1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
504 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
505 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
507 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
508 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
509 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
511 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
512 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
513 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
514 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
516 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
517 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
519 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
521 holder_signer: Signer,
522 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
523 destination_script: Script,
525 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
526 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
527 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
529 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
532 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
533 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
534 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
536 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
537 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
538 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
539 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
540 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
541 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
543 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
545 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
546 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
547 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
549 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
550 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
551 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
552 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
553 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
554 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
555 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
557 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
559 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
560 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
561 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
562 // HTLCs with similar state.
563 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
564 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
565 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
566 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
567 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
568 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
569 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
574 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
575 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
576 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
578 update_time_counter: u32,
580 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
581 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
582 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
584 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
587 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
588 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
590 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
591 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
592 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
593 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
595 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
596 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
598 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
600 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
602 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
603 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
604 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
605 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
606 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
607 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
609 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
610 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
611 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
612 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
613 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
615 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
616 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
617 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
618 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
619 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
620 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
621 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
622 channel_creation_height: u32,
624 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
627 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
629 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
632 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
634 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
637 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
642 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
645 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
649 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
650 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
652 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
658 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
660 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
661 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
663 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
669 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
671 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
672 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
673 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
674 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
676 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
677 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
678 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
680 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
681 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
682 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
684 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
685 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
686 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
687 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
689 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
691 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
693 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
694 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
695 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
696 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
697 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
699 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
700 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
703 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
704 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
705 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
706 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
707 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
708 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
709 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
711 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
712 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
714 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
715 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
716 // the channel's funding UTXO.
718 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
719 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
720 // associated channel mapping.
722 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
723 // to store all of them.
724 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
726 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
727 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
728 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
729 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
730 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
732 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
733 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
735 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
736 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
737 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
739 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
740 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
741 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
742 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
743 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
886 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
887 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
888 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
892 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
893 // `only_static_remotekey`.
895 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
896 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
897 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
898 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
905 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
906 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
907 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
908 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
909 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
910 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
911 // We've exhausted our options
914 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
915 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
918 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
919 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
920 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
921 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
923 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
924 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
925 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
926 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
927 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
930 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
932 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
936 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
937 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
938 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
939 outbound_scid_alias: u64
940 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
941 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
942 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
945 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
946 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
947 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
948 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
950 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
953 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
956 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
957 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
960 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
961 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
963 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
964 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
965 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
966 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
970 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
971 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
973 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
975 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
976 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
977 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
981 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
982 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
984 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
985 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
988 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
989 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
990 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
997 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
998 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
999 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1000 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1005 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1007 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1008 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1011 channel_value_satoshis,
1013 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1016 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1017 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1019 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1020 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1023 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_update_fee: None,
1027 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1028 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1029 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1030 update_time_counter: 1,
1032 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1034 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1035 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1036 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1037 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1041 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1042 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1044 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1046 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1047 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1048 closing_fee_limits: None,
1049 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1051 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1053 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1054 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1055 short_channel_id: None,
1056 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1058 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1059 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1060 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1061 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1062 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1063 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1064 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1065 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1066 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1067 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1068 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1070 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1072 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1073 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1074 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1075 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1076 counterparty_parameters: None,
1077 funding_outpoint: None,
1078 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1079 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1081 funding_transaction: None,
1083 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_node_id,
1087 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1089 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1091 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1092 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1094 announcement_sigs: None,
1096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1097 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1099 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1101 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1103 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1104 outbound_scid_alias,
1106 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1109 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1114 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1118 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1120 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1122 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1123 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1124 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1125 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1126 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1127 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1128 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1131 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1132 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1133 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1134 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1135 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1136 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1137 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1138 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1140 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1141 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1150 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1151 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1152 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1153 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1154 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1155 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1156 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1157 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1158 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1163 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1165 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1166 // support this channel type.
1167 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1168 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1172 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1173 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1174 // `static_remote_key`.
1175 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1178 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1179 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1182 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1185 channel_type.clone()
1187 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1188 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1193 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1198 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1199 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1200 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1201 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1202 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1203 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1206 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1210 // Check sanity of message fields:
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1220 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1221 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1230 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1232 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1233 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1236 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1243 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1244 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1247 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1250 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1259 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1266 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1268 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1269 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1274 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1277 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1280 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1285 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1287 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1291 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1292 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1293 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1295 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1299 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1300 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1301 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1302 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1306 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1307 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1308 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1309 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1310 if script.len() == 0 {
1313 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1316 Some(script.clone())
1319 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1320 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1327 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1330 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1331 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1336 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1337 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1339 let chan = Channel {
1342 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1343 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1345 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1350 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1352 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1353 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1357 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1360 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1361 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1363 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1365 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1367 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1370 pending_update_fee: None,
1371 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1372 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1373 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1374 update_time_counter: 1,
1376 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1378 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1379 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1380 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1381 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1383 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1386 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1390 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1391 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1392 closing_fee_limits: None,
1393 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1395 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1399 short_channel_id: None,
1400 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1402 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1403 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1404 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1405 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1407 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1408 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1410 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1411 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1412 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1413 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1415 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1417 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1418 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1419 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1420 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1421 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1422 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1423 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1425 funding_outpoint: None,
1426 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1427 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1429 funding_transaction: None,
1431 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1432 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1433 counterparty_node_id,
1435 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1437 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1439 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1440 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1442 announcement_sigs: None,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1447 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1449 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1452 outbound_scid_alias,
1454 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1457 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1462 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1468 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1469 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1470 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1471 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1472 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1474 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1475 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1476 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1477 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1478 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1479 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1480 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1482 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1483 where L::Target: Logger
1485 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1486 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1487 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1489 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1490 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1492 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1494 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1495 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1496 if match update_state {
1497 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1498 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1499 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1501 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1503 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1507 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1508 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1509 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1510 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1512 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1513 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1514 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1516 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1517 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1518 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1519 transaction_output_index: None
1524 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1525 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1526 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1527 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1528 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1531 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1533 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1538 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1541 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1542 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1547 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1552 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1559 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1560 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1568 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1569 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1571 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1573 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1574 if generated_by_local {
1575 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1576 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1585 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1587 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1589 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1593 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1596 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1597 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1599 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1603 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1604 preimages.push(preimage);
1608 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1609 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1611 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1613 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1616 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1617 if !generated_by_local {
1618 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1627 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1628 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1629 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1630 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1631 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1632 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1633 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1635 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1637 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1638 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1639 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1640 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1642 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1644 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1645 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1646 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1647 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1650 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1651 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1652 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1653 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1655 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1658 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1659 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1660 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1661 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1666 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1667 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1672 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1673 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1678 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1680 let channel_parameters =
1681 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1682 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1683 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1686 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1691 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1694 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1695 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1696 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1697 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1699 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1700 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1701 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1709 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1710 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1716 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1717 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1718 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1719 // outside of those situations will fail.
1720 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1724 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1729 1 + // script length (0)
1733 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1734 2 + // witness marker and flag
1735 1 + // witness element count
1736 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1737 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1738 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1739 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1740 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1741 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1743 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1744 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1745 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1751 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1752 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1754 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1756 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1757 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1758 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1760 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1761 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1763 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1764 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1765 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1768 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1769 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1772 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1773 value_to_holder = 0;
1776 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1777 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1778 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1779 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1781 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1782 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1785 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1786 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1790 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1791 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1792 /// our counterparty!)
1793 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1794 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1795 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1796 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1797 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1798 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1799 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1801 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1805 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1806 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1807 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1808 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1809 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1810 //may see payments to it!
1811 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1812 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1813 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1815 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1818 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1819 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1820 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1821 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1822 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1825 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1828 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1829 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1831 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1833 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1834 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1835 where L::Target: Logger {
1836 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1837 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1838 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1839 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1840 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1842 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1843 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1847 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1848 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1849 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1850 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1852 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1853 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1855 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1857 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1859 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1860 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1861 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1863 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1864 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1865 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1866 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1867 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1869 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1870 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1871 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1873 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1874 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1876 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1879 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1880 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1884 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1888 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1890 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1891 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1892 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1896 // Now update local state:
1898 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1899 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1900 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1901 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1902 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1903 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1909 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1911 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1912 // do not not get into this branch.
1913 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1914 match pending_update {
1915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1916 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1917 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1918 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1920 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1925 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1926 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1927 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1928 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1929 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1930 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1936 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1937 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1945 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1948 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1949 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1951 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1955 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1958 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1961 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1963 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1964 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1969 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1970 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1971 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1972 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1973 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1978 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1979 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1980 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1984 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1985 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1986 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1987 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1988 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1999 /// before we fail backwards.
2001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2010 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2011 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2012 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2013 /// before we fail backwards.
2015 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2016 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2017 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2018 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2019 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2020 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2021 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2023 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2025 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2026 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2027 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2029 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2030 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2031 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2033 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2034 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2035 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2049 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2052 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2053 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2057 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2058 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2059 force_holding_cell = true;
2062 // Now update local state:
2063 if force_holding_cell {
2064 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2065 match pending_update {
2066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2067 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2069 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2074 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2075 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2082 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2083 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2084 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2090 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2092 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2096 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2098 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2103 // Message handlers:
2105 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2106 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2108 // Check sanity of message fields:
2109 if !self.is_outbound() {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2112 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2126 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2128 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2129 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2132 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2133 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2136 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2139 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2143 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2144 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2147 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2153 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2156 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2159 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2162 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2166 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2167 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2170 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2171 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2173 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2174 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2177 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2180 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2181 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2182 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2184 if script.len() == 0 {
2187 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2190 Some(script.clone())
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2194 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2200 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2202 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2203 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2204 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2206 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2207 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2209 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2212 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2213 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2214 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2215 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2216 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2217 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2220 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2225 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2226 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2228 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2229 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2234 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2235 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2237 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2238 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2240 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2241 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2242 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2243 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2245 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2247 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2248 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2251 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2252 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2254 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2255 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2259 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2262 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2263 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2266 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2267 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2270 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2271 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2272 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2274 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2277 if self.is_outbound() {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2280 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2281 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2282 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2286 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2289 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2290 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2291 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2295 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2297 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2298 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2299 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2301 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2303 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2308 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2309 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2310 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2314 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2315 initial_commitment_tx,
2318 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2319 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2322 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2325 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2327 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2328 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2329 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2330 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2331 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2332 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2344 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2345 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2354 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2356 }, channel_monitor))
2359 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2360 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2361 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2362 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2363 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2365 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2368 if !self.is_outbound() {
2369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2371 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2374 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2375 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2376 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2377 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2380 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2382 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2383 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2384 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2385 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2387 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2388 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2390 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2391 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2393 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2394 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2395 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2396 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2397 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2402 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2403 initial_commitment_tx,
2406 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2407 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2410 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2411 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2414 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2415 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2416 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2417 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2418 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2419 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2420 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2421 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2422 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2423 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2425 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2427 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2429 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2431 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2432 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2433 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2434 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2436 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2438 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2443 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2444 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2446 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2447 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2448 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2449 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2454 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2455 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2456 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2459 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2460 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2461 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2462 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2463 // when routing outbound payments.
2464 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2468 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2470 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2471 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2472 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2475 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2476 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2477 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2478 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2480 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2481 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2482 let expected_point =
2483 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2484 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2486 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2488 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2489 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2490 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2491 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2492 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2494 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2502 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2503 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2505 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2507 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2510 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2511 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2512 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2513 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2519 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2520 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2521 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2522 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2523 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2524 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2525 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2526 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2527 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2530 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2533 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2534 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2535 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2537 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2538 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2539 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2540 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2541 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2542 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2544 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2545 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2551 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2552 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2553 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2554 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2555 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2556 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2557 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2558 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2559 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2562 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2565 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2566 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2567 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2569 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2570 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2571 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2572 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2573 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2574 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2576 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2577 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2581 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2582 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2583 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2584 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2585 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2586 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2587 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2589 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2590 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2592 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2599 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2600 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2601 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2602 /// corner case properly.
2603 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2604 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2605 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2607 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2608 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2609 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2610 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2615 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2616 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2617 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2620 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2621 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2622 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2623 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2625 outbound_capacity_msat,
2626 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2627 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2628 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2634 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2635 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2638 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2639 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2640 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2641 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2642 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2643 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2646 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2647 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2649 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2650 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2653 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2654 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2655 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2657 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2658 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2660 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2663 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2664 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2666 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2667 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2669 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2670 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2672 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2673 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2677 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2684 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2685 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2686 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2690 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2691 included_htlcs += 1;
2694 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2695 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2699 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2700 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2701 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2702 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2703 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2704 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2709 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2711 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2712 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2717 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2718 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2722 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2723 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2724 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2727 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2728 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2730 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2731 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2732 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2734 total_pending_htlcs,
2735 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2736 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2737 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2739 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2740 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2741 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2743 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2745 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2750 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2751 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2752 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2754 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2755 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2757 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2760 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2761 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2763 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2764 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2766 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2767 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2769 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2770 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2774 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2781 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2782 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2783 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2784 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2785 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2786 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2789 included_htlcs += 1;
2792 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2796 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2797 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2799 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2800 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2801 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2806 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2807 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2808 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2811 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2812 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2814 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2815 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2817 total_pending_htlcs,
2818 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2822 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2823 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2824 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2826 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2828 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2833 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2834 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2835 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2836 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2837 if local_sent_shutdown {
2838 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2840 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2841 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2842 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2845 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2848 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2851 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2854 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2858 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2859 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2860 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2863 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2866 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2867 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2868 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2869 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2870 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2871 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2872 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2873 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2874 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2875 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2876 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2878 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2879 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2880 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2881 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2882 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2883 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2887 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2890 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2891 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2892 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2894 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2895 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2896 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2897 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2898 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2899 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2900 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2904 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2905 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2906 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2907 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2908 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2909 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2910 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2914 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2915 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2916 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2917 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2918 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2922 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2923 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2924 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2925 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2926 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2928 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2932 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2936 if !self.is_outbound() {
2937 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2938 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2939 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2940 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2941 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2942 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2943 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2944 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2945 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2946 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2947 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2948 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2949 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2950 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2951 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2954 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2955 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2956 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2957 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2961 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2964 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2968 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2969 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2970 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2974 // Now update local state:
2975 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2976 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2977 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2978 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2979 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2980 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2981 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2986 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2988 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2989 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2990 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2991 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2992 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2993 None => fail_reason.into(),
2994 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2995 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2996 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2999 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3003 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3005 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3006 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3008 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3014 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3017 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3018 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3019 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3025 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3028 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3029 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3032 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3036 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3040 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3041 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3044 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3048 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3052 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3053 where L::Target: Logger
3055 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3058 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3059 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3061 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3065 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3067 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3069 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3070 let commitment_txid = {
3071 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3072 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3073 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3075 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3076 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3077 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3078 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3079 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3084 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3086 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3087 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3088 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3089 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3092 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3093 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3094 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3100 if self.is_outbound() {
3101 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3102 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3103 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3104 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3105 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3106 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3107 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3108 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3109 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3110 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3116 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3120 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3121 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3122 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3123 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3124 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3125 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3126 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3128 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3129 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3130 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3131 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3132 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3133 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3134 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3137 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3139 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3143 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3144 commitment_stats.tx,
3146 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3147 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3148 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3151 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3152 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3154 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3155 let mut need_commitment = false;
3156 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3157 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3158 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3159 need_commitment = true;
3163 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3164 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3165 Some(forward_info.clone())
3167 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3168 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3169 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3170 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3171 need_commitment = true;
3174 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3175 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3176 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3177 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3178 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3179 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3180 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3181 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3182 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3183 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3184 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3185 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3186 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3187 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3189 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3191 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3192 need_commitment = true;
3196 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3197 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3198 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3199 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3200 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3201 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3206 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3207 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3208 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3209 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3211 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3212 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3213 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3214 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3215 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3216 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3217 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3218 // includes the right HTLCs.
3219 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3220 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3221 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3222 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3223 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3224 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3226 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3227 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3228 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3229 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3232 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3233 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3234 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3235 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3236 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3237 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3238 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3239 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3240 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3244 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3245 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3246 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3247 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3248 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3251 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3252 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3253 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3254 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3255 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3256 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3257 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3258 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3261 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3262 /// for our counterparty.
3263 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3264 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3265 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3266 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3267 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3269 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3270 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3271 updates: Vec::new(),
3274 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3275 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3276 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3277 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3278 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3279 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3280 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3281 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3282 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3283 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3284 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3285 // to rebalance channels.
3286 match &htlc_update {
3287 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3288 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3289 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3292 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3293 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3294 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3295 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3296 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3297 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3298 // into the holding cell without ever being
3299 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3300 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3301 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3304 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3310 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3311 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3312 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3313 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3314 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3315 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3316 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3317 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3318 (msg, monitor_update)
3319 } else { unreachable!() };
3320 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3321 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3323 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3324 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3325 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3326 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3327 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3328 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3329 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3330 // for a full revocation before failing.
3331 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3334 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3336 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3343 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3344 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3346 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3347 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3352 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3353 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3354 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3355 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3356 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3358 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3359 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3360 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3362 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3363 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3364 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3370 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3371 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3372 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3373 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3374 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3375 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3376 where L::Target: Logger,
3378 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3381 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3384 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3388 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3390 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3391 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3396 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3397 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3398 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3399 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3400 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3401 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3402 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3403 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3404 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3407 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3409 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3410 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3413 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3414 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3416 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3418 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3419 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3420 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3421 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3422 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3423 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3424 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3425 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3429 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3430 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3431 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3432 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3433 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3434 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3435 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3436 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3438 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3439 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3442 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3443 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3444 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3445 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3446 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3447 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3448 let mut require_commitment = false;
3449 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3452 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3453 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3454 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3456 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3457 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3458 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3459 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3460 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3461 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3466 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3467 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3468 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3469 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3470 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3472 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3473 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3474 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3479 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3480 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3482 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3486 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3487 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3489 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3490 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3491 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3492 require_commitment = true;
3493 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3494 match forward_info {
3495 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3496 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3497 require_commitment = true;
3499 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3500 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3501 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3503 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3504 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3505 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3509 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3510 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3511 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3512 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3518 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3519 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3520 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3521 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3523 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3524 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3525 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3526 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3527 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3528 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3529 require_commitment = true;
3533 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3535 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3536 match update_state {
3537 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3538 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3540 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3541 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3543 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3544 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3545 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3546 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3547 require_commitment = true;
3548 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3549 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3554 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3555 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3556 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3557 if require_commitment {
3558 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3559 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3560 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3561 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3562 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3563 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3564 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3565 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3566 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3568 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3569 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3570 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3571 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3572 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3573 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3576 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3577 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3578 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3579 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3580 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3581 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3582 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3584 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3585 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3586 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3588 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3589 if require_commitment {
3590 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3592 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3593 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3594 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3595 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3597 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3598 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3599 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3600 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3601 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3603 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3604 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3605 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3606 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3612 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3613 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3614 /// commitment update.
3615 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3616 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3617 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3620 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3621 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3622 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3623 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3625 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3626 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3627 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3628 if !self.is_outbound() {
3629 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3631 if !self.is_usable() {
3632 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3634 if !self.is_live() {
3635 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3638 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3639 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3640 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3641 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3642 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3643 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3644 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3645 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3646 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3647 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3651 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3652 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3653 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3654 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3655 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3658 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3659 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3663 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3664 force_holding_cell = true;
3667 if force_holding_cell {
3668 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3672 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3673 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3675 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3676 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3681 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3682 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3684 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3686 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3687 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3688 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3689 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3693 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3694 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3695 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3699 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3700 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3703 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3704 // will be retransmitted.
3705 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3706 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3707 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3709 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3710 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3712 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3713 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3714 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3715 // this HTLC accordingly
3716 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3719 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3720 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3721 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3722 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3725 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3726 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3727 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3728 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3729 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3730 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3735 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3737 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3738 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3739 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3740 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3744 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3745 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3746 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3747 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3748 // the update upon reconnection.
3749 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3753 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3754 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3757 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3758 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3759 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3760 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3761 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3762 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3763 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3765 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3766 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3767 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3768 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3769 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3770 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3771 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3773 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3774 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3775 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3776 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3777 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3778 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3779 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3782 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3783 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3784 /// to the remote side.
3785 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3786 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3787 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3788 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3791 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3793 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3794 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3795 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3797 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3798 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3799 // first received the funding_signed.
3800 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3801 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3802 self.funding_transaction.take()
3804 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3805 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3806 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3807 funding_broadcastable = None;
3810 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3811 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3812 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3813 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3814 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3815 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3816 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3817 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3818 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3819 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3820 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3821 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3822 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3823 next_per_commitment_point,
3824 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3828 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3830 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3831 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3832 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3833 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3834 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3835 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3837 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3838 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3839 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3840 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3841 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3842 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3846 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3847 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3849 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3850 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3853 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3854 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3855 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3856 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3857 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3858 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3859 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3860 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3861 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3865 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3866 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3868 if self.is_outbound() {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3871 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3874 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3875 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3877 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3878 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3879 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3880 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3881 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3882 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3883 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3884 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3885 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3886 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3887 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3889 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3891 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3893 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3899 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3900 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3901 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3902 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3903 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3904 per_commitment_secret,
3905 next_per_commitment_point,
3909 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3910 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3911 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3912 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3913 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3915 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3916 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3917 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3918 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3919 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3920 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3921 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3922 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3923 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3928 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3929 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3931 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3932 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3933 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3934 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3935 reason: err_packet.clone()
3938 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3939 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3940 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3941 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3942 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3943 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3946 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3947 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3948 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3949 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3950 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3957 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3958 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3959 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3960 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3964 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3965 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3966 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3967 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3968 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3969 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3973 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3974 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3976 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3977 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3978 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3979 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3980 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3981 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3982 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3983 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3986 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3988 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3989 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3990 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3991 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3995 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3996 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4000 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4001 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4002 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4003 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4004 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4005 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4006 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4009 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4010 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4011 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4012 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4013 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4016 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4017 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4018 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4019 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4020 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4021 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4022 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4023 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4026 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4030 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4031 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4032 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4033 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4035 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4039 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4040 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4041 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4043 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4044 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4045 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4046 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4047 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4051 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4053 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4054 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4055 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4056 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4057 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4060 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4061 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4062 channel_ready: None,
4063 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4064 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4065 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4069 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4070 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4071 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4072 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4073 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4074 next_per_commitment_point,
4075 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4077 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4078 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4079 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4083 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4084 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4085 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4087 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4088 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4089 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4092 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4098 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4099 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4100 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4101 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4102 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4104 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4105 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4106 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4107 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4108 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4109 next_per_commitment_point,
4110 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4114 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4115 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4116 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4118 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4121 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4122 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4123 raa: required_revoke,
4124 commitment_update: None,
4125 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4127 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4128 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4129 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4131 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4134 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4135 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4136 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4137 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4138 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4139 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4142 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4143 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4144 raa: required_revoke,
4145 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4146 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4150 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4154 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4155 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4156 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4157 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4159 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4161 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4163 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4164 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4165 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4166 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4167 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4168 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4170 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4171 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4172 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4173 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4174 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4176 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4177 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4178 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4179 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4182 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4183 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4184 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4185 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4186 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4187 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4188 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4189 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4190 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4191 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4192 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4193 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4194 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4195 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4196 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4198 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4201 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4202 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4205 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4206 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4207 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4208 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4209 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4210 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4211 self.channel_state &
4212 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4213 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4214 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4215 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4218 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4219 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4220 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4221 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4222 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4223 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4226 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4232 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4233 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4234 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4235 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4237 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4238 return Ok((None, None));
4241 if !self.is_outbound() {
4242 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4243 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4245 return Ok((None, None));
4248 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4250 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4251 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4252 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4253 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4255 let sig = self.holder_signer
4256 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4257 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4259 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4260 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4261 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4262 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4264 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4265 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4266 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4271 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4272 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4273 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4274 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4276 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4279 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4280 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4281 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4282 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4285 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4286 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4290 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4292 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4296 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4297 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4301 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4304 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4305 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4306 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4307 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4309 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4312 assert!(send_shutdown);
4313 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4314 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4317 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4322 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4324 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4325 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4327 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4328 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4329 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4330 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4331 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4332 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4335 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4336 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4337 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4339 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4340 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4341 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4342 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4346 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4347 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4348 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4349 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4350 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4351 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4354 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4361 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4362 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4364 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4367 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4368 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4370 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4372 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4373 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4374 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4375 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4376 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4377 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4378 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4379 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4380 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4382 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4383 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4386 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4390 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4391 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4392 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4393 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4395 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4398 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4401 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4404 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4408 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4412 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4413 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4414 return Ok((None, None));
4417 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4418 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4419 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4422 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4424 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4427 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4428 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4429 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4430 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4431 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4435 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4436 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4441 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4442 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4443 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4444 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4445 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4446 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4447 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4451 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4453 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4454 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4455 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4456 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4458 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4461 let sig = self.holder_signer
4462 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4463 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4465 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4466 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4467 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4468 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4472 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4473 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4474 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4475 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4477 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4478 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4479 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4485 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4486 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4489 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4490 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4492 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4493 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4496 if !self.is_outbound() {
4497 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4498 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4499 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4500 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4502 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4504 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4506 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4507 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4510 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4511 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4512 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4513 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4514 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4515 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4516 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4517 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4522 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4523 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4524 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4525 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4531 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4533 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4534 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4536 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4542 // Public utilities:
4544 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4548 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4552 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4553 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4554 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4558 /// Gets the channel's type
4559 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4563 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4564 /// is_usable() returns true).
4565 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4566 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4567 self.short_channel_id
4570 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4571 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4572 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4575 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4576 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4577 self.outbound_scid_alias
4579 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4580 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4581 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4582 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4583 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4586 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4587 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4588 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4589 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4592 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4593 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4594 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4597 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4598 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4599 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4600 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4604 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4607 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4608 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4611 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4612 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4615 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4616 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4617 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4620 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4621 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4624 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4625 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4626 self.counterparty_node_id
4629 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4630 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4631 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4634 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4635 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4636 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4639 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4640 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4642 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4643 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4644 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4645 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4647 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4651 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4652 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4653 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4657 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4658 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4661 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4662 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4663 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4665 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4666 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4671 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4672 self.channel_value_satoshis
4675 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4676 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4679 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4680 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4683 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4684 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4687 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4688 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4689 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4692 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4693 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4694 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4697 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4698 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4699 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4702 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4703 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4704 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4705 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4706 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4709 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4711 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4712 self.prev_config = None;
4716 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4717 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4721 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4722 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4723 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4724 let did_channel_update =
4725 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4726 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4727 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4728 if did_channel_update {
4729 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4730 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4731 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4732 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4734 self.config.options = *config;
4738 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4739 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4740 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4741 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4742 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4743 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4744 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4746 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4747 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4750 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4752 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4753 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4759 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4760 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4761 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4762 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4763 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4764 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4765 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4767 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4768 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4775 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4779 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4780 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4781 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4782 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4783 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4784 // which are near the dust limit.
4785 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4786 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4787 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4788 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4789 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4791 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4792 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4794 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4797 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4798 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4801 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4802 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4805 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4806 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4810 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4815 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4817 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4818 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4819 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4820 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4821 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4822 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4824 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4826 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4834 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4835 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4839 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4840 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4841 self.update_time_counter
4844 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4845 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4848 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4849 self.config.announced_channel
4852 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4853 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4856 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4857 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4858 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4859 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4862 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4863 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4864 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4867 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4868 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4869 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4870 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4871 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4874 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4875 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4876 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4877 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4878 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4881 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4882 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4883 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4884 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4887 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4888 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4891 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4892 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4893 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4896 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4897 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4898 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4900 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4901 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4902 if self.channel_state &
4903 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4904 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4905 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4906 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4907 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4910 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4911 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4912 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4913 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4914 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4915 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4917 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4918 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4919 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4921 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4922 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4923 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4924 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4925 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4926 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4932 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4933 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4934 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4937 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4938 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4939 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4942 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4943 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4944 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4947 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4948 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4949 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4950 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4951 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4952 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4957 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4958 self.channel_update_status
4961 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4962 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4963 self.channel_update_status = status;
4966 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4968 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4969 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4970 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4974 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4975 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4976 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4979 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4983 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4984 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4985 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4987 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4988 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4989 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4991 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4992 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4995 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4996 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4997 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4998 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4999 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5000 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5001 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5002 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5003 self.channel_state);
5005 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5009 if need_commitment_update {
5010 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5011 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5012 let next_per_commitment_point =
5013 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5014 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5015 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5016 next_per_commitment_point,
5017 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5021 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5027 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5028 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5029 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5030 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5031 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5032 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5033 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5035 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5038 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5039 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5040 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5041 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5042 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5043 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5044 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5045 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5046 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5047 if self.is_outbound() {
5048 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5049 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5050 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5051 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5052 // channel and move on.
5053 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5054 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5056 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5057 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5058 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5060 if self.is_outbound() {
5061 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5062 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5063 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5064 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5065 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5066 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5070 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5071 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5072 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5073 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5074 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5078 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5079 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5080 // may have already happened for this block).
5081 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5082 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5083 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5084 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5087 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5088 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5089 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5090 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5098 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5099 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5100 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5101 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5103 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5104 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5107 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5109 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5110 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5111 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5112 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5114 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5117 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5120 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5121 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5122 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5123 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5125 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5128 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5129 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5130 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5132 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5133 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5135 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5136 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5137 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5145 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5147 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5148 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5149 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5151 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5152 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5155 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5156 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5157 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5158 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5159 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5160 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5161 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5162 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5163 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5166 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5167 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5168 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5169 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5171 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5172 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5173 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5175 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5176 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5177 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5178 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5180 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5181 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5182 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5183 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5184 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5185 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5186 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5189 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5190 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5192 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5195 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5196 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5197 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5198 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5199 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5200 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5201 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5202 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5203 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5204 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5205 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5206 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5207 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5208 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5209 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5210 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5211 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5217 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5222 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5223 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5225 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5226 if !self.is_outbound() {
5227 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5229 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5230 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5233 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5234 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5237 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5238 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5242 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5243 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5244 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5245 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5246 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5247 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5248 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5249 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5250 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5251 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5252 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5253 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5254 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5255 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5256 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5257 first_per_commitment_point,
5258 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5259 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5260 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5261 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5263 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5267 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5268 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5271 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5272 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5273 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5274 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5277 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5278 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5280 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5281 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5282 if self.is_outbound() {
5283 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5285 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5286 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5288 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5289 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5291 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5292 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5295 self.user_id = user_id;
5296 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5298 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5301 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5302 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5303 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5305 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5306 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5307 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5308 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5310 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5311 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5312 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5313 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5314 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5315 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5316 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5317 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5318 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5319 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5320 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5321 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5322 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5323 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5324 first_per_commitment_point,
5325 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5326 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5327 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5329 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5333 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5334 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5336 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5338 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5339 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5342 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5343 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5344 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5345 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5346 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5347 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5350 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5351 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5352 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5353 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5354 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5355 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5356 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5357 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5358 if !self.is_outbound() {
5359 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5361 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5362 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5364 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5365 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5366 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5367 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5370 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5371 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5373 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5376 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5382 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5384 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5386 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5387 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5388 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5390 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5391 temporary_channel_id,
5392 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5393 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5398 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5399 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5400 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5401 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5403 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5406 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5407 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5408 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5409 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5410 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5411 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5413 if !self.is_usable() {
5414 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5417 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5418 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5419 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5420 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5422 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5423 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5425 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5426 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5427 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5428 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5429 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5430 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5436 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5437 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5438 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5439 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5441 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5444 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5448 if !self.is_usable() {
5452 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5453 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5457 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5461 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5462 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5465 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5469 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5471 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5476 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5478 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5483 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5485 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5486 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5487 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5488 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5489 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5493 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5495 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5496 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5497 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5498 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5499 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5500 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5501 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5503 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5504 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5505 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5506 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5507 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5508 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5509 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5510 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5511 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5512 contents: announcement,
5515 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5519 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5520 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5521 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5522 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5523 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5524 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5525 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5526 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5528 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5530 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5531 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5532 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5533 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5535 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5537 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5538 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5541 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5542 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5543 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5544 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5547 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5550 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5551 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5552 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5553 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5554 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5555 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5558 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5560 Err(_) => return None,
5562 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5563 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5568 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5569 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5570 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5571 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5572 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5573 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5574 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5575 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5576 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5577 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5578 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5579 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5580 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5581 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5582 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5583 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5584 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5585 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5586 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5589 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5590 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5591 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5592 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5595 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5596 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5597 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5598 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5599 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5600 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5601 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5602 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5604 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5605 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5606 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5607 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5608 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5609 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5610 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5611 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5612 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5614 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5620 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5622 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5623 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5624 /// commitment update.
5626 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5627 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5628 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5629 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5631 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5632 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5634 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5635 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5640 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5641 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5643 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5645 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5646 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5648 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5649 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5650 /// regenerate them.
5652 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5653 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5655 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5656 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5657 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5658 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5659 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5660 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5662 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5663 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5664 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5667 if amount_msat == 0 {
5668 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5671 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5672 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5675 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5676 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5677 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5678 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5679 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5680 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5681 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5682 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5685 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5686 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5687 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5688 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5690 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5691 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5692 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5695 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5696 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5697 if !self.is_outbound() {
5698 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5699 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5700 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5701 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5702 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5703 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5707 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5710 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5711 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5712 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5714 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5715 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5716 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5717 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5718 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5719 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5723 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5724 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5725 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5726 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5727 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5728 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5732 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5733 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5734 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5737 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5738 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5739 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5740 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5742 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5743 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5746 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5747 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5748 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5749 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5750 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5753 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5754 force_holding_cell = true;
5757 // Now update local state:
5758 if force_holding_cell {
5759 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5764 onion_routing_packet,
5769 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5770 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5772 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5774 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5778 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5779 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5780 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5784 onion_routing_packet,
5786 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5791 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5792 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5793 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5794 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5796 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5797 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5798 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5800 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5801 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5805 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5806 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5807 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5808 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5809 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5810 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5811 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5814 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5815 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5816 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5817 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5818 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5819 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5822 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5824 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5825 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5826 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5828 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5829 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5832 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5833 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5834 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5835 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5836 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5837 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5838 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5839 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5842 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5846 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5847 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5848 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5849 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5851 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5853 if !self.is_outbound() {
5854 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5855 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5856 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5857 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5858 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5859 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5860 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5861 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5862 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5863 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5869 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5872 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5873 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5874 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5875 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5877 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5879 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5880 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5881 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5882 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5885 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5886 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5890 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5891 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5893 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5895 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5896 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5897 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5898 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5900 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5901 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5902 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5903 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5904 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5905 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5909 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5910 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5913 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5916 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5917 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5919 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5920 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5921 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5922 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5923 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5926 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5927 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5928 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5929 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5935 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5936 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5937 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5940 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5941 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5944 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5945 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5946 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5947 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5953 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5954 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5956 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5957 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5958 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5959 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5960 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5961 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5962 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5963 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5964 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5967 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5968 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5969 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5971 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5975 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5976 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5977 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5980 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5981 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5982 let mut chan_closed = false;
5983 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5987 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5989 None if !chan_closed => {
5990 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5991 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5992 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5994 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6000 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6001 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6002 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6003 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6005 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6007 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6009 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6010 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6011 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6012 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6013 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6014 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6017 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6018 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6019 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6021 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6022 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6023 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6026 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6027 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6028 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6029 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6030 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6032 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6033 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6040 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6041 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6043 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6046 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6047 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6048 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6049 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6050 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6051 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6052 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6053 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6054 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6055 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6056 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6058 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6059 // return them to fail the payment.
6060 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6061 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6062 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6064 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6065 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6070 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6071 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6072 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6073 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6074 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6075 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6076 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6077 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6078 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6079 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6080 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6081 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6082 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6087 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6088 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6089 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6092 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6093 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6094 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6096 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6097 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6101 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6105 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6106 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6108 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6114 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6115 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6116 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6117 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6118 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6120 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6121 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6122 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6123 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6129 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6130 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6131 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6132 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6133 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6134 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6139 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6140 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6141 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6142 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6144 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6145 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6146 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6147 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6152 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6153 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6154 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6155 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6156 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6157 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6162 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6163 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6164 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6167 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6169 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6170 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6171 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6172 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6173 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6175 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6176 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6177 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6178 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6180 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6181 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6182 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6184 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6186 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6187 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6188 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6189 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6190 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6191 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6193 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6194 // deserialized from that format.
6195 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6196 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6197 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6199 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6201 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6202 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6203 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6205 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6206 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6207 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6208 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6211 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6212 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6213 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6216 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6217 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6218 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6219 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6221 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6222 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6224 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6226 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6228 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6230 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6233 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6235 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6240 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6242 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6243 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6244 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6245 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6246 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6247 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6248 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6250 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6252 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6254 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6257 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6258 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6259 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6262 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6264 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6265 preimages.push(preimage);
6267 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6268 reason.write(writer)?;
6270 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6272 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6273 preimages.push(preimage);
6275 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6276 reason.write(writer)?;
6281 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6282 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6284 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6286 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6287 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6288 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6289 source.write(writer)?;
6290 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6292 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6294 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6295 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6297 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6299 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6300 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6305 match self.resend_order {
6306 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6307 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6310 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6311 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6312 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6314 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6315 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6316 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6317 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6320 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6321 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6322 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6323 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6324 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6327 if self.is_outbound() {
6328 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6329 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6330 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6332 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6333 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6334 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6336 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6338 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6339 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6340 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6341 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6343 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6344 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6345 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6346 // consider the stale state on reload.
6349 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6350 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6351 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6353 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6354 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6355 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6357 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6358 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6360 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6361 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6362 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6364 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6365 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6367 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6370 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6371 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6372 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6374 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6378 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6380 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6381 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6382 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6384 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6386 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6388 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6391 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6393 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6394 htlc.write(writer)?;
6397 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6398 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6399 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6401 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6402 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6404 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6405 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6406 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6407 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6408 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6409 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6410 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6412 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6413 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6414 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6415 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6416 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6418 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6420 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6421 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6422 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6423 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6425 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6426 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6427 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6428 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6429 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6430 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6431 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6433 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6434 (2, chan_type, option),
6435 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6436 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6437 (5, self.config, required),
6438 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6439 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6440 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6441 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6442 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6443 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6444 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6445 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6446 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6447 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6448 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6449 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6456 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6457 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6459 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6460 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6462 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6463 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6464 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6466 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6467 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6468 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6469 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6473 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6474 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6476 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6477 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6480 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let mut keys_data = None;
6491 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6492 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6493 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6495 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6496 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6497 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6498 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6499 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6500 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6504 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6505 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6506 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6509 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6515 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6517 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6518 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6519 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6520 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6521 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6522 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6523 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6524 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6525 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6526 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6527 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6528 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6533 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6534 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6535 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6536 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6537 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6538 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6539 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6540 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6541 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6543 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6544 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6546 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6547 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6550 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6554 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6557 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6562 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6563 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6564 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6565 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6566 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6567 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6568 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6569 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6570 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6571 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6573 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6574 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6575 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6577 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6578 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6579 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6581 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6585 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6586 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6587 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6588 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6591 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6592 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6593 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6595 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6597 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6598 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6601 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6602 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6603 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6604 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6607 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6617 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6618 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6619 // consider the stale state on reload.
6620 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6623 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6624 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6627 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6630 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6631 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6632 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6634 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6636 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6639 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6640 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6642 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6643 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6651 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6652 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6654 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6655 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6658 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6660 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6661 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6662 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6663 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6665 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6668 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6669 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6673 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6679 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6681 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6682 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6683 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6685 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6687 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6691 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6692 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6693 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6695 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6701 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6702 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6703 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6704 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6705 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6706 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6707 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6708 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6709 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6710 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6712 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6713 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6714 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6715 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6716 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6717 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6719 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6720 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6722 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6723 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6724 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6725 (2, channel_type, option),
6726 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6727 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6728 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6729 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6730 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6731 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6732 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6733 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6734 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6735 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6736 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6737 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6738 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6739 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6740 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6743 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6744 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6745 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6746 // required channel parameters.
6747 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6748 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6749 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6751 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6753 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6754 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6755 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6756 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6759 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6760 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6761 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6763 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6764 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6766 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6767 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6772 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6773 if iter.next().is_some() {
6774 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6778 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6779 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6780 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6781 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6782 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6785 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6786 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6788 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6789 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6790 // separate u64 values.
6791 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6796 config: config.unwrap(),
6800 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6801 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6802 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6806 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6808 channel_value_satoshis,
6810 latest_monitor_update_id,
6813 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6816 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6817 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6820 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6821 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6822 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6826 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6827 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6828 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6829 monitor_pending_forwards,
6830 monitor_pending_failures,
6831 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6834 holding_cell_update_fee,
6835 next_holder_htlc_id,
6836 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6837 update_time_counter,
6840 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6841 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6842 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6843 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6845 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6846 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6847 closing_fee_limits: None,
6848 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6850 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6852 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6853 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6855 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6857 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6858 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6859 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6860 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6861 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6862 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6863 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6864 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6865 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6868 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6870 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6871 funding_transaction,
6873 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6874 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6875 counterparty_node_id,
6877 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6881 channel_update_status,
6882 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6886 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6887 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6889 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6891 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6893 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6894 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6895 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6897 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6900 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6902 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6905 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6913 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6914 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6915 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6916 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6917 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6919 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6920 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6922 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6923 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6924 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6925 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6926 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6927 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6928 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6929 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6930 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6931 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6932 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6933 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6934 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6935 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6936 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6937 use crate::util::test_utils;
6938 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6939 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6940 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6941 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6942 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6943 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6944 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6945 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6946 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6947 use crate::prelude::*;
6949 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6952 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6953 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6959 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6960 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6961 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6962 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6966 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6967 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6968 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6969 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6970 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6971 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6972 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6976 signer: InMemorySigner,
6979 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6980 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6983 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6984 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6986 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6987 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6990 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6994 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6996 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6997 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6998 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6999 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7000 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7003 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7004 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7005 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7006 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7010 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7011 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7012 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7016 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7017 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7018 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7019 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7021 let seed = [42; 32];
7022 let network = Network::Testnet;
7023 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7024 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7025 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7028 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7029 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7030 let config = UserConfig::default();
7031 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7032 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7033 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7035 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7036 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7040 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7041 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7043 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7044 let original_fee = 253;
7045 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7046 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7047 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7048 let seed = [42; 32];
7049 let network = Network::Testnet;
7050 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7052 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7053 let config = UserConfig::default();
7054 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7056 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7057 // same as the old fee.
7058 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7059 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7060 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7064 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7065 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7066 // dust limits are used.
7067 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7068 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7069 let seed = [42; 32];
7070 let network = Network::Testnet;
7071 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7072 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7074 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7075 // they have different dust limits.
7077 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7078 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7079 let config = UserConfig::default();
7080 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7082 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7083 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7084 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7085 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7086 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7088 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7089 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7090 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7091 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7092 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7094 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7095 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7096 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7098 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7099 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7100 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7101 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7104 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7106 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7107 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7108 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7109 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7110 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7114 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7115 payment_secret: None,
7116 payment_params: None,
7120 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7121 // the dust limit check.
7122 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7123 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7124 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7125 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7127 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7128 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7129 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7130 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7131 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7132 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7133 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7137 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7138 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7139 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7140 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7141 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7142 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7143 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7144 let seed = [42; 32];
7145 let network = Network::Testnet;
7146 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7148 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7149 let config = UserConfig::default();
7150 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7152 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7153 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7155 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7156 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7157 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7158 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7159 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7160 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7162 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7163 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7164 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7165 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7166 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7168 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7170 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7171 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7172 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7173 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7174 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7176 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7177 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7178 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7179 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7180 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7184 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7185 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7186 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7187 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7188 let seed = [42; 32];
7189 let network = Network::Testnet;
7190 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7191 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7192 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7194 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7196 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7197 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7198 let config = UserConfig::default();
7199 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7201 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7202 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7203 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7204 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7206 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7207 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7208 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7210 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7211 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7212 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7213 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7215 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7216 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7217 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7219 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7220 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7222 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7223 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7224 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7225 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7226 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7227 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7228 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7229 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7230 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7235 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7237 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7238 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7239 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7240 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7241 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7242 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7243 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7250 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7251 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7252 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7253 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7254 let seed = [42; 32];
7255 let network = Network::Testnet;
7256 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7257 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7258 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7260 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7261 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7262 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7263 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7264 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7265 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7266 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7267 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7269 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7270 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7271 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7272 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7273 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7274 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7276 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7277 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7278 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7279 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7281 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7283 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7284 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7285 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7286 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7287 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7288 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7290 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7291 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7292 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7293 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7295 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7296 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7297 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7298 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7299 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7301 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7302 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7304 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7305 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7306 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7308 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7309 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7310 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7311 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7312 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7314 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7315 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7317 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7318 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7319 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7323 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7325 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7326 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7327 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7329 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7330 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7331 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7332 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7334 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7335 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7336 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7338 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7340 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7341 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7344 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7345 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7346 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7348 let seed = [42; 32];
7349 let network = Network::Testnet;
7350 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7351 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7352 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7355 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7356 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7357 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7359 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7360 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7362 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7363 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7364 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7366 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7367 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7369 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7371 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7372 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7374 // Channel Negotiations failed
7375 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7376 assert!(result.is_err());
7381 fn channel_update() {
7382 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7383 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7384 let seed = [42; 32];
7385 let network = Network::Testnet;
7386 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7387 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7389 // Create a channel.
7390 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7391 let config = UserConfig::default();
7392 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7393 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7394 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7395 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7397 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7398 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7399 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7401 short_channel_id: 0,
7404 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7405 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7406 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7408 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7409 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7411 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7413 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7415 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7416 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7417 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7418 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7420 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7421 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7422 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7424 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7428 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7430 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7431 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7432 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7433 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7434 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7435 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7436 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7437 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7438 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7439 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7440 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7441 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7442 use crate::sync::Arc;
7444 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7445 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7446 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7447 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7449 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7451 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7452 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7453 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7454 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7455 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7457 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7458 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7463 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7464 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7465 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7467 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7468 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7469 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7470 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7471 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7472 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7474 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7476 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7477 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7478 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7479 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7480 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7481 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7483 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7484 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7485 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7486 selected_contest_delay: 144
7488 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7489 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7491 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7492 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7494 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7495 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7497 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7498 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7500 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7501 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7502 // build_commitment_transaction.
7503 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7504 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7505 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7506 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7507 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7509 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7510 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7511 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7512 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7516 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7517 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7518 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7519 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7523 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7524 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7525 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7527 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7528 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7530 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7531 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7533 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7535 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7536 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7537 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7538 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7539 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7540 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7541 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7543 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7544 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7545 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7546 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7548 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7549 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7550 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7552 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7554 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7555 commitment_tx.clone(),
7556 counterparty_signature,
7557 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7558 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7559 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7561 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7562 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7564 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7565 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7566 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7568 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7569 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7572 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7573 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7575 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7576 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7577 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7578 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7579 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7580 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7581 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7582 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7584 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7587 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7588 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7589 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7593 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7596 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7597 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7598 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7600 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7601 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7602 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7603 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7604 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7605 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7606 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7607 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7609 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7613 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7614 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7616 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7617 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7618 "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", {});
7620 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7621 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7622 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7623 "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", {});
7625 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7626 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7628 amount_msat: 1000000,
7630 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7631 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7633 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7636 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7637 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7639 amount_msat: 2000000,
7641 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7642 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7644 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7647 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7648 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7650 amount_msat: 2000000,
7652 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7653 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7654 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7656 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7659 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7660 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7662 amount_msat: 3000000,
7664 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7665 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7666 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7668 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7671 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7672 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7674 amount_msat: 4000000,
7676 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7677 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7679 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7683 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7684 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7685 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7687 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7688 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7689 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7692 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7693 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7694 "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" },
7697 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7698 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7699 "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" },
7702 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7703 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7704 "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" },
7707 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7708 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7709 "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" },
7712 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7713 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7714 "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" }
7717 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7718 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7719 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7721 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7722 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7723 "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", {
7726 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7727 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7728 "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" },
7731 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7732 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7733 "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" },
7736 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7737 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7738 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7741 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7742 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7743 "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" },
7746 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7747 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7748 "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" }
7751 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7752 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7753 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7755 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7756 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7757 "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", {
7760 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7761 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7762 "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" },
7765 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7766 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7767 "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" },
7770 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7771 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7772 "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" },
7775 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7776 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7777 "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" }
7780 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7781 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7782 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7783 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7785 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7786 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7787 "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", {
7790 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7791 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7792 "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" },
7795 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7796 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7797 "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" },
7800 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7801 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7802 "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" },
7805 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7806 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7807 "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" }
7810 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7811 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7812 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7813 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7815 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7816 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7817 "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", {
7820 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7821 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7822 "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" },
7825 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7826 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7827 "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" },
7830 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7831 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7832 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7835 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7836 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7837 "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" }
7840 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7841 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7842 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7844 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7845 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7846 "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", {
7849 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7850 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7851 "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" },
7854 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7855 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7856 "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" },
7859 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7860 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7861 "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" }
7864 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7865 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7866 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7868 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7869 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7870 "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", {
7873 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7874 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7875 "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" },
7878 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7879 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7880 "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" },
7883 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7884 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7885 "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" }
7888 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7889 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7890 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7892 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7893 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7894 "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", {
7897 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7898 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7899 "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" },
7902 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7903 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7904 "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" }
7907 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7908 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7909 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7910 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7912 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7913 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7914 "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", {
7917 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7918 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7919 "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" },
7922 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7923 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7924 "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" }
7927 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7928 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7929 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7930 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7932 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7933 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7934 "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", {
7937 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7938 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7939 "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" },
7942 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7943 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7944 "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" }
7947 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7948 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7949 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7951 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7952 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7953 "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", {
7956 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7957 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7958 "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" }
7961 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7962 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7963 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7964 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7966 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7967 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7968 "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", {
7971 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7972 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7973 "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" }
7976 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7977 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7978 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7979 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7981 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7982 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7983 "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", {
7986 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7987 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7988 "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" }
7991 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7992 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7993 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7994 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7996 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7997 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7998 "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", {});
8000 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8001 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8002 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8003 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8005 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8006 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8007 "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", {});
8009 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8010 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8011 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8012 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8014 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8015 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8016 "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", {});
8018 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8019 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8020 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8022 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8023 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8024 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8026 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8027 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8028 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8029 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8031 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8032 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8033 "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", {});
8035 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8036 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8037 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8038 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8040 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8041 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8042 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8044 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8045 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8046 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8047 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8048 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8049 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8051 amount_msat: 2000000,
8053 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8054 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8056 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8059 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8060 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8061 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8063 amount_msat: 5000000,
8065 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8066 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8067 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8069 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8072 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8073 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8075 amount_msat: 5000000,
8077 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8078 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8079 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8081 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8085 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8086 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8087 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a79f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f014730440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8090 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8091 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8092 "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" },
8094 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8095 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8096 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8098 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8099 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8100 "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" }
8103 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8104 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8105 "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", {
8108 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8109 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8110 "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" },
8112 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8113 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8114 "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" },
8116 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8117 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8118 "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" }
8123 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8124 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8126 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8127 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8128 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8129 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8131 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8132 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8133 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8135 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8136 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8138 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8139 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8141 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8142 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8143 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8147 fn test_key_derivation() {
8148 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8149 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8151 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8152 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8154 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8155 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8157 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8158 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8160 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8161 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8163 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8164 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8166 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8167 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8169 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8170 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8174 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8175 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8176 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8177 let seed = [42; 32];
8178 let network = Network::Testnet;
8179 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8180 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8182 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8183 let config = UserConfig::default();
8184 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8185 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8187 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8188 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8190 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8191 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8192 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8193 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8194 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8195 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8196 assert!(res.is_ok());
8201 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8202 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8203 // resulting `channel_type`.
8204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8205 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8206 let network = Network::Testnet;
8207 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8208 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8210 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8211 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8213 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8214 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8216 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8217 // need to signal it.
8218 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8219 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8220 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8223 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8225 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8226 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8227 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8229 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8230 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8231 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8234 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8235 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8236 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8237 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8238 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8241 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8242 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8247 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8248 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8249 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8250 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8251 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8252 let network = Network::Testnet;
8253 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8254 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8256 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8257 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8259 let config = UserConfig::default();
8261 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8262 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8263 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8264 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8265 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8267 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8268 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8269 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8272 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8273 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8274 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8276 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8277 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8278 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8279 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8280 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8281 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8283 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8288 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8289 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8291 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8292 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8293 let network = Network::Testnet;
8294 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8295 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8297 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8298 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8300 let config = UserConfig::default();
8302 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8303 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8304 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8305 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8306 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8307 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8308 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8309 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8311 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8312 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8313 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8314 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8315 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8316 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8319 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8320 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8322 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8323 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8324 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8325 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8327 assert!(res.is_err());
8329 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8330 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8331 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8333 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8334 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8335 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8338 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8340 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8341 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8342 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8343 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8346 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8347 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8349 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8350 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8352 assert!(res.is_err());