1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
254 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
256 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
257 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
266 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
273 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
276 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
284 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
531 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
532 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
533 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
534 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
535 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
536 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
539 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
540 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
541 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
542 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
543 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
544 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
545 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
546 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
547 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
548 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
549 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
550 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
551 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
552 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
553 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
555 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
556 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
557 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
558 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
560 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
561 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
562 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
563 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
565 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
566 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
567 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
568 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
569 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
571 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
572 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
573 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
574 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
576 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
577 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
578 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
580 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
581 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
582 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
583 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
584 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
586 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
587 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
590 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
591 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
593 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
594 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
595 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
596 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
598 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
599 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
602 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
603 (0, update, required),
606 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
607 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
608 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
609 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
610 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
612 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
613 /// in a timely manner.
614 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
617 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
618 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
619 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
621 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
622 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
623 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
624 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
628 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
629 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
630 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
632 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
633 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
634 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
635 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
637 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
641 channel_id: [u8; 32],
642 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
645 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
646 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
648 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
649 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
650 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
652 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
653 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
654 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
655 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
657 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
658 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
660 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
662 holder_signer: Signer,
663 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
664 destination_script: Script,
666 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
667 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
668 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
670 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
671 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
672 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
673 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
674 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
675 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
677 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
678 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
679 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
680 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
681 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
682 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
684 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
686 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
687 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
688 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
690 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
691 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
692 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
693 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
694 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
695 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
696 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
698 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
700 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
701 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
702 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
703 // HTLCs with similar state.
704 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
705 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
706 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
707 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
708 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
709 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
710 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
711 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
712 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
715 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
716 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
717 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
719 update_time_counter: u32,
721 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
722 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
723 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
724 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
725 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
726 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
728 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
729 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
731 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
732 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
733 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
734 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
736 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
737 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
739 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
741 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
743 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
744 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
745 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
746 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
747 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
748 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
749 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
750 channel_creation_height: u32,
752 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
755 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
760 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
762 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
765 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
769 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
770 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
773 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
775 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
777 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
778 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
780 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
783 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
784 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
786 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
788 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
789 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
791 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
792 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
793 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
795 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
797 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
799 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
800 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
801 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
802 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
804 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
805 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
806 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
808 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
809 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
810 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
812 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
813 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
814 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
815 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
817 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
818 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
819 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
821 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
822 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
823 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
824 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
825 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
827 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
828 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
830 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
831 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
832 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
833 /// unblock the state machine.
835 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
836 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
837 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
839 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
840 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
841 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
843 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
844 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
845 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
846 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
847 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
848 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
849 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
850 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
852 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
853 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
855 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
856 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
857 // the channel's funding UTXO.
859 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
860 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
861 // associated channel mapping.
863 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
864 // to store all of them.
865 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
867 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
868 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
869 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
870 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
871 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
873 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
874 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
876 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
877 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
879 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
880 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
881 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
883 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
884 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
885 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
888 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.update_time_counter
894 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
895 self.latest_monitor_update_id
898 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
899 self.config.announced_channel
902 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
903 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
906 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
907 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
908 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
909 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
912 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
913 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
914 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
917 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
918 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
919 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
920 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
921 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
924 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
925 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
926 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
927 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
929 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
930 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
932 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
933 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
935 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
936 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
938 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
941 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
942 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
943 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
944 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
946 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
947 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
948 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
949 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
952 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
953 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
954 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
955 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
956 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
961 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
965 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
967 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
968 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
969 self.temporary_channel_id
972 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
976 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
977 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
978 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
982 /// Gets the channel's type
983 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
987 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
989 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
990 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
991 self.short_channel_id
994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
995 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
996 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
999 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1000 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1001 self.outbound_scid_alias
1004 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1005 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
1006 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1007 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1008 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1011 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1012 /// get_funding_created.
1013 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1014 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1017 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1018 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1019 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1022 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1023 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1024 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1025 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1029 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1032 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1033 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1036 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1037 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1041 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1042 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1045 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1046 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1051 self.counterparty_node_id
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1059 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1060 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1061 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1064 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1065 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1068 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1069 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1070 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1072 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1076 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1077 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1078 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1081 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1082 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1086 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1087 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1088 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1090 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1091 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1096 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1097 self.channel_value_satoshis
1100 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1101 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1104 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1105 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1108 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1109 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1112 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1113 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1114 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1115 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1118 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1122 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1123 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1124 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1127 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1128 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1129 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1132 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1133 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1137 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1138 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1139 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1142 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1143 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1144 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1147 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1148 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1149 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1152 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1153 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1154 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1155 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1156 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1159 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1161 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1162 self.prev_config = None;
1166 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1167 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1171 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1172 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1173 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1174 let did_channel_update =
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1176 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1177 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1178 if did_channel_update {
1179 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1180 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1181 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1184 self.config.options = *config;
1188 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1189 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1193 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1194 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1195 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1196 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1197 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1199 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1200 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1201 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1202 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1203 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1204 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1205 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1207 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1208 where L::Target: Logger
1210 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1211 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1212 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1214 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1215 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1217 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1219 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1220 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1221 if match update_state {
1222 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1223 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1224 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1226 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1228 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1232 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1233 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1234 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1235 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1237 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1238 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1239 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1241 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1242 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1243 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1244 transaction_output_index: None
1249 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1250 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1251 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1266 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1267 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1270 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1272 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1273 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1274 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1276 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1277 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1284 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1285 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1289 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1293 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1294 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1296 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1298 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1299 if generated_by_local {
1300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1301 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1310 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1312 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1313 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1314 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1318 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1321 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1322 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1328 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1329 preimages.push(preimage);
1333 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1334 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1339 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1341 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1342 if !generated_by_local {
1343 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1351 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1352 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1353 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1354 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1355 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1356 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1357 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1358 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1363 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1364 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1365 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1367 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1369 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1370 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1371 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1372 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1375 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1376 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1377 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1378 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1380 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1383 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1384 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1385 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1386 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1388 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1391 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1397 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1398 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1403 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1405 let channel_parameters =
1406 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1407 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1408 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1415 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1418 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1419 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1420 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1421 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1423 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1424 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1425 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1433 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1434 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1440 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1441 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1442 /// our counterparty!)
1443 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1444 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1445 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1446 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1447 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1455 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1456 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1457 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1458 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1459 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1460 //may see payments to it!
1461 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1462 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1463 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1465 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1468 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1469 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1470 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1471 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1472 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1475 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1476 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1479 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1483 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1484 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1485 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1486 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1487 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1488 // which are near the dust limit.
1489 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1490 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1491 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1492 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1495 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1496 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1498 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1501 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1502 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1503 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1506 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1507 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1509 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1510 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1511 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1512 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1514 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1515 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1518 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1521 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1522 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1523 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1525 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1527 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1530 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1532 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1533 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1540 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1542 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1543 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1544 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1545 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1547 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1548 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1551 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1554 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1555 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1556 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1558 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1560 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1563 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1566 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1571 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1572 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1573 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1574 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1575 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1576 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1578 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1579 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1588 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1589 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1590 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1591 /// corner case properly.
1592 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1593 -> AvailableBalances
1594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let context = &self;
1597 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1598 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1599 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1601 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1602 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1603 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1604 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1607 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1609 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1610 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1612 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1614 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1616 if context.is_outbound() {
1617 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1618 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1620 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1621 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1623 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1624 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1625 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1626 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1629 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1630 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1631 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1632 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1634 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1635 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1636 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1637 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1638 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1639 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1640 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1641 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1642 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1643 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1645 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1648 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1649 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1650 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1651 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1652 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1655 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1656 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1658 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1659 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1660 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1662 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1663 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1664 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1665 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1669 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1671 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1672 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1673 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1674 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1675 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1676 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1677 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1679 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1680 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1682 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1683 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1684 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1686 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1687 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1688 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1689 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1690 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1693 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1694 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1695 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1696 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1697 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1698 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1701 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1702 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1703 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1705 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1709 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1710 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1712 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1713 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1717 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1718 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1719 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1720 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1722 outbound_capacity_msat,
1723 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1724 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1729 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1730 let context = &self;
1731 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1734 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1735 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1737 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1738 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1740 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1741 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1743 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1744 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1745 let context = &self;
1746 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1748 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1751 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1752 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1754 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1755 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1757 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1758 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1760 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1761 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1765 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1766 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1772 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1773 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1777 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1778 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1779 included_htlcs += 1;
1782 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1783 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1787 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1788 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1789 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1790 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1791 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1792 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1797 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1799 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1800 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1805 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1806 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1810 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1811 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1812 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1815 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1816 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1818 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1819 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1820 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1822 total_pending_htlcs,
1823 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1824 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1825 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1827 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1828 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1829 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1831 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1833 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1838 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1839 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1841 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1842 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1844 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1845 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1847 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1848 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1849 let context = &self;
1850 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1852 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1855 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1856 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1858 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1859 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1861 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1862 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1864 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1865 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1870 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1876 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1877 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1878 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1879 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1880 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1881 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1884 included_htlcs += 1;
1887 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1888 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1891 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1892 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1894 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1895 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1896 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1901 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1902 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1903 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1906 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1907 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1909 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1910 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1912 total_pending_htlcs,
1913 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1914 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1915 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1917 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1919 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1921 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1923 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1928 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1929 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1930 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1931 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1937 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1938 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1939 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1940 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1941 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1942 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1943 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1944 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1945 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1946 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1947 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1949 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1950 // return them to fail the payment.
1951 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1952 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1953 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1955 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1956 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1961 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1962 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1963 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1964 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1965 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1966 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1967 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1968 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1969 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1970 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1971 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1972 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1973 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1978 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1979 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1980 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1984 // Internal utility functions for channels
1986 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1987 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1988 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1990 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1992 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1993 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1994 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1996 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1999 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2001 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2004 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2005 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2006 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2008 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2010 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2011 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2012 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2013 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2014 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2017 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2018 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2019 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2020 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2021 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2022 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2023 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2026 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2027 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2029 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2030 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2033 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2034 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2035 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2036 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2037 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2038 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2041 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2042 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2043 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2046 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2047 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2048 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2049 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2052 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2053 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2055 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2056 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2057 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2061 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2062 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2063 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2064 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2065 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2067 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2068 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2069 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2070 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2071 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2072 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2073 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2074 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2075 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2076 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2081 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2082 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2083 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2084 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2085 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2086 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2088 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2090 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2091 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2092 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2093 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2094 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2095 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2096 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2097 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2099 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2100 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2110 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2111 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2112 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2113 // outside of those situations will fail.
2114 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2118 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2123 1 + // script length (0)
2127 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2128 2 + // witness marker and flag
2129 1 + // witness element count
2130 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2131 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2132 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2133 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2134 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2135 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2137 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2138 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2139 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2145 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2146 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2147 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2148 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2150 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2151 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2152 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2154 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2155 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2156 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2157 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2158 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2159 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2162 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2163 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2166 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2167 value_to_holder = 0;
2170 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2171 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2172 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2173 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2175 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2176 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2179 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2180 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2183 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2186 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2187 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2189 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2191 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2192 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2193 where L::Target: Logger {
2194 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2195 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2196 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2197 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2198 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2199 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2200 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2201 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2205 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2206 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2207 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2208 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2210 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2211 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2213 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2215 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2217 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2218 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2219 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2221 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2222 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2223 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2224 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2225 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2227 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2228 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2229 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2231 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2232 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2234 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2237 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2238 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2242 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2246 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2248 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2249 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2250 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2251 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2254 // Now update local state:
2256 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2257 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2258 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2259 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2260 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2261 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2262 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2266 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2267 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2268 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2269 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2270 // do not not get into this branch.
2271 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2272 match pending_update {
2273 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2274 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2275 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2276 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2277 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2278 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2279 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2282 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2283 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2284 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2285 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2286 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2287 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2288 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2294 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2295 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2296 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2298 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2299 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2300 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2302 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2303 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2306 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2307 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2309 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2310 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2312 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2313 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2316 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2319 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2320 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2321 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2322 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2327 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2328 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2329 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2330 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2331 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2332 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2333 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2334 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2335 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2336 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2337 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2338 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2339 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2340 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2341 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2343 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2344 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2345 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2346 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2347 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2350 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2351 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2352 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2358 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2359 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2361 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2365 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2366 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2367 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2368 /// before we fail backwards.
2370 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2371 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2372 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2373 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2374 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2375 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2376 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2379 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2380 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2381 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2382 /// before we fail backwards.
2384 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2385 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2386 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2387 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2388 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2389 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2390 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2392 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2394 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2395 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2396 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2398 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2399 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2400 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2402 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2403 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2404 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2406 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2411 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2412 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2418 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2419 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2420 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2421 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2422 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2426 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2427 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2428 force_holding_cell = true;
2431 // Now update local state:
2432 if force_holding_cell {
2433 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2434 match pending_update {
2435 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2436 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2437 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2438 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2442 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2443 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2444 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2445 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2451 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2452 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2453 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2459 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2461 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2462 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2465 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2466 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2467 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2472 // Message handlers:
2474 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2475 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2476 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2477 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2478 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2480 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2483 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2486 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2489 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2490 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2491 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2492 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2495 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2497 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2498 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2499 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2500 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2502 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2503 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2505 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2506 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2508 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2509 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2510 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2511 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2512 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2513 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2517 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2518 initial_commitment_tx,
2521 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2522 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2525 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2526 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2529 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2530 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2531 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2532 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2533 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2534 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2535 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2536 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2537 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2538 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2539 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2540 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2542 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2544 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2546 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2547 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2548 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2549 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2551 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2553 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2554 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2558 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2559 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2561 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2562 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2563 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2564 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2566 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2569 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2570 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2574 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2575 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2576 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2577 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2578 // when routing outbound payments.
2579 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2583 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2585 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2586 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2587 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2588 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2589 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2590 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2591 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2592 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2593 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2595 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2596 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2597 let expected_point =
2598 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2599 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2601 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2602 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2603 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2604 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2605 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2606 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2608 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2609 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2610 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2611 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2612 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2614 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2622 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2623 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2625 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2627 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2630 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2631 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2632 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2633 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2634 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2635 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2637 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2638 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2639 if local_sent_shutdown {
2640 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2642 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2643 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2644 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2647 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2650 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2653 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2656 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2660 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2661 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2662 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2665 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2668 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2669 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2670 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2671 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2672 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2673 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2674 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2675 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2676 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2677 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2678 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2680 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2681 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2682 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2683 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2684 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2685 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2689 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2690 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2693 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2694 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2695 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2697 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2698 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2699 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2700 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2701 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2702 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2703 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2707 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2708 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2709 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2710 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2711 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2712 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2713 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2717 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2718 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2719 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2720 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2721 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2725 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2726 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2727 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2728 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2729 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2731 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2735 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2736 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2739 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2740 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2741 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2742 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2743 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2744 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2745 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2746 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2747 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2748 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2749 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2750 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2751 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2752 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2753 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2754 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2757 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2758 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2759 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2760 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2764 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2767 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2771 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2772 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2773 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2777 // Now update local state:
2778 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2779 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2780 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2781 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2782 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2783 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2784 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2789 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2791 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2792 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2793 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2794 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2795 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2796 None => fail_reason.into(),
2797 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2798 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2799 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2802 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2806 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2808 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2809 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2811 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2817 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2820 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2821 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2824 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2828 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2831 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2832 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2835 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2839 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2843 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2844 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2847 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2851 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2855 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2856 where L::Target: Logger
2858 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2861 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2864 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2868 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2870 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2872 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2873 let commitment_txid = {
2874 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2875 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2876 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2878 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2879 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2880 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2881 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2882 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2887 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2889 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2890 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2891 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2892 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2895 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2896 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2897 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2903 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2904 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2905 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2906 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2907 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2908 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2909 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2910 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2911 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2912 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2913 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2919 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2923 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2924 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2925 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2926 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2927 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2928 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2929 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2930 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2931 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2932 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2933 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2934 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2935 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2938 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2939 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2940 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2941 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2942 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2943 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2944 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2946 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2947 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2948 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2949 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2950 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2951 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2952 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2955 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2956 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2959 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2961 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2962 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2963 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2966 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2969 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2970 commitment_stats.tx,
2972 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2973 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2974 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2977 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2978 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2980 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2981 let mut need_commitment = false;
2982 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2983 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2984 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2985 need_commitment = true;
2989 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2990 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2991 Some(forward_info.clone())
2993 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2994 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2995 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2996 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2997 need_commitment = true;
3000 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3001 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3002 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3003 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3004 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3005 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3006 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3007 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3008 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3009 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3010 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3011 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3012 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3013 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3015 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3017 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3018 need_commitment = true;
3022 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3023 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3024 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3025 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3026 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3027 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3029 nondust_htlc_sources,
3033 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3034 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3035 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3036 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3038 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3039 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3040 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3041 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3042 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3043 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3044 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3045 // includes the right HTLCs.
3046 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3047 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3048 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3049 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3050 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3051 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3053 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3054 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3055 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3058 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3059 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3060 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3061 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3062 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3063 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3064 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3065 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3066 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3070 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3071 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3072 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3073 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3076 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3077 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3078 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3079 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3080 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3081 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3082 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3084 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3085 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3086 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3087 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3090 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3091 /// for our counterparty.
3092 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3093 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3094 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3095 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3097 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3098 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3099 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3100 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3102 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3103 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3104 updates: Vec::new(),
3107 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3108 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3109 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3110 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3111 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3112 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3113 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3114 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3115 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3116 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3117 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3118 // to rebalance channels.
3119 match &htlc_update {
3120 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3121 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3122 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3124 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3125 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3127 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3130 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3131 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3132 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3133 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3134 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3135 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3136 // into the holding cell without ever being
3137 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3138 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3139 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3142 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3148 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3149 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3150 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3151 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3152 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3153 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3154 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3155 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3156 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3157 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3158 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3159 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3162 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3163 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3164 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3165 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3166 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3167 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3168 // for a full revocation before failing.
3169 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3170 update_fail_count += 1;
3173 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3175 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3182 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3183 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3185 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3186 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3191 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3192 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3193 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3195 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3197 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3198 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3199 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3201 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3202 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3208 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3209 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3210 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3211 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3212 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3213 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3214 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3215 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3216 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3218 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3221 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3224 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3228 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3230 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3231 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3236 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3237 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3238 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3239 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3240 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3241 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3242 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3243 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3249 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3250 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3253 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3254 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3256 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3258 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3259 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3260 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3261 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3262 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3263 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3264 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3265 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3269 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3270 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3271 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3272 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3273 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3274 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3275 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3276 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3277 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3279 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3280 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3283 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3284 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3285 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3286 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3287 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3288 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3289 let mut require_commitment = false;
3290 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3293 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3294 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3295 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3297 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3298 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3299 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3300 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3301 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3302 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3307 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3308 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3309 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3310 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3311 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3313 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3314 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3315 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3320 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3321 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3323 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3327 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3328 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3330 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3331 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3332 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3333 require_commitment = true;
3334 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3335 match forward_info {
3336 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3337 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3338 require_commitment = true;
3340 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3341 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3342 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3344 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3345 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3346 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3350 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3351 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3352 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3353 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3359 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3360 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3361 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3362 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3364 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3365 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3366 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3367 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3368 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3369 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3370 require_commitment = true;
3374 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3376 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3377 match update_state {
3378 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3379 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3380 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3381 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3382 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3384 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3385 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3386 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3387 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3388 require_commitment = true;
3389 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3390 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3395 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3396 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3397 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3398 if require_commitment {
3399 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3400 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3401 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3402 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3403 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3404 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3405 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3406 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3407 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3409 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3410 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3411 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3412 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3413 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3416 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3417 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3418 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3419 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3420 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3421 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3423 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3424 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3426 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3427 if require_commitment {
3428 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3430 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3431 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3432 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3433 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3435 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3436 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3437 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3438 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3440 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3441 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3442 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3448 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3449 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3450 /// commitment update.
3451 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3452 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3453 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3455 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3456 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3459 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3460 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3461 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3462 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3464 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3465 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3466 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3467 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3468 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3469 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3470 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3472 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3473 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3475 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3476 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3478 if !self.context.is_live() {
3479 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3482 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3483 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3484 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3485 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3486 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3487 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3488 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3489 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3490 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3491 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3495 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3496 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3497 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3498 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3499 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3500 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3503 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3504 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3508 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3509 force_holding_cell = true;
3512 if force_holding_cell {
3513 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3517 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3518 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3520 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3521 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3526 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3527 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3529 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3531 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3532 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3533 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3534 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3538 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3539 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3540 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3544 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3545 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3548 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3549 // will be retransmitted.
3550 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3551 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3552 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3554 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3555 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3557 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3558 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3559 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3560 // this HTLC accordingly
3561 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3564 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3565 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3566 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3567 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3570 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3571 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3572 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3573 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3574 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3575 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3580 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3582 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3583 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3584 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3585 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3589 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3590 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3591 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3592 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3593 // the update upon reconnection.
3594 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3598 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3600 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3601 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3604 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3605 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3606 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3607 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3608 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3609 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3610 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3612 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3613 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3614 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3615 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3616 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3617 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3618 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3620 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3621 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3622 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3623 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3624 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3625 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3626 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3629 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3630 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3631 /// to the remote side.
3632 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3633 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3634 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3635 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3638 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3640 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3641 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3643 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3644 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3645 // first received the funding_signed.
3646 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3647 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3648 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3650 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3651 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3652 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3653 funding_broadcastable = None;
3656 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3657 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3658 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3659 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3660 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3661 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3662 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3663 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3664 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3666 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3667 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3668 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3669 next_per_commitment_point,
3670 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3674 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3676 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3677 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3678 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3679 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3680 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3681 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3683 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3684 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3685 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3686 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3687 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3688 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3692 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3693 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3695 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3696 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3697 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3700 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3701 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3702 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3703 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3704 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3705 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3706 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3707 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3708 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3712 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3715 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3718 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3721 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3722 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3724 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3725 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3726 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3727 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3728 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3729 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3730 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3731 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3732 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3733 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3734 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3735 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3737 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3739 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3741 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3747 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3748 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3749 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3750 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3751 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3752 per_commitment_secret,
3753 next_per_commitment_point,
3755 next_local_nonce: None,
3759 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3760 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3761 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3762 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3763 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3765 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3766 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3767 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3768 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3769 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3770 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3771 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3772 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3773 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3774 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3779 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3780 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3782 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3783 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3784 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3785 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3786 reason: err_packet.clone()
3789 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3790 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3791 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3792 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3793 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3794 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3797 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3798 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3799 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3800 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3801 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3808 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3809 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3810 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3811 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3815 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3816 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3817 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3818 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3819 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3820 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3824 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3825 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3827 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3828 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3829 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3830 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3831 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3832 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3833 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3834 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3837 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3839 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3840 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3841 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3842 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3846 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3847 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3851 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3852 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3853 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3854 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3855 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3858 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3859 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3860 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3861 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3862 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3865 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3866 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3867 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3868 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3869 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3870 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3871 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3872 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3876 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3877 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3878 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3879 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3881 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3885 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3886 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3887 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3888 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3890 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3891 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3892 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3893 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3894 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3898 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3900 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3901 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3902 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3903 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3904 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3907 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3908 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3909 channel_ready: None,
3910 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3911 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3912 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3916 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3917 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3918 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3919 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3920 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3921 next_per_commitment_point,
3922 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3924 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3925 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3926 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3930 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3931 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3932 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3934 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3935 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3936 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3939 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3945 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3946 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3947 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3948 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3949 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3950 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3951 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3953 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3955 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3956 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3957 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3958 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3959 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3960 next_per_commitment_point,
3961 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3965 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3966 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3967 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3969 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3972 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3973 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3974 raa: required_revoke,
3975 commitment_update: None,
3976 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3978 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3979 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3980 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3982 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3985 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3986 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3987 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3988 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3989 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3990 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3993 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3994 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3995 raa: required_revoke,
3996 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3997 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4001 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4005 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4006 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4007 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4008 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4010 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4012 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4014 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4015 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4016 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4017 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4018 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4019 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4021 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4022 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4023 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4024 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4025 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4027 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4028 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4029 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4030 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4033 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4034 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4035 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4036 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4037 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4038 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4039 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4040 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4041 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4042 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4043 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4044 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4045 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4046 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4047 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4049 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4052 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4053 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4056 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4057 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4058 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4059 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4060 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4061 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4064 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4065 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4066 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4067 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4068 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4069 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4070 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4072 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4078 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4079 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4080 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4081 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4083 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4084 return Ok((None, None));
4087 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4088 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4089 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4091 return Ok((None, None));
4094 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4096 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4097 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4098 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4099 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4101 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4102 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4103 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4105 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4106 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4107 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4108 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4110 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4111 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4112 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4117 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4118 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4120 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4121 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4124 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4125 /// within our expected timeframe.
4127 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4128 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4129 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4132 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4135 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4136 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4139 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4140 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4141 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4142 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4144 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4147 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4148 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4149 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4150 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4153 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4154 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4158 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4160 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4164 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4165 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4166 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4169 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4172 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4173 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4174 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4175 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4177 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4180 assert!(send_shutdown);
4181 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4182 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4183 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4185 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4188 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4193 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4195 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4196 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4198 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4199 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4200 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4201 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4202 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4203 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4206 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4207 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4209 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4210 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4211 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4212 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4216 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4217 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4218 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4219 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4220 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4221 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4223 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4224 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4231 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4232 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4234 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4237 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4238 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4240 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4242 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4243 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4244 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4245 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4246 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4247 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4248 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4249 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4250 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4252 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4253 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4256 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4260 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4261 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4262 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4263 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4265 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4268 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4271 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4274 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4278 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4282 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4283 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4284 return Ok((None, None));
4287 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4288 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4289 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4292 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4294 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4297 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4298 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4299 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4300 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4301 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4305 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4306 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4311 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4312 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4313 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4314 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4315 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4316 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4317 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4321 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4323 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4324 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4325 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4326 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4328 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4331 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4332 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4333 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4335 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4336 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4337 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4338 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4342 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4343 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4344 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4345 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4347 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4348 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4349 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4355 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4356 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4357 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4359 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4360 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4362 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4366 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4367 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4368 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4369 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4370 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4372 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4374 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4376 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4377 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4380 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4381 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4382 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4383 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4384 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4385 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4386 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4387 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4392 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4393 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4394 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4395 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4401 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4402 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4403 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4404 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4406 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4412 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4413 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4414 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4415 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4416 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4417 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4418 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4420 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4421 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4424 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4426 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4427 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4433 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4434 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4435 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4436 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4437 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4438 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4439 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4441 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4442 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4449 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4450 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4453 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4454 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4457 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4458 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4462 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4463 &self.context.holder_signer
4467 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4469 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4470 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4471 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4472 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4473 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4474 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4476 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4478 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4486 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4487 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4491 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4492 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4493 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4494 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4497 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4498 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4499 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4500 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4503 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4504 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4505 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4506 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4507 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4508 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4511 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4512 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4513 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4514 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4515 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4516 if !release_monitor {
4517 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4526 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4527 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4530 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4531 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4532 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4534 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4535 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4536 if self.context.channel_state &
4537 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4538 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4539 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4540 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4541 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4544 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4545 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4546 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4547 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4548 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4549 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4551 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4552 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4553 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4555 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4556 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4557 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4558 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4559 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4560 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4566 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4567 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4568 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4571 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4572 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4573 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4576 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4577 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4578 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4581 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4582 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4583 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4584 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4585 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4586 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4591 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4592 self.context.channel_update_status
4595 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4596 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4597 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4600 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4602 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4603 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4604 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4608 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4609 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4610 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4613 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4617 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4618 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4619 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4621 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4622 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4623 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4625 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4626 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4629 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4630 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4631 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4632 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4633 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4634 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4635 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4636 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4637 self.context.channel_state);
4639 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4643 if need_commitment_update {
4644 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4645 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4646 let next_per_commitment_point =
4647 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4648 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4649 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4650 next_per_commitment_point,
4651 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4655 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4661 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4662 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4663 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4664 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4665 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4666 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4667 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4669 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4672 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4673 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4674 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4675 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4676 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4677 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4678 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4679 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4680 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4681 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4682 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4683 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4684 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4685 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4686 // channel and move on.
4687 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4688 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4690 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4691 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4692 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4694 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4695 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4696 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4697 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4698 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4699 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4700 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4704 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4705 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4706 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4707 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4708 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4712 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4713 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4714 // may have already happened for this block).
4715 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4716 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4717 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4718 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4721 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4722 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4723 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4724 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4732 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4733 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4734 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4735 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4737 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4738 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4741 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4743 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4744 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4745 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4746 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4748 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4751 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4754 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4755 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4756 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4757 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4759 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4762 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4763 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4764 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4766 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4767 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4769 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4770 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4771 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4779 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4781 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4782 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4783 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4785 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4786 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4789 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4790 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4791 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4792 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4793 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4794 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4795 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4796 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4797 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4800 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4801 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4802 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4803 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4805 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4806 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4807 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4809 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4810 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4811 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4812 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4814 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4815 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4816 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4817 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4818 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4819 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4820 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4823 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4824 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4826 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4829 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4830 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4831 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4832 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4833 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4834 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4835 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4836 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4837 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4838 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4839 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4840 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4841 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4842 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4843 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4844 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4845 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4851 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4856 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4857 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4859 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4860 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4861 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4862 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4864 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4867 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4869 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4870 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4871 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4872 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4873 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4874 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4876 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4877 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4880 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4881 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4882 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4883 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4884 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4885 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4887 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4888 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4891 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4892 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4893 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4894 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4895 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4901 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4902 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4903 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4904 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4906 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4909 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4913 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4917 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4918 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4922 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4926 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4927 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4930 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4934 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4936 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4941 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4943 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4948 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4950 None => return None,
4953 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4955 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4956 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4958 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4959 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4963 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4965 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4966 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4967 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4968 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4969 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4970 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4971 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4973 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4974 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4975 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4976 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4977 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4978 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4979 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4980 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4981 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4982 contents: announcement,
4985 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4989 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4990 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4991 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4992 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4993 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4994 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4995 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4996 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4998 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5000 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5002 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5003 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5005 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5007 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5008 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5011 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5012 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5013 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5014 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5017 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5020 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5021 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5022 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5023 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5024 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5025 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5028 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5030 Err(_) => return None,
5032 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5033 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5038 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5039 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5040 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5041 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5042 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5043 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5044 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5045 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5046 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5047 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5048 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5049 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5050 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5051 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5052 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5053 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5056 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5059 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5060 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5061 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5062 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5063 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5064 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5065 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5066 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5067 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5069 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5070 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5071 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5072 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5073 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5074 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5075 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5076 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5077 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5079 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5080 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5081 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5082 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5083 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5084 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5085 next_funding_txid: None,
5090 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5092 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5093 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5094 /// commitment update.
5096 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5097 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5098 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5099 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5100 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5101 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5102 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5105 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5106 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5107 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5109 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5110 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5115 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5116 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5118 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5120 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5121 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5123 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5124 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5125 /// regenerate them.
5127 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5128 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5130 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5131 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5132 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5133 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5134 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5135 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5136 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5138 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5139 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5141 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5142 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5143 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5146 if amount_msat == 0 {
5147 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5150 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5151 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5152 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5153 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5156 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5157 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5158 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5161 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5162 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5163 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5164 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5165 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5166 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5167 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5168 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5171 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5172 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5173 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5174 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5175 else { "to peer" });
5177 if need_holding_cell {
5178 force_holding_cell = true;
5181 // Now update local state:
5182 if force_holding_cell {
5183 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5188 onion_routing_packet,
5194 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5195 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5197 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5199 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5204 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5205 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5206 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5210 onion_routing_packet,
5213 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5218 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5219 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5220 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5221 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5223 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5224 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5225 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5227 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5228 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5232 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5233 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5234 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5235 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5236 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5237 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5238 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5241 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5242 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5243 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5244 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5245 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5246 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5249 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5251 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5252 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5253 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5255 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5256 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5259 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5260 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5261 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5262 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5263 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5264 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5265 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5266 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5269 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5273 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5274 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5275 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5276 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5278 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5280 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5281 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5282 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5283 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5284 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5285 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5286 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5287 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5288 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5289 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5290 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5296 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5299 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5300 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5301 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5302 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5304 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5306 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5307 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5308 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5309 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5312 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5313 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5317 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5318 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5320 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5322 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5323 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5324 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5325 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5327 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5328 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5329 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5330 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5331 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5332 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5336 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5337 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5341 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5342 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5345 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5346 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5348 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5349 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5350 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5351 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5352 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5353 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5354 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5355 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5357 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5358 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5359 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5362 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5363 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5364 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5370 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5371 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5374 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5375 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5376 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5377 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5383 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5384 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5386 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5387 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5388 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5389 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5390 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5391 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5392 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5393 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5397 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5398 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5399 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5401 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5402 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5405 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5406 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5408 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5409 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5410 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5413 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5414 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5415 let mut chan_closed = false;
5416 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5420 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5422 None if !chan_closed => {
5423 // use override shutdown script if provided
5424 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5425 Some(script) => script,
5427 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5428 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5429 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5430 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5434 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5435 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5437 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5443 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5444 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5445 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5446 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5448 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5450 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5452 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5453 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5454 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5455 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5456 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5457 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5460 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5461 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5463 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5464 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5465 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5468 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5469 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5470 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5471 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5472 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5474 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5475 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5482 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5483 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5485 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5488 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5489 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5490 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5492 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5493 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5497 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5501 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5502 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5503 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5504 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5507 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5508 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5509 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5510 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5511 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5512 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5513 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5514 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5517 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5518 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5519 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5520 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5522 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5523 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5525 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5526 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5528 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5529 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5532 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5533 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5535 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5536 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5537 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5538 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5539 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5542 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5543 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5545 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5546 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5548 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5550 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5552 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5553 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5554 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5555 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5558 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5559 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5561 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5562 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5563 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5564 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5568 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5569 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5570 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5574 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5575 Ok(script) => script,
5576 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5579 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5582 context: ChannelContext {
5585 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5586 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5587 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5588 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5593 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5595 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5596 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5597 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5598 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5600 channel_value_satoshis,
5602 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5605 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5608 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5609 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5612 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5613 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5614 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5615 pending_update_fee: None,
5616 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5617 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5618 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5619 update_time_counter: 1,
5621 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5623 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5624 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5625 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5626 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5627 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5628 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5630 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5631 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5632 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5633 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5635 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5636 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5637 closing_fee_limits: None,
5638 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5640 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5641 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5642 short_channel_id: None,
5643 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5645 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5646 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5647 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5648 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5649 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5651 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5652 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5653 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5654 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5655 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5656 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5658 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5660 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5661 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5662 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5663 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5664 counterparty_parameters: None,
5665 funding_outpoint: None,
5666 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5668 funding_transaction: None,
5670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5672 counterparty_node_id,
5674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5679 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5681 announcement_sigs: None,
5683 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5684 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5685 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5686 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5688 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5689 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5691 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5692 outbound_scid_alias,
5694 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5695 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5698 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5703 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5705 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5709 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5710 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5711 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5712 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5713 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5714 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5717 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5718 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5719 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5720 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5721 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5722 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5723 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5724 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5725 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5726 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5727 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5729 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5730 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5732 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5733 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5734 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5735 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5738 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5739 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5741 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5744 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5745 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5746 return Err((self, e));
5750 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5752 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5754 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5755 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5756 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5758 let channel = Channel {
5759 context: self.context,
5762 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5763 temporary_channel_id,
5764 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5765 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5768 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5770 next_local_nonce: None,
5774 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5775 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5776 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5777 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5778 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5779 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5780 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5781 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5782 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5783 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5786 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5787 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5788 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5789 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5790 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5791 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5797 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5798 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5799 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5800 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5801 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5802 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5804 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5806 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5807 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5808 // We've exhausted our options
5811 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5812 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5815 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5816 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5817 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5818 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5820 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5821 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5822 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5823 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5824 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5825 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5827 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5829 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5830 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5833 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5834 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5835 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5837 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5838 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5841 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5842 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5845 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5846 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5850 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5851 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5852 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5853 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5854 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5855 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5856 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5857 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5858 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5859 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5860 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5861 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5862 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5863 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5864 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5865 first_per_commitment_point,
5866 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5867 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5868 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5869 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5871 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5876 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5877 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5879 // Check sanity of message fields:
5880 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5883 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5886 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5889 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5892 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5893 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5895 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5896 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5897 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5899 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5900 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5903 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5904 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5907 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5910 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5914 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5915 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5918 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5921 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5922 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5924 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5925 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5927 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5928 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5930 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5933 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5937 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5938 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5941 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5942 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5944 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5945 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5948 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5949 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5952 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5953 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5954 &Some(ref script) => {
5955 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5956 if script.len() == 0 {
5959 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5960 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5962 Some(script.clone())
5965 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5972 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5973 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5974 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5975 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5976 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5978 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5979 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5981 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5984 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5985 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5986 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5987 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5988 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5989 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5992 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5993 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5994 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5997 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5998 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6000 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6001 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6007 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6008 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6009 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6010 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6013 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6014 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6015 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6016 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6017 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6018 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6019 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6020 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64, is_0conf: bool,
6021 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6022 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6023 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6024 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6027 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6029 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6030 // support this channel type.
6031 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6032 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6036 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6037 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6038 // `static_remote_key`.
6039 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6042 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6043 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6046 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6049 channel_type.clone()
6051 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6052 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6058 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6059 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6060 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6061 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6062 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6063 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6064 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6065 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6066 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6069 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6073 // Check sanity of message fields:
6074 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6077 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6080 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6083 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6084 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6087 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6090 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6093 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6095 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6096 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6099 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6102 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6106 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6107 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6110 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6113 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6116 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6119 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6122 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6125 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6129 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6131 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6132 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6137 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6138 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6139 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6140 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6143 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6146 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6147 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6148 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6150 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6154 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6155 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6156 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6157 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6158 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6162 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6163 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6164 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6165 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6169 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6170 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6171 &Some(ref script) => {
6172 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6173 if script.len() == 0 {
6176 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6179 Some(script.clone())
6182 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6189 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6190 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6191 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6192 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6196 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6197 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6202 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6203 Ok(script) => script,
6204 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6207 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6208 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6210 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6213 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6217 context: ChannelContext {
6220 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6221 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6223 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6228 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6230 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6231 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6232 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6233 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6236 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6239 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6242 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6243 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6244 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6246 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6247 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6248 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6249 pending_update_fee: None,
6250 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6251 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6252 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6253 update_time_counter: 1,
6255 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6257 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6258 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6259 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6260 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6261 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6262 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6264 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6265 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6266 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6267 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6269 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6270 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6271 closing_fee_limits: None,
6272 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6274 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6275 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6276 short_channel_id: None,
6277 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6279 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6280 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6281 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6282 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6283 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6284 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6285 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6286 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6287 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6288 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6289 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6290 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6293 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6295 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6296 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6297 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6298 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6299 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6300 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6301 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6303 funding_outpoint: None,
6304 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6306 funding_transaction: None,
6308 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6309 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6310 counterparty_node_id,
6312 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6314 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6316 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6317 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6319 announcement_sigs: None,
6321 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6322 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6323 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6324 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6326 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6327 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6329 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6330 outbound_scid_alias,
6332 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6333 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6335 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6336 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6341 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6343 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6349 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6350 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6352 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6353 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6354 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6355 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6357 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6358 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6360 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6361 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6364 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6367 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6368 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6369 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6371 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6372 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6373 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6374 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6376 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6377 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6378 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6379 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6380 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6381 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6382 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6383 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6384 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6385 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6386 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6387 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6388 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6389 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6390 first_per_commitment_point,
6391 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6392 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6393 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6395 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6397 next_local_nonce: None,
6401 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6402 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6404 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6406 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6407 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6410 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6411 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6413 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6414 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6416 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6417 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6418 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6419 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6420 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6421 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6422 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6423 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6424 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6427 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6428 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6430 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6431 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6432 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6433 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6435 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6436 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6438 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6439 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6442 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6443 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6444 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6446 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6449 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6450 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6452 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6453 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6454 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6456 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6458 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6459 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6460 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6461 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6464 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6465 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6466 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6467 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6468 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6470 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6472 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6473 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6474 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6477 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6478 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6479 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6483 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6484 initial_commitment_tx,
6487 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6488 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6491 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6492 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6495 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6497 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6498 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6499 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6500 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6501 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6502 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6503 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6504 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6505 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6506 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6507 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6509 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6511 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6513 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6514 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6515 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6516 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6518 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6520 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6521 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6522 let mut channel = Channel {
6523 context: self.context,
6525 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6526 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6527 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6529 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6533 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6534 }, channel_monitor))
6538 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6539 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6541 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6547 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6548 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6549 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6550 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6551 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6553 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6554 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6555 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6556 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6562 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6563 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6564 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6565 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6566 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6567 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6572 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6573 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6574 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6575 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6577 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6578 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6579 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6580 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6585 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6586 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6587 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6588 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6589 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6590 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6595 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6596 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6597 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6600 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6602 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6603 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6604 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6605 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6606 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6608 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6609 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6610 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6611 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6613 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6614 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6615 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6617 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6619 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6620 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6621 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6622 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6623 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6624 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6626 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6627 // deserialized from that format.
6628 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6629 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6630 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6632 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6634 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6635 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6636 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6638 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6639 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6640 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6641 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6644 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6645 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6646 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6649 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6650 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6651 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6652 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6654 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6655 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6657 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6659 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6661 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6663 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6666 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6668 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6673 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6674 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6676 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6677 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6678 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6679 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6680 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6681 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6682 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6684 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6686 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6688 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6691 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6692 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6693 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6696 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6698 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6699 preimages.push(preimage);
6701 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6702 reason.write(writer)?;
6704 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6706 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6707 preimages.push(preimage);
6709 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6710 reason.write(writer)?;
6713 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6714 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6715 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6717 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6718 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6719 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6723 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6724 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6725 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6727 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6728 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6732 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6733 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6734 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6735 source.write(writer)?;
6736 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6738 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6739 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6740 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6742 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6743 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6745 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6747 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6748 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6752 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6753 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6758 match self.context.resend_order {
6759 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6760 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6763 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6764 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6765 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6767 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6768 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6769 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6770 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6773 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6774 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6775 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6776 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6777 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6780 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6781 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6782 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6783 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6785 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6786 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6787 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6789 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6791 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6792 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6793 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6794 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6796 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6797 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6798 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6799 // consider the stale state on reload.
6802 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6804 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6806 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6807 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6808 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6810 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6811 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6813 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6814 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6815 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6817 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6818 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6820 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6823 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6824 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6825 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6827 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6830 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6831 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6833 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6834 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6835 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6837 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6839 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6841 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6843 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6844 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6846 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6847 htlc.write(writer)?;
6850 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6851 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6852 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6854 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6855 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6857 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6858 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6859 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6860 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6861 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6862 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6863 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6865 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6866 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6867 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6868 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6869 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6871 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6872 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6874 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6875 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6876 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6877 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6879 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6881 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6882 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6883 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6884 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6885 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6886 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6887 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6889 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6890 (2, chan_type, option),
6891 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6892 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6893 (5, self.context.config, required),
6894 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6895 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6896 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6897 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6898 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6899 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6900 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6901 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6902 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6903 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6904 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6905 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6906 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6907 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6908 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6909 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6910 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6911 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6918 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6919 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6921 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6922 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6924 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6925 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6926 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6928 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6929 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6930 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6931 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6935 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6936 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6942 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 let mut keys_data = None;
6953 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6954 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6955 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6957 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6958 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6959 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6960 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6961 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6962 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6966 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6967 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6968 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6971 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6975 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6980 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6981 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6982 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6983 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6984 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6985 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6986 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6987 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6988 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6989 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6990 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6996 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6998 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6999 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7000 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7001 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7002 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7003 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7004 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7005 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7006 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7007 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7009 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7013 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7014 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7017 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7020 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7022 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7026 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7028 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7029 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7030 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7031 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7032 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7033 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7034 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7035 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7036 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7038 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7039 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7040 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7042 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7043 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7044 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7046 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7050 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7051 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7052 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7053 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7056 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7061 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7062 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7063 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7066 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7068 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7069 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7072 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7077 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7079 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7082 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7083 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7084 // consider the stale state on reload.
7085 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7088 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7095 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7102 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7104 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7105 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7107 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7108 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7111 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7112 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7114 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7116 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7117 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7119 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7120 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7125 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7126 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7127 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7128 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7130 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7133 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7142 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7147 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7148 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7150 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7152 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7156 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7157 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7158 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7160 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7166 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7167 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7168 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7169 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7170 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7171 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7172 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7173 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7174 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7175 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7177 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7178 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7179 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7180 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7181 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7182 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7183 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7185 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7186 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7187 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7188 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7190 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7192 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7193 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7195 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7196 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7197 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7198 (2, channel_type, option),
7199 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7200 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7201 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7202 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7203 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7204 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7205 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7206 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7207 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7208 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7209 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7210 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7211 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7212 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7213 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7214 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7215 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7216 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7217 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7218 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7219 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7222 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7223 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7224 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7225 // required channel parameters.
7226 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7227 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7228 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7230 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7232 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7233 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7234 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7235 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7238 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7239 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7240 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7242 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7243 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7245 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7246 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7251 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7252 if iter.next().is_some() {
7253 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7257 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7258 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7259 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7260 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7261 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7264 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7265 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7266 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7268 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7269 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7271 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7272 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7273 // separate u64 values.
7274 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7276 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7278 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7279 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7280 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7281 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7283 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7284 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7286 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7287 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7288 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7289 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7290 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7293 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7294 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7298 context: ChannelContext {
7301 config: config.unwrap(),
7305 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7306 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7307 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7310 temporary_channel_id,
7312 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7314 channel_value_satoshis,
7316 latest_monitor_update_id,
7319 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7322 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7323 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7326 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7327 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7328 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7329 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7333 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7334 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7335 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7336 monitor_pending_forwards,
7337 monitor_pending_failures,
7338 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7341 holding_cell_update_fee,
7342 next_holder_htlc_id,
7343 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7344 update_time_counter,
7347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7348 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7349 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7350 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7352 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7353 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7354 closing_fee_limits: None,
7355 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7357 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7358 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7360 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7362 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7363 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7364 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7365 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7366 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7367 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7368 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7369 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7370 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7373 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7375 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7376 funding_transaction,
7378 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7379 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7380 counterparty_node_id,
7382 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7386 channel_update_status,
7387 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7391 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7392 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7393 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7394 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7396 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7397 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7399 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7400 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7401 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7403 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7404 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7406 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7407 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7409 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7412 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7421 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7422 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7423 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7424 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7425 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7427 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7428 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7429 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7430 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7431 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7432 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7433 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7434 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7435 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7436 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7437 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7438 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7439 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7440 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7441 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7442 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7443 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7444 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7445 use crate::util::test_utils;
7446 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7447 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7448 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7449 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7450 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7451 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7452 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7453 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7454 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7455 use crate::prelude::*;
7457 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7460 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7461 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7467 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7468 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7469 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7470 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7474 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7475 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7476 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7477 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7478 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7479 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7480 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7481 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7485 signer: InMemorySigner,
7488 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7489 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7492 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7493 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7495 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7496 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7499 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7503 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7505 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7507 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7508 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7509 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7512 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7514 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7515 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7519 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7520 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7521 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7525 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7526 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7527 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7528 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7530 let seed = [42; 32];
7531 let network = Network::Testnet;
7532 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7533 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7534 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7537 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7538 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7539 let config = UserConfig::default();
7540 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7541 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7542 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7544 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7545 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7549 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7550 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7552 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7553 let original_fee = 253;
7554 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7555 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7556 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7557 let seed = [42; 32];
7558 let network = Network::Testnet;
7559 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7561 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7562 let config = UserConfig::default();
7563 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7565 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7566 // same as the old fee.
7567 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7568 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7569 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7573 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7574 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7575 // dust limits are used.
7576 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7577 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7578 let seed = [42; 32];
7579 let network = Network::Testnet;
7580 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7581 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7582 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7584 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7585 // they have different dust limits.
7587 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7588 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7589 let config = UserConfig::default();
7590 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7592 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7593 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7594 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7595 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7596 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7598 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7599 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7600 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7601 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7602 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7604 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7605 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7606 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7607 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7609 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7610 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7611 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7613 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7614 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7616 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7617 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7618 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7620 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7621 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7622 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7623 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7626 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7628 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7629 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7630 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7631 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7632 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7633 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7634 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7635 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7636 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7638 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7641 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7642 // the dust limit check.
7643 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7644 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7645 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7646 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7648 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7649 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7650 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7651 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7652 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7653 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7654 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7658 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7659 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7660 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7661 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7662 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7663 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7665 let seed = [42; 32];
7666 let network = Network::Testnet;
7667 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7669 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7670 let config = UserConfig::default();
7671 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7673 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7674 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7676 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7677 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7678 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7679 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7680 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7683 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7684 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7685 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7686 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7689 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7691 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7692 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7693 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7694 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7695 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7697 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7698 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7699 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7700 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7701 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7705 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7706 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7707 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7708 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7709 let seed = [42; 32];
7710 let network = Network::Testnet;
7711 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7712 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7713 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7715 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7717 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7718 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7719 let config = UserConfig::default();
7720 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7722 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7723 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7724 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7725 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7727 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7728 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7729 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7731 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7732 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7733 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7734 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7736 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7737 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7738 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7740 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7741 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7743 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7744 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7745 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7746 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7747 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7748 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7749 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7751 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7753 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7754 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7755 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7756 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7757 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7761 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7762 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7763 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7764 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7765 let seed = [42; 32];
7766 let network = Network::Testnet;
7767 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7768 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7769 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7771 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7772 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7773 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7774 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7775 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7776 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7777 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7778 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7780 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7781 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7782 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7783 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7784 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7785 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7787 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7788 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7789 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7790 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7792 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7794 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7795 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7796 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7797 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7798 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7799 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7801 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7802 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7803 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7804 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7806 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7807 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7808 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7809 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7810 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7812 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7813 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7815 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7816 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7817 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7819 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7820 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7821 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7822 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7823 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7825 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7826 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7828 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7829 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7830 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7834 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7836 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7837 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7838 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7840 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7841 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7842 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7843 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7845 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7846 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7847 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7849 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7851 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7852 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7855 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7856 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7857 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7858 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7859 let seed = [42; 32];
7860 let network = Network::Testnet;
7861 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7862 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7863 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7866 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7867 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7868 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7870 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7871 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7873 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7874 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7875 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7877 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7878 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7880 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7882 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7883 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7885 // Channel Negotiations failed
7886 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7887 assert!(result.is_err());
7892 fn channel_update() {
7893 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7894 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7895 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7896 let seed = [42; 32];
7897 let network = Network::Testnet;
7898 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7899 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7900 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7902 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7903 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7904 let config = UserConfig::default();
7905 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7907 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7908 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7909 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7910 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7911 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7913 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7914 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7915 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7916 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7917 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7919 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7920 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7921 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7922 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7924 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7925 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7926 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7928 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7929 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7931 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7932 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7933 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7935 short_channel_id: 0,
7938 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7939 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7940 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7942 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7943 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7945 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7947 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7949 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7950 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7951 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7952 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7954 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7955 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7956 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7958 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7962 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7964 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7965 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7966 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7967 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7968 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7969 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7970 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7971 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7972 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7973 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7974 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7975 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7976 use crate::sync::Arc;
7978 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7979 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7980 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7981 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7983 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7985 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7986 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7987 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7988 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7989 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7991 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7992 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7998 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7999 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8000 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8002 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8003 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8004 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8005 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8006 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8007 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8009 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8011 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8012 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8013 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8014 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8015 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8016 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8018 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8019 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8020 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8021 selected_contest_delay: 144
8023 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8024 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8026 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8027 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8029 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8030 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8032 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8033 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8035 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8036 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8037 // build_commitment_transaction.
8038 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8039 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8040 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8041 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8042 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8044 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8045 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8046 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8047 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8051 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8052 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8053 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8054 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8058 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8059 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8060 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8062 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8063 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8065 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8066 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8068 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8070 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8071 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8072 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8073 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8074 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8075 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8076 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8078 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8079 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8080 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8081 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8083 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8084 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8085 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8087 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8089 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8090 commitment_tx.clone(),
8091 counterparty_signature,
8092 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8093 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8094 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8096 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8097 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8099 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8100 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8101 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8103 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8104 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8107 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8108 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8110 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8111 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8112 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8113 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8114 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8115 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8116 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8117 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8119 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8122 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8123 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8124 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8128 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8131 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8132 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8133 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8135 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8136 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8137 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8138 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8139 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8140 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8141 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8142 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8144 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8148 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8149 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8150 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8151 "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", {});
8153 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8154 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8156 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8157 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8158 "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", {});
8160 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8161 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8162 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8163 "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", {});
8165 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8166 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8168 amount_msat: 1000000,
8170 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8171 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8173 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8176 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8177 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8179 amount_msat: 2000000,
8181 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8182 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8184 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8187 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8188 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8190 amount_msat: 2000000,
8192 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8193 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8194 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8195 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8197 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8200 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8201 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8203 amount_msat: 3000000,
8205 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8206 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8207 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8208 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8210 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8213 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8214 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8216 amount_msat: 4000000,
8218 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8219 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8221 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8225 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8226 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8227 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8229 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8230 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8231 "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", {
8234 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8235 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8236 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8239 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8240 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8241 "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" },
8244 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8245 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8246 "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" },
8249 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8250 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8251 "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" },
8254 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8255 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8256 "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" }
8259 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8260 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8261 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8263 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8264 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8265 "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", {
8268 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8269 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8270 "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" },
8273 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8274 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8275 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8278 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8279 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8280 "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" },
8283 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8284 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8285 "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" },
8288 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8289 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8290 "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" }
8293 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8294 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8295 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8297 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8298 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8299 "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", {
8302 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8303 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8304 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8307 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8308 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8309 "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" },
8312 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8313 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8314 "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" },
8317 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8318 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8319 "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" }
8322 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8323 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8324 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8325 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8327 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8328 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8329 "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", {
8332 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8333 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8334 "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" },
8337 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8338 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8339 "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" },
8342 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8343 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8344 "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" },
8347 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8348 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8349 "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" }
8352 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8353 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8354 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8355 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8357 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8358 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8359 "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", {
8362 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8363 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8364 "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" },
8367 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8368 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8369 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8372 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8373 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8374 "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" },
8377 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8378 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8379 "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" }
8382 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8383 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8384 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8386 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8387 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8388 "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", {
8391 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8392 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8393 "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" },
8396 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8397 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8398 "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" },
8401 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8402 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8403 "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" }
8406 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8407 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8408 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8410 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8411 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8412 "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", {
8415 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8416 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8417 "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" },
8420 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8421 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8422 "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" },
8425 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8426 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8427 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8430 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8431 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8432 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8434 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8435 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8436 "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", {
8439 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8440 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8441 "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" },
8444 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8445 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8446 "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" }
8449 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8452 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8453 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8454 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8456 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8457 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8458 "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", {
8461 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8462 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8463 "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" },
8466 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8467 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8468 "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" }
8471 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8472 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8473 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8474 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8475 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8477 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8478 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8479 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8482 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8483 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8484 "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" },
8487 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8488 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8489 "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" }
8492 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8493 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8494 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8496 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8497 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8498 "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", {
8501 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8502 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8503 "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" }
8506 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8507 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8508 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8509 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8510 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8512 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8513 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8514 "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", {
8517 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8518 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8519 "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" }
8522 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8523 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8524 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8525 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8526 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8528 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8529 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8530 "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", {
8533 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8534 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8535 "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" }
8538 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8539 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8540 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8541 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8543 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8544 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8545 "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", {});
8547 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8548 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8549 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8550 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8551 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8553 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8554 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8555 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8557 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8558 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8559 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8560 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8561 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8563 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8564 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8565 "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", {});
8567 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8568 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8569 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8571 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8572 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8573 "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", {});
8575 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8576 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8577 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8578 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8579 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8581 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8582 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8583 "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", {});
8585 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8586 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8587 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8588 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8589 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8591 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8592 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8593 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8595 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8597 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8598 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8599 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8600 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8602 amount_msat: 2000000,
8604 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8605 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8607 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8610 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8611 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8612 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8614 amount_msat: 5000001,
8616 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8617 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8618 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8619 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8621 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8624 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8625 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8627 amount_msat: 5000000,
8629 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8630 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8631 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8632 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8634 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8638 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8639 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8640 "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", {
8643 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8644 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8645 "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" },
8647 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8648 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8649 "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" },
8651 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8652 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8653 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8656 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8657 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8658 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8659 "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", {
8662 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8663 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8664 "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" },
8666 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8667 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8668 "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" },
8670 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8671 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8672 "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" }
8677 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8678 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8680 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8681 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8682 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8683 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8685 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8686 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8687 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8689 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8690 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8692 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8693 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8695 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8696 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8697 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8701 fn test_key_derivation() {
8702 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8703 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8705 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8706 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8708 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8709 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8711 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8712 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8714 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8715 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8717 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8718 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8720 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8721 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8723 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8724 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8728 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8729 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8730 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8731 let seed = [42; 32];
8732 let network = Network::Testnet;
8733 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8734 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8736 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8737 let config = UserConfig::default();
8738 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8739 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8741 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8742 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8744 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8745 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8746 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8747 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8748 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8749 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8750 assert!(res.is_ok());
8754 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8755 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8756 // resulting `channel_type`.
8757 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8758 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8759 let network = Network::Testnet;
8760 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8761 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8763 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8764 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8766 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8767 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8769 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8770 // need to signal it.
8771 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8772 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8773 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8776 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8778 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8779 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8780 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8782 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8783 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8784 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8787 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8788 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8789 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8790 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8791 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8794 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8795 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8799 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8800 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8801 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8803 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8804 let network = Network::Testnet;
8805 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8806 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8808 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8809 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8811 let config = UserConfig::default();
8813 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8814 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8815 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8816 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8817 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8819 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8820 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8821 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8824 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8825 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8826 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8828 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8829 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8830 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8831 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8832 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8833 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8835 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8839 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8840 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8842 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8843 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8844 let network = Network::Testnet;
8845 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8846 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8848 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8849 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8851 let config = UserConfig::default();
8853 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8854 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8855 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8856 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8857 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8858 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8859 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8860 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8862 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8863 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8864 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8865 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8866 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8867 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8870 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8871 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8873 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8874 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8875 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8876 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8878 assert!(res.is_err());
8880 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8881 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8882 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8884 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8885 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8886 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8889 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8891 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8892 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8893 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8894 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42, /*is_0conf=*/false
8897 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8898 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8900 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8901 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8903 assert!(res.is_err());