137 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
139 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
140 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
141 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
142 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
143 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
145 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
146 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
148 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
149 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
150 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
151 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
152 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
153 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
154 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
155 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
158 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
162 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
163 state: InboundHTLCState,
166 enum OutboundHTLCState {
167 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
168 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
169 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
170 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
171 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
172 /// money back (though we won't), and,
173 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
174 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
175 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
176 /// we'll never get out of sync).
177 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
178 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
179 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
181 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
182 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
183 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
188 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
189 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
190 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
191 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
192 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
193 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
194 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
195 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
199 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
201 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
202 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
205 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
206 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
208 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
209 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
214 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
215 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
218 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
223 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
227 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
228 state: OutboundHTLCState,
230 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
233 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
234 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
235 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
239 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
241 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
242 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
243 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
246 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
251 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
255 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
256 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
257 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
258 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
259 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
260 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
261 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
263 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
264 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
265 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
266 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
267 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
268 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
269 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
271 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
272 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
273 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
275 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
276 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
277 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
278 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
279 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
280 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
283 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
285 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
286 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
287 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
288 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
289 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
290 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
291 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
292 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
293 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
295 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
296 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
298 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
299 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
300 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
301 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
302 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
303 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
304 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
305 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
306 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
307 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
308 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
309 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
310 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
312 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
313 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
314 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
315 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
316 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
317 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
318 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
319 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
321 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
323 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
324 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
326 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
328 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
330 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
332 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
333 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
337 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
339 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
343 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
344 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
345 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
346 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
347 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
349 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
350 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
352 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
354 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
355 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
357 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
358 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
359 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
360 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
361 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
362 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
364 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
365 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
367 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
368 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
369 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
370 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
371 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
373 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
374 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
376 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
377 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
379 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
380 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
381 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
382 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
388 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
389 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
391 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
393 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
398 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
401 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
403 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
408 macro_rules! secp_check {
409 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
417 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
418 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
419 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
420 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
421 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
422 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
424 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
426 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
428 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
430 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
434 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
436 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
437 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
438 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
440 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
441 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
443 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
444 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
445 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
446 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
447 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
449 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
450 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
454 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
460 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
463 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
464 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
466 holding_cell_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
470 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
471 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
472 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
473 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
474 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
475 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
476 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
477 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
479 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
482 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
483 struct HTLCCandidate {
485 origin: HTLCInitiator,
489 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
497 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
499 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
501 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
502 htlc_value_msat: u64,
503 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
508 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
509 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
510 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
511 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
512 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
514 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
515 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
516 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
517 htlc_value_msat: u64,
519 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
520 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
524 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
525 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
526 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
527 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
528 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
529 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
530 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
531 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
532 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
533 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
534 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
537 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
539 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
542 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
543 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
546 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
547 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
548 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
549 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
550 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
551 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
552 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
553 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
556 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
558 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
559 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
560 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
561 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
562 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
563 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
564 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
565 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
568 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
569 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
570 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
571 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
572 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
573 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
574 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
575 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
576 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
577 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
578 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
579 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
580 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
581 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
582 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
584 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
585 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
586 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
587 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
589 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
590 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
591 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
592 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
594 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
595 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
596 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
597 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
598 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
600 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
601 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
602 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
603 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
605 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
606 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
607 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
609 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
610 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
611 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
612 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
613 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
615 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
616 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
619 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
620 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
622 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
623 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
624 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
625 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
627 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
628 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
630 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
635 (0, update, required),
638 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
639 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
640 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
641 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
642 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
646 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
647 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
648 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
650 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
652 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
658 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
660 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
662 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
667 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
668 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
670 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
671 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
673 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
674 /// in a timely manner.
675 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
678 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
679 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
680 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
682 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
683 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
685 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
689 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
690 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
691 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
693 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
694 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
695 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
696 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
698 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
702 /// The current channel ID.
703 channel_id: ChannelId,
704 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
705 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
706 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
709 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
710 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
712 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
713 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
714 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
716 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
717 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
718 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
719 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
721 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
724 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
726 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
727 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
728 destination_script: Script,
730 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
731 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
732 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
734 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
736 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
737 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
738 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
739 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
741 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
742 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
743 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
744 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
745 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
746 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
748 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
750 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
751 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
752 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
754 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
755 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
756 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
757 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
758 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
759 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
760 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
762 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
763 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
764 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
766 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
767 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
768 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
769 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
770 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
771 /// outbound or inbound.
772 signer_pending_funding: bool,
774 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
776 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
777 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
778 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
779 // HTLCs with similar state.
780 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
781 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
782 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
783 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
784 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
785 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
786 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
787 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
788 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
791 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
792 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
793 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
795 update_time_counter: u32,
797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
798 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
799 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
801 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
802 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
804 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
805 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
807 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
808 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
809 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
810 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
812 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
813 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
815 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
817 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
820 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
821 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
822 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
823 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
825 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
826 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
828 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
829 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
830 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
832 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
833 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
834 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
835 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
836 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
837 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
838 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
839 channel_creation_height: u32,
841 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
844 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
846 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
849 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
851 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
854 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
858 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
859 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
862 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
864 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
866 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
867 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
869 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
871 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
872 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
873 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
875 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
877 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
878 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
879 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
881 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
882 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
883 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
885 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
887 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
889 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
890 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
891 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
892 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
894 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
895 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
896 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
898 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
899 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
900 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
902 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
903 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
904 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
905 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
907 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
909 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
911 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
912 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
913 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
914 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
915 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
917 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
918 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
920 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
921 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
922 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
923 /// unblock the state machine.
925 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
926 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
927 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
929 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
930 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
931 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
934 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
935 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
936 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
937 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
938 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
939 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
940 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
942 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
943 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
945 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
946 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
947 // the channel's funding UTXO.
949 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
950 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
951 // associated channel mapping.
953 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
954 // to store all of them.
955 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
957 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
958 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
959 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
960 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
961 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
963 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
964 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
966 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
967 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
969 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
970 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
971 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
973 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
974 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
975 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
978 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
979 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
980 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
981 self.update_time_counter
984 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
985 self.latest_monitor_update_id
988 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
989 self.config.announced_channel
992 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
993 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
996 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
999 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1002 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1003 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1004 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1010 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1011 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1014 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1015 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1017 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1020 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1022 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1023 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1025 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1026 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1031 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1033 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1034 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1035 self.channel_state &
1036 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1037 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1038 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1039 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1042 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1043 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1044 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1045 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1046 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1049 // Public utilities:
1051 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1055 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1057 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1058 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1059 self.temporary_channel_id
1062 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1066 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1067 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1068 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1072 /// Gets the channel's type
1073 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1077 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1079 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1080 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1081 self.short_channel_id
1084 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1085 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1089 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1090 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1091 self.outbound_scid_alias
1094 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1096 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1097 return &self.holder_signer
1100 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1101 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1102 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1103 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1104 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1105 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1108 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1109 /// get_funding_created.
1110 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1111 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1114 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1115 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1116 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1119 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1120 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1121 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1122 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1126 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1129 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1130 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1133 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1134 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1137 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1138 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1139 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1142 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1143 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1146 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1147 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1148 self.counterparty_node_id
1151 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1152 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1153 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1156 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1157 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1158 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1161 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1162 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1164 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1165 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1166 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1167 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1169 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1173 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1174 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1175 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1178 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1179 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1180 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1183 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1184 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1185 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1187 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1188 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1193 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1194 self.channel_value_satoshis
1197 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1198 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1201 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1202 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1205 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1206 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1207 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1209 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1210 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1211 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1212 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1213 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1215 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1219 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1220 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1221 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1224 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1225 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1226 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1229 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1230 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1231 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1234 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1235 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1236 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1239 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1240 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1241 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1244 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1245 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1246 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1249 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1250 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1251 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1252 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1253 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1256 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1258 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1259 self.prev_config = None;
1263 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1264 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1268 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1269 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1270 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1271 let did_channel_update =
1272 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1273 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1274 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1275 if did_channel_update {
1276 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1277 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1278 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1279 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1281 self.config.options = *config;
1285 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1286 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1287 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1288 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1289 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1292 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1293 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1294 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1295 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1296 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1298 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1299 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1300 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1301 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1302 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1303 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1304 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1306 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1307 where L::Target: Logger
1309 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1310 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1311 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1313 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1314 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1315 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1316 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1318 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1319 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1320 if match update_state {
1321 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1322 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1323 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1324 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1325 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1327 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1331 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1332 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1333 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1335 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1337 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1338 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1339 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1341 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1342 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1343 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1344 transaction_output_index: None
1349 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1350 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1351 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1352 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1353 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1356 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1358 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1359 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1360 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1362 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1363 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1366 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1367 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1370 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1372 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1373 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1374 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1376 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1377 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1383 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1384 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1385 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1386 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1387 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1388 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1389 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1393 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1394 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1398 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1399 if generated_by_local {
1400 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1401 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1410 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1412 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1413 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1414 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1415 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1416 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1417 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1418 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1421 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1422 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1423 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1424 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1428 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1429 preimages.push(preimage);
1433 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1434 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1436 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1438 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1439 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1441 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1442 if !generated_by_local {
1443 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1451 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1452 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1453 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1454 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1455 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1456 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1457 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1458 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1460 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1462 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1463 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1464 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1465 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1467 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1469 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1470 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1471 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1472 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1475 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1476 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1477 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1478 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1480 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1483 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1484 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1485 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1486 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1488 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1491 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1492 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1497 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1498 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1503 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1505 let channel_parameters =
1506 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1507 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1508 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1515 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1518 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1519 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1520 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1521 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1523 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1524 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1525 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1533 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1534 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1540 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1541 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1542 /// our counterparty!)
1543 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1544 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1545 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1546 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1547 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1548 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1549 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1551 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1555 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1556 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1557 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1558 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1559 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1560 //may see payments to it!
1561 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1562 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1563 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1565 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1568 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1569 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1570 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1571 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1572 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1575 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1576 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1579 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1583 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1584 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1585 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1586 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1587 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1588 // which are near the dust limit.
1589 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1590 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1591 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1592 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1593 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1595 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1596 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1598 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1601 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1602 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1603 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1606 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1607 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1609 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1610 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1611 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1612 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1613 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1614 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1615 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1618 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1621 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1622 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1623 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1625 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1626 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1627 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1628 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1629 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1630 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1632 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1633 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1639 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1640 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1642 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1643 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1644 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1645 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1646 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1647 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1648 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1651 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1654 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1655 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1656 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1658 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1659 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1660 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1661 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1662 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1663 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1665 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1666 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1670 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1671 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1672 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1673 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1674 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1675 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1676 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1678 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1679 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1681 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1688 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1689 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1690 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1691 /// corner case properly.
1692 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1693 -> AvailableBalances
1694 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1696 let context = &self;
1697 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1698 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1699 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1701 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1702 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1703 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1704 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1707 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1709 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1710 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1712 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1714 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1716 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1717 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1721 if context.is_outbound() {
1722 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1723 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1725 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1726 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1728 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1729 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1730 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1731 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1734 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1735 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1736 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1737 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1738 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1739 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1740 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1743 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1744 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1745 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1746 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1747 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1748 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1749 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1750 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1751 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1752 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1753 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1755 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1758 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1759 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1760 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1761 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1762 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1765 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1766 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1768 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1769 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1770 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1772 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1773 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1774 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1775 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1779 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1781 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1782 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1783 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1784 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1785 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1786 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1787 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1789 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1790 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1792 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1793 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1794 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1796 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1797 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1798 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1799 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1800 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1803 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1804 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1805 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1806 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1807 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1808 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1811 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1812 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1813 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1815 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1819 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1820 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1822 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1823 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1827 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1828 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1829 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1830 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1832 outbound_capacity_msat,
1833 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1834 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1839 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1840 let context = &self;
1841 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1844 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1845 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1847 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1848 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1850 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1851 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1853 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1854 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1855 let context = &self;
1856 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1858 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1861 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1862 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1864 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1865 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1867 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1868 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1870 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1876 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1882 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1883 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1884 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1887 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1888 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1889 included_htlcs += 1;
1892 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1893 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1897 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1898 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1899 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1900 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1901 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1902 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1907 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1909 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1910 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1915 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1916 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1920 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1921 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1922 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1925 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1926 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1928 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1929 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1930 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1932 total_pending_htlcs,
1933 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1934 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1935 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1937 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1938 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1939 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1941 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1943 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1948 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1949 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1951 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1952 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1954 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1955 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1957 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1958 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1959 let context = &self;
1960 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1962 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1965 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1966 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1968 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1969 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1971 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1972 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1974 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1975 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1979 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1980 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1986 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1987 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1988 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1989 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1990 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1991 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1994 included_htlcs += 1;
1997 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1998 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2001 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2002 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2004 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2005 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2006 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2011 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2012 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2013 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2016 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2017 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2019 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2020 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2022 total_pending_htlcs,
2023 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2024 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2025 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2027 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2028 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2029 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2031 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2033 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2038 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2039 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2040 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2041 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2048 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2050 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2051 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2054 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2056 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2057 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2058 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2062 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2063 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2064 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2067 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2069 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2070 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2073 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2074 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2075 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2076 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2077 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2078 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2079 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2080 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2081 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2082 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2083 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2085 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2086 // return them to fail the payment.
2087 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2088 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2089 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2091 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2092 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2097 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2098 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2099 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2100 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2101 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2102 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2103 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2104 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2105 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2106 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2107 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2108 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2109 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2113 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2115 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2116 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2119 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2120 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2124 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2125 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2126 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2127 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2128 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2129 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2130 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2131 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2132 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2136 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2137 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2138 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2141 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2142 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2143 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2144 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2147 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2149 next_local_nonce: None,
2153 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2154 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2155 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2156 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2158 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2159 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2160 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2161 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2163 match &self.holder_signer {
2164 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2165 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2166 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2167 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2168 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2171 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2175 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2176 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2177 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2178 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2179 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2180 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2183 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2184 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2190 // Internal utility functions for channels
2192 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2193 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2194 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2196 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2198 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2199 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2200 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2202 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2205 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2207 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2210 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2211 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2212 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2214 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2216 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2217 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2218 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2219 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2220 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2223 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2224 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2225 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2226 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2227 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2228 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2229 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2232 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2233 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2235 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2236 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2239 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2240 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2241 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2242 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2243 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2244 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2247 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2248 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2249 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2250 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2253 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2254 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2256 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2257 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2258 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2262 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2264 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2266 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2267 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2268 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2269 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2271 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2272 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2274 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2276 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2277 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2278 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2279 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2281 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2282 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2292 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2293 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2294 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2295 // outside of those situations will fail.
2296 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2300 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2305 1 + // script length (0)
2309 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2310 2 + // witness marker and flag
2311 1 + // witness element count
2312 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2313 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2314 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2315 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2316 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2317 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2319 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2320 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2321 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2327 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2328 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2329 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2330 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2332 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2333 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2334 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2336 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2337 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2338 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2339 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2340 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2341 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2344 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2345 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2348 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2349 value_to_holder = 0;
2352 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2353 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2354 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2355 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2357 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2358 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2361 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2362 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2365 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2368 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2369 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2371 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2373 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2374 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2375 where L::Target: Logger {
2376 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2377 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2378 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2379 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2380 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2381 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2382 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2383 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2387 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2388 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2389 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2390 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2392 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2393 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2395 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2397 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2398 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2399 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2401 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2402 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2403 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2404 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2405 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2406 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2407 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2409 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2410 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2411 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2413 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2414 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2416 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2419 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2420 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2424 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2428 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2430 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2431 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2432 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2433 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2436 // Now update local state:
2438 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2439 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2440 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2441 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2442 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2443 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2444 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2448 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2449 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2450 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2451 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2452 // do not not get into this branch.
2453 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2454 match pending_update {
2455 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2456 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2457 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2458 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2459 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2460 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2461 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2464 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2465 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2466 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2467 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2468 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2469 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2470 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2476 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2477 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2478 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2481 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2482 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2484 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2485 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2488 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2489 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2491 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2492 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2494 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2495 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2498 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2501 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2502 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2503 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2504 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2509 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2510 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2511 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2512 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2513 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2514 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2515 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2516 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2517 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2518 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2519 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2520 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2521 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2522 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2523 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2525 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2526 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2527 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2528 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2529 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2532 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2533 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2534 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2540 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2541 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2543 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2547 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2548 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2549 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2550 /// before we fail backwards.
2552 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2553 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2554 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2555 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2556 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2557 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2558 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2561 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2562 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2563 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2564 /// before we fail backwards.
2566 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2567 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2568 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2569 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2570 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2571 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2572 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2574 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2576 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2577 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2578 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2580 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2581 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2582 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2584 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2585 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2586 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2588 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2593 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2594 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2600 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2601 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2602 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2603 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2604 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2608 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2609 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2610 force_holding_cell = true;
2613 // Now update local state:
2614 if force_holding_cell {
2615 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2616 match pending_update {
2617 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2618 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2620 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2624 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2625 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2626 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2627 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2633 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2634 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2635 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2641 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2643 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2644 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2647 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2648 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2649 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2654 // Message handlers:
2656 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2657 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2658 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2659 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2660 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2664 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2667 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2670 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2671 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2672 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2673 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2676 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2678 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2679 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2680 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2681 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2683 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2684 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2686 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2687 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2689 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2690 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2691 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2692 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2693 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2698 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2699 initial_commitment_tx,
2702 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2703 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2706 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2707 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2710 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2711 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2712 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2713 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2714 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2715 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2716 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2717 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2718 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2719 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2720 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2721 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2723 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2725 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2726 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2727 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2728 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2729 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2730 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2731 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2733 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2734 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2735 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2737 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2739 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2740 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2742 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2744 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2745 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2749 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2750 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2751 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2752 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2753 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2754 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2755 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2758 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2759 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2761 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2762 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2763 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2764 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2766 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2769 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2770 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2774 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2775 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2776 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2777 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2778 // when routing outbound payments.
2779 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2783 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2785 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2786 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2788 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2789 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2791 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2792 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2793 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2794 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2795 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2796 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2797 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2798 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2799 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2801 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2802 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2803 let expected_point =
2804 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2805 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2807 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2808 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2809 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2810 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2811 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2812 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2814 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2815 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2816 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2817 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2818 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2820 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2828 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2829 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2831 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2833 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2836 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2837 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2838 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2839 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2840 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2841 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2843 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2844 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2845 if local_sent_shutdown {
2846 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2848 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2849 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2850 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2856 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2859 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2862 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2866 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2867 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2868 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2871 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2875 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2876 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2877 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2878 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2879 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2880 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2881 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2882 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2883 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2884 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2885 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2887 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2888 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2889 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2890 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2891 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2892 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2896 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2897 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2900 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2901 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2902 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2904 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2905 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2906 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2907 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2908 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2909 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2910 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2914 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2915 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2916 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2917 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2918 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2919 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2920 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2924 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2925 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2926 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2927 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2928 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2932 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2933 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2935 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2936 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2937 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2939 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2940 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2944 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2947 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2952 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2953 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2957 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2958 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2959 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2960 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2961 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2962 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2963 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2964 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2965 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2967 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2968 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2969 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2970 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2971 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2974 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2975 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2976 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2977 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2981 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2984 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2988 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2989 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2990 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2994 // Now update local state:
2995 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2996 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2997 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2998 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2999 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3000 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3001 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3006 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3008 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3009 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3010 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3011 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3012 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3013 None => fail_reason.into(),
3014 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3015 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3016 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3019 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3023 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3025 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3026 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3028 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3034 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3037 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3038 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3041 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3045 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3048 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3049 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3052 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3056 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3060 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3061 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3064 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3068 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3072 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3073 where L::Target: Logger
3075 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3078 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3081 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3085 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3087 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3089 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3090 let commitment_txid = {
3091 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3092 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3093 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3095 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3096 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3097 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3098 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3099 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3104 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3106 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3107 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3108 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3109 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3112 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3113 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3114 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3118 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3120 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3121 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3122 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3123 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3124 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3125 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3126 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3127 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3128 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3129 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3130 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3136 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3140 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3141 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3142 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3143 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3144 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3145 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3146 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3147 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3148 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3149 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3150 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3151 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3152 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3155 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3156 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3157 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3158 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3159 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3160 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3161 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3163 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3164 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3165 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3166 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3167 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3168 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3169 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3172 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3173 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3176 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3178 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3179 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3180 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3183 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3186 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3187 commitment_stats.tx,
3189 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3190 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3191 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3194 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3195 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3197 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3198 let mut need_commitment = false;
3199 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3200 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3201 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3202 need_commitment = true;
3206 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3207 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3208 Some(forward_info.clone())
3210 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3211 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3212 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3213 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3214 need_commitment = true;
3217 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3218 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3219 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3220 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3221 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3222 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3223 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3224 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3225 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3226 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3227 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3228 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3229 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3230 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3232 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3234 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3235 need_commitment = true;
3239 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3240 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3241 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3242 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3243 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3244 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3246 nondust_htlc_sources,
3250 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3251 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3252 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3253 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3254 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3256 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3257 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3258 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3259 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3260 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3261 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3262 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3263 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3264 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3265 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3266 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3267 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3268 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3269 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3271 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3272 &self.context.channel_id);
3273 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3276 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3277 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3278 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3279 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3280 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3281 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3282 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3283 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3284 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3288 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3289 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3290 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3291 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3294 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3295 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3296 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3297 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3298 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3299 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3300 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3302 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3303 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3304 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3305 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3308 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3309 /// for our counterparty.
3310 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3311 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3312 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3313 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3315 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3316 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3317 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3318 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3320 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3321 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3322 updates: Vec::new(),
3325 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3326 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3327 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3328 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3329 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3330 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3331 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3332 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3333 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3334 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3335 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3336 // to rebalance channels.
3337 match &htlc_update {
3338 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3339 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3340 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3342 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3343 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3345 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3348 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3349 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3350 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3351 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3352 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3353 // into the holding cell without ever being
3354 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3355 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3356 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3359 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3365 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3366 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3367 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3368 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3369 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3370 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3371 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3372 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3373 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3374 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3375 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3376 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3378 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3379 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3380 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3381 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3382 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3383 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3384 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3385 // for a full revocation before failing.
3386 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3387 update_fail_count += 1;
3390 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3392 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3399 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3400 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3402 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3403 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3408 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3409 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3410 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3411 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3412 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3414 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3415 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3416 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3418 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3419 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3425 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3426 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3427 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3428 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3429 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3430 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3431 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3432 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3433 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3435 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3438 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3441 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3445 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3447 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3448 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3453 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3454 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3455 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3456 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3457 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3458 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3459 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3460 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3464 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3466 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3467 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3470 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3471 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3472 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3473 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3475 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3479 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3481 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3482 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3483 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3484 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3485 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3486 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3490 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3491 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3492 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3493 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3494 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3495 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3496 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3497 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3500 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3501 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3504 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3505 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3506 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3507 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3508 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3509 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3510 let mut require_commitment = false;
3511 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3514 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3515 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3516 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3517 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3519 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3520 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3521 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3522 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3523 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3524 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3526 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3530 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3531 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3532 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3533 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3534 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3536 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3537 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3538 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3543 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3544 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3546 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3550 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3551 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3553 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3554 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3555 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3556 require_commitment = true;
3557 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3558 match forward_info {
3559 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3560 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3561 require_commitment = true;
3563 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3564 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3565 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3567 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3568 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3569 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3573 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3574 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3575 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3576 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3582 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3583 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3584 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3585 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3586 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3588 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3589 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3590 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3591 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3592 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3593 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3594 require_commitment = true;
3598 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3600 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3601 match update_state {
3602 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3603 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3604 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3605 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3606 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3607 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3609 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3610 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3611 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3612 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3613 require_commitment = true;
3614 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3615 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3620 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3621 let release_state_str =
3622 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3623 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3624 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3625 if !release_monitor {
3626 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3627 update: monitor_update,
3629 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3631 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3636 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3637 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3638 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3639 if require_commitment {
3640 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3641 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3642 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3643 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3645 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3646 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3647 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3648 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3649 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3651 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3652 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3653 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3654 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3655 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3658 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3659 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3660 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3661 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3662 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3663 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3665 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3666 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3668 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3669 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3671 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3672 if require_commitment {
3673 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3675 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3676 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3677 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3678 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3680 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3681 &self.context.channel_id(),
3682 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3685 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3686 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3688 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3689 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3691 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3692 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3698 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3699 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3700 /// commitment update.
3701 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3702 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3703 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3705 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3706 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3709 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3710 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3711 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3712 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3714 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3715 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3716 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3717 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3718 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3719 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3720 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3722 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3723 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3725 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3726 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3728 if !self.context.is_live() {
3729 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3732 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3733 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3734 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3735 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3736 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3737 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3738 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3739 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3740 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3741 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3745 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3746 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3747 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3748 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3749 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3750 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3753 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3754 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3758 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3759 force_holding_cell = true;
3762 if force_holding_cell {
3763 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3767 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3768 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3770 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3771 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3776 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3777 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3779 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3781 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3782 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3783 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3784 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3788 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3789 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3790 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3794 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3795 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3798 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3799 // will be retransmitted.
3800 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3801 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3802 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3804 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3805 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3807 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3808 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3809 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3810 // this HTLC accordingly
3811 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3814 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3815 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3816 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3817 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3820 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3821 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3822 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3823 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3824 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3825 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3830 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3832 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3833 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3834 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3835 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3839 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3840 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3841 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3842 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3843 // the update upon reconnection.
3844 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3848 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3850 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3851 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3855 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3856 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3857 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3858 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3859 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3860 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3861 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3863 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3864 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3865 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3866 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3867 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3868 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3869 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3871 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3872 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3873 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3874 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3875 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3876 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3877 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3880 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3881 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3882 /// to the remote side.
3883 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3884 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3885 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3886 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3889 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3891 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3892 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3894 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3895 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3896 // first received the funding_signed.
3897 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3898 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3899 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3901 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3902 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3903 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3904 funding_broadcastable = None;
3907 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3908 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3909 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3910 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3911 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3912 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3913 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3914 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3915 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3916 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3917 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3918 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3919 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3920 next_per_commitment_point,
3921 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3925 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3927 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3928 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3929 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3930 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3931 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3932 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3934 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3935 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3936 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3937 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3938 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3939 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3943 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3944 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3946 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3947 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3949 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3950 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3953 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3954 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3955 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3956 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3957 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3958 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3959 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3960 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3961 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3965 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3966 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3968 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3971 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3972 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3974 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3976 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3977 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3978 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3979 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3980 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3981 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3982 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3983 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3984 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3985 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3987 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3989 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3991 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3997 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4000 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4001 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4002 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4004 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4005 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4007 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4008 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4010 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4011 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4014 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4015 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4016 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4017 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4018 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4020 SignerResumeUpdates {
4028 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4029 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4030 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4031 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4032 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4033 per_commitment_secret,
4034 next_per_commitment_point,
4036 next_local_nonce: None,
4040 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4041 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4042 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4043 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4044 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4045 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4047 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4048 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4049 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4050 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4051 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4052 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4053 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4054 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4055 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4056 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4061 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4062 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4064 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4065 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4066 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4067 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4068 reason: err_packet.clone()
4071 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4072 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4073 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4074 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4075 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4076 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4079 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4080 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4081 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4082 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4083 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4090 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4091 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4093 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4097 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4098 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4099 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4100 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4101 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4102 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4103 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4107 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4108 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4109 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4113 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4114 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4119 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4120 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4121 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4122 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4123 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4124 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4125 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4130 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4131 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4133 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4134 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4135 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4136 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4137 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4138 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4139 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4140 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4143 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4145 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4146 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4147 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4148 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4152 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4153 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4157 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4158 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4159 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4160 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4161 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4164 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4165 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4166 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4167 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4168 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4171 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4172 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4173 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4174 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4175 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4176 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4177 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4178 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4182 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4183 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4184 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4185 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4187 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4191 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4192 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4193 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4194 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4196 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4198 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4200 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4201 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4202 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4203 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4204 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4207 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4208 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4209 channel_ready: None,
4210 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4211 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4212 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4216 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4217 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4218 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4219 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4220 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4221 next_per_commitment_point,
4222 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4224 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4225 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4226 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4230 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4231 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4232 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4234 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4235 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4236 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4239 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4245 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4246 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4247 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4248 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4249 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4250 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4251 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4253 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4255 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4256 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4257 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4258 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4260 next_per_commitment_point,
4261 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4265 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4266 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4267 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4269 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4272 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4273 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4274 raa: required_revoke,
4275 commitment_update: None,
4276 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4278 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4279 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4280 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4282 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4285 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4286 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4287 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4288 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4289 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4290 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4293 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4294 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4295 raa: required_revoke,
4296 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4297 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4301 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4305 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4306 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4307 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4308 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4310 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4312 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4314 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4315 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4316 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4317 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4318 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4319 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4320 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4321 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4323 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4324 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4325 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4326 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4327 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4329 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4330 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4331 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4332 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4335 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4336 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4337 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4338 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4339 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4340 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4341 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4342 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4343 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4344 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4345 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4346 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4347 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4348 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4349 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4351 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4354 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4355 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4358 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4359 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4360 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4361 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4362 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4363 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4366 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4367 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4368 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4369 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4370 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4371 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4374 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4380 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4381 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4382 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4383 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4385 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4386 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4387 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4388 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4389 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4390 return Ok((None, None, None));
4393 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4394 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4395 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4397 return Ok((None, None, None));
4400 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4401 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4402 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4403 return Ok((None, None, None));
4406 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4408 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4409 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4410 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4411 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4413 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4414 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4416 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4417 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4419 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4420 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4421 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4422 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4424 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4425 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4426 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4433 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4434 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4436 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4437 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4440 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4441 /// within our expected timeframe.
4443 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4444 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4445 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4448 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4451 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4452 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4456 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4457 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4459 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4462 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4463 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4464 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4465 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4468 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4469 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4473 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4475 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4479 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4480 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4481 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4484 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4487 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4488 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4489 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4490 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4492 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4495 assert!(send_shutdown);
4496 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4497 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4498 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4500 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4501 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4503 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4508 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4510 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4511 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4513 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4514 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4515 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4516 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4517 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4518 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4521 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4522 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4524 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4525 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4526 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4527 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4531 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4532 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4533 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4534 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4535 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4536 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4538 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4539 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4546 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4547 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4549 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4552 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4553 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4555 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4557 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4558 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4559 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4560 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4561 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4562 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4563 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4564 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4565 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4567 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4568 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4571 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4575 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4576 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4577 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4578 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4580 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4583 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4586 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4589 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4593 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4594 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4597 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4598 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4599 return Ok((None, None, None));
4602 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4603 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4604 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4607 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4609 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4612 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4613 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4614 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4615 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4616 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4620 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4621 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4626 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4627 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4628 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4629 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4630 monitor_update: None,
4631 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4632 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4634 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4635 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4636 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4637 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4641 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4643 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4644 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4645 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4646 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4648 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4651 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4652 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4654 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4655 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4656 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4657 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4658 monitor_update: None,
4659 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4660 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4662 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4663 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4664 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4665 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4670 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4671 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4672 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4673 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4675 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4676 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4677 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4679 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4685 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4686 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4689 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4690 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4692 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4693 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4696 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4697 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4698 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4699 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4700 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4702 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4704 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4706 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4707 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4710 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4711 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4712 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4713 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4714 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4715 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4716 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4717 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4722 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4723 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4724 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4725 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4727 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4731 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4732 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4733 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4734 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4736 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4742 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4743 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4744 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4745 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4746 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4747 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4748 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4750 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4751 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4754 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4756 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4757 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4763 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4764 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4765 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4766 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4767 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4768 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4769 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4771 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4772 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4779 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4780 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4783 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4784 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4787 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4788 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4792 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4793 &self.context.holder_signer
4797 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4799 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4800 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4801 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4802 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4803 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4804 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4806 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4808 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4817 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4821 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4822 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4823 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4824 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4827 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4828 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4829 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4830 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4833 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4834 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4835 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4836 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4837 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4838 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4841 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4842 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4843 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4844 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4845 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4846 if !release_monitor {
4847 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4856 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4857 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4860 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4861 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4862 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4864 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4865 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4866 if self.context.channel_state &
4867 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4868 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4869 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4870 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4871 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4874 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4875 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4876 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4877 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4878 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4879 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4881 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4882 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4883 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4885 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4886 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4887 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4888 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4889 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4890 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4896 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4897 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4898 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4901 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4902 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4903 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4906 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4907 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4908 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4911 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4912 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4913 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4914 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4915 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4916 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4921 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4922 self.context.channel_update_status
4925 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4926 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4927 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4930 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4932 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4933 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4934 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4938 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4939 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4940 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4943 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4947 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4948 // channel_ready yet.
4949 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4953 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4954 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4955 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4956 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4957 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4959 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4960 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4961 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4963 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4964 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4967 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4968 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4969 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4970 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4971 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4972 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4973 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4974 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4975 self.context.channel_state);
4977 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4981 if need_commitment_update {
4982 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4983 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4984 let next_per_commitment_point =
4985 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4986 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4987 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4988 next_per_commitment_point,
4989 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4993 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4999 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5000 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5001 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5002 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5003 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5004 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5005 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5007 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5010 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5011 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5012 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5013 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5014 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5015 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5016 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5017 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5018 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5019 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5020 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5021 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5022 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5023 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5024 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5025 // channel and move on.
5026 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5027 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5029 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5030 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5031 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5033 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5034 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5035 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5036 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5037 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5038 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5039 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5040 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5045 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5046 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5047 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5048 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5049 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5052 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5053 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5054 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5055 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5056 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5057 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5060 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5061 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5062 // may have already happened for this block).
5063 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5064 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5065 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5066 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5069 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5070 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5071 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5072 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5080 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5081 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5082 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5083 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5085 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5086 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5089 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5091 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5092 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5093 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5094 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5096 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5099 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5102 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5103 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5104 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5105 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5107 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5110 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5111 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5112 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5114 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5115 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5117 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5118 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5119 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5127 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5129 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5130 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5131 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5133 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5134 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5137 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5138 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5139 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5140 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5141 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5142 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5143 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5144 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5145 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5148 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5149 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5150 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5151 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5153 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5154 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5155 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5157 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5158 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5159 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5160 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5162 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5163 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5164 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5165 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5166 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5167 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5168 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5171 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5172 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5174 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5177 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5178 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5179 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5180 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5181 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5182 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5183 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5184 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5185 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5186 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5187 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5188 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5189 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5190 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5191 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5192 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5193 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5199 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5204 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5205 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5207 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5208 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5209 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5210 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5212 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5215 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5217 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5218 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5219 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5220 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5221 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5222 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5224 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5225 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5228 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5229 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5230 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5231 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5232 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5233 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5235 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5236 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5239 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5240 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5241 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5242 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5243 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5249 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5250 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5251 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5252 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5254 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5257 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5261 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5265 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5266 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5270 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5274 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5275 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5278 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5282 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5284 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5289 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5290 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5291 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5293 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5298 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5300 None => return None,
5303 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5305 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5306 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5308 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5309 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5315 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5317 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5318 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5319 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5320 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5321 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5322 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5323 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5325 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5326 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5327 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5328 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5329 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5330 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5331 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5332 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5333 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5334 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5335 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5336 contents: announcement,
5341 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5345 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5346 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5347 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5348 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5349 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5350 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5351 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5352 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5354 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5356 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5357 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5358 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5359 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5361 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5363 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5364 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5367 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5368 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5369 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5370 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5373 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5376 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5377 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5378 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5379 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5380 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5381 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5384 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5386 Err(_) => return None,
5388 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5389 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5394 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5395 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5396 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5397 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5398 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5399 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5400 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5401 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5402 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5403 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5404 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5405 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5406 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5407 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5408 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5409 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5412 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5415 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5416 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5417 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5418 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5419 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5420 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5421 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5422 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5423 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5425 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5426 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5427 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5428 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5429 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5430 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5431 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5432 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5433 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5435 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5436 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5437 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5438 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5439 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5440 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5441 next_funding_txid: None,
5446 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5448 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5449 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5450 /// commitment update.
5452 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5453 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5454 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5455 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5456 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5457 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5458 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5461 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5462 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5463 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5465 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5466 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5471 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5472 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5474 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5476 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5477 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5479 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5480 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5481 /// regenerate them.
5483 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5484 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5486 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5487 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5488 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5489 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5490 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5491 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5492 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5494 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5495 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5497 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5498 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5499 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5502 if amount_msat == 0 {
5503 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5506 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5507 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5508 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5509 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5512 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5514 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5517 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5518 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5519 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5520 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5521 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5522 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5523 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5527 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5528 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5529 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5530 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5531 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5532 else { "to peer" });
5534 if need_holding_cell {
5535 force_holding_cell = true;
5538 // Now update local state:
5539 if force_holding_cell {
5540 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5545 onion_routing_packet,
5551 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5552 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5554 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5556 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5561 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5562 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5563 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5567 onion_routing_packet,
5570 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5575 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5576 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5577 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5578 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5580 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5581 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5582 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5584 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5585 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5589 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5590 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5591 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5592 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5593 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5594 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5595 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5598 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5599 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5600 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5601 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5602 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5603 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5606 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5608 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5609 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5610 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5611 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5612 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5614 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5615 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5618 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5619 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5620 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5621 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5622 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5623 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5624 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5625 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5626 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5627 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5628 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5631 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5635 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5636 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5637 where L::Target: Logger
5639 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5640 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5641 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5643 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5645 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5646 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5647 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5648 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5649 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5650 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5651 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5652 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5653 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5654 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5655 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5661 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5664 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5665 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5666 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5667 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5668 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5669 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5671 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5672 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5673 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5675 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5676 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5677 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5680 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5681 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5685 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5686 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5688 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5690 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5691 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5692 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5693 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5695 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5696 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5697 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5698 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5699 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5700 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5704 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5705 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5709 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5710 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5715 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5716 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5718 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5719 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5720 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5721 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5722 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5723 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5724 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5725 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5727 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5728 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5729 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5732 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5733 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5734 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5740 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5742 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5743 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5744 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5745 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5746 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5748 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5750 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5756 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5757 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5759 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5760 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5761 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5762 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5763 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5765 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5766 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5770 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5771 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5774 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5775 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5778 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5779 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5781 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5782 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5783 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5786 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5787 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5788 let mut chan_closed = false;
5789 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5793 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5795 None if !chan_closed => {
5796 // use override shutdown script if provided
5797 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5798 Some(script) => script,
5800 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5801 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5802 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5803 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5807 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5808 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5810 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5816 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5817 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5818 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5819 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5820 monitor_update: None,
5821 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5822 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5824 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5825 Some(shutdown_result)
5827 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5830 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5832 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5833 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5834 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5835 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5836 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5837 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5840 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5841 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5843 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5844 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5845 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5848 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5849 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5850 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5851 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5852 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5854 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5855 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5862 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5863 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5865 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5868 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5869 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5870 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5872 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5873 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5877 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5881 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5882 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5883 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5884 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5887 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5888 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5889 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5890 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5891 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5892 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5893 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5894 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5896 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5897 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5898 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5899 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5901 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5904 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5905 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5907 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5908 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5911 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5914 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5915 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5916 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5917 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5921 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5922 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5924 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5925 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5927 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5929 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5931 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5932 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5933 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5937 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5938 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5940 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5941 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5942 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5943 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5947 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5948 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5949 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5953 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5954 Ok(script) => script,
5955 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5958 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5961 context: ChannelContext {
5964 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5965 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5966 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5967 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5972 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5974 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5975 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5976 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5977 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5979 channel_value_satoshis,
5981 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5983 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5984 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5987 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5988 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5991 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5992 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5993 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5994 pending_update_fee: None,
5995 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5996 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5997 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5998 update_time_counter: 1,
6000 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6002 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6003 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6004 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6005 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6006 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6007 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6009 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6010 signer_pending_funding: false,
6012 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6013 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6014 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6015 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6017 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6018 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6019 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6020 closing_fee_limits: None,
6021 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6023 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6024 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6025 short_channel_id: None,
6026 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6028 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6029 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6030 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6031 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6032 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6033 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6034 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6035 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6036 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6037 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6038 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6039 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6041 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6043 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6044 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6045 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6046 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6047 counterparty_parameters: None,
6048 funding_outpoint: None,
6049 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6051 funding_transaction: None,
6052 is_batch_funding: None,
6054 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6055 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6056 counterparty_node_id,
6058 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6060 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6062 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6063 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6065 announcement_sigs: None,
6067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6068 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6070 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6072 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6073 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6075 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6076 outbound_scid_alias,
6078 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6079 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6081 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6082 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6087 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6089 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6093 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6094 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6095 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6096 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6097 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6098 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6099 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6100 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6101 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6102 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6103 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6105 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6106 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6108 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6109 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6110 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6111 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6114 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6115 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6117 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6119 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6120 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6122 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6123 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6124 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6125 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6126 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6127 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6130 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6131 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6133 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6134 if funding_created.is_none() {
6135 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6136 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6137 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6141 let channel = Channel {
6142 context: self.context,
6145 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6148 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6149 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6150 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6151 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6152 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6153 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6154 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6155 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6156 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6157 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6160 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6161 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6162 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6163 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6164 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6165 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6171 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6172 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6173 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6174 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6175 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6176 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6178 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6180 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6181 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6182 // We've exhausted our options
6185 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6186 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6189 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6190 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6191 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6192 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6194 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6195 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6196 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6197 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6198 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6199 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6201 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6203 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6204 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6207 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6208 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6209 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6211 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6212 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6215 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6216 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6219 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6220 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6224 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6225 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6226 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6227 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6228 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6229 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6230 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6231 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6232 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6233 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6234 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6235 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6236 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6237 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6238 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6239 first_per_commitment_point,
6240 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6241 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6242 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6243 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6245 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6250 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6251 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6253 // Check sanity of message fields:
6254 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6257 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6260 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6263 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6266 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6269 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6271 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6273 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6274 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6277 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6278 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6281 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6284 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6288 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6289 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6292 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6295 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6298 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6301 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6304 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6307 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6311 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6312 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6313 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6315 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6316 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6318 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6319 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6322 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6323 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6326 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6327 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6328 &Some(ref script) => {
6329 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6330 if script.len() == 0 {
6333 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6336 Some(script.clone())
6339 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6346 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6347 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6348 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6349 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6350 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6352 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6353 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6355 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6358 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6359 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6360 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6361 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6362 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6363 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6366 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6367 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6368 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6371 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6372 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6374 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6375 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6381 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6382 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6383 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6384 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6387 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6388 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6389 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6390 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6391 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6392 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6393 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6394 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6395 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6396 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6397 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6400 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6402 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6403 // support this channel type.
6404 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6405 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6409 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6410 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6411 // `static_remote_key`.
6412 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6415 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6416 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6419 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6422 channel_type.clone()
6424 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6425 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6431 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6432 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6433 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6434 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6435 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6436 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6437 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6438 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6439 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6442 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6446 // Check sanity of message fields:
6447 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6448 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6450 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6451 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6453 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6456 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6457 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6460 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6461 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6463 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6466 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6468 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6469 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6472 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6475 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6476 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6479 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6480 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6481 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6483 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6486 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6487 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6489 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6490 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6492 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6495 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6496 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6498 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6502 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6504 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6505 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6510 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6511 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6512 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6513 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6516 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6519 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6520 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6521 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6523 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6527 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6528 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6529 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6530 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6534 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6535 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6536 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6540 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6541 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6542 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6543 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6547 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6548 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6549 &Some(ref script) => {
6550 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6551 if script.len() == 0 {
6554 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6555 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6557 Some(script.clone())
6560 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6567 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6568 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6569 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6570 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6574 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6575 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6576 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6580 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6581 Ok(script) => script,
6582 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6585 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6586 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6588 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6591 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6595 context: ChannelContext {
6598 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6599 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6601 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6608 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6609 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6610 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6611 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6614 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6616 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6617 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6620 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6621 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6622 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6624 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6625 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6626 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6627 pending_update_fee: None,
6628 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6629 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6630 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6631 update_time_counter: 1,
6633 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6635 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6636 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6637 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6638 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6639 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6640 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6642 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6643 signer_pending_funding: false,
6645 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6646 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6647 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6648 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6650 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6651 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6652 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6653 closing_fee_limits: None,
6654 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6656 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6657 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6658 short_channel_id: None,
6659 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6661 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6662 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6663 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6664 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6665 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6666 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6667 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6668 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6669 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6670 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6671 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6672 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6675 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6677 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6678 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6679 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6680 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6681 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6682 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6683 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6685 funding_outpoint: None,
6686 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6688 funding_transaction: None,
6689 is_batch_funding: None,
6691 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6692 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6693 counterparty_node_id,
6695 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6697 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6699 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6700 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6702 announcement_sigs: None,
6704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6705 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6707 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6709 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6710 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6712 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6713 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6715 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6716 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6719 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6724 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6726 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6732 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6733 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6735 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6736 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6737 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6738 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6740 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6741 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6743 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6744 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6747 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6750 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6751 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6752 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6754 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6755 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6756 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6757 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6759 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6760 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6761 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6762 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6763 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6764 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6765 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6766 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6767 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6768 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6769 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6770 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6771 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6772 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6773 first_per_commitment_point,
6774 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6775 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6776 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6778 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6780 next_local_nonce: None,
6784 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6785 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6787 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6789 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6790 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6793 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6794 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6796 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6797 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6798 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6799 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6800 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6801 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6802 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6803 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6804 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6805 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6806 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6808 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6811 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6812 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6813 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6817 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6818 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6820 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6821 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6822 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6824 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6826 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6827 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6828 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6829 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6832 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6833 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6834 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6835 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6836 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6838 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6840 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6841 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6842 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6845 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6846 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6847 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6851 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6852 initial_commitment_tx,
6855 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6856 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6859 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6860 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6863 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6865 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6866 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6867 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6868 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6870 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6872 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6873 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6874 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6875 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6876 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6877 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6878 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6879 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6880 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6881 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6882 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6884 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6886 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6887 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6888 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6889 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6890 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6891 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6893 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6894 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6896 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6897 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6898 let mut channel = Channel {
6899 context: self.context,
6901 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6902 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6904 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6908 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6909 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6911 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6917 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6918 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6919 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6920 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6921 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6923 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6924 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6925 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6926 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6932 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6933 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6934 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6935 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6936 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6937 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6942 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6943 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6944 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6945 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6947 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6948 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6949 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6950 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6955 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6956 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6957 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6958 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6959 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6960 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6965 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6966 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6967 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6970 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6972 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6973 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6974 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6975 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6976 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6978 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6979 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6980 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6981 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6983 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6984 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6985 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6987 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6989 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6990 // deserialized from that format.
6991 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6992 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6993 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6995 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6997 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6998 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6999 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7001 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7002 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7003 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7004 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7007 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7008 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7009 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7012 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7013 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7014 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7015 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7017 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7018 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7020 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7022 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7024 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7026 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7029 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7031 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7036 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7037 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7039 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7040 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7041 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7042 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7043 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7044 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7045 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7047 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7049 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7051 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7054 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7055 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7056 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7059 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7061 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7062 preimages.push(preimage);
7064 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7065 reason.write(writer)?;
7067 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7069 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7070 preimages.push(preimage);
7072 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7073 reason.write(writer)?;
7076 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7077 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7078 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7080 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7081 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7082 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7086 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7087 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7088 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7090 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7091 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7095 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7096 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7097 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7098 source.write(writer)?;
7099 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7101 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7102 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7103 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7105 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7106 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7108 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7110 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7111 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7113 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7115 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7116 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7121 match self.context.resend_order {
7122 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7123 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7126 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7127 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7128 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7130 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7131 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7132 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7133 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7136 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7137 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7138 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7139 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7140 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7143 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7144 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7145 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7146 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7148 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7149 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7150 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7152 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7154 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7155 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7156 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7157 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7159 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7160 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7161 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7162 // consider the stale state on reload.
7165 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7166 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7167 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7169 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7170 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7171 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7173 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7174 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7176 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7177 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7178 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7180 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7181 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7183 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7186 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7187 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7188 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7190 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7193 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7194 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7196 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7197 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7198 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7200 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7202 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7204 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7206 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7207 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7209 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7210 htlc.write(writer)?;
7213 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7214 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7215 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7217 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7218 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7220 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7221 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7222 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7223 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7224 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7225 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7226 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7228 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7229 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7230 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7231 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7232 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7234 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7235 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7237 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7238 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7239 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7240 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7242 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7244 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7245 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7246 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7247 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7248 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7249 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7250 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7252 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7253 (2, chan_type, option),
7254 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7255 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7256 (5, self.context.config, required),
7257 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7258 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7259 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7260 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7261 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7262 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7263 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7264 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7265 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7266 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7267 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7268 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7269 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7270 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7271 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7272 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7273 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7274 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7275 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7282 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7283 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7286 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7288 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7289 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7290 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7292 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7293 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7294 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7295 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7297 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7299 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7300 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7301 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7306 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let mut keys_data = None;
7317 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7318 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7319 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7321 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7322 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7323 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7324 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7325 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7326 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7330 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7331 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7332 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7335 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7337 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7344 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7345 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7346 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7347 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7348 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7349 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7350 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7351 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7352 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7353 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7354 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7355 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7360 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7361 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7362 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7363 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7364 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7365 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7366 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7367 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7368 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7369 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7370 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7371 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7373 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7377 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7381 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7384 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7386 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7390 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7392 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7393 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7394 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7395 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7396 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7397 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7398 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7399 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7400 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7402 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7403 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7404 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7406 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7407 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7408 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7414 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7415 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7416 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7417 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7420 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7421 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7422 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7424 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7425 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7426 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7427 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7430 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7432 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7433 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7436 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7438 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7446 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7447 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7448 // consider the stale state on reload.
7449 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7452 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7456 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7459 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7461 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7468 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7469 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7471 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7472 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7480 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7481 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7483 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7484 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7489 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7490 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7491 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7492 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7494 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7497 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7505 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7506 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7511 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7512 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7514 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7516 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7520 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7521 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7522 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7524 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7530 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7531 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7532 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7533 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7534 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7535 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7536 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7537 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7538 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7539 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7541 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7542 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7543 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7544 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7545 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7546 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7547 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7549 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7550 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7551 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7552 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7554 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7556 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7557 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7559 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7561 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7562 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7563 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7564 (2, channel_type, option),
7565 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7566 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7567 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7568 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7569 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7570 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7571 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7572 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7573 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7574 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7575 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7576 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7577 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7578 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7579 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7580 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7581 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7582 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7583 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7584 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7585 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7586 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7589 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7590 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7591 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7592 // required channel parameters.
7593 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7594 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7595 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7597 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7599 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7600 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7601 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7602 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7605 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7606 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7607 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7609 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7610 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7612 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7613 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7618 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7619 if iter.next().is_some() {
7620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7624 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7625 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7626 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7627 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7628 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7631 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7632 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7633 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7635 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7636 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7638 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7639 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7640 // separate u64 values.
7641 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7643 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7645 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7646 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7647 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7648 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7650 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7651 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7653 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7654 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7655 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7656 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7657 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7660 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7661 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7665 context: ChannelContext {
7668 config: config.unwrap(),
7672 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7673 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7674 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7677 temporary_channel_id,
7679 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7681 channel_value_satoshis,
7683 latest_monitor_update_id,
7685 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7686 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7689 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7690 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7693 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7694 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7695 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7696 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7700 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7701 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7702 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7703 monitor_pending_forwards,
7704 monitor_pending_failures,
7705 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7707 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7708 signer_pending_funding: false,
7711 holding_cell_update_fee,
7712 next_holder_htlc_id,
7713 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7714 update_time_counter,
7717 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7718 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7720 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7722 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7723 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7724 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7725 closing_fee_limits: None,
7726 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7728 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7729 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7731 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7733 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7734 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7735 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7736 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7737 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7738 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7739 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7740 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7741 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7744 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7746 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7747 funding_transaction,
7750 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7751 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7752 counterparty_node_id,
7754 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7758 channel_update_status,
7759 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7764 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7766 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7768 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7769 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7771 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7772 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7773 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7775 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7776 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7778 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7779 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7781 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7784 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7793 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7794 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7795 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7796 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7797 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7799 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7800 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7801 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7802 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7803 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7804 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7805 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7806 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7807 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7808 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7809 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7810 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7811 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7812 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7813 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7814 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7815 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7816 use crate::util::test_utils;
7817 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7818 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7819 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7820 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7821 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7822 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7823 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7824 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7825 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7826 use crate::prelude::*;
7828 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7831 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7832 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7838 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7839 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7840 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7841 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7845 signer: InMemorySigner,
7848 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7849 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7852 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7853 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7855 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7856 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7859 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7863 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7865 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7867 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7868 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7869 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7872 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7873 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7874 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7875 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7879 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7880 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7881 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7885 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7886 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7887 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7888 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7890 let seed = [42; 32];
7891 let network = Network::Testnet;
7892 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7893 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7894 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7897 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7898 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7899 let config = UserConfig::default();
7900 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7901 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7902 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7904 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7905 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7909 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7910 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7912 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7913 let original_fee = 253;
7914 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7915 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7916 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7917 let seed = [42; 32];
7918 let network = Network::Testnet;
7919 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7921 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7922 let config = UserConfig::default();
7923 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7925 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7926 // same as the old fee.
7927 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7928 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7929 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7933 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7934 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7935 // dust limits are used.
7936 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7938 let seed = [42; 32];
7939 let network = Network::Testnet;
7940 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7941 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7942 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7944 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7945 // they have different dust limits.
7947 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7948 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7949 let config = UserConfig::default();
7950 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7952 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7953 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7954 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7955 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7956 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7958 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7959 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7960 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7961 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7962 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7964 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7965 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7966 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7967 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7969 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7970 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7971 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7973 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7974 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7976 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7977 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7978 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7980 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7981 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7982 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7983 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7986 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7988 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7989 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7990 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7991 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7992 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7993 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7994 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7995 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7996 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7998 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8001 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8002 // the dust limit check.
8003 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8004 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8005 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8006 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8008 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8009 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8010 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8011 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8012 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8013 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8014 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8018 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8019 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8020 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8021 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8022 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8023 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8024 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8025 let seed = [42; 32];
8026 let network = Network::Testnet;
8027 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8029 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8030 let config = UserConfig::default();
8031 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8033 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8034 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8036 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8037 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8038 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8039 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8040 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8041 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8043 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8044 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8045 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8046 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8047 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8049 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8051 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8052 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8053 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8054 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8055 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8057 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8058 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8059 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8060 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8061 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8065 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8066 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8067 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8068 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8069 let seed = [42; 32];
8070 let network = Network::Testnet;
8071 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8072 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8073 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8075 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8077 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8078 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8079 let config = UserConfig::default();
8080 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8082 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8083 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8084 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8085 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8087 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8088 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8089 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8091 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8092 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8093 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8094 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8096 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8097 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8098 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8100 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8101 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8103 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8104 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8105 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8106 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8107 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8108 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8109 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8111 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8113 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8114 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8115 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8116 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8117 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8121 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8122 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8123 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8124 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8125 let seed = [42; 32];
8126 let network = Network::Testnet;
8127 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8128 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8129 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8131 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8132 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8133 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8134 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8135 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8136 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8137 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8138 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8140 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8141 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8142 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8143 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8144 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8145 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8147 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8148 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8149 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8150 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8152 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8154 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8155 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8156 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8157 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8158 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8159 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8161 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8162 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8163 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8164 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8166 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8167 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8168 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8169 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8170 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8172 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8173 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8175 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8176 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8177 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8179 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8180 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8181 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8182 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8183 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8185 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8186 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8188 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8189 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8190 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8194 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8196 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8197 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8198 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8200 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8201 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8202 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8203 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8205 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8206 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8207 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8209 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8211 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8212 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8215 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8216 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8217 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8218 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8219 let seed = [42; 32];
8220 let network = Network::Testnet;
8221 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8222 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8223 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8226 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8227 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8228 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8230 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8231 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8233 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8234 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8235 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8237 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8238 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8240 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8242 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8243 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8245 // Channel Negotiations failed
8246 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8247 assert!(result.is_err());
8252 fn channel_update() {
8253 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8254 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8255 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8256 let seed = [42; 32];
8257 let network = Network::Testnet;
8258 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8259 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8260 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8262 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8263 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8264 let config = UserConfig::default();
8265 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8267 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8268 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8269 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8270 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8271 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8273 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8274 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8275 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8276 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8277 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8279 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8280 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8281 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8282 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8284 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8285 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8286 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8288 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8289 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8291 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8292 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8293 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8295 short_channel_id: 0,
8298 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8299 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8300 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8302 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8303 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8305 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8307 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8309 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8310 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8311 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8312 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8314 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8315 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8316 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8318 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8321 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8324 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8326 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8327 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8328 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8329 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8330 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8331 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8332 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8333 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8334 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8335 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8336 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8337 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8338 use crate::sync::Arc;
8340 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8341 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8342 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8345 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8347 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8348 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8349 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8350 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8351 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8353 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8354 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8360 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8361 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8362 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8364 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8365 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8366 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8367 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8368 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8369 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8371 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8373 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8374 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8375 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8376 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8377 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8378 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8380 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8381 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8382 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8383 selected_contest_delay: 144
8385 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8386 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8388 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8389 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8391 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8392 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8394 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8395 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8397 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8398 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8399 // build_commitment_transaction.
8400 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8401 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8402 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8403 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8404 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8406 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8407 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8408 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8409 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8413 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8414 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8415 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8416 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8420 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8421 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8422 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8424 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8425 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8427 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8428 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8430 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8432 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8433 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8434 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8435 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8436 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8437 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8438 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8440 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8441 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8442 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8443 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8445 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8446 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8447 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8449 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8451 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8452 commitment_tx.clone(),
8453 counterparty_signature,
8454 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8455 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8456 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8458 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8459 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8461 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8462 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8463 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8465 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8466 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8469 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8470 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8472 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8473 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8474 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8475 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8476 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8477 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8478 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8479 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8481 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8484 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8485 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8486 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8490 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8493 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8494 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8495 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8496 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8497 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8498 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8500 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8501 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8502 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8503 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8505 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8506 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8507 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8508 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8509 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8511 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8512 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8513 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8514 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8515 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8516 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8518 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8522 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8523 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8524 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8525 "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", {});
8527 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8530 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8531 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8532 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8534 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8535 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8536 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8537 "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", {});
8539 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8540 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8542 amount_msat: 1000000,
8544 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8545 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8547 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8550 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8551 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8553 amount_msat: 2000000,
8555 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8556 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8558 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8561 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8562 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8564 amount_msat: 2000000,
8566 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8567 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8568 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8569 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8571 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8574 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8575 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8577 amount_msat: 3000000,
8579 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8580 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8581 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8582 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8584 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8587 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8588 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8590 amount_msat: 4000000,
8592 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8593 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8595 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8599 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8600 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8601 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8603 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8604 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8605 "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", {
8608 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8609 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8610 "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" },
8613 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8614 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8615 "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" },
8618 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8619 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8620 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8623 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8624 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8625 "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" },
8628 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8629 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8630 "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" }
8633 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8634 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8635 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8637 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8638 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8639 "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", {
8642 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8643 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8644 "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" },
8647 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8648 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8649 "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" },
8652 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8653 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8654 "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" },
8657 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8658 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8659 "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" },
8662 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8663 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8664 "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" }
8667 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8668 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8669 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8671 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8672 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8673 "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", {
8676 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8677 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8678 "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" },
8681 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8682 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8683 "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" },
8686 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8687 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8688 "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" },
8691 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8692 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8693 "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" }
8696 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8697 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8698 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8699 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8701 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8702 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8703 "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", {
8706 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8707 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8708 "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" },
8711 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8712 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8713 "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" },
8716 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8717 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8718 "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" },
8721 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8722 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8723 "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" }
8726 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8727 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8728 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8729 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8731 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8732 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8733 "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", {
8736 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8737 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8738 "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" },
8741 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8742 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8743 "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" },
8746 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8747 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8748 "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" },
8751 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8752 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8753 "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" }
8756 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8757 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8758 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8760 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8761 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8762 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8765 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8766 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8767 "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" },
8770 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8771 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8772 "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" },
8775 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8776 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8777 "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" }
8780 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8781 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8782 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8784 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8785 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8786 "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", {
8789 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8790 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8791 "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" },
8794 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8795 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8796 "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" },
8799 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8800 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8801 "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" }
8804 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8805 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8806 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8808 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8809 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8810 "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", {
8813 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8814 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8815 "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" },
8818 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8819 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8820 "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" }
8823 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8824 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8825 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8826 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8827 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8828 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8830 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8831 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8832 "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", {
8835 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8836 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8837 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8840 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8841 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8842 "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" }
8845 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8846 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8847 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8848 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8849 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8851 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8852 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8853 "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", {
8856 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8857 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8858 "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" },
8861 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8862 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8863 "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" }
8866 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8867 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8868 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8870 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8871 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8872 "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", {
8875 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8876 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8877 "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" }
8880 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8881 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8882 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8883 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8884 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8886 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8887 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8888 "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", {
8891 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8892 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8893 "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" }
8896 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8897 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8898 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8899 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8900 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8902 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8903 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8904 "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", {
8907 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8908 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8909 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8912 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8913 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8914 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8915 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8917 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8918 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8919 "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", {});
8921 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8922 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8923 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8924 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8925 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8927 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8928 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8929 "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", {});
8931 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8932 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8933 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8934 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8935 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8937 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8938 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8939 "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", {});
8941 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8942 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8943 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8945 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8946 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8947 "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", {});
8949 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8950 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8951 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8952 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8953 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8955 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8956 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8957 "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", {});
8959 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8960 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8961 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8962 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8963 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8965 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8966 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8967 "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", {});
8969 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8970 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8971 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8972 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8973 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8974 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8976 amount_msat: 2000000,
8978 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8979 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8981 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8984 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8985 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8986 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8988 amount_msat: 5000001,
8990 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8991 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8992 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8993 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8995 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8998 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8999 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9001 amount_msat: 5000000,
9003 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9004 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9005 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9006 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9008 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9012 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9013 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9014 "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", {
9017 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9018 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9019 "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" },
9021 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9022 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9023 "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" },
9025 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9026 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9027 "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" }
9030 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9031 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9032 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9033 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9036 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9037 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9038 "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" },
9040 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9041 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9042 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
9044 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9045 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9046 "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" }
9051 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9052 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9054 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9055 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9056 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9057 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9059 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9060 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9061 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9063 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9064 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9066 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9067 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9069 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9070 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9071 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9075 fn test_key_derivation() {
9076 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9077 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9079 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9080 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9082 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9083 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9085 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9086 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9088 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9089 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9091 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9092 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9094 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9095 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9097 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9098 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9102 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9103 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9104 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9105 let seed = [42; 32];
9106 let network = Network::Testnet;
9107 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9108 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9110 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9111 let config = UserConfig::default();
9112 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9113 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9115 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9116 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9118 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9119 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9120 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9121 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9122 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9123 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9124 assert!(res.is_ok());
9128 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9129 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9130 // resulting `channel_type`.
9131 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9132 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9133 let network = Network::Testnet;
9134 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9135 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9137 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9138 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9140 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9141 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9143 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9144 // need to signal it.
9145 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9146 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9147 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9148 &config, 0, 42, None
9150 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9152 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9153 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9154 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9156 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9157 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9158 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9162 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9163 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9164 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9165 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9166 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9169 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9170 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9174 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9175 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9176 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9177 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9178 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9179 let network = Network::Testnet;
9180 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9181 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9183 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9184 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9186 let config = UserConfig::default();
9188 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9189 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9190 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9191 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9192 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9194 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9195 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9196 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9200 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9201 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9202 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9204 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9205 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9206 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9207 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9208 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9209 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9211 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9215 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9216 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9218 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9219 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9220 let network = Network::Testnet;
9221 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9222 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9224 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9225 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9227 let config = UserConfig::default();
9229 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9230 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9231 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9232 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9233 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9234 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9235 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9236 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9238 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9239 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9240 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9241 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9242 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9243 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9247 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9248 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9250 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9251 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9252 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9253 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9255 assert!(res.is_err());
9257 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9258 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9259 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9261 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9262 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9263 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9266 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9268 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9269 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9270 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9271 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9274 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9275 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9277 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9278 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9280 assert!(res.is_err());
9284 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9285 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9286 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9287 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9288 let seed = [42; 32];
9289 let network = Network::Testnet;
9290 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9291 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9292 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9294 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9295 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9296 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9297 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9299 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9300 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9301 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9306 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9316 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9317 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9318 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9323 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9324 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9330 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9333 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9334 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9335 &accept_channel_msg,
9336 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9337 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9340 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9341 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9342 let tx = Transaction {
9344 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9348 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9351 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9354 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9355 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9360 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9361 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9362 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9366 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9367 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9375 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9376 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9377 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9378 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9383 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9390 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9391 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9392 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9393 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9395 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9396 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9397 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9400 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9401 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9402 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9410 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9411 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9412 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9413 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9416 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9417 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9419 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9420 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9421 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9423 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());