1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
598 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
602 (0, update, required),
605 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
606 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
607 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
608 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
609 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
611 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
612 /// in a timely manner.
613 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
616 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
617 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
618 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
620 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
621 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
623 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
627 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
628 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
631 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
632 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
633 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
634 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
636 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
640 channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
644 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
645 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
647 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
648 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
649 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
653 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
656 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
657 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
661 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
662 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
663 destination_script: Script,
665 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
666 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
667 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
669 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
671 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
672 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
673 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
674 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
676 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
677 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
678 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
679 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
680 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
681 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
683 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
685 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
686 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
687 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
689 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
690 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
691 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
692 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
693 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
694 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
695 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
697 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
699 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
700 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
701 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
702 // HTLCs with similar state.
703 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
704 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
705 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
706 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
707 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
708 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
709 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
710 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
711 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
714 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
715 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
716 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
718 update_time_counter: u32,
720 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
721 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
722 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
725 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
727 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
728 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
730 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
731 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
732 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
733 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
735 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
736 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
738 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
740 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
742 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
743 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
744 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
745 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
746 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
747 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
748 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
749 channel_creation_height: u32,
751 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
756 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
759 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
761 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
764 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
766 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
768 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
769 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
772 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
774 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
776 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
777 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
779 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
783 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
785 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
787 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
788 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
790 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
792 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
794 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
796 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
798 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
799 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
800 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
801 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
803 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
804 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
805 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
807 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
808 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
809 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
811 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
812 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
813 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
814 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
816 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
817 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
818 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
820 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
821 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
822 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
823 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
824 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
826 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
827 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
829 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
830 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
831 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
832 /// unblock the state machine.
834 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
835 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
836 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
838 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
839 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
840 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
842 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
843 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
844 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
845 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
846 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
847 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
848 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
849 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
851 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
852 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
854 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
855 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
856 // the channel's funding UTXO.
858 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
859 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
860 // associated channel mapping.
862 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
863 // to store all of them.
864 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
866 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
867 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
868 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
869 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
870 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
872 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
873 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
875 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
876 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
878 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
879 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
880 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
882 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
883 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
884 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
887 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
888 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
889 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
890 self.update_time_counter
893 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
894 self.latest_monitor_update_id
897 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
898 self.config.announced_channel
901 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
902 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
905 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
908 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
911 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
912 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
913 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
916 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
918 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
919 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
920 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
923 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
924 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
926 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
929 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
931 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
934 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
937 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
940 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
941 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
943 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
945 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
946 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
947 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
948 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
951 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
952 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
955 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
960 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
964 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
966 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
967 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
968 self.temporary_channel_id
971 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
975 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
976 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
977 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
981 /// Gets the channel's type
982 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
986 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
988 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
989 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
990 self.short_channel_id
993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
994 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
995 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
999 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1000 self.outbound_scid_alias
1003 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1004 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1005 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1006 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1007 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1008 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1011 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1012 /// get_funding_created.
1013 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1014 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1017 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1018 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1019 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1022 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1023 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1024 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1025 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1029 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1032 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1033 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1036 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1037 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1041 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1042 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1045 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1046 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1051 self.counterparty_node_id
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1059 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1060 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1061 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1064 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1065 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1068 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1069 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1070 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1072 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1076 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1077 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1078 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1081 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1082 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1086 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1087 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1088 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1090 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1091 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1096 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1097 self.channel_value_satoshis
1100 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1101 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1104 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1105 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1108 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1109 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1112 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1113 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1114 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1115 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1118 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1122 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1123 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1124 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1127 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1128 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1129 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1132 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1133 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1137 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1138 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1139 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1142 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1143 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1144 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1147 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1148 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1149 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1152 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1153 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1154 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1155 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1156 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1159 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1161 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1162 self.prev_config = None;
1166 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1167 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1171 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1172 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1173 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1174 let did_channel_update =
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1176 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1177 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1178 if did_channel_update {
1179 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1180 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1181 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1184 self.config.options = *config;
1188 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1189 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1193 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1194 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1195 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1196 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1197 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1199 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1200 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1201 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1202 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1203 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1204 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1205 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1207 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1208 where L::Target: Logger
1210 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1211 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1212 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1214 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1215 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1217 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1219 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1220 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1221 if match update_state {
1222 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1223 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1224 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1226 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1228 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1232 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1233 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1234 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1235 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1237 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1238 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1239 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1241 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1242 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1243 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1244 transaction_output_index: None
1249 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1250 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1251 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1266 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1267 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1270 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1272 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1273 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1274 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1276 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1277 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1284 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1285 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1289 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1293 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1294 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1296 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1298 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1299 if generated_by_local {
1300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1301 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1310 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1312 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1313 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1314 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1318 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1321 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1322 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1328 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1329 preimages.push(preimage);
1333 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1334 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1339 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1341 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1342 if !generated_by_local {
1343 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1351 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1352 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1353 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1354 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1355 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1356 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1357 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1358 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1363 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1364 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1365 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1367 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1369 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1370 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1371 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1372 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1375 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1376 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1377 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1378 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1380 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1383 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1384 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1385 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1386 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1388 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1391 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1397 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1398 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1403 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1405 let channel_parameters =
1406 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1407 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1408 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1415 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1418 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1419 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1420 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1421 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1423 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1424 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1425 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1433 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1434 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1440 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1441 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1442 /// our counterparty!)
1443 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1444 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1445 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1446 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1447 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1455 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1456 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1457 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1458 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1459 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1460 //may see payments to it!
1461 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1462 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1463 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1465 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1468 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1469 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1470 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1471 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1472 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1475 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1476 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1479 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1483 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1484 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1485 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1486 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1487 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1488 // which are near the dust limit.
1489 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1490 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1491 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1492 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1495 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1496 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1498 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1501 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1502 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1503 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1506 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1507 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1509 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1510 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1511 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1512 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1514 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1515 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1518 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1521 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1522 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1523 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1525 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1527 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1530 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1532 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1533 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1540 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1542 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1543 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1544 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1545 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1547 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1548 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1551 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1554 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1555 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1556 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1558 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1560 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1563 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1566 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1571 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1572 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1573 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1574 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1575 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1576 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1578 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1579 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1588 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1589 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1590 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1591 /// corner case properly.
1592 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1593 -> AvailableBalances
1594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let context = &self;
1597 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1598 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1599 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1601 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1602 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1604 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1606 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1608 if context.is_outbound() {
1609 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1610 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1612 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1613 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1615 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1616 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1618 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1621 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1622 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1623 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1624 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1626 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1627 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1628 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1629 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1630 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1631 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1632 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1634 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1635 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1637 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1640 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1641 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1642 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1643 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1644 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1647 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1648 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1650 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1651 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1652 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1654 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1655 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1656 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1661 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1663 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1664 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1665 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1666 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1667 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1668 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1669 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1671 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1672 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1674 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1675 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1676 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1678 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1679 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1680 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1681 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1682 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1685 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1686 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1688 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1689 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1690 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1693 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1694 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1695 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1697 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1701 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1702 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1704 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1705 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1709 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1710 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1711 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1712 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1714 outbound_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1716 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1720 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1721 let context = &self;
1722 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1725 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1726 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1728 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1729 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1731 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1732 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1734 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1735 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1736 let context = &self;
1737 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1739 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1746 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1749 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1751 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1757 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1764 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1768 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1769 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1770 included_htlcs += 1;
1773 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1778 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1781 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1782 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1783 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1788 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1790 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1791 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1796 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1797 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1801 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1802 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1807 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1809 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1810 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1811 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1813 total_pending_htlcs,
1814 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1816 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1818 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1822 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1824 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1829 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1830 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1832 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1833 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1835 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1836 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1838 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1839 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1840 let context = &self;
1841 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1843 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1846 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1847 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1849 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1850 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1852 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1853 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1867 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1868 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1869 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1870 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1871 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 included_htlcs += 1;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1882 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1883 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1885 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1892 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1893 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1897 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1898 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1900 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1901 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1903 total_pending_htlcs,
1904 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1905 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1906 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1908 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1909 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1910 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1912 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1914 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1919 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1920 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1921 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1922 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1928 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1929 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1930 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1931 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1932 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1933 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1934 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1935 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1936 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1937 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1938 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1940 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1941 // return them to fail the payment.
1942 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1943 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1944 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1946 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1947 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1952 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1953 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1954 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1955 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1956 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1957 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1958 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1959 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1962 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1963 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1964 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1969 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1970 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1971 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1975 // Internal utility functions for channels
1977 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1978 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1979 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1981 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1983 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1984 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1985 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1987 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1990 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1992 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1995 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1996 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1997 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1999 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2001 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2002 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2003 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2004 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2005 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2008 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2009 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2010 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2011 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2012 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2013 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2014 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2017 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2018 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2020 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2021 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2024 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2025 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2026 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2027 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2028 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2029 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2032 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2033 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2034 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2037 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2038 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2039 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2040 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2044 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2046 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2052 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2054 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2056 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2057 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2058 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2059 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2061 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2062 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2063 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2064 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2065 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2066 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2067 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2068 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2069 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2070 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2075 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2076 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2077 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2078 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2079 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2080 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2082 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2084 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2085 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2086 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2087 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2088 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2089 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2090 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2091 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2093 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2094 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2104 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2105 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2106 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2107 // outside of those situations will fail.
2108 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2112 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2117 1 + // script length (0)
2121 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2122 2 + // witness marker and flag
2123 1 + // witness element count
2124 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2125 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2126 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2127 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2131 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2132 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2133 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2139 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2140 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2141 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2142 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2144 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2145 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2146 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2148 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2149 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2150 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2151 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2152 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2153 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2156 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2160 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2161 value_to_holder = 0;
2164 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2165 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2166 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2167 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2169 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2170 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2173 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2174 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2177 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2180 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2181 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2183 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2185 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2186 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2187 where L::Target: Logger {
2188 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2189 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2190 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2191 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2192 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2194 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2195 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2199 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2200 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2201 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2202 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2205 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2207 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2209 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2210 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2211 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2213 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2214 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2215 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2216 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2217 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2218 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2219 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2221 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2222 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2225 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2228 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2231 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2232 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2236 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2240 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2243 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2244 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2245 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2248 // Now update local state:
2250 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2251 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2252 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2253 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2254 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2256 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2260 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2261 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2262 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2263 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2264 // do not not get into this branch.
2265 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2266 match pending_update {
2267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2268 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2269 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2270 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2271 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2272 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2273 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2276 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2277 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2278 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2279 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2280 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2281 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2282 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2288 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2289 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2290 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2294 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2300 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2301 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2303 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2304 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2306 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2307 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2310 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2313 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2315 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2316 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2321 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2322 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2323 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2324 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2325 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2326 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2327 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2328 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2329 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2330 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2331 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2332 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2333 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2334 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2335 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2337 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2338 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2339 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2340 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2341 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2344 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2345 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2346 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2352 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2355 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2359 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2360 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2361 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2362 /// before we fail backwards.
2364 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2365 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2366 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2367 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2368 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2369 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2370 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2373 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2374 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2375 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2376 /// before we fail backwards.
2378 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2379 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2380 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2381 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2382 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2383 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2384 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2386 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2388 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2389 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2390 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2392 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2393 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2394 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2396 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2397 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2398 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2400 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2405 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2406 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2412 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2413 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2414 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2415 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2416 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2420 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2421 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2422 force_holding_cell = true;
2425 // Now update local state:
2426 if force_holding_cell {
2427 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2428 match pending_update {
2429 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2430 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2431 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2432 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2437 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2438 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2445 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2446 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2447 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2453 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2455 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2459 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2460 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2461 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2466 // Message handlers:
2468 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2469 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2470 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2471 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2472 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2476 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2482 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2483 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2484 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2485 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2488 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2490 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2491 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2492 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2493 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2495 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2496 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2498 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2499 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2501 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2502 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2503 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2504 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2505 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2510 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2511 initial_commitment_tx,
2514 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2515 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2518 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2519 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2522 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2523 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2524 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2525 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2526 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2527 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2528 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2529 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2530 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2531 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2532 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2533 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2535 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2537 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2538 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2539 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2540 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2541 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2542 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2543 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2545 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2546 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2547 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2548 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2550 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2552 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2553 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2557 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2558 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2560 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2561 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2562 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2563 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2565 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2568 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2569 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2570 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2573 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2574 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2575 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2576 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2577 // when routing outbound payments.
2578 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2582 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2584 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2585 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2586 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2587 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2588 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2589 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2590 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2591 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2592 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2594 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2595 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2596 let expected_point =
2597 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2598 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2600 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2601 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2602 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2603 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2604 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2605 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2607 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2608 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2609 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2610 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2611 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2613 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2621 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2622 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2624 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2626 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2629 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2630 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2631 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2632 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2633 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2634 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2636 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2637 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2638 if local_sent_shutdown {
2639 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2641 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2642 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2643 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2646 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2649 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2652 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2655 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2659 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2660 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2661 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2664 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2667 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2668 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2669 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2670 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2671 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2672 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2673 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2674 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2675 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2676 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2677 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2679 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2680 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2681 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2682 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2683 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2684 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2688 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2689 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2692 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2693 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2694 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2696 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2697 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2698 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2699 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2700 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2701 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2702 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2706 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2707 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2708 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2709 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2710 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2711 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2712 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2716 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2717 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2718 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2719 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2720 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2724 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2725 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2726 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2727 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2728 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2730 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2734 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2738 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2739 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2740 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2741 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2742 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2743 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2744 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2745 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2746 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2747 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2748 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2749 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2750 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2751 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2752 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2753 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2756 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2757 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2758 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2759 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2763 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2766 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2771 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2772 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2776 // Now update local state:
2777 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2778 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2779 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2780 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2781 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2782 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2783 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2788 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2790 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2791 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2792 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2793 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2794 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2795 None => fail_reason.into(),
2796 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2797 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2798 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2801 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2805 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2807 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2808 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2810 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2816 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2819 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2820 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2823 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2827 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2830 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2831 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2834 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2838 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2842 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2843 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2846 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2850 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2854 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2855 where L::Target: Logger
2857 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2860 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2863 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2867 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2869 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2871 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2872 let commitment_txid = {
2873 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2874 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2875 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2877 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2878 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2879 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2880 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2881 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2886 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2888 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2889 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2890 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2891 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2894 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2895 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2896 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2900 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2902 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2903 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2904 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2905 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2906 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2907 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2908 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2909 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2910 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2911 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2912 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2918 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2922 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2923 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2924 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2925 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2926 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2927 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2928 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2929 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2930 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2931 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2932 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2933 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2934 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2937 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2938 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2939 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2940 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2941 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2942 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2943 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2945 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2946 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2947 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2948 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2949 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2950 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2951 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2954 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2955 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2958 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2960 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2961 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2962 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2965 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2968 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2969 commitment_stats.tx,
2971 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2972 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2973 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2976 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2977 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2979 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2980 let mut need_commitment = false;
2981 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2982 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2983 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2984 need_commitment = true;
2988 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2989 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2990 Some(forward_info.clone())
2992 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2993 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2994 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2995 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2996 need_commitment = true;
2999 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3000 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3001 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3002 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3003 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3004 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3005 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3006 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3007 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3008 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3009 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3010 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3011 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3012 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3014 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3016 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3017 need_commitment = true;
3021 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3022 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3023 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3024 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3025 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3026 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3028 nondust_htlc_sources,
3032 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3033 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3034 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3035 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3037 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3038 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3039 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3040 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3041 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3042 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3043 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3044 // includes the right HTLCs.
3045 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3046 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3047 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3048 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3049 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3050 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3052 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3053 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3054 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3057 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3058 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3059 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3060 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3061 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3062 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3063 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3064 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3065 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3069 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3070 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3071 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3072 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3075 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3076 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3077 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3078 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3079 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3080 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3081 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3083 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3084 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3085 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3086 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3089 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3090 /// for our counterparty.
3091 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3092 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3093 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3094 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3096 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3097 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3098 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3099 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3101 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3102 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3103 updates: Vec::new(),
3106 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3107 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3108 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3109 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3110 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3111 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3112 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3113 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3114 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3115 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3116 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3117 // to rebalance channels.
3118 match &htlc_update {
3119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3120 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3121 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3123 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3124 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3126 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3129 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3130 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3131 &payment_hash, msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3132 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3133 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3134 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3135 // into the holding cell without ever being
3136 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3137 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3138 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3141 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3147 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3148 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3149 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3150 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3151 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3152 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3153 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3154 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3155 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3156 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3157 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3158 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3160 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3161 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3162 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3163 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3164 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3165 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3166 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3167 // for a full revocation before failing.
3168 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3169 update_fail_count += 1;
3172 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3174 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3181 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3182 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3184 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3185 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3190 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3191 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3192 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3194 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3196 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3197 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3198 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3200 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3201 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3207 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3208 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3209 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3210 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3211 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3212 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3213 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3214 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3215 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3217 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3220 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3223 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3227 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3229 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3230 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3235 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3236 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3237 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3238 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3239 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3240 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3241 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3242 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3246 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3248 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3249 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3252 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3253 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3254 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3255 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3257 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3261 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3262 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3263 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3264 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3265 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3266 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3267 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3268 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3272 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3273 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3274 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3275 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3276 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3277 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3278 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3279 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3280 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3282 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3283 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3286 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3287 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3288 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3289 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3290 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3291 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3292 let mut require_commitment = false;
3293 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3296 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3297 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3298 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3300 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3301 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3302 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3303 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3304 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3305 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3310 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3311 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3312 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3313 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3314 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3316 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3317 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3318 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3323 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3324 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3326 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3330 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3331 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3333 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3334 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3335 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3336 require_commitment = true;
3337 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3338 match forward_info {
3339 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3340 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3341 require_commitment = true;
3343 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3344 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3345 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3347 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3348 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3349 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3353 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3354 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3355 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3356 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3362 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3363 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3364 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3365 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3367 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3368 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3369 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3370 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3371 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3372 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3373 require_commitment = true;
3377 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3379 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3380 match update_state {
3381 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3382 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3383 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3384 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3385 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3387 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3388 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3389 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3390 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3391 require_commitment = true;
3392 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3393 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3398 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3399 let release_state_str =
3400 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3401 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3402 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3403 if !release_monitor {
3404 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3405 update: monitor_update,
3407 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3409 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3414 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3415 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3416 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3417 if require_commitment {
3418 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3419 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3420 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3421 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3422 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3423 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3424 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3425 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3426 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3428 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3429 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3430 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3431 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3432 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3435 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3436 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3437 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3438 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3439 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3440 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3442 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3443 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3445 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3446 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3448 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3449 if require_commitment {
3450 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3452 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3453 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3454 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3455 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3457 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3458 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()),
3459 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3462 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3463 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3465 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3466 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3468 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3469 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3475 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3476 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3477 /// commitment update.
3478 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3479 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3480 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3482 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3483 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3486 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3487 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3488 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3489 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3491 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3492 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3493 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3494 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3495 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3496 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3497 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3499 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3500 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3502 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3503 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3505 if !self.context.is_live() {
3506 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3509 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3510 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3511 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3512 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3513 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3514 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3515 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3516 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3517 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3518 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3522 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3523 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3524 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3525 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3526 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3527 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3530 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3531 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3535 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3536 force_holding_cell = true;
3539 if force_holding_cell {
3540 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3544 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3545 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3547 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3548 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3553 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3554 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3556 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3558 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3559 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3560 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3561 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3565 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3566 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3567 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3571 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3572 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3575 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3576 // will be retransmitted.
3577 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3578 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3579 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3581 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3582 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3584 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3585 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3586 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3587 // this HTLC accordingly
3588 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3591 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3592 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3593 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3594 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3597 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3598 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3599 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3600 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3601 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3602 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3607 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3609 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3610 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3611 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3612 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3616 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3617 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3618 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3619 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3620 // the update upon reconnection.
3621 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3625 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3627 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3628 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3631 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3632 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3633 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3634 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3635 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3636 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3637 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3639 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3640 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3641 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3642 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3643 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3644 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3645 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3647 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3648 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3649 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3650 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3651 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3652 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3653 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3656 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3657 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3658 /// to the remote side.
3659 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3660 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3661 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3662 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3665 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3667 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3668 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3670 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3671 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3672 // first received the funding_signed.
3673 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3674 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3675 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3677 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3678 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3679 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3680 funding_broadcastable = None;
3683 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3684 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3685 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3686 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3687 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3688 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3689 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3690 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3691 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3692 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3693 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3694 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3695 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3696 next_per_commitment_point,
3697 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3701 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3703 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3704 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3705 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3706 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3707 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3708 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3710 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3711 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3712 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3713 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3714 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3715 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3719 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3720 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3722 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3723 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3724 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3727 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3728 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3729 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3730 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3731 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3732 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3733 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3734 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3735 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3739 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3740 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3742 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3745 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3748 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3749 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3751 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3752 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3753 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3754 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3755 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3756 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3757 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3758 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3759 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3760 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3761 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3762 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3764 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3766 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3768 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3774 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3775 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3776 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3777 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3778 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3779 per_commitment_secret,
3780 next_per_commitment_point,
3782 next_local_nonce: None,
3786 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3787 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3788 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3789 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3790 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3792 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3793 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3794 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3795 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3796 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3797 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3798 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3799 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3800 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3801 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3806 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3807 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3809 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3810 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3811 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3812 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3813 reason: err_packet.clone()
3816 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3817 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3818 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3819 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3820 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3821 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3824 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3825 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3826 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3827 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3828 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3835 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3836 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3837 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3838 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3842 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3843 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3844 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3845 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3846 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3847 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3851 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3852 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3854 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3855 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3856 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3857 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3862 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3863 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3865 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3866 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3867 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3868 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3869 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3870 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3871 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3872 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3875 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3877 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3878 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3879 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3880 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3884 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3885 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3886 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3889 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3890 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3891 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3892 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3893 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3896 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3897 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3898 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3899 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3900 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3903 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3904 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3905 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3906 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3907 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3908 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3909 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3910 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3914 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3915 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3916 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3917 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3919 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3923 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3924 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3925 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3926 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3928 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3930 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3932 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3933 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3934 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3935 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3936 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3939 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3940 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3941 channel_ready: None,
3942 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3943 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3944 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3948 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3949 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3950 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3951 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3952 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3953 next_per_commitment_point,
3954 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3956 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3957 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3958 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3962 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3963 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3964 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3966 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3967 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3968 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3971 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3977 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3978 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3979 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3980 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3981 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3982 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3983 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3985 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3987 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3988 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3989 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3990 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3991 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3992 next_per_commitment_point,
3993 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3997 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3998 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3999 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4001 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4004 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4005 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4006 raa: required_revoke,
4007 commitment_update: None,
4008 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4010 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4011 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4012 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4014 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4017 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4018 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4019 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4020 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4021 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4022 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4025 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4026 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4027 raa: required_revoke,
4028 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4029 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4033 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4037 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4038 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4039 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4040 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4042 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4044 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4046 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4047 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4048 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4049 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4050 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4051 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4053 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4054 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4055 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4056 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4057 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4059 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4060 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4061 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4062 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4065 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4066 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4067 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4068 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4069 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4070 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4071 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4072 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4073 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4074 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4075 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4076 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4077 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4078 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4079 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4081 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4084 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4085 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4088 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4089 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4090 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4091 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4092 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4093 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4096 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4097 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4098 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4099 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4100 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4101 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4104 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4110 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4111 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4112 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4113 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4115 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4116 return Ok((None, None));
4119 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4120 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4121 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4123 return Ok((None, None));
4126 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4128 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4129 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4130 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4131 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4133 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4134 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4136 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4137 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4139 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4140 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4141 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4142 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4144 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4145 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4146 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4153 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4154 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4156 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4157 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4160 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4161 /// within our expected timeframe.
4163 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4164 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4165 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4168 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4171 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4172 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4176 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4177 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4179 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4182 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4183 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4184 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4185 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4188 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4189 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4193 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4195 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4199 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4200 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4201 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4204 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4207 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4208 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4209 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4210 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4212 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4215 assert!(send_shutdown);
4216 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4217 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4218 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4220 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4223 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4228 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4230 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4231 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4233 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4234 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4235 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4236 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4237 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4238 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4241 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4242 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4244 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4245 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4246 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4247 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4251 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4252 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4253 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4254 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4255 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4256 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4258 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4259 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4266 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4267 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4269 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4272 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4273 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4275 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4277 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4278 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4279 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4280 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4281 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4282 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4283 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4284 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4285 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4287 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4288 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4291 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4295 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4296 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4297 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4298 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4300 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4303 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4306 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4309 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4313 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4317 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4318 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4319 return Ok((None, None));
4322 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4323 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4324 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4327 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4329 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4332 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4333 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4334 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4335 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4336 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4340 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4341 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4346 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4347 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4348 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4349 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4350 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4351 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4352 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4356 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4358 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4359 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4360 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4361 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4363 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4366 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4367 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4369 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4370 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4372 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4373 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4374 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4375 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4379 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4380 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4381 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4382 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4384 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4385 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4386 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4394 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4395 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4398 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4401 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4405 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4406 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4407 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4408 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4409 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4413 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4415 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4416 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4419 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4420 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4421 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4422 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4423 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4424 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4425 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4426 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4431 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4432 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4433 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4434 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4440 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4441 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4442 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4443 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4445 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4451 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4452 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4453 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4454 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4455 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4456 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4457 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4459 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4460 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4463 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4465 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4466 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4472 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4473 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4474 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4475 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4476 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4477 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4478 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4480 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4481 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4488 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4489 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4492 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4493 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4496 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4497 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4501 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4502 &self.context.holder_signer
4506 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4508 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4509 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4510 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4511 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4512 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4513 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4515 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4517 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4525 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4526 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4530 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4531 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4532 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4533 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4536 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4537 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4538 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4539 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4542 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4543 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4544 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4545 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4546 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4547 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4550 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4551 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4552 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4553 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4554 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4555 if !release_monitor {
4556 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4565 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4566 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4569 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4570 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4571 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4573 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4574 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4575 if self.context.channel_state &
4576 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4577 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4578 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4579 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4580 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4583 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4584 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4585 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4586 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4587 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4588 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4590 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4591 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4592 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4594 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4595 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4596 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4597 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4598 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4599 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4605 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4606 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4607 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4610 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4611 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4612 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4615 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4616 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4617 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4620 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4621 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4622 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4623 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4624 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4625 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4630 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4631 self.context.channel_update_status
4634 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4635 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4636 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4639 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4641 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4642 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4643 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4647 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4648 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4649 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4652 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4656 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4657 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4658 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4660 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4661 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4662 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4664 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4665 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4668 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4669 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4670 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4671 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4672 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4673 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4674 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4675 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4676 self.context.channel_state);
4678 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4682 if need_commitment_update {
4683 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4684 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4685 let next_per_commitment_point =
4686 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4687 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4688 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4689 next_per_commitment_point,
4690 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4694 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4700 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4701 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4702 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4703 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4704 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4705 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4706 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4708 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4711 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4712 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4713 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4714 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4715 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4716 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4717 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4718 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4719 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4720 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4721 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4722 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4723 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4724 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4725 // channel and move on.
4726 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4727 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4729 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4730 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4731 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4733 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4734 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4735 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4736 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4737 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4738 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4739 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4743 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4744 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4745 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4746 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4747 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4751 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4752 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4753 // may have already happened for this block).
4754 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4755 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4756 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4757 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4760 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4761 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4762 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4763 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4771 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4772 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4773 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4774 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4776 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4777 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4780 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4782 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4783 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4784 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4785 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4790 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4793 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4794 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4795 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4796 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4798 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4801 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4802 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4803 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4805 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4806 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4808 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4809 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4810 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4818 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4820 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4821 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4822 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4824 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4825 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4828 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4829 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4830 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4831 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4832 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4833 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4834 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4835 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4836 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4839 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4840 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4841 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4842 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4844 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4845 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4846 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4848 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4849 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4850 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4851 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4853 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4854 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4855 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4856 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4857 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4858 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4859 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4862 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4863 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4865 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4868 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4869 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4870 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4871 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4872 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4873 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4874 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4875 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4876 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4877 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4878 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4879 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4880 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4881 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4882 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4883 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4884 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4890 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4895 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4896 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4898 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4899 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4900 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4901 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4903 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4906 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4908 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4909 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4910 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4911 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4912 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4913 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4915 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4916 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4919 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4920 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4921 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4922 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4923 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4924 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4926 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4927 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4930 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4931 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4932 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4933 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4934 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4940 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4941 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4942 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4943 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4945 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4948 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4952 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4956 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4957 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4961 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4965 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4966 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4969 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4973 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4975 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4980 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4981 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4982 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4984 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4989 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4991 None => return None,
4994 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4996 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4997 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4999 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5000 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5006 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5008 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5009 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5010 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5011 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5012 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5013 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5014 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5016 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5017 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5018 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5019 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5020 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5021 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5022 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5023 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5024 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5025 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5026 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5027 contents: announcement,
5032 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5036 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5037 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5038 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5039 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5040 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5041 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5042 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5043 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5045 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5047 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5049 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5050 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5052 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5054 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5055 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5058 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5059 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5060 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5061 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5064 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5067 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5068 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5069 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5070 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5071 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5072 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5075 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5077 Err(_) => return None,
5079 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5080 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5085 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5086 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5087 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5088 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5089 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5090 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5091 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5092 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5093 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5094 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5095 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5096 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5097 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5098 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5099 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5100 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5103 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5106 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5107 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5108 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5109 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5110 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5111 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5112 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5113 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5114 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5116 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5117 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5118 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5119 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5120 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5121 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5122 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5123 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5124 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5126 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5127 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5128 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5129 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5130 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5131 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5132 next_funding_txid: None,
5137 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5139 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5140 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5141 /// commitment update.
5143 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5144 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5145 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5146 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5147 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5148 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5149 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5152 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5153 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5154 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5156 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5157 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5162 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5163 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5165 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5167 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5168 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5170 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5171 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5172 /// regenerate them.
5174 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5175 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5177 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5178 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5179 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5180 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5181 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5182 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5183 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5185 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5188 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5189 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5190 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5193 if amount_msat == 0 {
5194 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5197 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5198 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5199 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5200 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5203 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5204 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5205 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5208 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5209 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5210 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5211 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5212 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5213 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5214 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5215 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5218 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5219 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5220 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5221 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5222 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5223 else { "to peer" });
5225 if need_holding_cell {
5226 force_holding_cell = true;
5229 // Now update local state:
5230 if force_holding_cell {
5231 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5236 onion_routing_packet,
5242 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5243 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5245 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5247 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5252 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5253 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5254 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5258 onion_routing_packet,
5261 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5266 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5267 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5268 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5269 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5271 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5272 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5273 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5275 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5276 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5280 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5281 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5282 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5283 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5284 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5285 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5286 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5289 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5290 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5291 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5292 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5293 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5294 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5297 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5299 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5300 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5301 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5302 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5303 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5305 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5306 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5309 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5310 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5311 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5312 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5313 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5314 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5315 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5316 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5317 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5318 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5319 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5322 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5326 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5327 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5328 where L::Target: Logger
5330 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5331 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5332 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5334 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5336 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5337 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5338 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5339 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5340 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5341 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5342 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5343 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5344 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5345 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5346 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5352 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5355 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5356 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5357 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5358 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5359 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5360 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5362 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5363 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5364 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5366 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5367 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5368 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5371 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5372 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5376 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5377 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5379 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5381 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5382 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5383 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5384 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5386 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5387 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5388 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5389 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5390 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5391 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5395 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5396 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5400 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5401 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5406 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5407 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5409 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5410 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5411 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5412 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5413 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5414 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5415 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5416 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5418 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5419 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5420 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5423 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5424 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5425 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5431 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5432 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5435 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5436 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5437 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5438 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5444 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5445 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5447 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5448 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5449 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5450 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5451 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5453 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5454 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5455 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5458 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5459 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5462 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5463 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5466 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5469 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5470 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5471 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5474 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5475 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5476 let mut chan_closed = false;
5477 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5481 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5483 None if !chan_closed => {
5484 // use override shutdown script if provided
5485 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5486 Some(script) => script,
5488 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5489 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5490 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5491 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5495 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5496 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5498 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5504 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5505 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5506 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5507 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5509 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5511 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5513 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5514 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5515 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5516 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5517 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5518 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5521 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5522 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5524 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5525 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5526 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5529 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5530 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5531 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5532 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5533 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5535 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5536 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5543 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5544 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5546 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5549 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5550 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5551 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5553 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5554 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5558 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5562 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5563 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5564 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5565 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5568 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5569 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5570 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5571 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5572 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5573 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5574 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5575 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5577 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5578 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5579 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5580 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5582 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5585 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5588 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5589 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5592 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5595 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5596 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5597 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5598 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5599 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5602 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5603 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5605 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5606 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5608 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5610 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5612 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5613 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5614 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5615 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5618 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5619 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5621 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5622 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5623 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5624 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5628 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5629 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5630 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5634 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5635 Ok(script) => script,
5636 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5639 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5642 context: ChannelContext {
5645 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5646 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5647 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5648 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5653 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5655 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5656 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5657 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5658 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5660 channel_value_satoshis,
5662 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5664 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5665 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5672 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5673 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5674 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5675 pending_update_fee: None,
5676 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5677 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5678 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5679 update_time_counter: 1,
5681 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5683 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5684 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5685 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5686 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5687 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5688 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5691 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5693 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5695 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5696 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5697 closing_fee_limits: None,
5698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5700 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5701 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5702 short_channel_id: None,
5703 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5705 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5706 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5707 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5708 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5709 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5710 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5711 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5712 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5713 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5714 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5715 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5716 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5718 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5720 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5721 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5722 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5723 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5724 counterparty_parameters: None,
5725 funding_outpoint: None,
5726 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5728 funding_transaction: None,
5730 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5731 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5732 counterparty_node_id,
5734 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5736 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5738 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5739 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5741 announcement_sigs: None,
5743 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5744 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5746 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5748 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5749 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5751 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5752 outbound_scid_alias,
5754 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5755 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5757 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5758 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5763 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5765 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5769 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5770 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5771 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5772 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5773 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5774 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5775 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5776 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5777 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5782 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5783 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5784 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5785 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5786 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5787 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5788 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5789 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5790 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5791 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5792 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5794 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5795 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5797 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5798 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5799 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5800 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5803 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5804 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5806 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5809 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5810 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5811 return Err((self, e));
5815 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5817 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5819 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5820 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5821 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5823 let channel = Channel {
5824 context: self.context,
5827 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5828 temporary_channel_id,
5829 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5830 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5833 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5835 next_local_nonce: None,
5839 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5840 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5841 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5842 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5843 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5844 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5845 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5846 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5847 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5848 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5851 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5852 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5853 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5854 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5855 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5856 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5862 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5863 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5864 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5865 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5866 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5867 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5869 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5871 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5872 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5873 // We've exhausted our options
5876 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5877 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5880 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5881 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5882 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5883 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5885 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5886 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5887 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5888 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5889 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5890 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5892 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5894 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5895 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5898 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5899 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5900 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5902 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5903 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5906 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5907 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5910 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5911 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5915 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5916 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5917 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5918 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5919 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5920 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5921 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5922 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5923 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5924 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5925 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5926 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5927 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5928 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5929 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5930 first_per_commitment_point,
5931 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5932 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5933 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5934 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5936 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5941 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5942 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5944 // Check sanity of message fields:
5945 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5948 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5951 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5952 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5954 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5957 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5960 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5962 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5964 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5965 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5968 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5969 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5972 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5975 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5979 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5980 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5983 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5986 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5987 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5989 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5992 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5995 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5998 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6002 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6003 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6006 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6007 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6009 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6010 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6013 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6014 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6017 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6018 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6019 &Some(ref script) => {
6020 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6021 if script.len() == 0 {
6024 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6027 Some(script.clone())
6030 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6037 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6038 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6039 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6040 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6041 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6043 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6044 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6046 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6049 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6050 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6051 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6052 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6053 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6054 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6057 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6058 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6059 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6062 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6063 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6065 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6066 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6072 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6073 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6074 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6075 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6078 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6079 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6080 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6081 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6082 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6083 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6084 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6085 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6086 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6087 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6091 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6093 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6094 // support this channel type.
6095 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6096 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6100 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6101 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6102 // `static_remote_key`.
6103 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6106 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6107 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6110 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6113 channel_type.clone()
6115 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6116 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6122 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6123 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6124 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6125 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6126 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6127 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6128 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6129 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6130 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6133 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6137 // Check sanity of message fields:
6138 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6141 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6144 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6147 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6148 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6151 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6154 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6157 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6159 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6160 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6163 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6166 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6170 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6171 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6174 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6177 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6180 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6183 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6186 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6189 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6193 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6195 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6196 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6201 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6202 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6203 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6204 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6207 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6210 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6211 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6212 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6214 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6218 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6219 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6220 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6221 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6222 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6226 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6227 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6228 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6229 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6233 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6234 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6235 &Some(ref script) => {
6236 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6237 if script.len() == 0 {
6240 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6243 Some(script.clone())
6246 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6253 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6254 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6255 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6256 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6260 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6261 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6266 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6267 Ok(script) => script,
6268 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6271 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6272 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6274 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6277 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6281 context: ChannelContext {
6284 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6285 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6287 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6292 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6294 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6295 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6296 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6297 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6300 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6302 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6303 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6306 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6307 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6308 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6310 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6311 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6312 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6313 pending_update_fee: None,
6314 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6315 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6316 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6317 update_time_counter: 1,
6319 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6321 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6322 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6323 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6324 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6325 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6326 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6328 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6329 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6330 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6331 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6333 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6334 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6335 closing_fee_limits: None,
6336 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6338 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6339 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6340 short_channel_id: None,
6341 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6343 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6344 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6345 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6346 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6347 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6348 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6349 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6350 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6351 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6352 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6353 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6354 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6357 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6359 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6360 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6361 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6362 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6363 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6364 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6365 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6367 funding_outpoint: None,
6368 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6370 funding_transaction: None,
6372 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6373 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6374 counterparty_node_id,
6376 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6378 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6380 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6381 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6383 announcement_sigs: None,
6385 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6386 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6387 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6388 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6390 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6391 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6393 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6394 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6396 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6397 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6399 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6400 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6405 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6407 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6413 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6414 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6416 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6417 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6418 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6419 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6421 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6422 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6424 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6425 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6428 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6431 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6432 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6433 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6435 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6436 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6437 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6438 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6440 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6441 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6442 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6443 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6444 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6445 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6446 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6447 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6448 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6449 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6450 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6451 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6452 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6453 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6454 first_per_commitment_point,
6455 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6456 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6457 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6459 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6461 next_local_nonce: None,
6465 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6466 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6468 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6470 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6471 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6474 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6475 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6477 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6478 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6480 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6481 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6482 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6483 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6484 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6485 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6486 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6487 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6488 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6491 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6492 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6494 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6495 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6496 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6497 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6499 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6500 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6501 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6502 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6503 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6505 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6506 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6511 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6512 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6513 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6517 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6518 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6520 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6521 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6522 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6524 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6526 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6527 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6528 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6529 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6532 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6533 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6534 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6535 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6536 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6538 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6540 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6541 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6542 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6545 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6546 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6547 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6551 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6552 initial_commitment_tx,
6555 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6556 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6559 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6560 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6563 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6565 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6566 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6567 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6568 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6569 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6570 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6571 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6572 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6573 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6574 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6575 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6577 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6579 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6580 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6581 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6582 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6583 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6584 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6586 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6587 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6588 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6589 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6591 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6593 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6594 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6595 let mut channel = Channel {
6596 context: self.context,
6598 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6599 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6600 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6602 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6606 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6607 }, channel_monitor))
6611 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6612 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6614 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6620 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6621 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6622 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6623 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6624 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6626 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6627 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6628 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6629 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6635 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6636 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6637 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6638 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6639 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6640 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6645 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6646 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6647 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6648 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6650 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6651 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6652 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6653 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6658 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6659 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6660 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6661 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6662 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6663 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6668 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6669 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6670 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6673 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6675 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6676 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6677 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6678 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6679 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6681 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6682 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6683 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6684 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6686 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6687 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6688 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6692 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6693 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6694 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6695 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6696 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6697 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6698 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6700 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6701 // deserialized from that format.
6702 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6703 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6704 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6706 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6708 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6709 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6712 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6713 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6714 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6715 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6718 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6719 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6720 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6723 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6724 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6725 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6726 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6728 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6729 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6731 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6733 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6735 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6737 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6740 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6742 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6747 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6748 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6750 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6751 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6752 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6753 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6754 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6755 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6756 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6758 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6760 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6762 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6765 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6766 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6767 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6770 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6772 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6773 preimages.push(preimage);
6775 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6776 reason.write(writer)?;
6778 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6780 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6781 preimages.push(preimage);
6783 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6784 reason.write(writer)?;
6787 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6788 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6789 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6791 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6792 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6793 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6797 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6798 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6799 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6801 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6802 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6806 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6807 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6808 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6809 source.write(writer)?;
6810 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6812 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6813 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6814 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6816 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6817 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6819 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6821 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6822 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6824 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6826 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6827 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6832 match self.context.resend_order {
6833 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6834 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6837 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6838 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6839 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6841 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6842 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6843 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6844 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6847 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6848 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6849 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6850 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6851 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6854 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6855 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6856 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6857 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6859 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6860 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6861 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6863 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6865 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6866 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6867 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6868 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6870 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6871 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6872 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6873 // consider the stale state on reload.
6876 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6877 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6878 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6880 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6881 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6882 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6884 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6885 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6887 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6888 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6889 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6891 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6892 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6894 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6897 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6898 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6899 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6901 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6904 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6905 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6907 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6908 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6909 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6911 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6913 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6915 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6918 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6920 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6921 htlc.write(writer)?;
6924 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6925 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6926 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6928 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6929 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6931 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6932 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6933 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6934 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6935 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6936 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6937 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6939 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6940 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6941 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6942 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6943 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6945 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6946 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6948 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6949 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6950 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6951 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6953 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6955 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6956 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6957 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6958 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6959 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6960 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6961 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6963 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6964 (2, chan_type, option),
6965 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6966 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6967 (5, self.context.config, required),
6968 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6969 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6970 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6971 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6972 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6973 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6974 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6975 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6976 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6977 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6978 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6979 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6980 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6981 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6982 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6983 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6984 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6985 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6992 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6993 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
6995 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6996 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6998 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6999 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7000 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7002 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7003 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7004 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7005 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7009 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7010 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7016 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let mut keys_data = None;
7027 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7028 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7029 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7031 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7032 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7033 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7034 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7035 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7036 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7040 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7041 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7042 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7045 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7054 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7055 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7056 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7057 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7058 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7059 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7060 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7061 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7062 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7063 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7064 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7065 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7070 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7072 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7073 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7074 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7075 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7076 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7077 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7078 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7079 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7080 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7081 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7083 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7084 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7087 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7088 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7091 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7094 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7096 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7100 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7102 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7103 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7104 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7105 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7106 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7107 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7108 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7109 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7110 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7112 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7113 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7114 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7116 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7117 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7118 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7120 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7124 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7125 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7126 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7127 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7130 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7136 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7137 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7140 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7142 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7143 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7146 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7156 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7157 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7158 // consider the stale state on reload.
7159 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7162 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7163 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7164 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7166 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7169 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7175 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7178 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7179 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7181 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7182 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7184 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7186 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7190 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7191 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7193 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7194 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7197 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7199 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7200 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7201 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7202 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7204 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7207 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7210 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7212 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7215 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7218 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7221 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7222 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7224 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7225 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7226 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7230 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7231 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7232 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7234 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7240 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7241 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7242 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7243 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7244 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7245 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7246 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7247 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7248 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7249 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7251 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7252 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7253 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7254 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7255 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7256 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7257 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7259 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7260 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7261 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7262 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7264 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7266 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7267 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7269 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7270 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7271 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7272 (2, channel_type, option),
7273 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7274 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7275 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7276 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7277 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7278 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7279 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7280 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7281 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7282 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7283 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7284 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7285 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7286 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7287 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7288 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7289 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7290 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7291 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7292 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7293 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7296 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7297 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7298 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7299 // required channel parameters.
7300 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7301 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7302 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7304 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7306 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7307 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7308 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7309 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7312 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7313 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7314 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7316 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7317 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7319 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7320 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7325 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7326 if iter.next().is_some() {
7327 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7331 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7332 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7333 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7334 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7335 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7338 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7339 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7340 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7342 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7343 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7345 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7346 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7347 // separate u64 values.
7348 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7350 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7352 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7353 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7354 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7355 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7357 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7358 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7360 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7361 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7362 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7363 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7364 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7367 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7368 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7372 context: ChannelContext {
7375 config: config.unwrap(),
7379 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7380 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7381 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7384 temporary_channel_id,
7386 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7388 channel_value_satoshis,
7390 latest_monitor_update_id,
7392 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7393 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7396 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7397 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7400 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7401 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7402 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7403 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7407 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7408 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7409 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7410 monitor_pending_forwards,
7411 monitor_pending_failures,
7412 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7415 holding_cell_update_fee,
7416 next_holder_htlc_id,
7417 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7418 update_time_counter,
7421 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7422 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7423 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7424 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7426 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7427 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7428 closing_fee_limits: None,
7429 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7431 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7432 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7434 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7436 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7437 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7438 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7439 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7440 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7441 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7442 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7443 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7444 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7447 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7449 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7450 funding_transaction,
7452 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7453 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7454 counterparty_node_id,
7456 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7460 channel_update_status,
7461 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7465 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7466 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7467 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7468 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7470 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7471 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7473 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7474 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7475 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7477 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7478 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7481 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7483 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7486 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7495 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7496 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7497 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7498 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7499 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7501 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7502 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7503 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7504 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7505 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7506 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7507 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7508 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7509 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7510 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7511 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7512 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7513 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7514 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7515 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7516 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7517 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7518 use crate::util::test_utils;
7519 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7520 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7521 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7522 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7523 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7524 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7525 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7526 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7527 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7528 use crate::prelude::*;
7530 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7533 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7534 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7540 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7541 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7542 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7543 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7547 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7548 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7549 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7550 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7551 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7552 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7553 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7554 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7558 signer: InMemorySigner,
7561 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7562 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7565 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7566 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7568 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7569 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7572 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7576 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7578 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7580 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7581 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7582 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7585 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7586 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7587 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7588 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7592 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7593 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7594 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7598 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7599 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7600 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7601 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7603 let seed = [42; 32];
7604 let network = Network::Testnet;
7605 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7606 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7607 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7610 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7611 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7612 let config = UserConfig::default();
7613 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7614 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7615 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7617 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7618 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7622 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7623 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7625 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7626 let original_fee = 253;
7627 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7628 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7630 let seed = [42; 32];
7631 let network = Network::Testnet;
7632 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7634 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7635 let config = UserConfig::default();
7636 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7638 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7639 // same as the old fee.
7640 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7641 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7642 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7646 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7647 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7648 // dust limits are used.
7649 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7651 let seed = [42; 32];
7652 let network = Network::Testnet;
7653 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7654 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7655 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7657 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7658 // they have different dust limits.
7660 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7661 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7662 let config = UserConfig::default();
7663 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7665 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7666 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7667 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7668 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7669 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7671 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7672 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7673 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7674 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7675 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7677 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7678 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7679 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7680 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7682 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7683 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7684 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7686 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7687 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7689 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7690 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7691 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7693 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7694 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7695 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7696 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7699 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7701 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7702 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7703 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7704 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7705 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7706 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7707 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7708 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7709 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7711 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7714 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7715 // the dust limit check.
7716 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7717 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7718 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7719 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7721 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7722 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7723 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7724 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7725 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7726 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7727 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7731 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7732 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7733 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7734 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7735 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7736 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7737 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7738 let seed = [42; 32];
7739 let network = Network::Testnet;
7740 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7742 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7743 let config = UserConfig::default();
7744 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7746 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7747 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7749 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7750 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7751 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7752 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7753 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7754 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7756 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7757 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7758 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7759 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7760 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7762 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7764 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7765 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7766 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7767 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7768 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7770 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7771 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7772 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7773 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7774 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7778 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7779 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7780 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7781 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7782 let seed = [42; 32];
7783 let network = Network::Testnet;
7784 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7785 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7786 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7788 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7790 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7791 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7792 let config = UserConfig::default();
7793 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7795 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7796 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7797 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7798 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7800 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7801 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7802 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7804 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7805 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7806 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7807 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7809 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7810 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7811 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7813 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7814 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7816 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7817 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7818 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7819 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7820 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7821 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7822 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7824 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7826 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7827 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7828 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7829 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7830 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7834 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7835 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7836 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7837 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7838 let seed = [42; 32];
7839 let network = Network::Testnet;
7840 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7841 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7842 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7844 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7845 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7846 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7847 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7848 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7849 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7850 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7851 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7853 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7854 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7855 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7856 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7857 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7858 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7860 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7861 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7862 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7863 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7865 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7867 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7868 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7869 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7870 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7871 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7872 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7874 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7875 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7876 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7877 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7879 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7880 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7881 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7882 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7883 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7885 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7886 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7888 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7889 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7890 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7892 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7893 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7894 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7895 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7896 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7898 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7899 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7901 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7902 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7903 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7907 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7909 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7910 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7911 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7913 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7914 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7915 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7916 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7918 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7919 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7920 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7922 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7924 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7925 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7928 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7929 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7930 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7931 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7932 let seed = [42; 32];
7933 let network = Network::Testnet;
7934 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7935 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7936 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7939 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7940 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7941 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7943 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7944 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7946 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7947 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7948 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7950 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7951 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7953 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7955 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7956 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7958 // Channel Negotiations failed
7959 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7960 assert!(result.is_err());
7965 fn channel_update() {
7966 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7967 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7969 let seed = [42; 32];
7970 let network = Network::Testnet;
7971 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7972 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7973 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7975 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7976 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7977 let config = UserConfig::default();
7978 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7980 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7981 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7982 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7983 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7984 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7986 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7987 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7988 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7989 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7990 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7992 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7993 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7994 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7995 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7997 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7998 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7999 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8001 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8002 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8004 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8005 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8006 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8008 short_channel_id: 0,
8011 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8012 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8013 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8015 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8016 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8018 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8020 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8022 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8023 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8024 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8025 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8027 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8028 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8029 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8031 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8035 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8037 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8038 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8039 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8040 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8041 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8042 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8043 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8044 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8045 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8046 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8047 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8048 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8049 use crate::sync::Arc;
8051 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8052 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8053 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8054 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8056 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8058 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8059 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8060 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8061 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8062 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8064 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8065 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8071 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8072 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8073 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8075 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8076 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8077 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8078 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8079 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8080 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8082 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8084 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8085 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8086 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8087 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8088 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8089 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8091 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8092 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8093 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8094 selected_contest_delay: 144
8096 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8097 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8099 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8100 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8102 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8103 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8105 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8106 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8108 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8109 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8110 // build_commitment_transaction.
8111 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8112 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8113 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8114 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8115 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8117 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8118 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8119 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8120 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8124 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8125 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8126 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8127 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8131 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8132 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8133 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8135 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8136 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8138 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8139 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8141 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8143 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8144 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8145 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8146 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8147 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8148 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8149 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8151 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8152 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8153 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8154 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8156 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8157 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8158 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8160 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8162 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8163 commitment_tx.clone(),
8164 counterparty_signature,
8165 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8166 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8167 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8169 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8170 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8172 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8173 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8174 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8176 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8177 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8180 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8181 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8183 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8184 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8185 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8186 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8187 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8188 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8189 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8190 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8192 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8195 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8196 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8197 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8201 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8204 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8205 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8206 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8208 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8209 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8210 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8211 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8212 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8213 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8214 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8215 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8217 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8221 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8222 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8223 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8224 "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", {});
8226 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8227 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8229 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8230 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8231 "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", {});
8233 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8234 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8235 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8236 "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", {});
8238 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8239 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8241 amount_msat: 1000000,
8243 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8244 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8246 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8249 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8250 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8252 amount_msat: 2000000,
8254 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8255 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8257 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8260 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8261 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8263 amount_msat: 2000000,
8265 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8266 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8267 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8268 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8270 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8273 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8274 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8276 amount_msat: 3000000,
8278 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8279 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8280 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8281 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8283 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8286 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8287 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8289 amount_msat: 4000000,
8291 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8292 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8294 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8298 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8299 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8300 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8302 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8303 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8304 "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", {
8307 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8308 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8309 "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" },
8312 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8313 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8314 "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" },
8317 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8318 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8319 "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" },
8322 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8323 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8324 "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" },
8327 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8328 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8329 "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" }
8332 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8333 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8334 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8336 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8337 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8338 "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", {
8341 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8342 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8343 "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" },
8346 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8347 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8348 "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" },
8351 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8352 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8353 "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" },
8356 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8357 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8358 "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" },
8361 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8362 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8363 "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" }
8366 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8367 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8368 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8370 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8371 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8372 "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", {
8375 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8376 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8377 "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" },
8380 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8381 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8382 "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" },
8385 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8386 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8387 "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" },
8390 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8391 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8392 "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" }
8395 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8396 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8397 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8398 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8400 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8401 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8402 "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", {
8405 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8406 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8407 "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" },
8410 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8411 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8412 "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" },
8415 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8416 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8417 "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" },
8420 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8421 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8422 "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" }
8425 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8426 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8427 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8428 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8430 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8431 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8432 "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", {
8435 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8436 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8437 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8440 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8441 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8442 "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" },
8445 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8446 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8447 "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" },
8450 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8451 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8452 "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" }
8455 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8456 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8457 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8459 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8460 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8461 "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", {
8464 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8465 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8466 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8469 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8470 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8471 "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" },
8474 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8475 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8476 "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" }
8479 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8480 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8481 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8483 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8484 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8485 "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", {
8488 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8489 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8490 "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" },
8493 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8494 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8495 "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" },
8498 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8499 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8500 "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" }
8503 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8507 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8508 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8509 "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", {
8512 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8513 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8514 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8517 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8518 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8519 "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" }
8522 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8523 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8524 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8525 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8526 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8527 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8529 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8530 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8531 "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", {
8534 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8535 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8536 "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" },
8539 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8540 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8541 "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" }
8544 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8545 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8546 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8547 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8548 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8550 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8551 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8552 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8555 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8556 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8557 "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" },
8560 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8561 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8562 "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" }
8565 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8566 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8567 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8569 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8570 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8571 "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", {
8574 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8575 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8576 "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" }
8579 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8580 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8581 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8582 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8583 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8585 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8586 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8587 "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", {
8590 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8591 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8592 "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" }
8595 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8597 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8598 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8599 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8601 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8602 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8603 "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", {
8606 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8607 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8608 "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" }
8611 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8612 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8613 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8614 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8616 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8617 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8618 "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", {});
8620 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8621 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8622 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8623 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8624 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8626 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8627 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8628 "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", {});
8630 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8631 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8632 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8633 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8634 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8636 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8637 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8638 "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", {});
8640 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8641 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8642 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8644 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8645 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8646 "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", {});
8648 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8649 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8650 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8651 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8652 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8654 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8655 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8656 "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", {});
8658 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8659 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8660 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8661 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8662 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8664 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8665 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8666 "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", {});
8668 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8671 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8672 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8673 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8675 amount_msat: 2000000,
8677 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8678 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8680 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8683 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8684 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8685 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8687 amount_msat: 5000001,
8689 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8690 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8691 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8692 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8694 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8697 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8698 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8700 amount_msat: 5000000,
8702 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8703 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8704 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8705 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8707 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8711 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8712 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8713 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8716 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8717 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8718 "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" },
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8722 "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" },
8724 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8725 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8726 "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" }
8729 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8730 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8732 "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", {
8735 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8736 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8737 "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" },
8739 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8740 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8741 "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" },
8743 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8744 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8745 "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" }
8750 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8751 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8753 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8754 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8755 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8756 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8758 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8759 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8760 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8762 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8763 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8765 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8766 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8768 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8769 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8770 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8774 fn test_key_derivation() {
8775 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8776 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8778 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8779 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8781 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8782 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8784 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8785 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8787 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8788 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8790 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8791 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8793 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8794 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8796 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8797 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8801 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8802 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8803 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8804 let seed = [42; 32];
8805 let network = Network::Testnet;
8806 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8807 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8809 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8810 let config = UserConfig::default();
8811 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8812 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8814 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8815 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8817 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8818 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8819 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8820 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8821 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8822 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8823 assert!(res.is_ok());
8827 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8828 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8829 // resulting `channel_type`.
8830 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8831 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8832 let network = Network::Testnet;
8833 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8834 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8836 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8837 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8839 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8840 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8842 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8843 // need to signal it.
8844 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8845 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8846 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8849 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8851 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8852 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8853 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8855 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8856 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8857 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8860 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8861 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8862 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8863 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8864 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8867 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8868 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8872 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8873 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8874 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8875 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8876 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8877 let network = Network::Testnet;
8878 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8879 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8881 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8882 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8884 let config = UserConfig::default();
8886 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8887 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8888 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8889 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8890 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8892 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8893 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8894 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8897 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8898 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8899 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8901 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8902 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8903 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8904 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8905 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8906 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8908 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8912 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8913 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8915 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8916 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8917 let network = Network::Testnet;
8918 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8919 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8921 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8922 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8924 let config = UserConfig::default();
8926 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8927 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8928 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8929 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8930 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8931 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8932 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8933 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8935 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8936 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8937 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8938 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8939 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8940 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8943 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8944 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8946 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8947 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8948 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8949 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8951 assert!(res.is_err());
8953 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8954 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8955 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8957 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8958 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8959 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8962 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8964 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8965 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8966 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8967 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8970 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8971 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8973 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8974 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8976 assert!(res.is_err());