1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
304 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
305 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
306 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
308 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
309 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
310 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
311 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
312 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
313 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
314 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
315 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
317 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
318 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
319 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
320 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
322 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
324 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
326 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
327 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
328 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
329 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
333 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
335 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
337 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
339 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
340 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
341 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
342 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
343 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
345 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
346 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
348 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
350 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
351 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
353 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
354 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
355 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
356 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
357 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
358 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
360 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
361 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
363 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
364 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
365 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
366 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
367 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
369 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
370 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
372 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
373 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
375 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
376 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
377 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
378 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
384 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
385 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
387 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
388 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
389 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
394 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
395 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
397 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
398 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
399 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
404 macro_rules! secp_check {
405 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
408 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
413 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
414 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
415 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
416 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
417 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
418 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
419 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
420 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
422 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
424 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
426 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
430 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
432 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
433 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
434 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
436 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
437 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
439 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
440 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
441 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
442 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
443 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
445 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
446 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
450 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
456 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
459 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
460 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
461 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
462 holding_cell_msat: u64,
463 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
466 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
467 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
468 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
469 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
470 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
471 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
472 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
473 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
474 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
475 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
478 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
479 struct HTLCCandidate {
481 origin: HTLCInitiator,
485 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
493 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
495 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
504 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
505 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
506 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
507 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
508 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
510 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
511 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
512 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
513 htlc_value_msat: u64,
515 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
516 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
520 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
521 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
526 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
527 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
528 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
529 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
530 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
533 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
534 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
535 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
536 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
537 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
538 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
539 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
540 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
543 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
545 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
546 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
547 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
548 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
549 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
550 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
551 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
552 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
556 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
557 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
558 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
559 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
560 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
561 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
562 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
563 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
564 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
565 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
566 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
567 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
568 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
569 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
570 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
572 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
573 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
574 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
575 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
577 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
578 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
579 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
580 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
582 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
583 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
584 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
585 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
586 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
588 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
589 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
590 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
591 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
593 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
594 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
595 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
597 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
598 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
599 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
600 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
601 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
603 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
604 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
607 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
608 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
610 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
611 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
612 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
613 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
615 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
616 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
618 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
619 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
622 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
623 (0, update, required),
626 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
627 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
628 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
630 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
634 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
635 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
636 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
638 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
640 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
641 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
646 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
648 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
649 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
650 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
655 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
656 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
657 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
658 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
659 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
661 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
662 /// in a timely manner.
663 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
666 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
667 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
668 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
670 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
671 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
672 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
673 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
677 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
678 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
679 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
681 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
682 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
683 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
684 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
686 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
690 /// The current channel ID.
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
693 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
694 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
697 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
698 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
700 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
701 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
702 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
704 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
705 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
706 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
707 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
709 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
710 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
712 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
714 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
715 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
716 destination_script: Script,
718 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
719 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
720 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
722 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
723 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
724 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
725 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
726 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
727 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
729 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
730 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
731 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
732 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
733 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
734 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
736 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
738 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
739 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
740 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
742 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
743 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
744 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
745 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
746 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
747 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
748 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
750 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
752 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
753 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
754 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
755 // HTLCs with similar state.
756 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
757 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
758 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
759 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
760 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
761 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
762 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
763 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
764 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
767 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
768 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
769 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
771 update_time_counter: u32,
773 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
774 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
775 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
776 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
777 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
778 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
780 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
781 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
783 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
784 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
785 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
786 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
788 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
789 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
791 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
793 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
795 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
796 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
797 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
798 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
799 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
800 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
801 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
802 channel_creation_height: u32,
804 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
807 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
809 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
812 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
814 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
817 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
819 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
821 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
822 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
825 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
827 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
829 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
830 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
832 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
834 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
835 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
836 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
838 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
840 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
841 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
842 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
844 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
845 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
846 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
848 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
850 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
852 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
853 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
854 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
855 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
857 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
858 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
859 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
861 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
862 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
863 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
865 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
866 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
867 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
868 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
869 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
870 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
872 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
874 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
875 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
876 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
877 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
878 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
880 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
881 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
883 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
884 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
885 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
886 /// unblock the state machine.
888 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
889 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
890 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
892 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
893 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
894 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
896 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
897 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
898 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
899 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
900 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
901 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
902 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
903 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
905 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
906 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
908 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
909 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
910 // the channel's funding UTXO.
912 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
913 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
914 // associated channel mapping.
916 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
917 // to store all of them.
918 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
920 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
921 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
922 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
923 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
924 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
926 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
927 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
929 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
930 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
932 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
933 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
934 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
936 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
937 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
938 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
941 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
942 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
943 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
944 self.update_time_counter
947 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
948 self.latest_monitor_update_id
951 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
952 self.config.announced_channel
955 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
956 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
959 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
960 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
961 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
962 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
965 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
966 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
967 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
970 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
971 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
972 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
973 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
974 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
977 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
978 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
979 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
980 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
983 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
985 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
986 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
988 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
989 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
991 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
994 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
995 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
996 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
997 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
999 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1000 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1001 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1002 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1005 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1006 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1008 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1009 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1012 // Public utilities:
1014 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1018 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1020 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1021 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1022 self.temporary_channel_id
1025 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1029 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1030 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1031 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1035 /// Gets the channel's type
1036 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1040 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1042 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1043 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1044 self.short_channel_id
1047 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1048 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1049 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1052 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1053 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1054 self.outbound_scid_alias
1057 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1058 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1059 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1060 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1061 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1062 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1065 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1066 /// get_funding_created.
1067 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1068 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1071 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1072 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1073 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1076 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1077 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1078 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1079 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1083 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1086 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1087 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1090 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1091 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1094 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1095 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1096 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1099 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1100 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1103 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1104 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1105 self.counterparty_node_id
1108 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1109 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1110 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1113 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1114 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1115 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1118 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1119 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1121 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1122 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1123 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1124 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1126 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1130 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1131 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1132 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1135 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1136 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1137 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1140 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1141 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1142 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1144 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1145 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1150 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1151 self.channel_value_satoshis
1154 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1155 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1158 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1159 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1162 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1163 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1164 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1166 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1167 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1168 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1169 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1170 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1172 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1176 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1177 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1178 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1181 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1182 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1183 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1186 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1187 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1188 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1191 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1192 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1193 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1196 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1197 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1198 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1201 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1202 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1203 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1206 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1207 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1208 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1209 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1210 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1213 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1215 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1216 self.prev_config = None;
1220 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1221 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1225 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1226 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1227 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1228 let did_channel_update =
1229 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1230 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1231 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1232 if did_channel_update {
1233 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1234 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1235 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1236 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1238 self.config.options = *config;
1242 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1243 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1244 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1245 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1246 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1249 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1250 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1251 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1252 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1253 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1255 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1256 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1257 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1258 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1259 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1260 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1261 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1263 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1264 where L::Target: Logger
1266 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1267 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1268 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1270 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1271 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1272 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1273 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1275 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1276 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1277 if match update_state {
1278 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1279 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1280 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1281 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1282 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1284 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1288 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1289 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1290 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1292 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1294 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1295 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1296 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1298 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1299 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1300 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1301 transaction_output_index: None
1306 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1307 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1308 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1309 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1310 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1313 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1315 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1316 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1317 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1319 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1320 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1323 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1324 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1327 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1329 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1330 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1331 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1333 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1334 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1340 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1341 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1342 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1343 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1344 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1345 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1350 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1351 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1353 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1355 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1356 if generated_by_local {
1357 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1358 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1367 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1369 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1370 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1371 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1372 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1373 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1374 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1378 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1379 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1380 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1381 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1385 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1386 preimages.push(preimage);
1390 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1391 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1393 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1396 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1398 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1399 if !generated_by_local {
1400 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1408 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1409 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1410 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1411 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1412 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1413 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1414 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1415 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1417 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1419 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1420 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1421 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1422 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1424 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1426 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1427 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1432 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1433 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1434 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1435 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1440 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1441 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1442 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1443 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1445 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1449 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1454 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1455 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1460 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1462 let channel_parameters =
1463 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1464 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1465 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1472 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1475 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1476 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1477 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1478 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1480 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1481 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1482 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1490 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1491 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1497 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1498 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1499 /// our counterparty!)
1500 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1501 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1502 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1503 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1504 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1505 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1506 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1508 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1512 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1513 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1514 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1515 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1516 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1517 //may see payments to it!
1518 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1519 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1520 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1522 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1525 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1526 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1527 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1528 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1529 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1532 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1533 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1536 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1540 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1541 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1542 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1543 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1544 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1545 // which are near the dust limit.
1546 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1547 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1548 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1549 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1550 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1552 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1555 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1558 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1559 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1560 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1563 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1564 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1566 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1567 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1568 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1569 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1570 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1571 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1572 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1575 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1578 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1579 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1580 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1582 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1583 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1584 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1585 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1586 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1587 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1590 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1596 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1597 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1599 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1600 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1601 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1602 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1603 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1604 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1605 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1608 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1611 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1612 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1613 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1615 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1616 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1618 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1620 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1623 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1627 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1628 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1629 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1630 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1631 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1632 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1633 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1635 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1636 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1638 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1645 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1646 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1647 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1648 /// corner case properly.
1649 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1650 -> AvailableBalances
1651 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1653 let context = &self;
1654 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1655 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1656 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1658 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1659 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1661 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1663 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1665 if context.is_outbound() {
1666 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1667 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1669 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1670 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1672 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1673 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1674 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1675 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1678 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1679 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1680 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1681 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1683 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1684 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1685 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1686 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1687 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1688 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1689 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1690 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1691 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1692 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1694 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1697 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1698 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1699 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1700 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1701 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1704 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1705 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1707 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1708 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1709 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1711 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1712 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1713 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1714 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1718 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1720 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1721 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1722 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1723 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1724 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1725 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1726 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1728 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1729 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1731 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1732 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1733 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1735 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1736 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1737 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1738 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1739 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1742 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1743 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1744 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1745 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1746 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1747 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1750 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1751 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1752 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1754 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1758 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1759 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1761 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1762 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1766 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1767 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1768 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1769 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1771 outbound_capacity_msat,
1772 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1773 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1777 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1778 let context = &self;
1779 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1782 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1783 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1785 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1786 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1788 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1789 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1791 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1792 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1793 let context = &self;
1794 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1796 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1799 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1800 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1802 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1803 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1805 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1808 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1809 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1813 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1814 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1820 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1821 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1822 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1825 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1826 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1827 included_htlcs += 1;
1830 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1831 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1835 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1836 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1837 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1838 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1839 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1840 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1845 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1847 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1848 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1853 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1854 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1858 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1859 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1863 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1864 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1866 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1867 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1868 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1870 total_pending_htlcs,
1871 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1875 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1876 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1877 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1879 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1881 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1886 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1887 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1889 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1890 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1892 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1893 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1895 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1896 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1897 let context = &self;
1898 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1900 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1903 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1909 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1910 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1912 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1917 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1918 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1924 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1925 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1926 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1927 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1928 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1929 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1932 included_htlcs += 1;
1935 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1936 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1939 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1940 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1942 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1943 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1944 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1949 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1950 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1951 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1954 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1955 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1957 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1958 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1960 total_pending_htlcs,
1961 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1962 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1963 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1965 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1966 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1967 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1969 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1971 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1976 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1977 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1978 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1979 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1986 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1988 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1989 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
1992 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1994 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
1995 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
1996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2000 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2001 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2002 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2005 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2007 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2008 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2011 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2012 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2013 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2014 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2015 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2016 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2017 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2018 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2019 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2020 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2021 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2023 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2024 // return them to fail the payment.
2025 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2026 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2027 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2029 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2030 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2035 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2036 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2037 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2038 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2039 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2040 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2041 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2042 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2044 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2045 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2046 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2047 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2051 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2053 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2054 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2055 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2059 // Internal utility functions for channels
2061 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2062 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2063 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2065 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2067 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2068 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2069 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2071 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2074 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2076 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2079 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2080 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2083 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2085 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2086 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2087 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2088 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2089 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2092 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2093 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2094 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2095 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2096 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2097 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2098 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2101 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2102 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2104 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2105 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2108 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2109 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2110 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2111 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2112 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2113 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2116 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2117 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2118 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2119 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2122 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2123 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2125 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2126 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2127 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2131 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2132 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2133 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2135 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2136 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2137 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2138 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2140 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2141 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2142 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2143 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2144 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2145 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2146 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2147 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2148 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2149 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2154 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2155 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2156 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2157 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2158 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2159 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2161 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2163 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2164 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2165 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2166 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2167 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2168 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2169 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2170 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2172 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2173 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2183 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2184 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2185 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2186 // outside of those situations will fail.
2187 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2191 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2196 1 + // script length (0)
2200 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2201 2 + // witness marker and flag
2202 1 + // witness element count
2203 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2204 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2205 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2206 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2207 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2208 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2210 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2211 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2212 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2218 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2219 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2220 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2221 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2223 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2224 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2225 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2227 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2228 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2229 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2230 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2231 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2232 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2235 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2236 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2239 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2240 value_to_holder = 0;
2243 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2244 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2245 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2246 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2248 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2249 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2252 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2253 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2256 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2259 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2260 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2262 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2264 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2265 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2266 where L::Target: Logger {
2267 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2268 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2269 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2270 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2271 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2272 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2273 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2274 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2278 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2279 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2280 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2281 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2283 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2284 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2286 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2288 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2289 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2290 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2292 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2293 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2294 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2295 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2296 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2297 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2298 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2300 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2301 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2302 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2304 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2305 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2307 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2310 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2311 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2315 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2319 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2321 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2322 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2323 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2324 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2327 // Now update local state:
2329 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2330 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2331 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2332 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2333 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2334 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2335 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2339 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2340 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2341 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2342 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2343 // do not not get into this branch.
2344 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2345 match pending_update {
2346 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2347 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2348 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2349 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2350 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2351 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2352 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2355 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2356 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2357 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2358 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2359 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2360 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2361 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2367 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2368 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2369 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2372 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2373 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2375 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2376 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2379 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2380 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2382 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2383 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2385 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2386 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2389 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2392 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2393 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2394 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2395 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2400 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2401 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2402 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2403 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2404 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2405 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2406 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2407 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2408 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2409 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2410 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2411 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2412 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2413 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2414 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2416 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2417 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2418 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2419 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2420 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2423 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2424 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2425 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2431 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2432 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2434 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2438 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2439 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2440 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2441 /// before we fail backwards.
2443 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2444 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2445 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2446 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2447 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2448 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2449 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2452 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2453 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2454 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2455 /// before we fail backwards.
2457 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2458 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2459 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2460 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2461 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2462 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2463 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2465 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2467 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2468 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2469 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2471 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2472 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2473 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2475 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2476 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2477 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2479 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2484 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2485 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2491 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2493 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2494 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2495 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2499 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2500 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2501 force_holding_cell = true;
2504 // Now update local state:
2505 if force_holding_cell {
2506 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2507 match pending_update {
2508 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2509 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2510 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2511 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2515 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2516 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2517 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2524 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2525 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2526 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2532 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2534 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2535 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2538 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2539 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2540 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2545 // Message handlers:
2547 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2548 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2549 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2550 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2551 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2555 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2556 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2558 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2561 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2562 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2563 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2564 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2567 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2569 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2570 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2571 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2572 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2574 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2575 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2577 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2578 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2580 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2581 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2582 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2583 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2584 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2589 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2590 initial_commitment_tx,
2593 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2594 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2597 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2598 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2601 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2602 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2603 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2604 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2605 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2606 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2607 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2608 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2609 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2610 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2611 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2612 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2614 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2616 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2617 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2618 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2619 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2620 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2621 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2622 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2624 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2625 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2626 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2628 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2630 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2631 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2633 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2635 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2636 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2640 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2641 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2642 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2643 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2644 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2645 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2646 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2649 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2650 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2652 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2653 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2654 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2655 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2657 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2660 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2661 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2662 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2665 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2666 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2667 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2668 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2669 // when routing outbound payments.
2670 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2674 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2676 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2677 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2679 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2680 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2682 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2683 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2684 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2685 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2686 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2687 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2688 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2689 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2690 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2692 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2693 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2694 let expected_point =
2695 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2696 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2698 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2699 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2700 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2701 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2702 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2703 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2705 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2706 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2707 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2708 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2709 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2711 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2719 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2720 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2722 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2724 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2727 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2728 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2729 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2730 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2731 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2732 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2734 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2735 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2736 if local_sent_shutdown {
2737 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2739 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2740 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2741 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2744 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2747 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2750 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2753 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2757 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2758 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2759 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2762 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2765 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2766 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2767 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2768 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2769 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2770 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2771 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2772 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2773 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2774 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2775 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2777 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2778 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2779 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2780 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2781 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2782 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2786 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2787 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2790 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2791 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2792 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2794 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2795 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2796 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2797 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2798 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2799 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2800 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2804 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2805 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2806 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2807 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2808 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2809 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2810 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2814 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2815 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2816 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2817 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2818 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2822 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2823 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2824 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2825 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2826 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2828 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2832 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2836 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2837 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2838 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2839 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2840 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2841 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2842 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2843 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2844 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2845 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2846 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2847 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2848 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2849 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2850 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2851 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2854 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2855 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2856 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2857 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2861 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2864 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2868 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2869 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2870 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2874 // Now update local state:
2875 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2876 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2877 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2878 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2879 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2880 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2881 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2886 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2888 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2889 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2890 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2891 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2892 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2893 None => fail_reason.into(),
2894 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2895 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2896 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2899 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2903 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2905 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2906 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2908 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2914 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2917 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2918 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2921 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2925 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2928 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2929 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2932 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2936 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2940 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2941 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2944 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2948 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2952 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2953 where L::Target: Logger
2955 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2958 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2961 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2965 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2967 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2969 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2970 let commitment_txid = {
2971 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2972 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2973 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2975 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2976 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2977 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2978 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2979 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2984 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2986 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2987 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2988 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2989 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2992 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2993 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2994 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2998 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3000 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3001 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3002 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3003 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3004 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3005 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3006 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3007 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3008 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3009 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3010 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3016 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3020 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3021 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3022 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3023 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3024 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3025 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3026 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3027 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3028 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3029 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3030 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3031 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3032 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3035 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3036 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3037 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3038 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3039 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3040 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3041 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3043 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3044 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3045 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3046 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3047 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3048 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3049 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3052 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3053 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3056 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3058 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3059 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3060 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3063 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3066 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3067 commitment_stats.tx,
3069 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3070 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3071 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3074 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3075 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3077 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3078 let mut need_commitment = false;
3079 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3080 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3081 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3082 need_commitment = true;
3086 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3087 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3088 Some(forward_info.clone())
3090 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3091 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3092 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3094 need_commitment = true;
3097 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3098 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3099 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3100 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3101 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3102 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3103 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3104 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3105 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3106 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3107 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3108 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3109 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3110 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3112 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3114 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3115 need_commitment = true;
3119 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3120 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3121 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3122 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3123 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3124 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3126 nondust_htlc_sources,
3130 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3131 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3132 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3133 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3135 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3136 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3137 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3138 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3139 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3140 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3141 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3142 // includes the right HTLCs.
3143 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3144 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3145 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3146 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3147 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3148 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3150 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3151 &self.context.channel_id);
3152 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3155 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3156 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3157 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3158 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3159 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3160 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3161 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3162 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3163 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3167 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3168 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3169 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3170 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3173 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3174 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3175 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3176 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3177 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3178 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3179 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3181 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3182 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3183 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3184 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3187 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3188 /// for our counterparty.
3189 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3190 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3191 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3192 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3194 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3195 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3196 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3197 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3199 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3200 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3201 updates: Vec::new(),
3204 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3205 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3206 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3207 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3208 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3209 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3210 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3211 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3212 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3213 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3214 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3215 // to rebalance channels.
3216 match &htlc_update {
3217 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3218 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3219 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3221 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3222 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3224 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3227 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3228 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3229 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3230 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3231 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3232 // into the holding cell without ever being
3233 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3234 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3235 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3238 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3244 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3245 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3246 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3247 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3248 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3249 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3250 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3251 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3252 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3253 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3254 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3255 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3257 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3258 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3259 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3260 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3261 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3262 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3263 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3264 // for a full revocation before failing.
3265 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3266 update_fail_count += 1;
3269 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3271 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3278 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3279 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3281 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3282 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3287 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3288 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3289 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3290 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3291 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3293 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3294 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3295 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3297 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3298 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3304 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3305 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3306 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3307 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3308 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3309 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3310 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3311 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3314 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3317 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3320 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3324 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3326 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3327 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3328 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3332 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3333 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3334 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3335 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3336 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3337 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3338 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3339 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3343 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3345 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3346 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3349 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3350 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3351 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3352 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3354 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3358 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3359 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3360 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3361 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3362 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3363 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3364 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3365 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3369 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3370 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3371 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3372 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3373 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3374 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3375 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3376 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3377 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3379 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3380 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3383 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3384 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3385 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3386 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3387 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3388 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3389 let mut require_commitment = false;
3390 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3393 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3394 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3395 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3397 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3398 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3399 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3400 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3401 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3402 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3407 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3408 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3409 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3410 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3411 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3413 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3414 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3415 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3420 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3421 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3423 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3427 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3428 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3430 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3431 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3432 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3433 require_commitment = true;
3434 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3435 match forward_info {
3436 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3437 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3438 require_commitment = true;
3440 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3441 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3442 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3444 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3445 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3446 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3450 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3451 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3452 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3453 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3459 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3460 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3461 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3462 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3464 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3465 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3466 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3467 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3468 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3469 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3470 require_commitment = true;
3474 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3476 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3477 match update_state {
3478 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3479 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3480 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3481 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3482 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3484 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3485 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3486 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3487 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3488 require_commitment = true;
3489 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3490 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3495 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3496 let release_state_str =
3497 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3498 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3499 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3500 if !release_monitor {
3501 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3502 update: monitor_update,
3504 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3506 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3511 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3512 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3513 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3514 if require_commitment {
3515 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3516 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3517 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3518 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3519 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3520 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3521 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3522 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3523 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3525 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3526 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3527 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3528 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3529 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3532 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3533 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3534 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3535 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3536 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3537 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3539 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3540 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3542 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3543 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3545 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3546 if require_commitment {
3547 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3549 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3550 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3551 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3552 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3554 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3555 &self.context.channel_id(),
3556 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3559 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3560 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3562 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3563 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3565 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3566 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3572 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3573 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3574 /// commitment update.
3575 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3576 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3577 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3579 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3580 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3583 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3584 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3585 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3586 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3588 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3589 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3590 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3591 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3592 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3593 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3596 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3597 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3599 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3600 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3602 if !self.context.is_live() {
3603 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3606 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3607 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3608 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3609 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3610 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3611 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3612 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3613 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3614 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3615 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3619 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3620 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3621 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3622 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3623 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3624 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3627 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3632 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3633 force_holding_cell = true;
3636 if force_holding_cell {
3637 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3641 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3642 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3644 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3645 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3650 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3651 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3653 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3655 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3656 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3657 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3658 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3662 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3663 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3664 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3668 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3669 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3672 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3673 // will be retransmitted.
3674 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3675 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3676 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3678 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3679 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3681 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3682 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3683 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3684 // this HTLC accordingly
3685 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3688 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3689 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3690 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3691 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3694 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3695 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3696 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3697 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3698 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3699 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3704 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3706 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3707 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3708 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3709 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3713 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3714 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3715 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3716 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3717 // the update upon reconnection.
3718 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3722 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3724 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3725 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3729 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3730 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3731 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3732 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3733 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3734 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3735 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3737 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3738 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3739 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3740 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3741 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3742 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3743 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3745 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3746 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3747 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3748 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3749 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3750 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3751 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3754 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3755 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3756 /// to the remote side.
3757 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3758 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3759 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3760 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3763 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3765 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3766 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3768 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3769 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3770 // first received the funding_signed.
3771 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3772 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3773 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3775 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3776 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3777 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3778 funding_broadcastable = None;
3781 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3782 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3783 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3784 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3785 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3786 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3787 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3788 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3789 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3790 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3791 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3792 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3793 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3794 next_per_commitment_point,
3795 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3799 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3801 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3802 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3803 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3804 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3805 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3808 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3809 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3810 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3811 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3812 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3813 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3817 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3818 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3820 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3821 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3822 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3825 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3826 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3827 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3828 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3829 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3830 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3831 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3832 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3833 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3837 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3838 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3840 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3843 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3846 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3847 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3849 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3850 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3851 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3852 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3853 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3854 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3855 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3856 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3857 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3858 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3859 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3860 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3862 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3864 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3866 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3872 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3873 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3874 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3875 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3876 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3877 per_commitment_secret,
3878 next_per_commitment_point,
3880 next_local_nonce: None,
3884 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3885 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3886 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3887 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3888 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3890 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3891 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3892 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3893 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3894 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3895 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3896 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3897 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3898 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3899 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3904 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3905 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3907 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3908 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3909 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3910 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3911 reason: err_packet.clone()
3914 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3915 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3916 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3917 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3918 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3919 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3922 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3923 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3924 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3925 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3926 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3933 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3934 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3935 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3936 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3940 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3941 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3942 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3943 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3944 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3945 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3949 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3950 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3951 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3952 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3953 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3954 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3955 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3960 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3961 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3963 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3964 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3965 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3966 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3967 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3968 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3969 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3970 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3973 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3975 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3976 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3977 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3978 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3982 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3983 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3987 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3988 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3989 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3990 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3991 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3994 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3995 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3996 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3997 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3998 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4001 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4002 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4003 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4004 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4005 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4006 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4007 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4008 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4012 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4013 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4014 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4015 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4017 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4021 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4022 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4023 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4024 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4026 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4028 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4030 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4031 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4032 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4033 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4034 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4037 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4038 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4039 channel_ready: None,
4040 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4041 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4042 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4046 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4047 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4048 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4049 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4050 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4051 next_per_commitment_point,
4052 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4054 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4055 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4056 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4060 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4061 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4062 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4064 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4065 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4066 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4069 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4075 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4076 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4077 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4078 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4079 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4080 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4081 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4083 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4085 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4086 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4087 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4088 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4089 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4090 next_per_commitment_point,
4091 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4095 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4096 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4097 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4099 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4102 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4103 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4104 raa: required_revoke,
4105 commitment_update: None,
4106 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4108 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4109 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4110 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4112 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4115 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4116 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4117 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4118 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4119 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4120 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4123 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4124 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4125 raa: required_revoke,
4126 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4127 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4131 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4135 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4136 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4137 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4138 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4140 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4142 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4144 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4145 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4146 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4147 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4148 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4149 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4151 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4152 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4153 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4154 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4155 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4157 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4158 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4159 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4160 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4163 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4164 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4165 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4166 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4167 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4168 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4169 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4170 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4171 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4172 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4173 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4174 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4175 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4176 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4177 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4179 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4182 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4183 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4186 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4187 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4188 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4189 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4190 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4191 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4194 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4195 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4196 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4197 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4198 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4199 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4202 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4208 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4209 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4210 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4211 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4213 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4214 return Ok((None, None));
4217 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4218 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4219 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4221 return Ok((None, None));
4224 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4226 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4227 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4228 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4229 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4231 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4232 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4234 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4235 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4237 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4238 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4239 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4240 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4242 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4243 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4244 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4251 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4252 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4254 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4255 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4258 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4259 /// within our expected timeframe.
4261 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4262 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4263 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4266 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4269 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4270 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4274 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4275 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4277 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4280 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4281 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4282 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4283 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4286 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4287 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4291 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4293 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4297 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4298 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4302 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4305 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4306 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4307 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4308 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4310 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4313 assert!(send_shutdown);
4314 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4315 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4316 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4318 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4321 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4326 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4328 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4329 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4331 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4332 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4333 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4334 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4335 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4336 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4339 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4340 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4342 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4343 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4344 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4345 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4349 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4350 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4351 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4352 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4353 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4354 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4356 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4357 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4364 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4365 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4367 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4370 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4371 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4373 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4375 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4376 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4377 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4378 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4379 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4380 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4381 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4382 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4383 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4385 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4386 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4393 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4394 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4395 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4396 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4398 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4401 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4404 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4407 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4411 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4415 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4416 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4417 return Ok((None, None));
4420 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4421 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4422 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4425 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4427 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4430 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4431 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4432 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4433 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4434 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4438 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4439 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4444 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4445 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4446 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4447 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4448 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4449 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4450 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4454 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4456 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4457 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4458 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4459 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4461 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4464 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4465 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4467 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4468 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4470 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4471 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4472 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4473 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4477 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4478 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4479 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4480 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4482 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4483 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4484 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4492 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4493 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4496 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4499 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4503 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4504 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4505 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4506 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4507 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4509 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4511 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4513 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4514 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4517 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4518 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4519 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4521 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4522 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4523 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4524 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4529 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4531 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4538 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4539 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4540 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4541 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4543 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4549 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4550 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4551 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4552 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4553 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4554 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4555 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4557 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4558 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4561 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4563 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4564 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4570 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4571 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4572 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4573 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4574 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4575 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4576 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4578 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4579 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4586 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4587 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4590 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4591 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4594 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4595 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4599 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4600 &self.context.holder_signer
4604 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4606 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4607 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4608 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4609 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4610 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4611 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4613 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4615 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4623 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4624 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4628 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4629 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4630 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4631 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4634 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4635 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4636 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4637 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4640 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4641 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4642 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4643 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4644 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4645 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4648 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4649 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4650 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4651 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4652 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4653 if !release_monitor {
4654 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4663 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4664 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4667 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4668 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4669 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4671 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4672 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4673 if self.context.channel_state &
4674 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4675 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4676 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4677 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4678 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4681 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4682 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4683 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4684 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4685 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4686 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4688 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4689 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4690 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4692 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4693 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4694 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4695 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4696 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4697 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4703 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4704 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4705 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4708 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4709 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4710 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4713 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4714 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4715 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4718 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4719 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4720 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4721 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4722 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4723 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4728 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4729 self.context.channel_update_status
4732 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4733 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4734 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4737 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4739 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4740 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4741 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4745 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4746 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4747 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4750 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4754 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4755 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4756 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4757 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4758 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4760 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4761 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4762 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4764 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4765 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4768 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4769 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4770 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4771 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4772 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4773 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4774 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4775 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4776 self.context.channel_state);
4778 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4782 if need_commitment_update {
4783 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4784 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4785 let next_per_commitment_point =
4786 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4787 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4788 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4789 next_per_commitment_point,
4790 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4794 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4800 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4801 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4802 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4803 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4804 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4805 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4806 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4808 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4811 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4812 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4813 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4814 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4815 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4816 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4817 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4818 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4819 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4820 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4821 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4822 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4823 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4824 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4825 // channel and move on.
4826 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4827 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4829 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4830 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4831 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4833 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4834 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4835 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4836 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4837 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4838 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4839 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4840 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4845 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4846 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4847 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4848 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4849 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4852 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4853 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4854 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4855 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4856 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4857 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4860 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4861 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4862 // may have already happened for this block).
4863 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4864 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4865 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4866 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4869 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4870 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4871 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4872 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4880 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4881 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4882 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4883 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4885 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4886 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4889 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4891 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4892 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4893 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4894 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4896 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4899 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4902 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4903 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4904 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4905 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4907 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4910 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4911 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4912 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4914 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4915 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4917 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4918 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4919 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4927 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4929 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4930 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4931 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4933 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4934 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4937 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4938 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4939 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4940 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4941 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4942 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4943 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4944 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4945 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4948 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4949 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4950 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4951 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4953 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4954 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4955 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4957 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4958 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4959 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4960 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4962 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4963 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4964 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4965 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4966 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4967 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4968 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4971 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4972 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4974 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4977 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4978 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4979 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4980 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4981 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4982 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4983 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4984 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4985 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4986 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4987 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4988 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4989 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4990 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4991 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4992 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4993 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4999 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5004 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5005 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5007 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5008 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5009 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5010 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5012 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5015 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5017 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5018 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5019 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5020 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5021 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5022 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5024 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5025 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5028 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5029 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5030 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5031 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5032 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5033 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5035 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5036 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5039 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5040 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5041 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5042 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5043 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5049 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5050 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5051 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5052 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5054 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5057 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5061 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5065 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5066 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5070 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5074 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5075 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5078 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5082 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5084 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5089 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5090 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5091 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5093 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5098 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5100 None => return None,
5103 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5105 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5106 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5108 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5109 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5115 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5117 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5118 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5119 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5120 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5121 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5122 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5123 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5125 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5126 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5127 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5128 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5129 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5130 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5131 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5132 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5133 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5134 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5135 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5136 contents: announcement,
5141 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5145 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5146 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5147 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5148 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5149 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5150 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5151 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5152 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5154 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5156 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5158 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5159 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5161 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5163 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5164 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5167 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5168 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5169 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5170 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5173 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5176 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5177 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5178 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5179 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5180 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5181 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5184 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5186 Err(_) => return None,
5188 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5189 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5194 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5195 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5196 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5197 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5198 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5199 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5200 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5201 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5202 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5203 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5204 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5205 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5206 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5207 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5208 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5209 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5212 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5215 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5216 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5217 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5218 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5219 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5220 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5221 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5222 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5223 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5225 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5226 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5227 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5228 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5229 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5230 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5231 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5232 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5233 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5235 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5236 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5237 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5238 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5239 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5240 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5241 next_funding_txid: None,
5246 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5248 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5249 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5250 /// commitment update.
5252 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5253 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5254 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5255 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5256 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5257 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5258 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5261 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5262 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5263 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5265 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5266 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5271 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5272 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5274 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5276 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5277 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5279 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5280 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5281 /// regenerate them.
5283 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5284 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5286 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5287 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5288 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5289 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5290 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5291 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5292 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5294 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5295 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5297 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5298 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5299 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5302 if amount_msat == 0 {
5303 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5306 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5307 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5308 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5309 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5312 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5313 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5314 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5317 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5318 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5319 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5320 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5321 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5322 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5323 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5324 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5327 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5328 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5329 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5330 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5331 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5332 else { "to peer" });
5334 if need_holding_cell {
5335 force_holding_cell = true;
5338 // Now update local state:
5339 if force_holding_cell {
5340 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5345 onion_routing_packet,
5351 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5352 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5354 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5356 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5361 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5362 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5363 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5367 onion_routing_packet,
5370 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5375 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5376 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5377 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5378 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5380 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5381 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5382 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5384 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5385 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5389 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5390 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5391 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5392 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5393 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5394 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5395 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5398 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5399 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5400 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5401 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5402 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5403 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5406 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5408 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5409 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5410 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5411 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5412 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5414 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5415 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5418 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5419 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5420 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5421 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5422 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5423 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5424 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5425 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5426 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5427 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5428 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5431 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5435 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5436 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5437 where L::Target: Logger
5439 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5440 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5441 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5445 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5446 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5447 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5448 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5449 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5450 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5451 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5452 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5453 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5454 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5455 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5461 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5464 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5465 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5466 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5467 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5469 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5471 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5472 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5473 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5475 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5476 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5477 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5480 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5481 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5485 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5486 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5488 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5490 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5491 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5492 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5493 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5495 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5496 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5497 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5498 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5499 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5500 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5504 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5505 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5509 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5510 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5515 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5516 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5518 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5519 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5520 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5521 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5522 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5523 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5524 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5525 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5527 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5528 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5529 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5532 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5533 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5534 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5540 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5542 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5543 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5544 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5545 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5546 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5548 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5550 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5556 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5557 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5559 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5560 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5561 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5562 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5563 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5565 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5566 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5570 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5571 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5574 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5575 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5578 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5581 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5582 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5583 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5586 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5587 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5588 let mut chan_closed = false;
5589 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5593 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5595 None if !chan_closed => {
5596 // use override shutdown script if provided
5597 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5598 Some(script) => script,
5600 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5601 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5602 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5603 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5607 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5608 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5610 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5616 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5617 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5618 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5619 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5621 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5623 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5625 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5626 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5627 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5628 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5629 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5630 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5633 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5634 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5636 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5637 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5638 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5641 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5642 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5643 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5644 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5645 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5647 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5648 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5655 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5656 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5658 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5661 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5662 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5663 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5665 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5666 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5670 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5674 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5675 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5676 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5677 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5680 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5681 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5682 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5683 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5684 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5685 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5686 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5687 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5689 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5690 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5691 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5692 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5694 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5695 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5697 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5700 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5701 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5702 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5704 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5707 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5708 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5709 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5710 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5714 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5715 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5717 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5718 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5720 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5722 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5724 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5725 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5726 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5730 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5731 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5733 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5734 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5735 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5736 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5740 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5741 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5742 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5746 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5747 Ok(script) => script,
5748 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5751 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5754 context: ChannelContext {
5757 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5758 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5759 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5760 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5765 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5767 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5768 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5769 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5770 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5772 channel_value_satoshis,
5774 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5776 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5777 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5780 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5781 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5784 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5785 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5786 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5787 pending_update_fee: None,
5788 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5789 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5790 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5791 update_time_counter: 1,
5793 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5795 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5796 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5797 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5798 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5799 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5800 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5803 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5804 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5805 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5807 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5808 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5809 closing_fee_limits: None,
5810 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5812 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5813 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5814 short_channel_id: None,
5815 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5817 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5818 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5819 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5820 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5821 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5822 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5823 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5824 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5825 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5826 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5827 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5828 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5830 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5832 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5833 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5834 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5835 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5836 counterparty_parameters: None,
5837 funding_outpoint: None,
5838 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5840 funding_transaction: None,
5841 is_batch_funding: None,
5843 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5844 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5845 counterparty_node_id,
5847 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5849 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5851 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5852 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5854 announcement_sigs: None,
5856 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5857 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5858 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5859 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5861 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5862 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5864 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5865 outbound_scid_alias,
5867 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5868 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5870 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5871 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5876 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5878 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5882 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5883 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5884 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5885 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5886 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5887 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5888 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5889 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5890 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5895 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5896 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5897 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5898 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5899 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5900 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5901 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5902 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5903 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5904 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5905 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5907 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5908 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5910 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5911 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5912 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5913 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5916 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5917 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5919 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5922 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5923 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5924 return Err((self, e));
5928 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5930 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5932 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5933 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5935 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5936 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5937 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5938 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5939 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5940 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5943 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5944 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5946 let channel = Channel {
5947 context: self.context,
5950 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5951 temporary_channel_id,
5952 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5953 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5956 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5958 next_local_nonce: None,
5962 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5963 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5964 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5965 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5966 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5967 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5968 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5969 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5970 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5971 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5974 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5975 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5976 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5977 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5978 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5979 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5985 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5986 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5987 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5988 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5989 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5990 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5992 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5994 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5995 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5996 // We've exhausted our options
5999 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6000 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6003 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6004 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6005 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6006 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6008 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6009 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6010 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
6011 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6012 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6013 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6015 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6017 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6018 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6021 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6022 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6023 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6025 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6026 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6029 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6030 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6033 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6034 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6038 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6039 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6040 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6041 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6042 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6043 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6044 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6045 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6046 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6047 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6048 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6049 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6050 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6051 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6052 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6053 first_per_commitment_point,
6054 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6055 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6056 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6057 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6059 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6064 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6065 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6067 // Check sanity of message fields:
6068 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6071 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6074 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6077 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6080 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6083 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6085 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6087 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6088 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6091 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6092 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6095 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6098 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6102 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6103 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6106 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6109 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6112 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6118 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6121 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6125 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6126 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6129 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6130 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6132 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6133 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6136 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6137 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6140 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6141 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6142 &Some(ref script) => {
6143 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6144 if script.len() == 0 {
6147 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6150 Some(script.clone())
6153 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6160 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6161 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6162 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6163 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6164 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6166 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6167 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6169 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6172 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6173 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6174 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6175 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6176 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6177 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6180 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6181 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6182 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6185 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6186 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6188 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6189 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6195 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6196 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6197 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6198 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6201 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6202 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6203 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6204 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6205 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6206 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6207 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6208 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6209 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6210 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6211 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6214 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6216 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6217 // support this channel type.
6218 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6219 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6223 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6224 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6225 // `static_remote_key`.
6226 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6229 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6230 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6233 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6236 channel_type.clone()
6238 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6239 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6245 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6246 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6247 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6248 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6249 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6250 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6251 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6252 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6253 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6256 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6260 // Check sanity of message fields:
6261 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6264 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6267 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6270 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6271 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6274 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6277 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6280 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6282 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6283 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6286 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6289 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6293 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6294 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6297 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6300 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6303 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6306 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6309 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6312 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6316 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6318 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6319 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6324 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6325 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6326 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6327 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6330 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6333 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6334 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6335 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6337 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6341 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6342 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6343 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6344 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6345 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6349 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6350 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6351 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6352 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6356 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6357 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6358 &Some(ref script) => {
6359 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6360 if script.len() == 0 {
6363 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6364 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6366 Some(script.clone())
6369 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6376 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6377 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6378 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6379 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6383 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6384 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6385 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6389 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6390 Ok(script) => script,
6391 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6394 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6395 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6397 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6400 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6404 context: ChannelContext {
6407 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6408 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6410 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6415 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6417 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6418 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6419 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6420 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6423 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6425 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6426 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6429 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6430 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6431 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6433 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6434 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6435 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6436 pending_update_fee: None,
6437 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6438 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6439 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6440 update_time_counter: 1,
6442 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6444 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6445 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6446 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6447 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6448 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6449 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6451 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6452 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6453 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6454 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6456 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6457 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6458 closing_fee_limits: None,
6459 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6461 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6462 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6463 short_channel_id: None,
6464 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6466 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6467 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6468 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6469 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6470 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6471 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6472 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6473 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6474 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6475 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6476 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6477 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6480 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6482 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6483 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6484 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6485 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6486 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6487 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6488 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6490 funding_outpoint: None,
6491 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6493 funding_transaction: None,
6494 is_batch_funding: None,
6496 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6497 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6498 counterparty_node_id,
6500 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6502 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6504 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6505 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6507 announcement_sigs: None,
6509 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6510 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6511 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6512 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6514 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6515 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6517 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6518 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6520 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6521 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6523 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6524 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6529 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6531 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6537 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6538 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6540 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6541 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6542 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6543 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6545 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6546 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6548 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6549 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6552 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6555 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6556 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6557 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6559 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6560 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6561 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6562 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6564 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6565 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6566 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6567 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6568 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6569 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6570 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6571 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6572 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6573 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6574 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6575 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6576 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6577 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6578 first_per_commitment_point,
6579 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6580 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6581 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6583 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6585 next_local_nonce: None,
6589 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6590 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6592 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6594 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6595 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6598 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6599 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6601 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6602 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6604 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6605 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6606 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6607 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6608 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6609 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6610 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6611 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6612 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6615 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6616 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6618 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6619 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6620 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6621 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6623 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6624 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6625 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6626 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6627 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6629 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6630 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6635 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6636 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6637 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6641 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6642 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6644 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6645 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6646 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6648 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6650 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6651 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6652 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6653 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6656 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6657 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6658 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6659 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6660 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6662 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6664 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6665 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6666 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6669 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6670 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6671 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6675 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6676 initial_commitment_tx,
6679 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6680 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6683 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6684 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6687 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6689 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6690 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6691 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6692 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6693 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6694 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6695 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6696 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6697 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6698 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6699 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6701 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6703 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6704 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6705 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6706 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6707 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6708 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6710 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6711 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6712 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6713 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6715 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6717 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6718 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6719 let mut channel = Channel {
6720 context: self.context,
6722 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6723 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6724 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6726 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6730 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6731 }, channel_monitor))
6735 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6736 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6738 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6744 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6745 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6746 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6747 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6748 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6750 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6751 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6752 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6753 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6759 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6760 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6761 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6762 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6763 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6764 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6769 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6770 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6771 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6772 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6774 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6775 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6776 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6777 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6782 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6783 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6784 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6785 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6786 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6787 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6792 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6793 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6794 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6797 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6799 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6800 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6801 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6802 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6803 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6805 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6806 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6807 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6808 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6810 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6811 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6812 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6814 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6816 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6817 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6818 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6819 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6820 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6821 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6822 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6824 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6825 // deserialized from that format.
6826 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6827 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6828 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6830 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6832 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6833 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6834 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6836 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6837 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6838 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6839 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6842 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6843 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6844 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6847 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6848 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6849 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6850 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6852 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6853 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6855 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6857 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6859 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6861 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6864 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6866 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6871 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6872 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6874 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6875 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6876 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6877 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6878 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6879 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6880 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6882 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6884 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6886 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6889 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6890 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6891 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6894 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6896 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6897 preimages.push(preimage);
6899 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6900 reason.write(writer)?;
6902 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6904 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6905 preimages.push(preimage);
6907 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6908 reason.write(writer)?;
6911 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6912 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6913 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6915 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6916 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6917 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6921 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6922 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6923 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6925 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6926 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6930 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6931 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6932 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6933 source.write(writer)?;
6934 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6936 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6937 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6938 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6940 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6941 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6943 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6945 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6946 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6948 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6950 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6951 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6956 match self.context.resend_order {
6957 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6958 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6961 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6962 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6963 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6965 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6966 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6967 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6968 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6971 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6972 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6973 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6974 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6975 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6978 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6979 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6980 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6981 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6983 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6984 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6985 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6987 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6989 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6990 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6991 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6992 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6994 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6995 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6996 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6997 // consider the stale state on reload.
7000 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7001 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7002 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7004 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7005 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7006 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7008 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7009 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7011 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7012 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7013 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7015 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7016 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7018 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7021 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7022 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7023 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7025 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7028 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7029 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7031 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7032 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7033 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7035 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7037 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7039 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7041 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7042 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7044 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7045 htlc.write(writer)?;
7048 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7049 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7050 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7052 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7053 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7055 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7056 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7057 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7058 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7059 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7060 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7061 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7063 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7064 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7065 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7066 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7067 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7069 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7070 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7072 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7073 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7074 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7075 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7077 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7079 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7080 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7081 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7082 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7083 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7084 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7085 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7087 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7088 (2, chan_type, option),
7089 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7090 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7091 (5, self.context.config, required),
7092 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7093 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7094 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7095 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7096 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7097 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7098 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7099 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7100 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7101 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7102 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7103 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7104 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7105 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7106 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7107 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7108 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7109 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7110 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7117 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7118 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7120 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7121 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7123 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7124 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7125 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7127 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7128 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7129 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7130 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7134 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7135 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7141 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7145 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let mut keys_data = None;
7152 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7153 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7154 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7156 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7157 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7158 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7159 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7160 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7161 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7165 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7166 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7167 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7170 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7172 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7179 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7180 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7181 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7182 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7183 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7184 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7185 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7186 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7187 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7188 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7189 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7190 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7195 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7196 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7197 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7198 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7199 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7200 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7201 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7202 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7203 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7204 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7205 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7206 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7208 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7209 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7212 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7216 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7217 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7219 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7221 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7225 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7227 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7228 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7229 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7230 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7231 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7232 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7233 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7234 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7235 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7237 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7238 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7239 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7241 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7242 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7243 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7245 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7249 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7250 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7251 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7252 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7255 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7256 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7259 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7260 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7261 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7262 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7265 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7267 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7268 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7271 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7275 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7276 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7277 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7278 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7281 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7282 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7283 // consider the stale state on reload.
7284 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7287 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7294 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7295 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7300 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7301 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7303 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7304 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7306 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7307 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7315 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7316 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7318 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7319 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7324 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7325 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7326 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7327 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7329 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7332 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7337 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7346 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7347 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7349 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7351 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7355 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7356 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7357 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7359 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7365 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7366 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7367 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7368 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7369 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7370 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7371 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7372 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7373 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7374 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7376 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7377 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7378 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7379 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7380 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7381 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7382 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7384 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7385 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7386 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7387 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7389 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7391 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7392 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7394 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7396 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7397 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7398 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7399 (2, channel_type, option),
7400 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7401 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7402 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7403 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7404 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7405 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7406 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7407 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7408 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7409 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7410 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7411 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7412 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7413 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7414 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7415 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7416 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7417 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7418 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7419 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7420 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7421 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7424 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7425 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7426 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7427 // required channel parameters.
7428 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7429 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7430 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7432 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7434 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7435 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7436 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7437 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7440 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7441 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7442 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7444 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7445 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7447 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7448 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7453 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7454 if iter.next().is_some() {
7455 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7459 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7460 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7461 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7462 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7463 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7466 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7467 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7468 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7470 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7471 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7473 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7474 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7475 // separate u64 values.
7476 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7478 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7480 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7481 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7482 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7483 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7485 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7486 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7488 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7489 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7490 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7491 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7492 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7495 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7496 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7500 context: ChannelContext {
7503 config: config.unwrap(),
7507 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7508 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7512 temporary_channel_id,
7514 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7516 channel_value_satoshis,
7518 latest_monitor_update_id,
7520 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7521 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7524 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7525 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7528 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7529 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7530 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7531 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7535 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7536 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7537 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7538 monitor_pending_forwards,
7539 monitor_pending_failures,
7540 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7543 holding_cell_update_fee,
7544 next_holder_htlc_id,
7545 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7546 update_time_counter,
7549 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7550 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7551 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7552 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7554 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7555 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7556 closing_fee_limits: None,
7557 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7559 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7560 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7562 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7564 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7565 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7566 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7567 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7568 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7569 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7570 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7571 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7572 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7575 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7577 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7578 funding_transaction,
7581 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7582 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7583 counterparty_node_id,
7585 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7589 channel_update_status,
7590 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7594 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7595 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7596 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7597 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7599 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7600 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7602 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7603 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7604 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7606 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7607 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7609 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7610 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7612 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7615 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7624 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7625 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7626 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7627 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7628 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7630 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7631 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7632 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7633 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7634 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7635 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7636 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7637 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7638 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7639 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7640 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7641 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7642 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7643 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7644 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7645 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7646 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7647 use crate::util::test_utils;
7648 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7649 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7650 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7651 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7652 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7653 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7654 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7655 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7656 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7657 use crate::prelude::*;
7659 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7662 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7663 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7669 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7670 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7671 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7672 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7676 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7677 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7678 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7679 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7680 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7681 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7682 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7683 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7687 signer: InMemorySigner,
7690 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7691 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7694 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7695 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7697 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7698 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7701 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7705 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7707 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7708 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7709 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7710 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7711 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7714 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7715 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7716 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7717 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7721 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7722 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7723 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7727 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7728 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7729 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7730 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7732 let seed = [42; 32];
7733 let network = Network::Testnet;
7734 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7735 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7736 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7739 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7740 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7741 let config = UserConfig::default();
7742 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7743 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7744 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7746 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7747 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7751 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7752 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7754 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7755 let original_fee = 253;
7756 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7757 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7758 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7759 let seed = [42; 32];
7760 let network = Network::Testnet;
7761 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7763 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7764 let config = UserConfig::default();
7765 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7767 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7768 // same as the old fee.
7769 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7770 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7771 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7775 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7776 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7777 // dust limits are used.
7778 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7780 let seed = [42; 32];
7781 let network = Network::Testnet;
7782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7784 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7786 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7787 // they have different dust limits.
7789 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7790 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7791 let config = UserConfig::default();
7792 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7794 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7795 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7796 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7797 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7798 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7800 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7801 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7802 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7803 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7804 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7806 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7807 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7808 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7809 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7811 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7812 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7813 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7815 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7816 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7818 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7819 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7820 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7822 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7823 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7824 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7825 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7828 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7830 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7831 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7832 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7833 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7834 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7835 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7836 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7837 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7838 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7840 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7843 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7844 // the dust limit check.
7845 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7846 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7847 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7848 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7850 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7851 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7852 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7853 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7854 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7855 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7856 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7860 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7861 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7862 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7863 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7864 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7865 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7867 let seed = [42; 32];
7868 let network = Network::Testnet;
7869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7871 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7872 let config = UserConfig::default();
7873 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7875 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7876 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7878 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7879 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7880 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7881 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7882 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7883 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7885 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7886 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7887 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7888 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7889 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7891 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7893 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7894 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7895 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7896 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7897 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7899 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7900 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7901 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7902 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7903 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7907 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7908 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7909 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7910 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7911 let seed = [42; 32];
7912 let network = Network::Testnet;
7913 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7914 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7915 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7917 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7919 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7920 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7921 let config = UserConfig::default();
7922 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7924 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7925 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7926 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7927 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7929 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7930 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7931 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7933 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7934 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7935 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7936 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7938 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7939 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7940 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7942 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7943 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7945 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7946 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7947 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7948 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7949 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7950 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7951 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7953 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7955 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7956 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7957 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7958 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7959 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7963 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7964 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7965 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7967 let seed = [42; 32];
7968 let network = Network::Testnet;
7969 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7970 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7971 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7973 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7974 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7975 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7976 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7977 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7978 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7979 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7980 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7982 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7983 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7984 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7985 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7986 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7987 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7989 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7990 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7991 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7992 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7994 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7996 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7997 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7998 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7999 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8000 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8001 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8003 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8004 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8005 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8006 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8008 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8009 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8010 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8011 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8012 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8014 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8015 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8017 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8018 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8019 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8021 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8022 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8023 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8024 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8025 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8027 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8028 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8030 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8031 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8032 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8036 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8038 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8039 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8040 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8042 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8043 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8044 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8045 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8047 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8048 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8049 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8051 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8053 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8054 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8057 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8058 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8059 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8060 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8061 let seed = [42; 32];
8062 let network = Network::Testnet;
8063 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8064 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8065 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8068 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8069 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8070 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8072 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8073 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8075 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8076 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8077 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8079 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8080 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8082 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8084 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8085 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8087 // Channel Negotiations failed
8088 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8089 assert!(result.is_err());
8094 fn channel_update() {
8095 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8096 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8097 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8098 let seed = [42; 32];
8099 let network = Network::Testnet;
8100 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8101 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8102 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8104 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8105 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8106 let config = UserConfig::default();
8107 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8109 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8110 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8111 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8112 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8113 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8115 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8116 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8117 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8118 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8119 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8121 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8122 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8123 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8124 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8126 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8127 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8128 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8130 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8131 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8133 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8134 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8135 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8137 short_channel_id: 0,
8140 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8141 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8142 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8144 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8145 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8147 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8149 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8151 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8152 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8153 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8154 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8156 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8157 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8158 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8160 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8163 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8166 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8168 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8169 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8170 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8171 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8172 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8173 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8174 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8175 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8176 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8177 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8178 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8179 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8180 use crate::sync::Arc;
8182 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8183 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8184 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8185 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8187 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8189 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8190 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8191 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8192 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8193 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8195 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8196 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8202 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8203 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8204 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8206 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8207 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8208 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8209 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8210 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8211 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8213 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8215 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8216 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8217 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8218 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8219 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8220 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8222 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8223 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8224 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8225 selected_contest_delay: 144
8227 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8228 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8230 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8231 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8233 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8234 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8236 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8237 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8239 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8240 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8241 // build_commitment_transaction.
8242 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8243 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8244 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8245 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8246 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8248 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8249 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8250 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8251 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8255 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8256 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8257 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8258 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8262 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8263 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8264 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8266 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8267 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8269 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8270 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8272 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8274 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8275 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8276 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8277 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8278 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8279 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8280 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8282 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8283 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8284 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8285 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8287 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8288 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8289 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8291 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8293 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8294 commitment_tx.clone(),
8295 counterparty_signature,
8296 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8297 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8298 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8300 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8301 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8303 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8304 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8305 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8307 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8308 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8311 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8312 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8314 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8315 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8316 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8317 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8318 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8319 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8320 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8321 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8323 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8326 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8327 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8328 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8332 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8335 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8336 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8337 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8339 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8340 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8341 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8342 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8343 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8344 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8345 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8346 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8348 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8352 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8353 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8354 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8355 "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", {});
8357 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8358 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8360 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8361 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8362 "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", {});
8364 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8365 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8366 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8367 "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", {});
8369 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8370 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8372 amount_msat: 1000000,
8374 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8375 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8377 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8380 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8381 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8383 amount_msat: 2000000,
8385 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8386 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8388 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8391 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8392 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8394 amount_msat: 2000000,
8396 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8397 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8398 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8399 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8401 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8404 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8405 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8407 amount_msat: 3000000,
8409 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8410 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8411 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8412 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8414 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8417 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8418 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8420 amount_msat: 4000000,
8422 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8423 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8425 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8429 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8430 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8431 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8433 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8434 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8435 "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", {
8438 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8439 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8440 "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" },
8443 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8444 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8445 "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" },
8448 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8449 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8450 "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" },
8453 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8454 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8455 "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" },
8458 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8459 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8460 "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" }
8463 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8464 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8465 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8467 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8468 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8469 "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", {
8472 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8473 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8474 "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" },
8477 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8478 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8479 "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" },
8482 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8483 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8484 "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" },
8487 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8488 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8489 "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" },
8492 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8493 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8494 "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" }
8497 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8501 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8502 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8503 "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", {
8506 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8507 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8508 "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" },
8511 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8512 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8513 "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" },
8516 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8517 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8518 "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" },
8521 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8522 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8523 "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" }
8526 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8527 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8528 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8529 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8531 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8532 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8533 "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", {
8536 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8537 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8538 "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" },
8541 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8542 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8543 "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" },
8546 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8547 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8548 "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" },
8551 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8552 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8553 "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" }
8556 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8557 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8558 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8559 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8561 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8562 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8563 "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", {
8566 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8567 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8568 "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" },
8571 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8572 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8573 "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" },
8576 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8577 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8578 "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" },
8581 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8582 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8583 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8586 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8587 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8588 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8590 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8591 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8592 "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", {
8595 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8596 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8597 "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" },
8600 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8601 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8602 "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" },
8605 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8606 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8607 "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" }
8610 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8611 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8612 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8614 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8615 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8616 "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", {
8619 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8620 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8621 "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" },
8624 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8625 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8626 "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" },
8629 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8630 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8631 "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" }
8634 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8635 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8636 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8638 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8639 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8640 "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", {
8643 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8644 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8645 "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" },
8648 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8649 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8650 "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" }
8653 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8654 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8655 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8656 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8657 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8658 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8660 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8661 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8662 "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", {
8665 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8666 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8667 "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" },
8670 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8671 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8672 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8675 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8676 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8677 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8678 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8679 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8681 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8682 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8683 "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", {
8686 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8687 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8688 "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" },
8691 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8692 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8693 "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" }
8696 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8697 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8698 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8700 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8701 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8702 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8705 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8706 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8707 "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" }
8710 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8711 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8712 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8713 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8714 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8716 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8717 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8718 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8721 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8722 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8723 "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" }
8726 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8727 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8728 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8729 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8730 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8732 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8733 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8734 "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", {
8737 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8738 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8739 "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" }
8742 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8743 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8744 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8745 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8747 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8748 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8749 "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", {});
8751 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8752 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8753 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8754 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8755 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8757 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8758 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8759 "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", {});
8761 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8762 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8763 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8764 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8765 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8767 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8768 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8769 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8771 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8772 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8773 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8775 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8776 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8777 "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", {});
8779 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8780 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8781 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8782 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8783 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8785 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8786 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8787 "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", {});
8789 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8790 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8791 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8792 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8793 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8795 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8796 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8797 "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", {});
8799 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8800 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8801 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8802 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8803 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8804 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8806 amount_msat: 2000000,
8808 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8809 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8811 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8814 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8815 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8816 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8818 amount_msat: 5000001,
8820 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8821 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8822 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8823 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8825 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8828 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8829 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8831 amount_msat: 5000000,
8833 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8834 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8835 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8836 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8838 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8842 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8843 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8844 "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", {
8847 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8848 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8849 "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" },
8851 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8852 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8853 "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" },
8855 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8856 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8857 "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" }
8860 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8861 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8862 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8863 "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", {
8866 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8867 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8868 "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" },
8870 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8871 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8872 "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" },
8874 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8875 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8876 "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" }
8881 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8882 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8884 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8885 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8886 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8887 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8889 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8890 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8891 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8893 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8894 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8896 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8897 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8899 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8900 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8901 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8905 fn test_key_derivation() {
8906 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8907 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8909 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8910 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8912 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8913 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8915 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8916 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8918 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8919 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8921 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8922 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8924 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8925 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8927 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8928 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8932 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8933 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8935 let seed = [42; 32];
8936 let network = Network::Testnet;
8937 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8938 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8940 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8941 let config = UserConfig::default();
8942 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8943 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8945 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8946 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8948 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8949 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8950 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8951 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8952 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8953 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8954 assert!(res.is_ok());
8958 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8959 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8960 // resulting `channel_type`.
8961 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8962 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8963 let network = Network::Testnet;
8964 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8965 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8967 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8968 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8970 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8971 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8973 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8974 // need to signal it.
8975 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8976 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8977 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8980 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8982 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8983 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8984 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8986 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8987 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8988 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8991 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8992 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8993 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8994 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8995 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8998 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8999 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9003 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9004 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9005 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9007 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9008 let network = Network::Testnet;
9009 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9010 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9012 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9013 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9015 let config = UserConfig::default();
9017 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9018 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9019 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9020 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9021 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9023 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9024 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9025 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9028 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9029 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9030 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9032 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9033 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9034 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9035 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9036 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9037 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9039 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9043 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9044 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9046 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9047 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9048 let network = Network::Testnet;
9049 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9050 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9052 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9053 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9055 let config = UserConfig::default();
9057 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9058 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9059 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9060 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9061 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9062 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9063 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9064 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9066 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9067 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9068 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9069 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9070 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9071 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9074 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9075 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9077 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9078 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9079 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9080 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9082 assert!(res.is_err());
9084 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9085 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9086 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9088 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9089 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9090 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9093 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9095 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9096 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9097 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9098 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9101 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9102 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9104 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9105 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9107 assert!(res.is_err());
9111 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9112 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9113 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9114 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9115 let seed = [42; 32];
9116 let network = Network::Testnet;
9117 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9118 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
9119 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9121 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9122 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9123 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9124 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9126 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9127 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9128 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9133 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9142 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9143 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9144 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9149 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9150 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9156 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9159 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9160 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9161 &accept_channel_msg,
9162 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9163 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9166 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9167 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9168 let tx = Transaction {
9170 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9174 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9177 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9180 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9181 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9186 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9187 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9188 &funding_created_msg,
9192 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9193 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9201 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9202 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9203 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9204 &funding_signed_msg,
9209 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9216 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9217 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9218 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9219 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9221 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9222 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9223 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9226 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9227 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9228 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9236 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9237 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9238 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9239 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9242 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9243 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9245 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9246 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9247 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9249 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());