1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
74 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
229 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
230 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
234 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
236 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
238 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
241 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
246 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
250 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
251 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
252 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
253 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
254 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
255 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
256 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
258 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
259 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
260 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
261 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
262 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
263 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
264 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
266 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
267 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
268 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
270 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
271 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
272 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
277 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
278 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
280 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
282 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
283 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
284 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
285 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
286 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
287 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
288 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
290 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
291 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
292 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
293 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
294 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
295 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
297 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
298 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
299 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
300 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
301 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
304 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
306 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
308 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
310 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
313 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
317 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
319 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
323 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
324 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
325 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
326 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
327 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
329 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
330 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
332 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
334 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
335 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
337 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
338 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
339 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
340 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
341 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
342 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
344 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
345 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
347 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
348 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
349 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
350 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
351 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
353 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
354 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
356 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
357 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
359 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
360 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
361 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
362 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
368 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
369 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
371 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
378 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
379 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
381 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
388 macro_rules! secp_check {
389 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
392 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
397 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
398 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
399 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
400 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
401 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
402 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
403 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
404 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
406 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
408 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
410 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
414 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
416 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
417 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
418 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
420 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
421 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
423 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
424 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
425 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
426 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
427 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
429 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
430 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
434 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
440 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
443 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
444 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 holding_cell_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
450 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
451 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
452 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
453 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
454 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
455 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
456 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
457 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
462 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
463 struct HTLCCandidate {
465 origin: HTLCInitiator,
469 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
477 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
479 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
481 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
482 htlc_value_msat: u64,
483 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
488 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
489 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
490 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
491 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
492 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
494 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
495 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
496 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
497 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
500 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
504 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
505 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
506 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
507 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
508 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
509 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
510 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
511 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
512 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
513 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
514 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
517 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
518 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
519 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
520 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
521 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
522 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
523 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
524 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
527 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
529 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
530 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
531 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
532 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
533 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
534 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
537 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
538 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
539 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
540 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
541 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
542 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
543 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
544 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
545 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
546 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
547 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
548 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
549 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
550 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
551 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
553 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
554 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
555 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
556 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
558 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
559 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
560 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
561 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
563 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
564 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
565 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
566 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
567 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
569 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
570 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
571 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
572 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
574 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
575 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
576 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
578 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
579 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
580 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
581 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
582 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
584 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
585 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
588 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
589 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
591 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
592 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
593 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
594 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
596 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
597 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
601 (0, update, required),
604 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
605 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
606 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
607 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
608 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
610 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
611 /// in a timely manner.
612 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
615 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
616 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
617 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
619 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
620 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
621 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
626 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
627 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
628 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
630 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
631 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
632 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
633 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
635 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
639 channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
643 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
644 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
646 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
647 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
648 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
650 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
651 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
652 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
653 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
655 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
656 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
658 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
660 holder_signer: Signer,
661 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
662 destination_script: Script,
664 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
665 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
666 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
671 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
672 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
673 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
675 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
676 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
677 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
678 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
679 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
680 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
684 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
688 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
689 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
690 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
691 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
692 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
693 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
694 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
696 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
698 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
699 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
700 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
701 // HTLCs with similar state.
702 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
703 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
704 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
705 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
706 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
707 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
708 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
709 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
710 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
713 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
714 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
715 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
717 update_time_counter: u32,
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
720 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
721 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
723 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
724 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
726 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
727 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
729 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
730 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
731 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
734 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
735 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
737 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
739 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
741 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
742 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
743 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
744 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
745 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
746 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
747 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
748 channel_creation_height: u32,
750 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
753 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
755 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
758 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
760 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
763 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
765 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
768 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
771 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
773 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
775 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
776 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
778 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
780 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
784 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
786 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
787 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
789 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
790 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
793 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
795 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
797 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
798 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
799 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
800 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
802 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
803 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
804 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
806 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
807 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
808 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
810 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
811 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
812 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
813 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
814 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
815 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
817 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
819 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
820 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
821 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
822 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
823 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
825 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
826 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
828 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
829 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
830 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
831 /// unblock the state machine.
833 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
834 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
835 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
837 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
838 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
839 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
841 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
842 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
843 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
844 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
845 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
846 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
847 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
848 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
850 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
851 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
853 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
854 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
855 // the channel's funding UTXO.
857 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
858 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
859 // associated channel mapping.
861 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
862 // to store all of them.
863 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
865 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
866 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
867 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
868 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
869 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
871 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
872 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
874 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
875 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
877 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
878 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
879 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
881 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
882 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
883 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
886 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
887 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
888 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
889 self.update_time_counter
892 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
893 self.latest_monitor_update_id
896 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
897 self.config.announced_channel
900 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
901 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
904 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
905 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
906 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
907 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
910 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
911 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
912 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
915 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
916 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
917 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
918 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
919 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
922 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
923 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
924 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
925 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
928 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
930 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
931 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
933 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
934 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
936 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
939 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
940 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
941 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
944 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
945 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
946 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
947 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
950 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
951 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
954 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
959 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
963 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
965 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
966 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
967 self.temporary_channel_id
970 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
974 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
975 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
976 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
980 /// Gets the channel's type
981 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
985 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
987 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
988 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
989 self.short_channel_id
992 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
993 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
994 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
999 self.outbound_scid_alias
1002 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1003 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
1004 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1005 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1006 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1009 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1010 /// get_funding_created.
1011 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1012 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1015 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1016 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1017 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1020 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1021 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1022 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1023 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1027 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1030 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1031 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1034 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1035 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1038 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1039 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1040 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1043 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1044 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1047 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1048 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1049 self.counterparty_node_id
1052 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1053 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1054 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1057 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1058 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1059 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1062 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1063 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1065 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1066 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1067 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1068 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1070 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1074 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1075 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1076 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1079 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1080 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1081 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1084 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1085 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1086 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1088 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1089 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1094 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1095 self.channel_value_satoshis
1098 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1099 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1102 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1103 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1106 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1107 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1108 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1110 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1111 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1112 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1113 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1114 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1116 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1120 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1121 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1122 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1125 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1126 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1127 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1130 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1131 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1132 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1135 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1136 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1137 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1140 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1141 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1142 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1145 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1146 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1147 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1150 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1151 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1152 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1153 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1154 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1157 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1159 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1160 self.prev_config = None;
1164 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1165 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1169 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1170 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1171 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1172 let did_channel_update =
1173 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1174 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1175 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1176 if did_channel_update {
1177 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1178 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1179 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1180 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1182 self.config.options = *config;
1186 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1187 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1188 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1191 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1192 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1193 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1194 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1195 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1197 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1198 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1199 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1200 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1201 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1202 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1203 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1205 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1206 where L::Target: Logger
1208 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1209 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1210 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1212 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1213 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1214 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1215 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1217 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1218 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1219 if match update_state {
1220 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1221 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1222 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1223 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1224 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1226 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1230 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1231 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1232 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1233 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1235 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1236 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1237 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1239 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1240 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1241 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1242 transaction_output_index: None
1247 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1248 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1249 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1250 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1251 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1254 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1256 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1257 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1258 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1260 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1261 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1264 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1265 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1268 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1270 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1271 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1272 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1274 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1275 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1281 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1282 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1283 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1284 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1285 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1291 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1292 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1294 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1296 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1297 if generated_by_local {
1298 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1299 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1308 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1310 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1311 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1312 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1313 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1314 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1319 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1320 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1321 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1326 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1327 preimages.push(preimage);
1331 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1332 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1334 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1336 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1337 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1339 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1340 if !generated_by_local {
1341 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1349 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1350 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1351 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1352 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1353 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1354 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1355 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1356 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1360 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1361 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1362 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1363 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1365 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1367 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1368 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1369 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1370 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1373 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1374 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1375 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1376 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1378 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1381 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1382 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1383 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1384 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1386 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1389 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1390 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1395 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1401 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1403 let channel_parameters =
1404 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1405 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1406 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1413 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1416 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1417 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1418 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1419 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1421 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1422 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1423 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1431 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1432 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1438 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1439 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1440 /// our counterparty!)
1441 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1442 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1443 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1444 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1445 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1446 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1447 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1449 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1453 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1454 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1455 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1456 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1457 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1458 //may see payments to it!
1459 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1460 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1461 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1463 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1466 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1467 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1468 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1469 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1470 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1473 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1474 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1477 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1481 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1482 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1483 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1484 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1485 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1486 // which are near the dust limit.
1487 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1488 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1489 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1490 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1491 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1493 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1494 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1496 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1499 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1500 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1501 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1504 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1505 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1507 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1508 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1509 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1510 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1511 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1512 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1513 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1516 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1519 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1520 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1521 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1523 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1524 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1525 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1526 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1527 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1528 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1530 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1531 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1537 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1538 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1540 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1541 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1542 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1543 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1544 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1545 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1546 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1549 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1552 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1553 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1554 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1556 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1557 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1558 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1559 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1560 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1561 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1563 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1564 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1569 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1570 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1571 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1572 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1573 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1574 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1576 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1577 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1579 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1586 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1587 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1588 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1589 /// corner case properly.
1590 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1591 -> AvailableBalances
1592 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1594 let context = &self;
1595 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1596 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1597 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1599 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1600 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1602 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1604 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1606 if context.is_outbound() {
1607 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1608 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1610 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1611 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1613 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1614 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1615 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1616 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1619 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1620 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1621 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1622 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1624 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1625 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1626 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1627 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1628 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1629 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1630 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1631 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1632 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1633 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1635 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1638 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1639 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1640 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1641 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1642 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1645 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1646 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1648 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1649 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1650 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1652 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1653 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1654 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1655 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1659 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1661 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1662 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1663 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1664 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1665 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1666 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1667 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1669 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1670 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1672 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1673 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1674 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1676 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1677 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1678 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1679 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1680 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1683 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1684 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1685 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1686 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1687 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1688 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1691 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1692 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1693 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1695 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1699 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1700 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1702 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1703 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1707 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1708 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1709 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1710 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1712 outbound_capacity_msat,
1713 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1714 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1718 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1719 let context = &self;
1720 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1723 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1724 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1726 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1727 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1729 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1730 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1732 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1733 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1734 let context = &self;
1735 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1737 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1740 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1741 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1743 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1744 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1746 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1747 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1749 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1750 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1754 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1755 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1761 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1762 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1763 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1766 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1767 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1768 included_htlcs += 1;
1771 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1772 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1776 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1777 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1778 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1780 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1781 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1786 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1788 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1789 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1794 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1795 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1799 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1800 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1801 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1804 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1805 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1807 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1808 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1809 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1811 total_pending_htlcs,
1812 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1813 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1814 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1816 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1817 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1818 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1820 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1822 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1827 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1828 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1830 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1831 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1833 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1834 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1836 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1837 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1838 let context = &self;
1839 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1841 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1844 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1845 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1847 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1848 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1850 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1851 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1853 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1854 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1858 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1859 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1865 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1866 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1867 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1868 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1869 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1870 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1873 included_htlcs += 1;
1876 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1877 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1880 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1881 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1883 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1884 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1885 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1890 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1891 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1895 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1896 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1898 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1899 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1901 total_pending_htlcs,
1902 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1903 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1904 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1906 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1907 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1908 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1910 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1912 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1917 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1918 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1919 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1920 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1926 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1927 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1928 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1929 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1930 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1931 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1932 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1933 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1934 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1935 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1936 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1938 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1939 // return them to fail the payment.
1940 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1941 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1942 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1944 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1945 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1950 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1951 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1952 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1953 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1954 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1955 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1956 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1957 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1958 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1959 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1960 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1961 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1962 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1967 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1968 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1969 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1973 // Internal utility functions for channels
1975 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1976 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1977 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1979 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1981 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1982 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1983 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1985 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1988 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1990 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1993 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1994 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1995 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1997 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1999 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2000 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2001 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2002 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2003 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2006 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2007 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2008 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2009 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2010 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2011 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2012 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2015 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2016 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2018 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2019 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2022 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2023 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2024 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2025 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2026 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2027 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2030 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2031 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2032 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2035 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2036 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2037 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2038 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2041 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2042 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2044 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2045 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2046 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2050 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2051 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2052 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2053 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2054 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2056 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2057 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2058 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2059 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2060 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2061 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2062 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2063 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2064 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2065 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2070 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2071 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2072 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2073 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2074 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2075 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2077 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2079 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2080 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2081 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2082 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2083 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2084 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2085 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2086 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2088 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2089 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2099 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2100 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2101 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2102 // outside of those situations will fail.
2103 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2107 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2112 1 + // script length (0)
2116 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2117 2 + // witness marker and flag
2118 1 + // witness element count
2119 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2120 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2121 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2122 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2123 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2124 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2126 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2127 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2128 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2134 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2135 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2136 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2137 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2139 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2140 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2141 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2143 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2144 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2145 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2146 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2147 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2148 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2151 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2152 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2155 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2156 value_to_holder = 0;
2159 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2160 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2161 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2162 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2164 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2165 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2168 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2169 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2172 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2175 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2176 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2178 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2180 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2181 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2182 where L::Target: Logger {
2183 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2184 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2185 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2186 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2187 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2188 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2189 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2190 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2194 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2195 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2196 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2197 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2199 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2200 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2202 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2204 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2206 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2207 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2208 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2210 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2211 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2212 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2213 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2214 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2216 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2217 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2218 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2220 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2221 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2223 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2227 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2231 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2235 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2237 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2238 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2239 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2240 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2243 // Now update local state:
2245 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2246 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2247 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2248 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2249 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2250 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2251 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2255 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2256 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2257 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2258 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2259 // do not not get into this branch.
2260 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2261 match pending_update {
2262 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2263 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2264 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2265 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2266 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2267 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2268 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2271 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2272 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2273 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2274 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2275 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2276 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2277 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2283 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2284 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2285 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2287 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2288 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2289 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2291 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2292 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2295 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2296 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2298 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2299 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2301 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2302 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2305 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2308 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2309 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2310 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2311 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2316 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2317 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2318 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2319 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2320 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2321 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2322 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2323 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2324 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2325 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2326 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2327 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2328 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2329 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2330 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2332 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2333 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2334 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2335 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2336 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2339 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2340 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2341 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2347 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2348 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2350 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2354 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2355 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2356 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2357 /// before we fail backwards.
2359 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2360 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2361 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2362 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2363 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2364 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2365 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2368 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2369 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2370 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2371 /// before we fail backwards.
2373 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2374 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2375 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2376 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2377 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2378 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2379 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2381 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2383 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2384 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2385 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2387 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2388 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2389 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2391 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2392 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2393 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2395 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2400 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2401 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2407 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2408 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2409 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2410 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2411 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2415 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2416 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2417 force_holding_cell = true;
2420 // Now update local state:
2421 if force_holding_cell {
2422 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2423 match pending_update {
2424 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2425 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2427 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2431 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2432 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2433 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2434 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2440 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2441 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2442 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2448 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2450 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2451 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2454 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2455 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2456 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2461 // Message handlers:
2463 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2464 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2465 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2466 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2467 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2469 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2472 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2475 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2478 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2479 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2480 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2481 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2484 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2486 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2487 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2488 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2489 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2491 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2492 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2494 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2495 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2497 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2498 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2499 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2500 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2501 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2506 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2507 initial_commitment_tx,
2510 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2511 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2514 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2515 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2518 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2519 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2520 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2521 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2522 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2523 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2524 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2525 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2526 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2527 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2528 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2529 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2531 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2533 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2535 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2536 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2537 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2538 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2540 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2542 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2543 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2547 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2548 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2550 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2551 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2552 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2553 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2555 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2558 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2559 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2560 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2563 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2564 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2565 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2566 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2567 // when routing outbound payments.
2568 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2572 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2574 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2575 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2576 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2577 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2578 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2579 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2580 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2581 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2582 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2584 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2585 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2586 let expected_point =
2587 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2588 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2590 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2591 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2592 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2593 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2594 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2595 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2597 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2598 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2599 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2600 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2601 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2603 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2611 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2612 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2614 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2616 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2619 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2620 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2621 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2622 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2623 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2624 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2626 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2627 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2628 if local_sent_shutdown {
2629 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2631 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2632 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2633 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2636 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2639 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2642 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2645 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2646 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2649 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2650 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2651 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2654 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2657 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2658 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2659 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2660 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2661 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2662 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2663 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2664 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2665 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2666 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2667 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2669 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2670 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2671 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2672 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2673 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2674 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2678 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2679 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2682 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2683 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2684 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2686 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2687 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2688 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2689 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2690 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2691 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2692 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2696 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2697 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2698 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2699 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2700 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2701 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2702 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2706 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2707 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2708 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2709 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2710 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2714 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2715 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2716 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2717 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2718 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2720 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2724 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2728 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2729 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2730 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2731 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2732 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2733 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2734 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2735 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2736 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2737 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2738 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2739 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2740 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2741 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2742 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2743 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2746 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2747 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2748 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2749 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2753 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2756 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2760 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2761 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2762 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2766 // Now update local state:
2767 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2768 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2769 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2770 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2771 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2772 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2773 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2778 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2780 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2781 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2782 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2783 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2784 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2785 None => fail_reason.into(),
2786 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2787 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2788 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2789 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2791 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2795 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2796 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2797 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2798 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2800 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2806 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2809 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2810 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2813 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2817 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2820 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2821 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2824 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2828 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2832 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2833 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2836 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2840 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2844 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2845 where L::Target: Logger
2847 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2850 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2853 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2857 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2859 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2861 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2862 let commitment_txid = {
2863 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2864 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2865 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2867 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2868 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2869 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2870 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2871 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2876 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2878 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2879 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2880 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2881 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2884 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2885 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2886 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2892 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2893 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2894 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2895 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2896 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2897 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2898 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2899 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2900 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2901 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2902 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2908 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2912 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2913 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2914 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2915 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2916 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2917 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2918 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2919 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2920 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2921 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2922 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2923 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2924 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2927 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2928 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2929 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2930 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2931 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2932 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2933 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2935 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2936 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2937 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2938 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2939 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2940 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2941 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2944 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2945 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2948 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2950 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2951 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2952 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2955 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2958 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2959 commitment_stats.tx,
2961 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2962 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2963 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2966 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2967 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2969 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2970 let mut need_commitment = false;
2971 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2972 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2973 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2974 need_commitment = true;
2978 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2979 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2980 Some(forward_info.clone())
2982 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2983 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2984 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2985 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2986 need_commitment = true;
2989 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2990 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2991 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2992 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2993 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2994 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2995 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2996 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2997 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2998 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2999 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3000 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3001 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3002 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3004 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3006 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3007 need_commitment = true;
3011 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3012 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3013 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3014 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3015 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3016 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3018 nondust_htlc_sources,
3022 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3023 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3024 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3025 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3027 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3028 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3029 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3030 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3031 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3032 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3033 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3034 // includes the right HTLCs.
3035 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3036 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3037 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3038 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3039 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3040 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3042 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3043 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3044 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3047 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3048 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3049 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3050 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3051 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3052 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3053 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3054 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3055 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3059 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3060 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3061 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3062 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3065 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3066 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3067 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3068 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3069 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3070 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3071 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3073 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3074 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3075 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3076 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3079 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3080 /// for our counterparty.
3081 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3082 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3083 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3084 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3086 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3087 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3088 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3089 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3091 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3092 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3093 updates: Vec::new(),
3096 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3097 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3098 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3099 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3100 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3101 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3102 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3103 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3104 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3105 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3106 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3107 // to rebalance channels.
3108 match &htlc_update {
3109 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3110 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3111 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3113 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3114 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3116 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3119 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3120 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3121 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3122 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3123 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3124 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3125 // into the holding cell without ever being
3126 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3127 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3128 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3131 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3138 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3139 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3140 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3141 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3142 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3143 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3144 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3145 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3146 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3147 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3148 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3150 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3151 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3152 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3153 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3154 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3155 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3156 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3157 // for a full revocation before failing.
3158 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3159 update_fail_count += 1;
3162 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3164 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3171 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3172 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3174 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3175 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3180 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3181 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3182 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3183 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3184 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3186 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3187 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3188 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3190 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3191 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3197 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3198 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3199 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3200 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3201 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3202 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3203 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3204 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3205 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3207 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3210 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3213 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3217 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3219 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3220 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3225 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3226 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3227 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3228 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3229 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3230 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3231 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3232 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3238 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3239 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3242 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3243 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3245 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3247 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3248 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3249 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3250 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3251 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3252 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3253 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3254 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3258 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3259 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3260 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3261 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3262 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3263 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3264 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3265 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3266 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3268 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3269 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3272 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3273 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3274 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3275 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3276 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3277 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3278 let mut require_commitment = false;
3279 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3282 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3283 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3284 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3286 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3287 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3288 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3289 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3290 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3291 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3296 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3297 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3298 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3299 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3300 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3302 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3303 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3304 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3309 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3310 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3312 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3316 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3317 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3319 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3320 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3321 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3322 require_commitment = true;
3323 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3324 match forward_info {
3325 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3326 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3327 require_commitment = true;
3329 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3330 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3331 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3333 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3334 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3335 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3339 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3340 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3341 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3342 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3348 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3349 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3350 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3351 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3353 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3354 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3355 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3356 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3357 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3358 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3359 require_commitment = true;
3363 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3365 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3366 match update_state {
3367 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3368 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3369 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3370 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3371 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3373 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3374 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3375 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3376 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3377 require_commitment = true;
3378 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3379 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3384 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3385 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3386 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3387 if require_commitment {
3388 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3389 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3390 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3391 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3392 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3393 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3394 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3395 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3396 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3398 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3399 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3400 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3401 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3402 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3405 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3406 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3407 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3408 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3409 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3410 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3412 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3413 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3415 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3416 if require_commitment {
3417 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3419 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3420 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3421 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3422 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3424 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3425 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3426 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3427 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3429 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3430 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3431 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3437 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3438 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3439 /// commitment update.
3440 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3441 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3442 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3444 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3445 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3448 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3449 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3450 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3451 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3453 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3454 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3455 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3456 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3457 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3458 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3459 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3461 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3462 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3464 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3465 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3467 if !self.context.is_live() {
3468 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3471 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3472 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3473 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3474 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3475 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3476 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3477 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3478 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3479 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3480 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3484 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3485 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3486 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3487 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3488 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3489 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3492 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3497 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3498 force_holding_cell = true;
3501 if force_holding_cell {
3502 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3506 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3507 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3509 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3510 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3515 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3516 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3518 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3520 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3521 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3522 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3523 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3527 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3528 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3529 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3533 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3534 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3537 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3538 // will be retransmitted.
3539 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3540 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3541 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3543 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3544 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3546 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3547 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3548 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3549 // this HTLC accordingly
3550 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3553 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3554 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3555 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3556 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3559 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3560 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3561 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3562 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3563 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3564 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3569 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3571 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3572 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3573 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3574 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3578 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3579 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3580 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3581 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3582 // the update upon reconnection.
3583 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3587 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3589 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3590 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3593 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3594 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3595 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3596 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3597 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3598 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3599 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3601 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3602 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3603 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3604 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3605 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3606 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3607 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3609 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3611 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3613 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3614 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3615 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3618 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3619 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3620 /// to the remote side.
3621 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3622 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3623 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3624 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3627 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3629 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3630 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3632 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3633 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3634 // first received the funding_signed.
3635 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3636 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3637 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3639 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3640 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3641 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3642 funding_broadcastable = None;
3645 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3646 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3647 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3648 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3649 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3650 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3651 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3652 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3653 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3654 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3655 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3656 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3657 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3658 next_per_commitment_point,
3659 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3663 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3665 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3666 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3667 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3668 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3669 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3670 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3672 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3673 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3674 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3675 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3676 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3677 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3681 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3682 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3684 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3685 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3686 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3689 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3690 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3691 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3692 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3693 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3694 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3695 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3696 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3697 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3701 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3702 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3704 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3707 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3710 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3711 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3713 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3714 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3715 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3716 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3717 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3718 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3719 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3720 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3721 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3722 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3723 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3724 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3725 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3726 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3728 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3730 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3736 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3737 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3738 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3739 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3740 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3741 per_commitment_secret,
3742 next_per_commitment_point,
3744 next_local_nonce: None,
3748 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3749 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3750 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3751 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3752 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3754 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3755 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3756 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3757 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3758 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3759 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3760 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3761 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3762 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3763 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3768 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3769 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3771 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3772 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3773 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3774 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3775 reason: err_packet.clone()
3778 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3779 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3780 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3781 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3782 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3783 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3786 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3787 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3788 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3789 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3790 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3797 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3798 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3799 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3800 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3804 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3805 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3806 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3807 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3808 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3809 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3813 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3814 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3816 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3817 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3818 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3819 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3820 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3821 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3822 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3823 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3826 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3828 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3829 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3830 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3831 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3835 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3836 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3840 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3841 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3842 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3843 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3844 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3847 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3848 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3849 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3850 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3851 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3854 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3855 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3856 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3857 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3858 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3859 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3860 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3861 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3865 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3866 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3867 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3868 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3870 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3874 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3875 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3876 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3877 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3879 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3880 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3881 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3882 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3883 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3887 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3889 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3890 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3891 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3892 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3893 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3896 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3897 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3898 channel_ready: None,
3899 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3900 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3901 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3905 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3906 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3907 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3908 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3909 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3910 next_per_commitment_point,
3911 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3913 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3914 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3915 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3919 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3920 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3921 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3923 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3924 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3925 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3928 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3934 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3935 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3936 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3937 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3938 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3939 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3940 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3942 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3944 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3945 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3946 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3947 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3948 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3949 next_per_commitment_point,
3950 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3954 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3955 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3956 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3958 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3961 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3962 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3963 raa: required_revoke,
3964 commitment_update: None,
3965 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3967 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3968 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3969 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3971 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3974 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3975 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3976 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3977 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3978 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3979 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3982 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3983 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3984 raa: required_revoke,
3985 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3986 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3990 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3994 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3995 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3996 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3997 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3999 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4001 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4003 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4004 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4005 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4006 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4007 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4008 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4010 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4011 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4012 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4013 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4014 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4016 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4017 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4018 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4019 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4022 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4023 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4024 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4025 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4026 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4027 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4028 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4029 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4030 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4031 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4032 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4033 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4034 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4035 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4036 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4038 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4041 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4042 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4045 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4046 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4047 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4048 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4049 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4050 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4053 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4054 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4055 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4056 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4057 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4058 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4059 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4061 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4067 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4068 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4069 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4070 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4072 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4073 return Ok((None, None));
4076 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4077 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4078 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4080 return Ok((None, None));
4083 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4085 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4086 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4087 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4088 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4090 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4091 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4092 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4094 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4095 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4096 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4097 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4099 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4100 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4101 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4106 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4107 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4109 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4110 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4113 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4114 /// within our expected timeframe.
4116 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4117 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4118 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4121 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4124 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4125 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4128 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4129 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4130 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4131 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4133 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4136 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4137 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4138 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4139 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4142 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4143 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4147 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4149 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4150 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4153 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4154 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4155 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4158 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4161 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4162 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4163 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4164 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4166 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4169 assert!(send_shutdown);
4170 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4171 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4172 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4174 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4177 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4182 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4184 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4185 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4187 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4188 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4189 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4190 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4191 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4192 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4195 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4196 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4198 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4199 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4200 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4201 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4205 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4206 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4207 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4208 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4209 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4210 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4213 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4220 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4221 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4223 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4226 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4227 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4229 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4231 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4232 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4233 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4234 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4235 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4236 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4237 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4238 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4239 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4241 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4242 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4245 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4249 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4250 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4251 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4252 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4254 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4257 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4260 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4263 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4267 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4271 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4272 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4273 return Ok((None, None));
4276 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4277 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4278 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4281 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4283 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4286 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4287 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4288 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4289 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4290 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4294 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4295 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4300 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4301 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4302 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4303 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4304 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4305 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4306 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4310 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4312 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4313 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4314 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4315 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4317 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4320 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4321 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4322 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4324 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4325 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4326 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4327 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4331 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4332 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4333 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4334 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4336 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4337 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4338 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4344 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4345 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4348 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4351 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4355 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4356 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4357 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4358 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4359 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4361 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4363 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4365 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4366 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4369 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4370 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4371 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4372 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4373 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4374 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4375 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4376 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4378 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4381 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4382 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4383 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4384 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4390 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4391 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4392 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4393 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4395 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4401 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4402 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4403 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4404 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4405 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4406 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4407 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4409 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4410 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4413 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4415 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4416 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4422 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4423 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4424 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4425 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4426 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4427 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4428 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4430 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4431 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4438 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4439 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4442 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4443 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4446 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4447 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4451 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4452 &self.context.holder_signer
4456 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4458 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4459 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4460 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4461 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4462 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4463 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4465 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4467 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4475 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4476 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4480 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4481 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4482 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4483 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4486 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4487 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4488 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4489 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4492 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4493 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4494 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4495 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4496 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4497 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4500 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4501 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4502 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4503 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4504 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4505 if !release_monitor {
4506 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4515 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4516 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4519 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4520 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4521 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4523 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4524 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4525 if self.context.channel_state &
4526 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4527 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4528 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4529 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4530 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4533 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4534 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4535 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4536 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4537 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4538 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4540 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4541 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4542 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4544 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4545 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4546 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4547 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4548 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4549 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4555 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4556 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4557 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4560 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4561 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4562 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4565 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4566 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4567 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4570 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4571 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4572 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4573 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4574 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4575 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4580 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4581 self.context.channel_update_status
4584 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4585 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4586 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4589 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4591 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4592 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4593 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4597 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4598 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4599 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4602 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4606 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4607 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4608 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4610 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4611 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4612 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4614 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4615 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4618 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4619 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4620 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4621 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4622 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4623 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4624 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4625 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4626 self.context.channel_state);
4628 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4632 if need_commitment_update {
4633 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4634 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4635 let next_per_commitment_point =
4636 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4637 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4638 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4639 next_per_commitment_point,
4640 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4644 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4650 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4651 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4652 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4653 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4654 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4655 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4656 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4658 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4661 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4662 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4663 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4664 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4665 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4666 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4667 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4668 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4669 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4670 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4671 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4672 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4673 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4674 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4675 // channel and move on.
4676 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4677 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4679 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4680 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4681 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4683 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4684 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4685 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4686 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4687 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4688 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4689 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4693 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4694 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4695 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4696 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4697 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4701 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4702 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4703 // may have already happened for this block).
4704 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4705 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4706 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4707 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4710 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4711 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4712 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4713 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4721 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4722 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4723 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4724 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4726 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4727 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4730 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4732 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4733 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4734 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4735 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4740 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4743 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4744 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4745 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4746 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4748 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4751 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4752 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4753 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4755 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4756 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4758 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4759 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4760 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4768 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4770 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4771 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4772 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4774 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4775 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4778 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4779 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4780 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4781 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4782 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4783 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4784 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4785 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4786 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4789 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4790 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4791 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4792 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4794 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4795 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4796 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4798 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4799 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4800 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4801 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4803 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4804 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4805 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4806 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4807 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4808 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4809 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4812 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4813 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4815 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4818 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4819 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4820 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4821 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4822 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4823 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4824 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4825 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4826 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4827 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4828 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4829 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4830 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4831 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4832 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4833 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4834 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4840 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4845 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4846 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4848 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4849 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4850 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4851 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4853 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4856 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4858 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4859 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4860 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4861 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4862 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4863 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4865 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4866 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4869 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4870 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4871 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4872 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4873 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4874 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4876 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4877 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4880 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4881 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4882 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4883 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4884 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4890 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4891 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4892 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4893 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4895 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4898 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4902 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4906 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4907 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4911 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4915 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4916 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4919 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4923 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4925 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4930 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4932 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4937 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4939 None => return None,
4942 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4944 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4945 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4947 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4948 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4952 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4954 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4955 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4956 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4957 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4958 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4959 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4960 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4962 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4963 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4964 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4965 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4966 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4967 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4968 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4969 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4970 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4971 contents: announcement,
4974 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4978 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4979 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4980 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4981 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4982 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4983 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4984 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4985 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4987 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4989 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4991 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4992 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4994 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4996 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4997 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5000 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5001 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5002 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5003 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5006 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5009 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5010 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5011 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5012 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5013 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5014 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5017 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5019 Err(_) => return None,
5021 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5022 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5027 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5028 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5029 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5030 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5031 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5032 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5033 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5034 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5035 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5036 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5037 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5038 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5039 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5040 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5041 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5042 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5045 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5048 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5049 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5050 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5051 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5052 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5053 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5054 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5055 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5056 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5058 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5059 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5060 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5061 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5062 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5063 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5064 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5065 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5066 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5068 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5069 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5070 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5071 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5072 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5073 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5074 next_funding_txid: None,
5079 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5081 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5082 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5083 /// commitment update.
5085 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5086 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5087 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5088 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5089 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5090 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5091 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5094 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5095 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5096 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5098 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5099 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5104 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5105 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5107 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5109 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5110 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5112 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5113 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5114 /// regenerate them.
5116 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5117 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5119 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5120 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5121 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5122 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5123 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5124 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5125 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5127 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5128 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5130 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5131 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5132 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5135 if amount_msat == 0 {
5136 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5139 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5140 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5141 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5142 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5145 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5146 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5147 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5150 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5151 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5152 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5153 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5154 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5155 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5156 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5157 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5160 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5161 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5162 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5163 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5164 else { "to peer" });
5166 if need_holding_cell {
5167 force_holding_cell = true;
5170 // Now update local state:
5171 if force_holding_cell {
5172 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5177 onion_routing_packet,
5183 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5184 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5186 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5188 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5193 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5194 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5195 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5199 onion_routing_packet,
5202 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5207 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5208 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5209 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5210 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5212 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5213 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5214 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5216 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5217 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5221 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5222 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5223 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5224 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5225 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5226 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5227 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5230 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5231 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5232 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5233 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5234 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5235 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5238 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5240 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5241 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5242 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5244 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5245 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5248 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5249 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5250 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5251 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5252 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5253 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5254 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5255 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5258 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5262 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5263 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5264 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5265 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5269 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5270 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5271 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5272 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5273 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5274 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5275 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5276 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5277 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5278 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5279 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5285 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5288 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5289 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5290 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5291 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5293 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5295 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5296 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5297 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5298 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5301 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5302 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5306 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5307 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5309 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5311 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5312 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5313 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5314 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5316 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5317 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5318 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5319 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5320 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5321 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5325 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5326 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5330 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5331 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5334 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5335 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5337 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5338 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5339 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5340 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5341 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5342 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5343 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5344 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5346 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5347 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5348 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5351 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5352 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5353 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5359 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5360 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5363 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5364 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5365 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5366 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5372 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5373 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5375 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5376 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5377 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5378 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5379 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5380 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5381 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5382 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5383 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5386 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5387 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5388 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5390 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5391 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5394 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5395 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5397 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5398 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5399 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5402 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5403 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5404 let mut chan_closed = false;
5405 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5409 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5411 None if !chan_closed => {
5412 // use override shutdown script if provided
5413 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5414 Some(script) => script,
5416 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5417 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5418 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5419 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5423 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5424 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5426 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5432 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5433 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5434 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5435 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5437 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5439 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5441 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5442 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5443 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5444 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5445 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5446 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5449 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5450 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5452 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5453 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5454 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5457 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5458 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5459 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5460 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5461 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5463 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5464 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5471 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5472 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5474 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5477 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5478 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5479 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5481 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5482 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5486 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5490 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5491 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5492 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5493 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5496 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5497 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5498 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5499 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5500 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5501 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5502 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5503 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5504 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5506 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5507 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5508 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5509 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5511 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5512 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5514 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5515 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5517 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5518 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5519 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5521 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5522 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5524 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5525 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5526 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5527 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5528 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5531 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5532 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5534 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5535 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5537 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5539 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5541 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5542 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5543 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5544 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5547 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5548 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5550 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5551 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5552 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5553 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5557 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5558 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5559 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5563 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5564 Ok(script) => script,
5565 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5568 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5571 context: ChannelContext {
5574 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5575 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5576 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5577 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5582 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5584 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5585 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5586 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5587 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5589 channel_value_satoshis,
5591 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5594 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5597 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5598 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5601 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5602 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5603 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5604 pending_update_fee: None,
5605 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5606 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5607 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5608 update_time_counter: 1,
5610 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5612 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5613 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5614 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5615 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5616 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5617 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5619 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5620 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5621 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5622 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5624 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5625 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5626 closing_fee_limits: None,
5627 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5629 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5630 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5631 short_channel_id: None,
5632 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5634 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5635 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5637 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5638 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5639 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5640 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5641 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5642 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5643 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5644 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5645 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5647 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5649 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5650 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5651 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5652 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5653 counterparty_parameters: None,
5654 funding_outpoint: None,
5655 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5657 funding_transaction: None,
5659 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5660 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5661 counterparty_node_id,
5663 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5665 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5667 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5668 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5670 announcement_sigs: None,
5672 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5673 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5674 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5675 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5677 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5678 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5680 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5681 outbound_scid_alias,
5683 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5684 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5686 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5687 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5692 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5694 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5698 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5699 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5700 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5701 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5702 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5703 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5706 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5707 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5708 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5709 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5710 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5711 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5712 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5713 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5714 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5715 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5716 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5718 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5719 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5721 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5722 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5723 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5724 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5727 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5728 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5730 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5733 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5734 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5735 return Err((self, e));
5739 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5741 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5743 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5744 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5745 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5747 let channel = Channel {
5748 context: self.context,
5751 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5752 temporary_channel_id,
5753 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5754 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5757 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5759 next_local_nonce: None,
5763 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5764 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5765 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5766 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5767 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5768 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5769 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5770 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5771 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5772 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5775 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5776 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5777 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5778 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5779 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5780 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5786 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5787 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5788 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5789 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5790 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5791 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5793 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5795 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5796 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5797 // We've exhausted our options
5800 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5801 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5804 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5805 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5806 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5807 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5809 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5810 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5811 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5812 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5813 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5814 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5816 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5818 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5819 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5822 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5823 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5824 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5826 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5827 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5830 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5831 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5834 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5835 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5839 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5840 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5841 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5842 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5843 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5844 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5845 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5846 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5847 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5848 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5849 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5850 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5851 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5852 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5853 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5854 first_per_commitment_point,
5855 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5856 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5857 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5858 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5860 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5865 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5866 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5868 // Check sanity of message fields:
5869 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5872 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5875 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5878 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5881 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5884 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5886 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5888 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5889 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5892 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5893 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5894 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5896 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5899 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5903 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5904 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5907 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5910 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5913 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5916 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5919 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5922 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5926 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5927 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5930 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5931 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5933 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5934 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5937 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5938 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5941 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5942 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5943 &Some(ref script) => {
5944 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5945 if script.len() == 0 {
5948 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5951 Some(script.clone())
5954 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5961 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5962 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5963 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5964 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5965 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5967 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5968 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5970 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5973 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5974 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5975 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5976 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5977 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5978 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5981 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5982 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5983 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5986 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5987 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5989 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5990 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5996 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5997 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5998 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5999 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6002 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6003 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6004 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6005 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6006 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6007 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6008 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6009 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64, is_0conf: bool,
6010 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6011 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6012 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6013 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6016 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6018 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6019 // support this channel type.
6020 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6021 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6025 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6026 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6027 // `static_remote_key`.
6028 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6031 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6032 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6035 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6038 channel_type.clone()
6040 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6041 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6047 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6048 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6049 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6050 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6051 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6052 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6053 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6054 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6055 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6058 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6062 // Check sanity of message fields:
6063 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6064 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6066 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6069 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6072 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6073 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6076 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6079 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6082 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6084 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6085 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6088 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6091 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6095 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6096 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6099 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6102 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6105 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6108 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6111 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6118 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6120 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6121 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6126 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6127 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6128 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6129 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6132 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6135 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6136 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6137 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6139 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6143 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6144 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6145 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6146 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6147 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6151 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6152 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6153 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6154 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6158 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6159 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6160 &Some(ref script) => {
6161 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6162 if script.len() == 0 {
6165 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6166 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6168 Some(script.clone())
6171 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6178 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6179 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6180 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6181 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6185 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6186 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6191 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6192 Ok(script) => script,
6193 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6196 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6197 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6199 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6202 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6206 context: ChannelContext {
6209 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6210 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6212 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6217 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6219 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6220 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6221 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6222 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6225 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6228 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6231 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6232 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6233 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6235 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6236 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6237 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6238 pending_update_fee: None,
6239 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6240 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6241 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6242 update_time_counter: 1,
6244 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6246 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6247 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6248 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6249 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6250 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6251 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6253 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6254 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6255 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6256 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6258 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6259 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6260 closing_fee_limits: None,
6261 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6263 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6264 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6265 short_channel_id: None,
6266 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6268 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6269 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6270 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6271 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6272 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6273 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6274 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6275 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6276 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6277 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6278 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6279 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6282 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6284 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6285 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6286 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6287 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6288 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6289 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6290 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6292 funding_outpoint: None,
6293 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6295 funding_transaction: None,
6297 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6298 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6299 counterparty_node_id,
6301 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6303 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6305 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6306 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6308 announcement_sigs: None,
6310 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6311 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6312 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6313 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6315 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6316 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6318 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6319 outbound_scid_alias,
6321 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6322 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6324 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6325 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6330 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6332 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6338 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6339 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6341 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6342 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6343 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6344 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6346 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6347 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6349 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6350 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6353 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6356 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6357 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6358 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6360 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6361 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6362 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6363 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6365 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6366 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6367 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6368 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6369 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6370 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6371 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6372 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6373 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6374 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6375 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6376 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6377 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6378 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6379 first_per_commitment_point,
6380 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6381 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6382 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6384 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6386 next_local_nonce: None,
6390 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6391 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6393 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6395 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6396 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6399 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6400 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6402 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6403 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6405 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6406 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6407 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6408 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6409 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6410 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6411 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6412 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6413 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6416 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6417 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6419 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6420 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6421 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6422 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6424 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6425 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6427 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6428 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6431 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6432 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6433 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6435 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6438 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6439 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6441 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6442 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6443 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6445 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6447 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6448 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6449 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6450 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6453 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6454 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6455 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6456 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6457 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6459 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6461 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6462 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6463 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6466 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6467 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6468 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6472 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6473 initial_commitment_tx,
6476 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6477 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6480 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6481 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6484 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6486 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6487 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6488 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6489 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6490 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6491 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6492 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6493 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6494 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6495 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6496 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6498 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6500 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6502 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6503 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6504 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6505 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6507 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6509 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6510 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6511 let mut channel = Channel {
6512 context: self.context,
6514 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6515 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6516 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6518 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6522 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6523 }, channel_monitor))
6527 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6528 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6530 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6536 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6538 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6539 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6540 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6542 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6543 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6544 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6545 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6551 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6552 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6553 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6554 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6555 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6556 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6561 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6562 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6563 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6564 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6566 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6567 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6568 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6569 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6574 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6575 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6576 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6577 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6578 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6579 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6584 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6586 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6589 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6591 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6592 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6593 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6594 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6595 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6597 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6598 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6599 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6600 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6602 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6603 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6604 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6606 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6608 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6609 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6610 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6611 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6612 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6613 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6615 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6616 // deserialized from that format.
6617 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6618 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6619 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6621 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6623 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6624 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6625 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6627 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6628 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6629 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6630 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6633 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6634 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6635 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6638 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6639 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6640 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6641 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6643 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6644 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6646 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6648 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6650 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6652 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6655 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6657 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6662 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6663 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6665 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6666 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6667 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6668 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6669 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6670 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6671 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6673 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6675 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6677 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6680 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6681 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6682 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6685 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6687 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6688 preimages.push(preimage);
6690 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6691 reason.write(writer)?;
6693 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6695 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6696 preimages.push(preimage);
6698 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6699 reason.write(writer)?;
6702 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6703 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6704 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6706 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6707 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6708 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6712 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6713 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6714 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6717 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6721 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6722 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6723 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6724 source.write(writer)?;
6725 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6727 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6728 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6729 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6731 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6732 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6734 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6736 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6737 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6739 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6741 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6742 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6747 match self.context.resend_order {
6748 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6749 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6752 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6756 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6757 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6758 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6759 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6762 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6763 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6764 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6765 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6766 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6769 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6770 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6771 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6772 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6774 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6775 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6776 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6778 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6780 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6781 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6782 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6783 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6785 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6786 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6787 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6788 // consider the stale state on reload.
6791 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6792 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6793 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6795 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6796 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6797 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6799 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6800 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6802 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6804 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6806 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6807 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6809 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6812 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6813 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6814 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6816 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6819 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6820 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6822 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6823 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6824 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6826 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6828 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6830 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6833 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6835 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6836 htlc.write(writer)?;
6839 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6840 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6841 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6843 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6844 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6846 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6847 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6848 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6849 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6850 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6851 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6852 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6854 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6855 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6856 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6857 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6858 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6860 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6861 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6863 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6864 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6865 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6866 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6868 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6870 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6871 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6872 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6873 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6874 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6875 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6876 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6878 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6879 (2, chan_type, option),
6880 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6881 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6882 (5, self.context.config, required),
6883 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6884 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6885 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6886 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6887 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6888 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6889 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6890 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6891 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6892 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6893 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6894 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6895 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6896 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6897 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6898 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6899 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6900 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6907 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6908 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6910 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6911 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6913 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6914 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6915 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6917 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6918 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6919 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6920 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6924 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6925 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6926 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6930 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6931 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let mut keys_data = None;
6942 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6943 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6944 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6946 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6947 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6948 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6949 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6950 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6951 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6955 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6956 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6957 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6960 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6969 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6970 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6971 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6972 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6973 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6974 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6975 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6976 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6977 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6978 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6979 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6980 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6985 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6987 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6988 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6989 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6990 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6991 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6993 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6995 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6996 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6998 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7002 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7006 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7009 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7011 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7015 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7017 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7018 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7019 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7020 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7021 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7022 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7023 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7024 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7025 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7027 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7028 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7029 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7031 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7032 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7033 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7035 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7039 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7040 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7041 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7042 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7045 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7051 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7052 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7055 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7057 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7058 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7061 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7065 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7071 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7072 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7073 // consider the stale state on reload.
7074 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7077 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7079 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7084 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7085 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7088 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7093 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7094 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7096 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7097 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7105 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7106 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7108 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7109 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7112 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7114 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7115 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7116 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7117 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7122 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7125 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7130 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7136 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7139 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7141 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7145 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7146 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7147 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7149 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7155 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7156 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7157 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7158 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7159 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7160 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7161 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7162 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7163 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7164 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7166 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7167 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7168 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7169 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7170 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7171 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7172 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7174 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7175 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7176 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7177 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7179 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7181 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7182 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7184 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7185 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7186 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7187 (2, channel_type, option),
7188 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7189 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7190 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7191 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7192 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7193 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7194 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7195 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7196 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7197 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7198 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7199 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7200 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7201 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7202 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7203 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7204 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7205 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7206 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7207 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7208 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7211 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7212 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7213 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7214 // required channel parameters.
7215 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7216 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7217 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7219 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7221 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7222 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7223 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7224 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7227 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7228 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7229 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7231 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7232 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7234 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7235 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7240 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7241 if iter.next().is_some() {
7242 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7246 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7247 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7248 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7249 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7250 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7253 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7254 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7255 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7257 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7260 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7261 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7262 // separate u64 values.
7263 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7265 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7267 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7268 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7269 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7270 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7272 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7273 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7275 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7276 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7277 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7278 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7279 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7282 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7283 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7287 context: ChannelContext {
7290 config: config.unwrap(),
7294 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7295 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7296 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7299 temporary_channel_id,
7301 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7303 channel_value_satoshis,
7305 latest_monitor_update_id,
7308 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7311 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7312 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7315 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7316 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7317 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7318 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7322 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7323 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7324 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7325 monitor_pending_forwards,
7326 monitor_pending_failures,
7327 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7330 holding_cell_update_fee,
7331 next_holder_htlc_id,
7332 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7333 update_time_counter,
7336 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7337 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7338 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7339 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7341 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7342 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7343 closing_fee_limits: None,
7344 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7346 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7347 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7349 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7351 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7352 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7353 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7354 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7355 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7356 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7357 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7358 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7359 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7362 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7364 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7365 funding_transaction,
7367 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7368 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7369 counterparty_node_id,
7371 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7375 channel_update_status,
7376 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7380 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7381 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7383 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7385 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7386 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7388 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7389 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7390 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7392 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7393 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7396 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7398 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7401 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7410 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7411 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7412 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7413 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7414 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7416 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7417 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7418 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7419 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7420 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7421 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7422 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7423 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7424 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7425 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7426 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7427 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7428 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7429 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7430 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7431 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7432 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7433 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7434 use crate::util::test_utils;
7435 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7436 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7437 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7438 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7439 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7440 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7441 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7442 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7443 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7444 use crate::prelude::*;
7446 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7449 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7450 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7456 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7457 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7458 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7459 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7463 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7464 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7465 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7466 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7467 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7468 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7469 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7470 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7474 signer: InMemorySigner,
7477 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7478 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7481 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7482 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7484 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7485 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7488 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7492 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7494 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7496 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7497 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7498 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7501 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7502 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7503 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7504 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7508 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7509 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7510 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7514 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7515 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7516 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7517 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7519 let seed = [42; 32];
7520 let network = Network::Testnet;
7521 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7522 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7523 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7526 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7527 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7528 let config = UserConfig::default();
7529 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7530 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7531 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7533 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7534 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7538 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7539 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7541 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7542 let original_fee = 253;
7543 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7544 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7545 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7546 let seed = [42; 32];
7547 let network = Network::Testnet;
7548 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7550 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7551 let config = UserConfig::default();
7552 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7554 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7555 // same as the old fee.
7556 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7557 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7558 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7562 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7563 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7564 // dust limits are used.
7565 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7566 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7567 let seed = [42; 32];
7568 let network = Network::Testnet;
7569 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7570 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7571 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7573 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7574 // they have different dust limits.
7576 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7577 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7578 let config = UserConfig::default();
7579 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7581 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7582 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7583 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7584 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7585 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7587 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7588 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7589 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7590 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7591 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7593 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7594 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7595 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7596 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7598 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7599 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7600 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7602 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7603 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7605 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7606 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7607 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7609 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7610 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7611 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7612 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7615 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7617 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7618 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7619 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7620 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7621 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7622 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7623 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7624 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7625 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7627 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7630 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7631 // the dust limit check.
7632 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7633 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7634 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7635 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7637 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7638 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7639 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7640 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7641 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7642 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7643 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7647 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7648 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7649 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7650 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7651 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7652 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7653 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7654 let seed = [42; 32];
7655 let network = Network::Testnet;
7656 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7658 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7659 let config = UserConfig::default();
7660 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7662 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7663 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7665 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7666 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7667 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7668 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7669 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7670 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7672 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7673 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7674 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7675 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7676 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7678 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7680 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7681 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7682 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7683 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7684 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7686 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7687 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7688 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7689 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7690 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7694 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7695 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7696 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7697 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7698 let seed = [42; 32];
7699 let network = Network::Testnet;
7700 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7701 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7702 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7704 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7706 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7707 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7708 let config = UserConfig::default();
7709 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7711 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7712 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7713 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7714 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7716 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7717 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7718 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7720 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7721 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7722 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7723 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7725 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7726 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7727 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7729 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7730 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7732 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7733 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7734 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7735 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7736 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7737 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7738 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7740 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7742 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7743 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7744 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7745 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7746 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7750 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7751 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7752 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7753 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7754 let seed = [42; 32];
7755 let network = Network::Testnet;
7756 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7757 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7758 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7760 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7761 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7762 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7763 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7764 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7765 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7766 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7767 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7769 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7770 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7771 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7772 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7773 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7774 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7776 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7777 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7778 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7779 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7781 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7783 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7784 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7785 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7786 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7787 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7788 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7790 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7791 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7792 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7793 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7795 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7796 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7797 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7798 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7799 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7801 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7802 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7804 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7805 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7806 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7808 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7809 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7810 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7811 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7812 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7814 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7815 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7817 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7818 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7819 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7823 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7825 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7826 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7827 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7829 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7830 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7831 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7832 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7834 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7835 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7836 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7838 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7840 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7841 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7844 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7845 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7846 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7847 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7848 let seed = [42; 32];
7849 let network = Network::Testnet;
7850 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7851 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7852 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7855 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7856 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7857 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7859 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7860 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7862 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7863 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7864 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7866 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7867 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7869 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7871 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7872 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7874 // Channel Negotiations failed
7875 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7876 assert!(result.is_err());
7881 fn channel_update() {
7882 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7883 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7884 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7885 let seed = [42; 32];
7886 let network = Network::Testnet;
7887 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7888 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7889 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7891 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7892 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7893 let config = UserConfig::default();
7894 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7896 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7897 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7898 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7899 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7900 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7902 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7903 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7904 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7905 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7906 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7908 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7909 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7910 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7911 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7913 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7914 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7915 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7917 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7918 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7920 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7921 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7922 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7924 short_channel_id: 0,
7927 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7928 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7929 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7931 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7932 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7934 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7936 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7938 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7939 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7940 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7941 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7943 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7944 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7945 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7947 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7951 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7953 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7954 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7955 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7956 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7957 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7958 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7959 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7960 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7961 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7962 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7963 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7964 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7965 use crate::sync::Arc;
7967 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7968 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7969 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7970 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7972 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7974 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7975 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7976 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7977 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7978 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7980 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7981 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7987 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7988 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7989 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7991 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7992 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7993 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7994 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7995 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7996 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7998 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8000 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8001 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8002 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8003 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8004 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8005 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8007 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8008 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8009 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8010 selected_contest_delay: 144
8012 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8013 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8015 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8016 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8018 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8019 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8021 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8022 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8024 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8025 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8026 // build_commitment_transaction.
8027 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8028 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8029 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8030 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8031 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8033 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8034 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8035 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8036 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8040 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8041 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8042 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8043 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8047 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8048 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8049 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8051 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8052 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8054 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8055 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8057 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8059 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8060 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8061 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8062 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8063 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8064 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8065 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8067 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8068 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8069 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8070 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8072 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8073 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8074 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8076 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8078 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8079 commitment_tx.clone(),
8080 counterparty_signature,
8081 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8082 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8083 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8085 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8086 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8088 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8089 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8090 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8092 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8093 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8096 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8097 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8099 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8100 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8101 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8102 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8103 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8104 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8105 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8106 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8108 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8111 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8112 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8113 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8117 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8120 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8121 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8122 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8124 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8125 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8126 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8127 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8128 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8129 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8130 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8131 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8133 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8137 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8138 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8139 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8140 "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", {});
8142 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8143 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8145 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8146 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8147 "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", {});
8149 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8150 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8151 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8152 "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", {});
8154 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8155 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8157 amount_msat: 1000000,
8159 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8160 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8162 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8165 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8166 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8168 amount_msat: 2000000,
8170 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8171 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8173 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8176 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8177 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8179 amount_msat: 2000000,
8181 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8182 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8183 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8184 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8186 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8189 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8190 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8192 amount_msat: 3000000,
8194 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8195 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8196 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8197 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8199 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8202 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8203 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8205 amount_msat: 4000000,
8207 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8208 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8210 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8214 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8215 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8216 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8218 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8219 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8220 "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", {
8223 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8224 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8225 "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" },
8228 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8229 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8230 "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" },
8233 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8234 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8235 "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" },
8238 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8239 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8240 "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" },
8243 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8244 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8245 "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" }
8248 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8249 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8250 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8252 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8253 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8254 "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", {
8257 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8258 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8259 "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" },
8262 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8263 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8264 "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" },
8267 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8268 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8269 "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" },
8272 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8273 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8274 "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" },
8277 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8278 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8279 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8282 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8283 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8284 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8286 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8287 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8288 "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", {
8291 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8292 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8293 "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" },
8296 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8297 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8298 "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" },
8301 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8302 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8303 "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" },
8306 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8307 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8308 "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" }
8311 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8312 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8313 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8314 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8316 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8317 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8318 "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", {
8321 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8322 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8323 "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" },
8326 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8327 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8328 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8331 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8332 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8333 "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" },
8336 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8337 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8338 "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" }
8341 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8342 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8343 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8344 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8346 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8347 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8348 "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", {
8351 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8352 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8353 "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" },
8356 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8357 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8358 "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" },
8361 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8362 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8363 "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" },
8366 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8367 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8368 "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" }
8371 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8372 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8373 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8375 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8376 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8377 "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", {
8380 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8381 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8382 "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" },
8385 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8386 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8387 "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" },
8390 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8391 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8392 "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" }
8395 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8396 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8397 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8399 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8400 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8401 "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", {
8404 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8405 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8406 "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" },
8409 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8410 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8411 "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" },
8414 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8415 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8416 "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" }
8419 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8420 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8421 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8423 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8424 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8425 "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", {
8428 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8429 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8430 "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" },
8433 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8434 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8435 "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" }
8438 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8439 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8440 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8441 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8442 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8443 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8445 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8446 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8447 "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", {
8450 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8451 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8452 "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" },
8455 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8456 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8457 "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" }
8460 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8461 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8462 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8463 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8464 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8466 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8467 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8468 "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", {
8471 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8472 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8473 "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" },
8476 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8477 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8478 "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" }
8481 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8482 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8483 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8485 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8486 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8487 "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", {
8490 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8491 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8492 "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" }
8495 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8496 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8497 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8498 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8499 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8501 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8502 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8503 "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", {
8506 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8507 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8508 "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" }
8511 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8512 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8513 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8514 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8515 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8517 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8518 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8519 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8522 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8523 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8524 "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" }
8527 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8530 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8532 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8533 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8534 "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", {});
8536 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8537 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8538 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8539 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8540 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8542 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8543 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8544 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8546 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8547 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8548 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8549 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8550 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8552 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8553 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8554 "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", {});
8556 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8557 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8558 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8560 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8561 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8562 "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", {});
8564 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8565 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8566 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8567 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8568 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8570 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8571 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8572 "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", {});
8574 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8575 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8576 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8577 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8578 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8580 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8581 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8582 "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", {});
8584 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8585 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8586 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8587 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8588 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8589 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8591 amount_msat: 2000000,
8593 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8594 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8596 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8599 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8600 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8601 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8603 amount_msat: 5000001,
8605 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8606 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8607 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8608 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8610 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8613 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8614 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8616 amount_msat: 5000000,
8618 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8619 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8620 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8621 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8623 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8627 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8628 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8629 "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", {
8632 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8633 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8634 "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" },
8636 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8637 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8638 "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" },
8640 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8641 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8642 "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" }
8645 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8646 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8647 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8648 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8651 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8652 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8653 "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" },
8655 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8656 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8657 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8659 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8660 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8661 "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" }
8666 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8667 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8669 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8670 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8671 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8672 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8674 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8675 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8676 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8678 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8679 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8681 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8682 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8684 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8685 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8686 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8690 fn test_key_derivation() {
8691 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8692 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8694 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8695 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8697 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8698 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8700 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8701 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8703 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8704 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8706 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8707 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8709 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8710 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8712 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8713 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8717 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8718 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8719 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8720 let seed = [42; 32];
8721 let network = Network::Testnet;
8722 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8723 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8725 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8726 let config = UserConfig::default();
8727 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8728 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8730 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8731 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8733 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8734 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8735 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8736 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8737 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8738 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8739 assert!(res.is_ok());
8743 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8744 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8745 // resulting `channel_type`.
8746 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8747 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8748 let network = Network::Testnet;
8749 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8750 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8752 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8753 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8755 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8756 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8758 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8759 // need to signal it.
8760 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8761 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8762 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8765 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8767 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8768 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8769 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8771 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8772 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8773 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8776 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8777 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8778 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8779 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8780 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8783 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8784 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8788 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8789 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8790 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8792 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8793 let network = Network::Testnet;
8794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8795 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8797 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8798 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8800 let config = UserConfig::default();
8802 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8803 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8804 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8805 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8806 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8808 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8809 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8810 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8813 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8814 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8815 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8817 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8818 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8819 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8820 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8821 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8822 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8824 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8828 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8829 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8831 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8832 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8833 let network = Network::Testnet;
8834 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8835 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8837 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8838 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8840 let config = UserConfig::default();
8842 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8843 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8844 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8845 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8846 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8847 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8848 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8849 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8851 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8852 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8853 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8854 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8855 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8856 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8859 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8860 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8862 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8863 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8864 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8865 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8867 assert!(res.is_err());
8869 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8870 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8871 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8873 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8874 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8875 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8878 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8880 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8881 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8882 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8883 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8886 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8887 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8889 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8890 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8892 assert!(res.is_err());