1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
593 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
594 (0, update, required),
597 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
598 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
599 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
601 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
602 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
603 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
604 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
610 channel_id: [u8; 32],
611 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
614 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
615 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
617 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
618 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
619 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
621 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
622 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
623 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
624 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
629 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
631 holder_signer: Signer,
632 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
633 destination_script: Script,
635 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
636 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
637 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
639 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
640 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
641 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
642 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
643 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
644 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
646 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
647 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
648 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
649 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
650 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
651 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
653 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
655 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
656 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
657 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
659 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
660 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
661 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
662 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
663 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
664 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
665 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
667 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
669 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
670 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
671 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
672 // HTLCs with similar state.
673 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
674 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
675 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
676 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
677 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
678 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
679 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
680 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
684 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
685 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
686 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
688 update_time_counter: u32,
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
692 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
694 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
695 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
700 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
701 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
702 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
703 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
705 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
706 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
708 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
710 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
712 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
713 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
714 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
715 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
716 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
717 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
719 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
720 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
721 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
722 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
723 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
725 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
726 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
727 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
728 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
729 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
730 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
731 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
732 channel_creation_height: u32,
734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
737 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
739 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
742 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
747 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
749 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
752 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
755 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
759 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
760 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
764 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
765 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
766 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
768 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
770 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
771 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
773 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
774 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
777 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
779 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
781 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
782 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
783 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
784 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
786 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
787 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
788 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
790 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
791 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
792 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
794 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
795 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
796 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
797 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
801 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
803 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
804 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
805 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
806 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
807 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
809 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
810 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
812 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
813 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
814 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
815 /// unblock the state machine.
817 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
818 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
819 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
821 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
822 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
823 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
826 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
827 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
828 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
829 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
830 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
831 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
832 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
834 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
835 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
837 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
838 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
839 // the channel's funding UTXO.
841 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
842 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
843 // associated channel mapping.
845 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
846 // to store all of them.
847 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
849 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
850 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
851 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
852 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
853 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
855 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
856 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
858 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
859 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
861 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
862 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
863 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
865 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
866 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
867 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
870 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
907 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
908 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
909 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
910 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
915 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
919 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
921 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
922 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
923 self.temporary_channel_id
926 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
930 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
931 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
932 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
936 /// Gets the channel's type
937 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
941 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
942 /// is_usable() returns true).
943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
944 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
945 self.short_channel_id
948 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
949 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
950 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
955 self.outbound_scid_alias
958 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
959 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
960 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
961 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
962 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
965 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
966 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
967 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
968 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
971 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
972 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
973 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
976 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
977 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
979 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
983 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
986 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
987 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
990 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
991 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
994 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
996 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
999 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1000 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1003 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1005 self.counterparty_node_id
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1010 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1014 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1015 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1021 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1022 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1023 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1024 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1026 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1032 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1037 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1040 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1041 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1042 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1044 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1045 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1050 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1051 self.channel_value_satoshis
1054 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1055 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1058 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1059 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1062 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1063 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1064 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1066 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1067 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1068 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1069 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1070 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1072 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1076 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1077 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1078 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1081 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1083 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1086 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1088 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1096 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1097 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1098 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1101 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1102 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1103 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1106 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1107 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1108 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1109 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1110 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1113 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1115 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1116 self.prev_config = None;
1120 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1121 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1125 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1126 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1127 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1128 let did_channel_update =
1129 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1130 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1131 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1132 if did_channel_update {
1133 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1134 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1135 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1136 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1138 self.config.options = *config;
1142 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1143 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1144 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1147 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1148 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1149 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1150 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1151 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1153 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1154 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1155 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1156 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1157 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1158 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1159 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1161 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1162 where L::Target: Logger
1164 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1165 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1166 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1168 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1169 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1170 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1171 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1173 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1174 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1175 if match update_state {
1176 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1177 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1178 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1179 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1180 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1182 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1186 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1187 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1188 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1189 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1191 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1192 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1193 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1195 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1196 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1197 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1198 transaction_output_index: None
1203 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1204 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1205 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1206 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1207 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1210 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1212 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1213 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1214 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1221 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1224 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1226 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1227 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1228 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1237 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1238 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1239 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1240 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1241 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1242 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1247 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1248 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1250 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1252 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1253 if generated_by_local {
1254 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1255 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1264 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1266 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1267 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1268 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1269 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1270 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1275 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1276 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1277 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1282 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1283 preimages.push(preimage);
1287 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1288 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1290 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1292 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 if !generated_by_local {
1297 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1305 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1306 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1307 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1308 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1309 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1310 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1311 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1312 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1314 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1316 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1317 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1318 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1319 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1321 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1323 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1324 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1325 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1326 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1329 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1330 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1331 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1332 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1334 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1337 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1338 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1339 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1340 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1342 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1346 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1351 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1352 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1357 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1359 let channel_parameters =
1360 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1361 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1362 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1369 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1372 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1373 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1374 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1375 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1377 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1378 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1379 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1387 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1388 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1394 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1395 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1396 /// our counterparty!)
1397 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1398 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1399 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1400 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1401 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1402 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1403 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1405 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1409 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1410 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1411 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1412 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1413 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1414 //may see payments to it!
1415 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1416 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1417 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1419 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1422 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1423 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1424 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1425 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1426 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1429 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1430 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1433 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1437 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1438 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1439 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1440 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1441 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1442 // which are near the dust limit.
1443 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1444 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1445 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1446 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1447 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1449 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1450 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1452 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1455 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1456 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1457 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1460 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1461 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1463 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1464 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1465 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1466 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1467 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1468 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1469 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1472 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1475 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1476 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1477 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1479 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1480 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1481 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1482 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1483 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1484 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1486 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1487 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1493 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1494 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1496 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1497 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1498 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1499 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1500 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1501 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1502 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1505 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1508 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1509 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1510 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1512 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1513 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1514 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1515 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1516 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1517 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1519 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1520 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1524 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1525 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1526 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1527 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1528 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1529 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1530 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1532 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1533 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1535 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1542 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1543 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1544 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1545 /// corner case properly.
1546 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1547 -> AvailableBalances
1548 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1550 let context = &self;
1551 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1552 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1553 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1555 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1556 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1557 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1558 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1561 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1563 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1564 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1566 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1568 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1570 if context.is_outbound() {
1571 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1572 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1574 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1575 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1577 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1578 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1579 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1580 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1583 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1584 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1585 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1586 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1588 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1589 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1590 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1591 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1592 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1593 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1594 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1595 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1596 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1597 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1599 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1602 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1603 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1604 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1605 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1606 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1609 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1610 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1612 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1613 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1614 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1616 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1617 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1618 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1619 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1623 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1625 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1626 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1627 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1628 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1629 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1630 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1631 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1633 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1636 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1637 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1638 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1640 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1641 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1643 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1644 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1647 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1648 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1649 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1650 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1651 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1652 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1655 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1656 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1659 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1663 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1664 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1666 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1667 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1671 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1672 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1673 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1674 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1676 outbound_capacity_msat,
1677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1683 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1684 let context = &self;
1685 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1688 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1689 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1691 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1692 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1694 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1695 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1697 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1698 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1699 let context = &self;
1700 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1702 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1705 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1706 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1708 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1709 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1712 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1720 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1726 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1727 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1728 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1731 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1732 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1733 included_htlcs += 1;
1736 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1741 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1742 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1743 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1744 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1745 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1746 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1751 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1753 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1754 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1759 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1760 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1764 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1765 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1769 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1770 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1772 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1773 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1774 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1776 total_pending_htlcs,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1778 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1781 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1782 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1783 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1785 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1787 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1792 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1793 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1795 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1796 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1798 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1799 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1801 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1802 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1803 let context = &self;
1804 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1806 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1809 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1810 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1812 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1813 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1819 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1824 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1830 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1831 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1832 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1833 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1834 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1845 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1846 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1856 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1861 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1863 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1864 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1866 total_pending_htlcs,
1867 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1871 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1875 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1877 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1882 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1883 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1884 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1885 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1891 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1892 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1893 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1894 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1895 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1896 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1897 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1898 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1899 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1900 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1901 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1903 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1904 // return them to fail the payment.
1905 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1906 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1907 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1915 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1916 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1917 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1918 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1919 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1920 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1921 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1922 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1924 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1925 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1933 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1934 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1938 // Internal utility functions for channels
1940 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1941 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1944 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1947 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1948 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1950 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1953 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1955 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1958 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1959 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1960 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1962 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1964 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1965 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1966 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1967 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1968 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1971 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1972 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1973 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1974 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1975 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1976 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1977 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1980 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1981 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1983 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1984 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1987 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1988 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1989 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1990 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1991 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1992 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1995 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1996 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1997 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2000 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2001 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2002 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2003 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2006 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2007 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2009 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2010 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2011 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2015 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2016 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2017 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2020 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2021 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2022 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2023 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2024 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2025 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2026 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2029 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2030 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2031 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2032 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2033 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2034 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2035 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2036 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2038 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2039 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2049 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2050 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2051 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2052 // outside of those situations will fail.
2053 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2057 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2062 1 + // script length (0)
2066 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2067 2 + // witness marker and flag
2068 1 + // witness element count
2069 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2070 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2071 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2072 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2076 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2077 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2078 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2084 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2085 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2086 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2087 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2089 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2090 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2091 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2093 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2094 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2096 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2097 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2098 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2101 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2102 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2105 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2106 value_to_holder = 0;
2109 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2110 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2112 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2114 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2115 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2118 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2119 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2122 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2125 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2126 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2128 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2130 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2131 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2132 where L::Target: Logger {
2133 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2134 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2135 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2136 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2137 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2139 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2140 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2144 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2145 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2146 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2147 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2149 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2150 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2152 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2154 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2156 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2157 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2158 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2160 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2161 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2162 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2163 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2164 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2166 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2167 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2168 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2170 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2171 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2173 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2176 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2177 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2181 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2185 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2186 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2187 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2188 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2189 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2190 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2193 // Now update local state:
2195 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2196 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2201 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2205 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2206 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2207 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2208 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2209 // do not not get into this branch.
2210 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2211 match pending_update {
2212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2213 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2214 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2215 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2217 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2218 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2223 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2224 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2225 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2227 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2234 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2239 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2245 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2246 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2248 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2249 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2252 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2255 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2258 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2260 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2261 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2266 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2267 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2268 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2269 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2270 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2271 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2272 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2273 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2274 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2275 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2276 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2277 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2278 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2279 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2280 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2282 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2283 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2284 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2285 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2286 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2289 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2290 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2291 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2297 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2298 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2300 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2304 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2305 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2306 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2307 /// before we fail backwards.
2309 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2310 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2311 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2312 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2313 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2314 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2315 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2318 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2319 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2320 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2321 /// before we fail backwards.
2323 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2324 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2325 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2326 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2327 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2328 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2329 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2331 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2333 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2334 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2335 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2337 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2338 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2339 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2341 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2342 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2343 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2345 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2350 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2357 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2359 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2360 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2361 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2365 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2366 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2367 force_holding_cell = true;
2370 // Now update local state:
2371 if force_holding_cell {
2372 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2373 match pending_update {
2374 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2375 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2376 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2377 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2381 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2382 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2383 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2390 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2391 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2392 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2398 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2400 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2401 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2404 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2405 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2406 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2411 // Message handlers:
2413 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2414 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2415 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2416 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2417 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2419 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2422 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2425 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2428 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2429 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2430 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2431 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2434 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2436 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2437 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2438 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2439 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2441 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2442 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2444 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2445 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2447 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2448 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2449 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2450 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2451 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2456 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2457 initial_commitment_tx,
2460 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2461 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2464 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2465 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2468 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2469 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2470 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2471 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2472 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2473 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2474 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2475 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2476 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2477 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2478 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2479 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2481 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2483 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2485 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2486 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2487 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2488 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2490 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2492 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2493 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2497 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2498 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2500 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2501 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2502 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2503 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2505 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2508 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2509 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2513 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2514 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2515 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2516 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2517 // when routing outbound payments.
2518 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2522 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2524 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2525 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2526 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2527 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2528 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2529 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2530 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2531 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2532 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2534 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2535 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2536 let expected_point =
2537 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2538 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2540 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2541 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2542 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2543 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2544 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2545 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2547 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2548 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2549 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2550 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2551 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2553 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2561 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2562 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2564 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2566 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2569 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2570 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2571 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2572 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2573 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2574 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2576 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2577 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2578 if local_sent_shutdown {
2579 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2581 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2582 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2583 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2586 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2589 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2592 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2595 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2596 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2599 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2600 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2601 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2604 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2607 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2608 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2609 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2610 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2611 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2612 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2613 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2614 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2615 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2616 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2617 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2619 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2620 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2621 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2622 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2623 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2624 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2628 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2629 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2632 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2633 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2634 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2636 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2637 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2638 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2639 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2640 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2641 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2642 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2646 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2647 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2648 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2649 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2650 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2651 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2652 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2656 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2657 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2658 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2659 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2660 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2661 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2664 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2665 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2666 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2667 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2668 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2670 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2671 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2674 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2678 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2679 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2680 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2681 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2682 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2683 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2684 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2685 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2686 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2687 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2688 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2689 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2690 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2691 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2692 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2693 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2696 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2697 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2698 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2699 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2700 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2703 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2706 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2710 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2711 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2712 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2716 // Now update local state:
2717 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2718 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2719 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2720 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2721 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2722 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2723 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2728 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2730 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2731 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2732 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2733 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2734 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2735 None => fail_reason.into(),
2736 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2737 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2738 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2741 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2745 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2747 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2748 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2750 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2756 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2759 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2760 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2763 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2767 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2770 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2771 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2774 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2778 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2782 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2783 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2784 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2786 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2790 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2794 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2795 where L::Target: Logger
2797 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2800 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2803 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2807 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2809 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2811 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2812 let commitment_txid = {
2813 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2814 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2815 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2817 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2818 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2819 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2820 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2821 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2826 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2828 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2829 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2830 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2831 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2834 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2835 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2836 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2840 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2842 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2843 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2844 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2845 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2846 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2847 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2848 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2849 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2850 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2851 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2852 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2858 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2862 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2863 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2864 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2865 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2866 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2867 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2868 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2869 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2870 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2871 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2872 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2873 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2874 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2877 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2878 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2879 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2880 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2881 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2882 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2883 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2885 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2886 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2887 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2888 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2889 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2890 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2891 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2894 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2895 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2898 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2900 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2901 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2902 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2905 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2908 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2909 commitment_stats.tx,
2911 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2912 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2913 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2916 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2917 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2919 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2920 let mut need_commitment = false;
2921 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2922 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2923 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2924 need_commitment = true;
2928 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2929 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2930 Some(forward_info.clone())
2932 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2933 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2934 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2935 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2936 need_commitment = true;
2939 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2940 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2941 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2942 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2943 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2944 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2945 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2946 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2947 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2948 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2949 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2950 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2951 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2952 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2954 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2956 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2957 need_commitment = true;
2961 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2962 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2963 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2964 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2965 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2966 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2968 nondust_htlc_sources,
2972 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2973 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2974 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2975 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2977 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2978 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2979 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2980 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2981 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2982 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2983 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2984 // includes the right HTLCs.
2985 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2986 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2987 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2988 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2989 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2990 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2992 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2993 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2994 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2997 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2998 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2999 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3000 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3001 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3002 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3003 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3004 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3005 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3009 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3010 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3011 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3012 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3015 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3016 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3017 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3018 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3019 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3020 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3021 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3023 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3024 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3025 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3026 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3029 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3030 /// for our counterparty.
3031 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3032 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3033 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3034 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3036 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3037 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3038 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3039 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3041 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3042 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3043 updates: Vec::new(),
3046 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3047 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3048 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3049 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3050 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3051 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3052 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3053 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3054 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3055 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3056 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3057 // to rebalance channels.
3058 match &htlc_update {
3059 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3060 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3061 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3063 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3064 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3066 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3069 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3070 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3071 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3072 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3073 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3074 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3075 // into the holding cell without ever being
3076 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3077 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3078 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3081 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3087 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3088 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3089 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3090 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3091 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3092 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3093 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3094 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3095 (msg, monitor_update)
3096 } else { unreachable!() };
3097 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3098 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3101 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3102 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3103 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3104 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3105 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3106 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3107 // for a full revocation before failing.
3108 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3111 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3113 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3120 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3121 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3123 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3124 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3129 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3130 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3131 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3132 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3133 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3135 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3136 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3137 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3139 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3140 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3146 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3147 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3148 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3149 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3150 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3151 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3152 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3153 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3154 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3156 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3159 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3162 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3163 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3166 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3168 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3169 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3174 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3175 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3176 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3177 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3178 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3179 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3180 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3181 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3187 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3188 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3191 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3192 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3194 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3196 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3197 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3198 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3199 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3200 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3201 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3202 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3203 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3207 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3208 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3209 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3210 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3211 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3212 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3213 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3214 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3215 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3217 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3218 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3221 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3222 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3223 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3224 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3225 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3226 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3227 let mut require_commitment = false;
3228 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3231 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3232 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3233 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3235 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3236 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3237 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3238 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3239 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3240 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3245 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3246 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3247 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3248 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3249 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3251 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3252 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3253 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3258 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3259 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3261 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3265 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3266 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3268 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3269 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3270 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3271 require_commitment = true;
3272 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3273 match forward_info {
3274 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3275 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3276 require_commitment = true;
3278 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3279 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3280 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3282 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3283 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3284 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3288 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3289 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3290 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3291 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3297 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3298 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3300 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3302 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3303 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3304 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3305 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3306 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3307 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3308 require_commitment = true;
3312 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3314 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3315 match update_state {
3316 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3317 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3318 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3319 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3320 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3322 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3323 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3324 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3325 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3326 require_commitment = true;
3327 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3328 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3333 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3334 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3335 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3336 if require_commitment {
3337 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3338 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3339 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3340 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3341 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3342 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3343 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3344 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3345 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3347 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3348 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3349 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3350 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3351 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3354 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3355 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3356 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3357 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3358 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3359 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3361 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3362 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3364 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3365 if require_commitment {
3366 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3368 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3369 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3370 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3371 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3373 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3374 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3375 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3376 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3378 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3379 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3380 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3386 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3387 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3388 /// commitment update.
3389 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3390 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3391 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3393 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3394 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3397 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3398 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3399 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3400 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3402 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3403 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3404 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3405 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3406 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3407 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3408 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3410 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3411 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3413 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3414 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3416 if !self.context.is_live() {
3417 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3420 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3421 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3422 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3423 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3424 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3425 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3426 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3427 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3428 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3429 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3433 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3434 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3435 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3436 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3437 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3438 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3441 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3442 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3446 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3447 force_holding_cell = true;
3450 if force_holding_cell {
3451 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3455 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3456 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3458 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3459 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3464 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3465 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3467 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3469 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3470 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3471 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3472 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3476 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3477 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3478 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3482 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3483 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3486 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3487 // will be retransmitted.
3488 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3489 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3490 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3492 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3493 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3495 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3496 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3497 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3498 // this HTLC accordingly
3499 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3502 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3503 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3504 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3505 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3508 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3509 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3510 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3511 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3512 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3513 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3518 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3520 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3521 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3522 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3523 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3527 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3528 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3529 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3530 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3531 // the update upon reconnection.
3532 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3536 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3538 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3539 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3542 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3543 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3544 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3545 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3546 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3547 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3548 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3550 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3551 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3552 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3553 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3554 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3555 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3556 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3558 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3559 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3560 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3561 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3562 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3563 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3564 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3567 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3568 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3569 /// to the remote side.
3570 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3571 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3572 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3573 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3576 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3578 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3579 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3581 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3582 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3583 // first received the funding_signed.
3584 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3585 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3586 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3588 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3589 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3590 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3591 funding_broadcastable = None;
3594 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3595 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3596 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3597 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3598 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3599 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3600 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3601 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3602 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3603 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3604 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3605 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3606 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3607 next_per_commitment_point,
3608 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3612 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3614 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3615 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3616 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3617 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3618 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3619 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3621 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3622 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3623 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3624 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3625 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3626 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3630 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3631 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3633 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3634 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3635 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3638 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3639 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3640 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3641 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3642 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3643 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3644 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3645 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3646 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3650 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3651 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3653 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3656 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3659 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3660 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3662 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3663 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3664 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3665 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3666 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3667 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3668 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3669 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3670 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3671 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3672 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3673 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3675 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3677 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3679 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3685 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3686 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3687 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3688 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3690 per_commitment_secret,
3691 next_per_commitment_point,
3693 next_local_nonce: None,
3697 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3698 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3699 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3700 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3701 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3703 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3704 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3705 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3706 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3707 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3708 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3709 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3710 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3711 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3712 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3717 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3718 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3720 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3721 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3722 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3723 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3724 reason: err_packet.clone()
3727 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3728 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3729 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3730 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3731 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3732 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3735 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3736 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3737 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3738 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3739 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3746 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3747 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3748 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3749 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3753 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3754 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3755 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3756 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3757 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3758 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3762 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3763 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3765 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3766 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3767 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3768 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3769 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3770 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3771 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3772 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3775 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3777 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3778 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3779 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3780 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3784 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3785 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3786 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3789 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3790 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3791 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3792 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3793 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3796 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3797 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3798 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3799 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3800 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3803 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3804 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3805 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3806 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3807 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3808 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3809 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3810 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3814 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3815 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3816 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3817 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3819 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3823 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3824 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3825 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3826 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3828 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3829 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3830 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3831 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3832 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3836 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3838 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3839 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3840 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3841 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3842 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3845 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3846 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3847 channel_ready: None,
3848 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3849 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3850 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3854 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3855 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3856 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3857 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3858 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3859 next_per_commitment_point,
3860 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3862 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3863 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3864 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3868 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3869 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3870 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3872 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3873 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3874 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3877 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3883 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3884 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3885 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3886 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3887 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3888 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3889 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3891 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3893 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3894 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3895 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3896 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3897 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3898 next_per_commitment_point,
3899 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3903 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3904 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3905 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3907 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3910 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3911 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3912 raa: required_revoke,
3913 commitment_update: None,
3914 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3916 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3917 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3918 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3920 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3923 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3924 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3925 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3926 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3927 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3928 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3931 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3932 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3933 raa: required_revoke,
3934 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3935 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3939 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3943 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3944 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3945 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3946 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3948 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3950 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3952 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3953 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3954 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3955 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3956 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3957 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3959 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3960 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3961 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3962 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3963 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3965 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3966 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3967 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3968 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3971 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3972 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3973 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3974 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3975 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3976 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3977 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3978 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3979 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3980 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3981 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3982 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3983 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3984 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3985 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3987 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3990 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3991 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3994 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3995 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3996 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3997 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3998 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3999 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4000 self.context.channel_state &
4001 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4002 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4003 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4004 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4007 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4008 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4009 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4010 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4011 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4012 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4015 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4021 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4022 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4023 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4024 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4026 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4027 return Ok((None, None));
4030 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4031 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4032 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4034 return Ok((None, None));
4037 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4039 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4040 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4041 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4042 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4044 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4045 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4046 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4048 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4049 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4050 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4051 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4053 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4054 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4055 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4060 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4061 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4063 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4064 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4067 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4068 /// within our expected timeframe.
4070 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4071 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4072 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4075 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4078 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4079 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4082 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4083 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4084 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4085 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4087 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4090 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4091 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4092 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4093 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4096 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4097 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4101 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4103 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4104 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4107 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4108 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4109 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4112 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4115 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4116 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4117 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4118 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4120 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4123 assert!(send_shutdown);
4124 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4125 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4126 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4128 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4131 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4136 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4138 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4139 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4141 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4142 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4143 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4144 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4145 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4146 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4149 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4150 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4152 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4153 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4154 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4155 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4159 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4160 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4161 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4162 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4163 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4164 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4166 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4167 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4174 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4175 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4177 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4180 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4181 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4183 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4185 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4186 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4187 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4188 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4189 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4190 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4191 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4192 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4193 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4195 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4196 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4199 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4203 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4204 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4205 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4206 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4208 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4211 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4214 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4217 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4221 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4225 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4226 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4227 return Ok((None, None));
4230 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4231 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4232 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4235 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4237 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4240 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4241 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4242 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4243 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4244 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4248 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4249 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4254 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4255 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4256 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4257 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4258 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4259 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4260 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4264 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4266 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4267 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4268 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4269 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4271 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4274 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4275 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4276 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4278 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4279 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4280 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4281 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4285 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4286 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4287 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4288 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4290 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4291 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4292 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4298 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4299 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4302 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4305 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4309 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4310 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4311 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4312 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4313 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4315 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4317 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4319 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4320 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4323 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4324 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4325 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4326 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4327 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4328 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4329 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4330 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4335 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4336 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4337 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4338 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4344 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4345 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4346 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4347 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4349 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4355 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4356 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4357 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4358 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4359 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4360 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4361 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4363 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4364 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4367 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4369 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4370 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4376 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4377 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4378 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4379 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4380 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4381 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4382 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4384 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4385 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4392 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4393 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4396 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4397 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4400 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4401 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4405 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4406 &self.context.holder_signer
4410 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4412 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4413 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4414 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4415 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4416 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4417 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4419 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4421 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4429 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4430 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4434 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4435 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4436 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4437 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4440 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4441 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4442 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4443 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4446 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4447 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4448 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4449 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4450 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4451 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4454 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4455 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4456 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4457 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4458 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4459 if !release_monitor {
4460 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4469 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4470 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4473 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4474 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4475 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4477 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4478 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4479 if self.context.channel_state &
4480 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4481 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4482 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4483 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4484 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4487 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4488 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4489 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4490 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4491 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4492 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4494 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4495 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4496 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4498 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4499 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4500 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4501 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4502 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4503 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4509 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4510 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4511 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4514 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4515 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4516 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4519 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4520 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4521 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4524 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4525 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4526 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4527 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4528 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4529 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4534 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4535 self.context.channel_update_status
4538 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4539 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4540 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4543 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4545 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4546 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4547 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4551 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4552 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4553 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4556 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4560 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4561 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4562 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4564 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4565 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4566 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4568 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4569 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4572 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4573 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4574 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4575 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4576 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4577 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4578 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4579 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4580 self.context.channel_state);
4582 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4586 if need_commitment_update {
4587 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4588 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4589 let next_per_commitment_point =
4590 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4591 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4592 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4593 next_per_commitment_point,
4594 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4598 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4604 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4605 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4606 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4607 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4608 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4609 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4610 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4612 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4615 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4616 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4617 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4618 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4619 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4620 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4621 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4622 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4623 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4624 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4625 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4626 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4627 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4628 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4629 // channel and move on.
4630 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4631 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4633 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4634 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4635 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4637 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4638 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4639 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4640 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4641 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4642 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4643 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4647 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4648 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4649 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4650 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4651 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4655 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4656 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4657 // may have already happened for this block).
4658 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4659 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4660 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4661 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4664 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4665 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4666 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4667 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4675 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4676 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4677 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4678 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4680 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4681 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4684 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4686 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4687 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4688 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4689 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4691 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4694 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4697 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4698 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4699 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4700 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4702 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4705 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4706 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4707 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4709 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4710 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4712 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4713 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4714 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4722 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4724 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4725 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4726 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4728 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4729 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4732 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4733 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4734 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4735 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4736 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4737 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4738 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4739 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4740 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4743 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4744 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4745 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4746 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4748 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4749 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4750 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4752 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4753 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4754 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4755 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4757 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4758 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4759 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4760 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4761 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4762 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4763 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4766 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4767 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4769 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4772 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4773 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4774 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4775 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4776 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4777 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4778 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4779 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4780 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4781 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4782 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4783 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4784 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4785 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4786 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4787 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4788 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4794 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4799 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4800 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4802 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4803 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4804 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4805 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4807 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4810 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4811 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4812 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4813 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4814 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4815 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4817 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4818 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4821 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4822 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4823 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4824 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4826 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4827 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4829 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4830 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4831 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4832 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4833 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4834 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4840 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4841 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4842 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4843 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4845 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4848 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4852 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4856 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4857 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4861 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4865 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4866 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4869 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4873 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4875 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4880 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4882 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4887 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4889 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4890 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4891 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4892 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4893 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4897 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4899 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4900 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4901 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4902 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4903 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4904 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4905 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4907 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4908 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4909 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4910 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4911 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4912 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4913 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4914 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4915 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4916 contents: announcement,
4919 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4923 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4924 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4925 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4926 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4927 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4928 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4929 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4930 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4932 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4934 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4936 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4937 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4939 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4940 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4941 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4942 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4945 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4946 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4947 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4948 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4951 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4954 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4955 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4956 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4957 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4958 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4959 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4962 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4964 Err(_) => return None,
4966 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4967 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4972 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4973 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4974 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4975 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4976 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4977 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4978 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4979 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4980 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4981 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4982 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4983 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4984 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4985 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4986 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4987 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4990 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4993 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4994 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4995 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4996 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4997 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4998 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4999 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5000 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5001 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5003 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5004 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5005 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5006 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5007 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5008 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5009 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5010 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5011 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5013 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5014 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5015 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5016 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5017 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5018 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5019 next_funding_txid: None,
5024 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5026 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5027 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5028 /// commitment update.
5030 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5031 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5032 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5033 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5034 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5035 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5036 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5039 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5040 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5041 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5043 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5044 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5049 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5050 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5052 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5054 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5055 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5057 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5058 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5059 /// regenerate them.
5061 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5062 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5064 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5065 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5066 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5067 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5068 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5069 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5070 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5072 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5073 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5075 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5076 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5077 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5080 if amount_msat == 0 {
5081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5084 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5085 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5087 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5090 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5091 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5092 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5095 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5096 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5097 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5098 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5099 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5100 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5101 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5102 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5105 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5106 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5107 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5108 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5109 else { "to peer" });
5111 if need_holding_cell {
5112 force_holding_cell = true;
5115 // Now update local state:
5116 if force_holding_cell {
5117 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5122 onion_routing_packet,
5128 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5129 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5131 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5133 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5138 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5139 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5140 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5144 onion_routing_packet,
5147 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5152 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5153 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5154 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5155 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5157 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5158 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5159 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5161 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5162 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5166 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5167 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5168 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5169 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5170 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5171 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5172 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5175 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5176 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5177 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5178 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5179 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5180 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5183 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5185 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5186 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5187 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5189 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5190 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5194 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5195 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5196 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5197 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5198 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5199 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5200 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5203 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5207 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5208 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5209 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5210 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5212 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5214 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5215 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5216 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5217 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5218 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5219 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5220 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5221 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5222 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5223 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5224 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5230 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5233 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5234 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5235 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5236 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5238 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5240 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5241 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5242 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5243 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5246 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5247 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5251 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5252 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5254 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5256 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5257 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5258 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5259 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5261 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5262 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5263 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5264 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5265 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5266 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5270 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5275 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5276 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5279 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5280 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5282 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5283 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5284 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5285 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5286 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5287 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5288 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5289 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5291 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5292 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5293 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5296 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5297 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5298 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5304 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5305 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5308 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5309 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5310 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5311 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5317 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5318 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5320 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5321 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5322 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5323 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5324 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5325 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5326 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5327 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5328 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5331 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5332 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5333 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5335 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5336 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5339 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5340 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5342 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5343 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5344 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5347 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5348 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5349 let mut chan_closed = false;
5350 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5354 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5356 None if !chan_closed => {
5357 // use override shutdown script if provided
5358 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5359 Some(script) => script,
5361 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5362 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5363 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5364 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5368 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5369 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5371 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5377 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5378 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5379 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5380 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5382 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5384 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5386 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5387 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5388 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5389 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5390 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5391 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5394 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5395 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5397 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5398 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5399 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5402 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5403 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5404 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5405 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5406 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5408 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5409 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5416 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5417 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5419 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5422 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5423 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5424 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5426 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5427 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5431 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5435 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5436 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5437 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5440 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5441 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5442 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5443 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5444 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5445 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5446 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5447 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5450 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5451 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5452 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5453 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5455 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5456 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5458 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5459 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5461 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5462 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5463 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5465 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5466 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5468 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5469 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5470 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5471 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5472 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5475 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5476 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5478 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5480 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5481 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5482 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5483 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5486 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5487 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5489 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5490 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5491 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5492 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5496 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5497 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5498 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5502 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5503 Ok(script) => script,
5504 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5507 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5510 context: ChannelContext {
5513 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5514 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5515 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5516 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5521 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5523 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5524 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5525 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5528 channel_value_satoshis,
5530 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5533 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5536 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5537 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5540 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5541 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5542 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5543 pending_update_fee: None,
5544 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5545 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5546 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5547 update_time_counter: 1,
5549 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5551 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5552 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5553 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5554 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5555 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5556 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5558 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5559 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5560 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5561 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5563 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5564 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5565 closing_fee_limits: None,
5566 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5568 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5570 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5571 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5572 short_channel_id: None,
5573 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5575 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5576 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5577 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5578 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5579 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5580 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5581 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5582 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5583 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5584 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5585 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5586 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5588 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5590 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5591 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5592 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5593 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5594 counterparty_parameters: None,
5595 funding_outpoint: None,
5596 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5598 funding_transaction: None,
5600 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5601 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5602 counterparty_node_id,
5604 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5606 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5608 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5609 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5611 announcement_sigs: None,
5613 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5614 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5615 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5616 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5618 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5619 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5621 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5622 outbound_scid_alias,
5624 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5625 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5627 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5628 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5633 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5638 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5639 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5640 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5641 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5642 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5643 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5646 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5647 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5648 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5649 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5650 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5651 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5652 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5653 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5654 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5655 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5656 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5658 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5659 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5661 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5662 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5663 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5664 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5667 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5668 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5670 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5673 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5674 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5675 return Err((self, e));
5679 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5681 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5683 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5684 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5685 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5687 let channel = Channel {
5688 context: self.context,
5691 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5692 temporary_channel_id,
5693 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5694 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5697 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5699 next_local_nonce: None,
5703 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5704 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5705 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5706 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5707 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5708 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5709 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5710 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5711 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5712 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5715 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5716 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5717 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5718 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5719 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5720 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5726 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5727 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5728 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5729 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5730 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5731 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5732 // We've exhausted our options
5735 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5736 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5739 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5740 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5741 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5742 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5744 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5745 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5746 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5747 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5748 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5750 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5752 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5753 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5756 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5757 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5758 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5760 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5761 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5764 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5765 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5768 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5769 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5773 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5774 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5775 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5776 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5777 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5778 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5779 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5780 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5781 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5782 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5783 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5784 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5785 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5786 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5787 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5788 first_per_commitment_point,
5789 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5790 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5791 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5792 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5794 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5799 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5800 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5802 // Check sanity of message fields:
5803 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5806 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5809 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5812 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5815 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5818 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5819 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5820 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5822 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5823 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5826 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5827 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5830 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5833 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5837 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5838 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5841 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5844 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5847 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5850 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5853 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5856 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5860 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5861 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5864 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5865 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5867 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5868 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5871 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5872 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5875 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5876 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5877 &Some(ref script) => {
5878 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5879 if script.len() == 0 {
5882 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5885 Some(script.clone())
5888 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5895 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5896 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5897 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5898 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5899 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5901 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5902 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5904 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5907 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5908 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5909 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5910 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5911 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5912 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5915 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5916 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5917 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5920 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5921 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5923 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5924 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5930 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5931 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5932 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5935 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5936 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5937 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5938 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5939 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5940 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5941 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5942 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5943 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5944 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5945 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5949 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5951 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5952 // support this channel type.
5953 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5954 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5958 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5959 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5960 // `static_remote_key`.
5961 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5964 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5965 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5968 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5971 channel_type.clone()
5973 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5974 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5980 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5981 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5982 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5983 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5984 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5985 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5986 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5987 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5988 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5991 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5995 // Check sanity of message fields:
5996 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5999 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6002 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6005 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6006 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6009 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6012 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6015 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6017 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6018 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6021 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6024 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6028 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6029 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6032 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6035 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6038 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6041 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6044 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6047 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6051 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6053 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6054 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6059 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6060 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6061 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6062 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6065 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6068 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6069 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6070 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6072 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6076 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6077 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6078 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6079 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6080 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6084 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6085 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6086 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6087 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6091 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6092 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6093 &Some(ref script) => {
6094 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6095 if script.len() == 0 {
6098 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6101 Some(script.clone())
6104 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6111 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6112 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6113 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6114 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6118 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6119 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6124 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6125 Ok(script) => script,
6126 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6129 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6130 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6133 context: ChannelContext {
6136 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6137 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6139 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6144 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6146 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6147 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6148 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6149 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6152 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6155 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6158 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6159 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6160 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6162 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6163 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6164 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6165 pending_update_fee: None,
6166 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6167 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6168 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6169 update_time_counter: 1,
6171 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6173 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6174 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6175 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6176 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6177 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6178 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6180 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6181 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6182 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6183 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6185 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6186 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6187 closing_fee_limits: None,
6188 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6190 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6192 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6193 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6194 short_channel_id: None,
6195 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6197 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6198 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6199 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6200 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6201 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6202 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6203 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6204 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6205 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6206 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6207 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6208 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6209 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6211 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6213 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6214 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6215 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6216 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6217 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6218 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6219 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6221 funding_outpoint: None,
6222 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6224 funding_transaction: None,
6226 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6227 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6228 counterparty_node_id,
6230 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6232 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6234 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6235 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6237 announcement_sigs: None,
6239 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6240 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6242 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6244 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6245 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6247 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6248 outbound_scid_alias,
6250 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6251 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6253 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6254 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6259 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6266 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6267 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6270 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6271 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6272 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6273 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6276 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6277 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6279 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6280 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6281 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6282 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6284 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6285 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6287 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6288 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6290 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6291 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6294 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6295 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6297 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6300 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6301 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6302 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6304 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6305 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6306 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6307 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6309 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6310 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6311 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6312 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6313 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6314 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6315 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6316 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6317 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6318 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6319 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6320 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6321 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6322 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6323 first_per_commitment_point,
6324 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6325 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6326 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6328 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6330 next_local_nonce: None,
6334 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6335 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6337 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6339 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6340 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6343 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6344 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6346 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6347 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6349 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6350 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6351 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6352 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6353 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6354 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6355 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6356 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6357 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6360 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6361 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6363 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6364 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6365 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6366 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6368 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6369 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6371 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6372 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6375 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6376 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6377 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6379 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6382 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6383 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6385 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6386 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6387 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6389 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6391 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6392 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6394 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6395 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6396 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6397 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6400 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6401 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6402 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6403 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6404 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6406 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6408 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6409 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6410 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6413 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6414 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6415 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6419 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6420 initial_commitment_tx,
6423 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6424 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6427 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6428 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6431 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6433 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6434 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6435 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6436 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6437 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6438 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6439 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6440 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6441 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6442 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6443 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6445 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6447 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6449 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6450 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6451 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6452 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6454 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6456 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6457 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6458 let mut channel = Channel {
6459 context: self.context,
6461 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6462 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6463 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6465 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6469 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6470 }, channel_monitor))
6474 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6475 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6477 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6483 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6484 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6485 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6486 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6487 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6489 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6490 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6491 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6492 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6498 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6499 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6500 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6501 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6502 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6503 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6508 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6509 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6510 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6511 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6513 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6514 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6515 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6516 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6521 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6522 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6523 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6524 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6525 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6526 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6531 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6533 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6536 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6538 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6539 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6540 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6541 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6542 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6544 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6545 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6546 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6547 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6549 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6550 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6551 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6553 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6555 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6556 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6557 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6558 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6559 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6560 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6562 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6563 // deserialized from that format.
6564 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6565 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6566 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6568 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6570 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6571 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6572 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6574 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6575 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6576 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6577 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6580 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6581 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6582 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6585 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6586 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6587 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6588 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6590 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6591 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6593 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6595 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6597 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6599 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6602 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6604 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6609 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6610 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6612 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6613 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6614 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6615 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6616 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6617 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6618 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6620 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6622 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6624 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6627 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6628 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6629 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6632 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6634 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6635 preimages.push(preimage);
6637 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6638 reason.write(writer)?;
6640 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6642 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6643 preimages.push(preimage);
6645 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6646 reason.write(writer)?;
6649 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6650 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6651 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6653 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6654 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6655 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6659 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6660 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6661 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6663 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6664 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6668 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6669 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6670 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6671 source.write(writer)?;
6672 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6674 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6675 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6676 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6678 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6679 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6681 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6683 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6684 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6686 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6688 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6689 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6694 match self.context.resend_order {
6695 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6696 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6699 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6700 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6701 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6703 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6704 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6705 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6706 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6709 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6710 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6711 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6712 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6713 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6716 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6717 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6718 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6719 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6721 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6722 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6723 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6725 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6728 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6729 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6730 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6732 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6733 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6734 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6735 // consider the stale state on reload.
6738 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6739 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6742 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6743 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6744 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6746 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6747 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6749 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6750 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6751 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6753 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6754 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6756 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6759 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6760 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6761 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6763 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6766 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6767 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6769 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6770 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6771 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6773 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6775 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6777 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6779 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6780 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6781 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6782 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6783 htlc.write(writer)?;
6786 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6787 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6788 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6790 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6791 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6793 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6794 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6795 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6796 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6797 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6798 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6799 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6801 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6802 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6803 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6804 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6805 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6807 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6808 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6810 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6811 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6812 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6813 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6815 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6817 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6818 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6819 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6820 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6821 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6822 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6823 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6825 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6826 (2, chan_type, option),
6827 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6828 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6829 (5, self.context.config, required),
6830 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6831 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6832 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6833 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6834 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6835 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6836 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6837 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6838 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6839 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6840 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6841 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6842 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6843 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6844 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6845 (33, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6846 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6847 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6854 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6855 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6857 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6858 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6860 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6861 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6862 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6864 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6865 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6866 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6867 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6871 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6872 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6878 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6882 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let mut keys_data = None;
6889 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6890 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6891 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6893 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6894 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6895 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6896 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6897 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6898 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6902 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6903 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6904 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6907 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6911 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6916 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6917 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6918 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6919 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6920 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6921 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6922 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6923 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6924 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6925 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6926 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6927 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6932 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6934 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6935 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6936 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6937 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6938 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6939 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6940 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6941 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6942 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6943 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6945 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6949 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6953 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6954 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6956 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6958 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6962 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6964 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6965 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6966 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6967 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6968 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6969 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6970 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6971 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6972 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6974 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6975 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6976 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6978 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6979 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6980 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6982 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6986 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6987 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6988 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6989 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6992 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6998 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6999 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7002 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7004 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7005 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7008 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7014 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7018 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7019 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7020 // consider the stale state on reload.
7021 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7024 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7031 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7040 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7041 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7043 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7044 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7052 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7053 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7055 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7056 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7061 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7062 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7063 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7064 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7066 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7069 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7075 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7077 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7080 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7082 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7083 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7084 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7086 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7088 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7092 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7093 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7094 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7096 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7102 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7103 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7104 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7105 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7106 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7107 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7108 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7109 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7110 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7111 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7113 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7114 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7115 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7116 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7117 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7118 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7119 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7121 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7122 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7123 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7124 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7126 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7128 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7129 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7131 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7132 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7133 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7134 (2, channel_type, option),
7135 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7136 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7137 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7138 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7139 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7140 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7141 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7142 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7143 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7144 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7145 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7146 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7147 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7148 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7149 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7150 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7151 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7152 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7153 (33, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7154 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7155 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7158 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7159 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7160 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7161 // required channel parameters.
7162 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7163 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7164 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7166 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7168 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7169 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7170 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7171 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7174 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7175 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7176 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7178 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7179 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7181 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7182 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7187 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7188 if iter.next().is_some() {
7189 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7193 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7194 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7195 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7196 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7197 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7200 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7201 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7202 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7204 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7205 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7207 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7208 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7209 // separate u64 values.
7210 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7212 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7214 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7215 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7216 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7217 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7219 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7220 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7222 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7223 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7224 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7225 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7226 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7229 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7230 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7234 context: ChannelContext {
7237 config: config.unwrap(),
7241 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7242 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7243 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7246 temporary_channel_id,
7248 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7250 channel_value_satoshis,
7252 latest_monitor_update_id,
7255 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7258 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7259 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7262 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7263 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7264 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7265 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7269 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7270 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7271 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7272 monitor_pending_forwards,
7273 monitor_pending_failures,
7274 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7277 holding_cell_update_fee,
7278 next_holder_htlc_id,
7279 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7280 update_time_counter,
7283 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7284 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7285 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7286 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7288 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7289 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7290 closing_fee_limits: None,
7291 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7293 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7295 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7296 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7298 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7300 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7301 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7302 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7303 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7304 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7305 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7306 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7307 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7308 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7311 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7313 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7314 funding_transaction,
7316 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7317 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7318 counterparty_node_id,
7320 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7324 channel_update_status,
7325 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7329 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7330 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7331 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7332 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7334 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7335 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7337 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7338 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7339 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7341 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7342 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7344 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7345 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7347 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7350 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7359 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7360 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7361 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7362 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7363 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7365 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7366 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7367 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7368 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7369 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7370 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7371 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7372 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7373 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7374 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7375 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7376 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7377 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7378 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7379 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7380 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7381 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7382 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7383 use crate::util::test_utils;
7384 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7385 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7386 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7387 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7388 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7389 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7390 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7391 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7392 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7393 use crate::prelude::*;
7395 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7398 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7399 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7405 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7406 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7407 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7408 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7412 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7413 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7414 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7415 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7416 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7417 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7418 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7422 signer: InMemorySigner,
7425 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7426 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7429 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7430 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7432 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7433 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7436 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7440 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7442 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7443 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7444 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7445 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7446 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7449 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7450 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7451 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7452 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7456 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7457 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7458 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7462 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7463 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7464 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7465 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7467 let seed = [42; 32];
7468 let network = Network::Testnet;
7469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7470 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7471 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7475 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7476 let config = UserConfig::default();
7477 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7478 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7479 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7481 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7482 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7486 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7487 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7489 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7490 let original_fee = 253;
7491 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7492 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7494 let seed = [42; 32];
7495 let network = Network::Testnet;
7496 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7498 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7499 let config = UserConfig::default();
7500 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7502 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7503 // same as the old fee.
7504 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7505 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7506 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7510 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7511 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7512 // dust limits are used.
7513 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7514 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7515 let seed = [42; 32];
7516 let network = Network::Testnet;
7517 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7518 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7519 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7521 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7522 // they have different dust limits.
7524 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7525 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7526 let config = UserConfig::default();
7527 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7529 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7530 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7531 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7532 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7533 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7535 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7536 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7537 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7538 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7539 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7541 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7542 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7543 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7544 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7546 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7547 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7548 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7550 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7551 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7553 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7554 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7555 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7557 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7558 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7559 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7560 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7563 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7565 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7566 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7567 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7568 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7569 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7570 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7571 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7572 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7573 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7575 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7578 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7579 // the dust limit check.
7580 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7581 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7582 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7583 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7585 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7586 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7587 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7588 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7589 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7590 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7591 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7595 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7596 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7597 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7598 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7599 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7600 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7601 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7602 let seed = [42; 32];
7603 let network = Network::Testnet;
7604 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7606 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7607 let config = UserConfig::default();
7608 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7610 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7611 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7613 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7614 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7615 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7616 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7617 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7618 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7620 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7621 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7622 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7623 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7624 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7626 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7628 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7629 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7630 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7631 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7632 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7634 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7635 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7636 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7637 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7638 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7642 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7643 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7644 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7645 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7646 let seed = [42; 32];
7647 let network = Network::Testnet;
7648 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7649 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7650 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7652 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7654 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7655 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7656 let config = UserConfig::default();
7657 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7659 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7660 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7661 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7662 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7664 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7665 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7666 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7668 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7669 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7670 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7671 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7673 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7674 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7675 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7677 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7678 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7680 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7681 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7682 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7683 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7684 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7685 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7686 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7688 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7690 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7691 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7692 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7693 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7694 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7698 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7699 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7700 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7701 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7702 let seed = [42; 32];
7703 let network = Network::Testnet;
7704 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7705 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7706 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7708 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7709 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7710 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7711 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7712 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7713 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7714 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7715 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7717 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7718 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7719 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7720 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7721 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7722 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7724 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7725 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7726 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7727 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7729 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7731 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7732 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7733 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7734 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7735 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7736 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7738 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7739 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7740 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7741 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7743 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7744 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7745 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7746 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7747 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7749 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7750 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7752 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7753 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7754 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7756 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7757 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7758 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7759 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7760 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7762 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7763 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7765 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7766 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7767 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7771 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7773 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7774 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7775 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7777 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7778 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7779 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7780 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7782 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7783 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7784 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7786 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7788 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7789 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7792 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7793 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7794 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7795 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7796 let seed = [42; 32];
7797 let network = Network::Testnet;
7798 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7799 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7800 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7803 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7804 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7805 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7807 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7808 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7810 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7811 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7812 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7814 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7815 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7817 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7819 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7820 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7822 // Channel Negotiations failed
7823 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7824 assert!(result.is_err());
7829 fn channel_update() {
7830 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7831 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7832 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7833 let seed = [42; 32];
7834 let network = Network::Testnet;
7835 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7836 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7837 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7839 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7840 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7841 let config = UserConfig::default();
7842 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7844 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7845 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7846 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7847 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7848 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7850 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7851 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7852 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7853 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7854 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7856 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7857 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7858 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7859 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7861 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7862 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7863 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7865 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7866 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7868 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7869 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7870 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7872 short_channel_id: 0,
7875 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7876 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7877 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7879 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7880 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7882 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7884 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7886 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7887 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7888 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7889 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7891 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7892 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7893 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7895 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7899 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7901 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7902 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7903 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7904 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7905 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7906 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7907 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7908 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7909 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7910 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7911 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7912 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7913 use crate::sync::Arc;
7915 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7916 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7917 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7920 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7922 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7923 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7924 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7925 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7926 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7928 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7929 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7935 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7936 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7937 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7939 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7940 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7941 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7942 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7943 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7944 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7946 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7948 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7949 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7950 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7951 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7952 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7953 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7955 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7956 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7957 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7958 selected_contest_delay: 144
7960 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7961 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7963 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7964 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7966 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7967 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7969 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7970 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7972 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7973 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7974 // build_commitment_transaction.
7975 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7976 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7977 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7978 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7979 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7981 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7982 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7983 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7984 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
7988 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7989 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7990 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
7991 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
7995 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7996 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7997 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7999 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8000 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8002 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8003 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8005 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8007 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8008 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8009 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8010 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8011 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8012 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8013 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8015 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8016 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8017 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8018 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8020 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8021 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8022 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8024 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8026 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8027 commitment_tx.clone(),
8028 counterparty_signature,
8029 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8030 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8031 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8033 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8034 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8036 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8037 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8038 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8040 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8041 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8044 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8045 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8047 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8048 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8049 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8050 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8051 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8052 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8053 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8054 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8056 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8059 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8060 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8061 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8065 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8068 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8069 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8070 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8072 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8073 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8074 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8075 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8076 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8077 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8078 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8079 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8081 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8085 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8086 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8087 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8088 "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", {});
8090 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8091 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8093 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8094 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8095 "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", {});
8097 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8098 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8099 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8100 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8102 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8103 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8105 amount_msat: 1000000,
8107 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8108 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8110 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8113 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8114 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8116 amount_msat: 2000000,
8118 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8119 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8121 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8124 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8125 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8127 amount_msat: 2000000,
8129 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8130 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8131 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8132 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8134 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8137 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8138 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8140 amount_msat: 3000000,
8142 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8143 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8144 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8145 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8147 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8150 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8151 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8153 amount_msat: 4000000,
8155 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8156 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8158 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8162 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8163 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8164 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8166 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8167 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8168 "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", {
8171 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8172 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8173 "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" },
8176 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8177 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8178 "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" },
8181 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8182 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8183 "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" },
8186 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8187 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8188 "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" },
8191 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8192 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8193 "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" }
8196 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8197 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8198 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8200 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8201 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8202 "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", {
8205 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8206 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8207 "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" },
8210 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8211 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8212 "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" },
8215 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8216 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8217 "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" },
8220 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8221 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8222 "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" },
8225 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8226 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8227 "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" }
8230 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8231 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8232 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8234 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8235 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8236 "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", {
8239 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8240 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8241 "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" },
8244 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8245 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8246 "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" },
8249 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8250 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8251 "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" },
8254 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8255 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8256 "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" }
8259 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8260 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8261 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8262 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8264 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8265 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8266 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8269 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8270 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8271 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8274 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8275 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8276 "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" },
8279 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8280 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8281 "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" },
8284 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8285 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8286 "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" }
8289 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8290 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8291 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8292 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8294 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8295 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8296 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8299 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8300 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8301 "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" },
8304 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8305 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8306 "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" },
8309 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8310 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8311 "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" },
8314 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8315 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8316 "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" }
8319 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8320 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8321 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8323 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8324 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8325 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8328 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8329 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8330 "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" },
8333 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8334 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8335 "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" },
8338 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8339 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8340 "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" }
8343 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8344 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8345 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8347 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8348 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8349 "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", {
8352 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8353 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8354 "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" },
8357 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8358 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8359 "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" },
8362 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8363 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8364 "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" }
8367 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8368 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8369 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8371 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8372 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8373 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8376 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8377 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8378 "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" },
8381 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8382 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8383 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8386 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8387 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8388 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8389 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8390 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8391 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8393 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8394 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8395 "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", {
8398 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8399 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8400 "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" },
8403 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8404 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8405 "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" }
8408 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8409 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8410 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8411 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8412 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8414 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8415 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8416 "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", {
8419 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8420 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8421 "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" },
8424 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8425 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8426 "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" }
8429 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8430 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8431 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8433 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8434 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8435 "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", {
8438 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8439 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8440 "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" }
8443 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8446 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8447 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8449 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8450 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8451 "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", {
8454 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8455 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8456 "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" }
8459 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8460 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8461 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8462 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8463 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8465 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8466 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8467 "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", {
8470 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8471 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8472 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8475 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8476 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8477 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8478 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8480 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8481 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8482 "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", {});
8484 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8485 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8486 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8487 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8488 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8490 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8491 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8492 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8494 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8495 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8496 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8497 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8498 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8500 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8501 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8502 "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", {});
8504 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8508 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8509 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8510 "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", {});
8512 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8513 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8514 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8515 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8516 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8518 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8519 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8520 "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", {});
8522 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8523 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8524 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8525 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8526 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8528 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8529 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8530 "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", {});
8532 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8535 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8536 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8537 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8539 amount_msat: 2000000,
8541 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8542 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8544 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8547 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8548 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8549 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8551 amount_msat: 5000001,
8553 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8554 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8555 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8556 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8558 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8561 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8562 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8564 amount_msat: 5000000,
8566 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8567 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8568 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8569 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8571 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8575 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8576 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8577 "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", {
8580 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8581 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8582 "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" },
8584 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8585 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8586 "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" },
8588 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8589 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8590 "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" }
8593 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8594 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8595 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8596 "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", {
8599 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8600 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8601 "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" },
8603 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8604 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8605 "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" },
8607 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8608 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8609 "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" }
8614 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8615 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8617 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8618 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8619 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8620 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8622 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8623 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8624 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8626 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8627 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8629 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8630 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8632 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8633 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8634 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8638 fn test_key_derivation() {
8639 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8640 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8642 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8643 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8645 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8646 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8648 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8649 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8651 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8652 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8654 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8655 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8657 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8658 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8660 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8661 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8665 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8666 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8667 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8668 let seed = [42; 32];
8669 let network = Network::Testnet;
8670 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8671 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8673 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8674 let config = UserConfig::default();
8675 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8676 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8678 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8679 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8681 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8682 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8683 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8684 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8685 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8686 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8687 assert!(res.is_ok());
8691 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8692 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8693 // resulting `channel_type`.
8694 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8695 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8696 let network = Network::Testnet;
8697 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8698 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8700 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8701 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8703 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8704 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8706 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8707 // need to signal it.
8708 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8709 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8710 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8713 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8715 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8716 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8717 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8719 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8720 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8721 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8724 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8725 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8726 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8727 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8728 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8731 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8732 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8736 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8737 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8738 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8739 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8740 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8741 let network = Network::Testnet;
8742 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8743 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8745 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8746 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8748 let config = UserConfig::default();
8750 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8751 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8752 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8753 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8754 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8756 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8757 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8758 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8761 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8762 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8763 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8765 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8766 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8767 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8768 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8769 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8770 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8772 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8776 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8777 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8780 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8781 let network = Network::Testnet;
8782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8785 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8786 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8788 let config = UserConfig::default();
8790 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8791 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8792 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8793 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8794 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8795 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8796 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8797 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8799 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8800 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8801 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8802 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8803 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8804 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8807 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8808 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8810 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8811 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8812 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8813 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8815 assert!(res.is_err());
8817 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8818 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8819 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8821 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8822 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8823 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8826 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8828 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8829 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8830 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8831 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8834 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8835 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8837 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8838 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8840 assert!(res.is_err());