1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
438 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
439 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
440 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
443 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
444 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
445 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
446 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
447 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
448 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
449 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
450 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
451 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
452 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
453 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
454 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
455 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
456 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
457 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
460 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
461 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
462 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
464 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
465 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
466 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
467 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
469 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
470 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
471 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
472 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
473 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
475 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
476 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
477 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
478 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
480 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
481 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
482 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
484 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
485 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
486 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
487 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
488 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
490 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
491 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
494 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
495 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
497 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
498 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
499 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
500 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
501 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
503 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
508 (0, update, required),
509 (2, blocked, required),
512 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
513 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
514 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
516 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
517 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
518 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
519 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
521 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
525 channel_id: [u8; 32],
526 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
529 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
530 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
532 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
533 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
534 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
536 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
537 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
538 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
539 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
541 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
542 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
544 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
546 holder_signer: Signer,
547 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
548 destination_script: Script,
550 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
551 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
552 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
554 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
555 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
556 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
557 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
558 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
559 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
561 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
562 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
563 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
564 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
565 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
566 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
568 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
570 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
571 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
572 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
574 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
575 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
576 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
577 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
578 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
579 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
580 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
582 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
584 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
585 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
586 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
587 // HTLCs with similar state.
588 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
589 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
590 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
591 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
592 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
593 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
594 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
595 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
596 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
599 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
600 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
601 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
603 update_time_counter: u32,
605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
606 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
607 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
608 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
609 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
610 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
612 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
613 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
615 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
616 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
617 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
618 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
620 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
621 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
623 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
625 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
627 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
628 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
629 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
630 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
631 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
632 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
634 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
635 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
636 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
637 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
638 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
640 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
641 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
642 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
643 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
644 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
645 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
646 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
647 channel_creation_height: u32,
649 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
652 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
657 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
662 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
664 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
666 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
667 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
670 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
672 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
674 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
675 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
677 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
679 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
680 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
681 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
683 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
685 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
686 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
688 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
689 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
692 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
694 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
696 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
697 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
698 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
699 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
701 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
702 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
703 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
705 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
706 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
707 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
709 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
710 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
711 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
712 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
714 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
716 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
718 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
719 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
720 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
721 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
722 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
724 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
725 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
727 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
728 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
729 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
730 /// unblock the state machine.
732 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
733 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
734 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
736 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
737 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
738 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
741 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
742 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
743 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
744 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
745 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
746 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
747 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
749 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
750 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
752 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
753 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
754 // the channel's funding UTXO.
756 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
757 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
758 // associated channel mapping.
760 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
761 // to store all of them.
762 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
764 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
765 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
766 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
767 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
768 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
770 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
771 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
773 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
774 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
776 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
777 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
778 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
780 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
781 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
782 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
783 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
784 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
787 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
788 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
789 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
793 // Internal utility functions for channels
795 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
796 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
797 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
799 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
801 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
802 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
803 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
805 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
808 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
810 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
813 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
814 /// required by us according to the configured or default
815 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
817 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
819 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
820 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
821 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
822 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
823 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
826 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
827 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
828 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
829 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
830 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
831 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
832 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
835 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
836 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
837 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
840 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
841 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
842 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
843 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
846 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
847 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
849 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
850 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
851 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
855 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
857 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
858 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
859 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
860 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
864 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
866 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
868 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
870 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
871 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
872 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
873 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
874 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
876 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
877 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
879 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
881 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
882 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
884 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
885 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
886 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
887 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
888 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
889 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
891 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
892 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
894 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
895 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
896 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
897 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
898 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
900 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
901 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
903 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
904 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
906 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
907 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
908 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
909 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
915 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
916 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
918 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
919 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
920 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
925 macro_rules! secp_check {
926 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
929 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
934 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
935 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
936 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
937 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
938 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
939 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
940 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
941 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
942 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
943 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
944 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
947 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
948 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
949 // `only_static_remotekey`.
951 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
952 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
953 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
954 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
961 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
962 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
963 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
964 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
965 if !self.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
966 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
967 // We've exhausted our options
970 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
971 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
974 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
975 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
976 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
977 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
979 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
980 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
981 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
982 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
983 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
984 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
986 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
988 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
992 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
993 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
994 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
995 outbound_scid_alias: u64
996 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
997 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
998 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
999 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1001 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1002 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1003 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1004 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1006 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1009 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1010 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1012 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1013 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1014 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1016 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1019 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
1020 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1021 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1022 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
1026 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1027 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1029 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1031 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1032 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1033 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1034 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1037 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1038 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1040 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1041 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1042 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1043 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1047 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1048 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1049 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1053 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1054 Ok(script) => script,
1055 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1058 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1061 context: ChannelContext {
1064 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1065 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1066 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1067 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1072 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1074 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1075 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1076 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1077 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1079 channel_value_satoshis,
1081 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1084 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1087 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1088 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1091 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1092 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1093 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1094 pending_update_fee: None,
1095 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1096 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1097 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1098 update_time_counter: 1,
1100 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1102 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1103 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1104 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1105 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1106 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1107 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1109 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1110 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1111 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1112 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1114 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1115 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1116 closing_fee_limits: None,
1117 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1119 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1121 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1122 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1123 short_channel_id: None,
1124 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1126 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1127 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1128 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1129 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1130 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1131 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1132 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1133 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1134 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1135 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1136 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1137 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1139 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1141 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1142 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1143 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1144 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1145 counterparty_parameters: None,
1146 funding_outpoint: None,
1147 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1148 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1150 funding_transaction: None,
1152 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1153 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1154 counterparty_node_id,
1156 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1158 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1160 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1161 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1163 announcement_sigs: None,
1165 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1166 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1168 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1170 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1171 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1173 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1174 outbound_scid_alias,
1176 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1177 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1179 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1180 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1185 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1190 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1191 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1192 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1194 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1195 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1196 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1197 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1198 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1199 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1200 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1203 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1204 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1205 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1206 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1207 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1208 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1209 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1210 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1212 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1213 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1222 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1223 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1224 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1225 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1226 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1227 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1228 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1229 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1230 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1231 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1235 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1237 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1238 // support this channel type.
1239 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1240 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1244 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1245 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1246 // `static_remote_key`.
1247 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1250 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1251 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1254 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1257 channel_type.clone()
1259 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1260 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1265 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1267 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1268 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1269 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1270 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1271 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1272 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1273 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1274 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1275 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1278 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1282 // Check sanity of message fields:
1283 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1286 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1289 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1292 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1293 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1296 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1299 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1302 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1304 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1305 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1308 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1311 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1315 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1316 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1319 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1322 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1325 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1328 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1331 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1334 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1338 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1340 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1341 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1346 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1347 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1348 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1349 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1352 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1355 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1356 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1357 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1359 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1360 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1363 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1364 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1365 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1366 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1367 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1371 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1372 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1373 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1374 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1378 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1379 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1380 &Some(ref script) => {
1381 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1382 if script.len() == 0 {
1385 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1386 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1388 Some(script.clone())
1391 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1398 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1399 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1400 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1401 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1405 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1406 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1411 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1412 Ok(script) => script,
1413 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1416 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1417 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1419 let chan = Channel {
1420 context: ChannelContext {
1423 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1424 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1426 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1431 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1433 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1434 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1435 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1436 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1439 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1442 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1445 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1446 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1447 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1449 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1450 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1451 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1452 pending_update_fee: None,
1453 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1454 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1455 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1456 update_time_counter: 1,
1458 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1460 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1461 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1462 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1463 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1464 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1465 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1467 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1468 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1469 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1470 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1472 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1473 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1474 closing_fee_limits: None,
1475 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1477 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1479 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1480 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1481 short_channel_id: None,
1482 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1484 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1485 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1486 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1487 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1488 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1489 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1490 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1491 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1492 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1493 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1494 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1495 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1496 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1498 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1500 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1501 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1502 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1503 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1504 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1505 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1506 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1508 funding_outpoint: None,
1509 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1510 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1512 funding_transaction: None,
1514 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1515 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1516 counterparty_node_id,
1518 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1520 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1522 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1523 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1525 announcement_sigs: None,
1527 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1528 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1529 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1530 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1532 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1533 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1535 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1536 outbound_scid_alias,
1538 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1539 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1541 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1542 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1547 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1554 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1555 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1556 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1557 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1558 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1560 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1561 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1562 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1563 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1564 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1565 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1566 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1568 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1569 where L::Target: Logger
1571 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1572 let num_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1573 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1575 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1576 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1577 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1578 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1580 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.context.feerate_per_kw;
1581 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
1582 if match update_state {
1583 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1584 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1585 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1586 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1587 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1589 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1593 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1594 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1595 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1596 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1598 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1599 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1600 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1602 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1603 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1604 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1605 transaction_output_index: None
1610 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1611 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1612 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1613 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1614 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
1617 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1619 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1620 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1621 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1623 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1624 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1627 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1628 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
1631 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1633 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1634 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1635 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1637 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1638 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1644 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1645 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1646 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1647 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1648 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1649 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1650 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1654 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1655 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1657 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1659 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1660 if generated_by_local {
1661 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1662 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1671 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1673 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1674 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1675 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1676 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1677 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1678 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1679 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1682 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1683 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1684 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1685 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1689 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1690 preimages.push(preimage);
1694 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1695 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1697 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1699 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1700 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1702 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1703 if !generated_by_local {
1704 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1712 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1713 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1714 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1715 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1716 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1717 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1718 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1719 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1721 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1723 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1724 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1725 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1726 self.context.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1728 self.context.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1730 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1731 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1732 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1733 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1736 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1737 let anchors_val = if self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1738 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1739 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1741 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1744 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1745 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1746 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1747 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1749 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1752 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1753 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1758 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1759 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1764 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1766 let channel_parameters =
1767 if local { self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1768 else { self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1769 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1772 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1777 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1780 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1781 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1782 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1783 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1785 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1786 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1787 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1795 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1796 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1802 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1803 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1804 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1805 // outside of those situations will fail.
1806 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1810 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1815 1 + // script length (0)
1819 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1820 2 + // witness marker and flag
1821 1 + // witness element count
1822 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1823 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1824 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1825 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1826 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1827 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1829 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1830 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1831 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1837 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1838 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1839 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1840 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1842 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1843 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1844 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1846 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1847 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1848 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1849 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1850 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1851 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1854 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1855 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1858 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1859 value_to_holder = 0;
1862 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1863 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1864 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1865 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1867 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1868 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1871 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1872 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1876 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1877 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1878 /// our counterparty!)
1879 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1880 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1881 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1882 let per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
1883 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1884 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1885 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1887 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1891 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1892 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1893 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1894 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1895 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1896 //may see payments to it!
1897 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1898 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1899 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1901 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1904 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1905 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1906 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1907 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1908 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1911 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1914 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1915 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1917 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1919 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1920 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1921 where L::Target: Logger {
1922 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1923 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1924 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1925 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1926 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1927 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1928 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1929 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1933 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1934 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1935 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1936 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1938 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1939 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1941 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1943 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1945 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1946 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1947 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1949 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1950 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1951 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1952 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1953 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1955 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1956 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1957 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1959 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1960 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1962 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1965 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1966 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1970 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1974 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1975 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1976 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1977 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1978 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1979 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1982 // Now update local state:
1984 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1985 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1986 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1987 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1988 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
1989 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1990 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1994 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1995 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1996 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1997 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1998 // do not not get into this branch.
1999 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2000 match pending_update {
2001 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2002 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2003 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2004 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2005 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2006 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2007 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2010 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2011 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2012 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2013 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2014 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2015 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2016 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2022 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2023 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2024 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2027 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2028 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2030 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2031 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2034 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2035 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2038 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2040 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2041 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2044 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2047 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2048 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2049 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2050 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2055 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2056 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2057 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2058 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2059 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2060 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2061 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2062 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2063 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2064 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2065 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2066 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2067 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2068 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2069 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2070 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2071 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2073 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2075 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2076 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2077 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2078 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2079 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2080 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2081 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2083 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2084 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2087 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2088 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2089 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2090 update, blocked: true,
2095 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2096 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2097 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2098 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2102 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2106 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2107 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2108 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2109 /// before we fail backwards.
2111 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2112 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2113 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2114 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2115 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2116 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2117 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2120 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2121 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2122 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2123 /// before we fail backwards.
2125 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2126 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2127 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2128 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2129 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2130 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2131 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2133 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2135 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2136 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2137 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2139 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2140 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2141 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2143 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2144 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2145 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2147 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2152 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2159 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2160 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2161 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2162 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2163 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2167 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2168 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2169 force_holding_cell = true;
2172 // Now update local state:
2173 if force_holding_cell {
2174 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2175 match pending_update {
2176 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2177 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2178 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2179 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2183 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2184 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2185 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2192 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2193 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2194 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2200 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2202 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2203 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2206 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2207 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2208 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2213 // Message handlers:
2215 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2216 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2218 // Check sanity of message fields:
2219 if !self.is_outbound() {
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2222 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2225 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2228 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
2229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
2231 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2234 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2236 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2238 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2239 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2242 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2243 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2246 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2249 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2253 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2254 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2257 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2260 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2263 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2266 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2269 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2272 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2276 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2277 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2280 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2281 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2283 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2284 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2287 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
2290 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2291 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2292 &Some(ref script) => {
2293 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2294 if script.len() == 0 {
2297 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2300 Some(script.clone())
2303 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2310 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2311 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2312 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2313 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2314 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2316 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2317 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2319 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2322 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2323 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2324 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2325 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2326 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2327 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2330 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2331 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2332 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2335 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2336 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2338 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2339 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2344 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2345 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2347 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2348 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2350 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2351 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2352 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2353 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2354 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2355 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2356 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2357 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2358 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2361 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2362 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2364 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2365 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2366 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2367 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2369 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
2370 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2372 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2373 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2376 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2377 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2380 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2381 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2382 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2384 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2387 if self.is_outbound() {
2388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2390 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2391 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2392 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2396 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2399 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2400 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2401 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2402 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2405 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2406 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2407 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2408 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2409 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2411 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2413 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2414 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2415 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2418 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2419 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2420 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2424 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2425 initial_commitment_tx,
2428 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2429 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2432 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2433 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2435 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2437 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2438 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2439 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2440 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2441 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2442 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2443 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2444 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2445 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2446 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2447 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2449 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2451 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2453 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2454 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2455 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2456 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2458 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2460 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2461 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2463 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2464 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
2467 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2468 }, channel_monitor))
2471 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2472 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2473 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2474 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2475 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2477 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2480 if !self.is_outbound() {
2481 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2483 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2486 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2487 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2488 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2489 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2492 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2494 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2495 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2496 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2497 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2499 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2500 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2502 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2503 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2505 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2506 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2507 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2508 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2509 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2514 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2515 initial_commitment_tx,
2518 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2519 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2522 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2523 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2526 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2527 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2528 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2529 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2530 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2531 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2532 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2533 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2534 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2535 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2536 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2537 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2539 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2541 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2543 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2544 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2545 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2546 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2548 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2550 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2551 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2555 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2556 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2558 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2559 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2560 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2561 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2563 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2566 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2567 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2568 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2571 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2572 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2573 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2574 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2575 // when routing outbound payments.
2576 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2580 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2582 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2583 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2584 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2585 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2586 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2587 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2588 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2589 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2590 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2592 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2593 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2594 let expected_point =
2595 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2596 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2598 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2599 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2600 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2601 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2602 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2603 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2605 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2606 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2607 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2608 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2609 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2611 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2619 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2620 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2622 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2624 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2627 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2628 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2629 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2630 self.context.funding_transaction.clone()
2636 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2637 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2638 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2639 pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2640 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2641 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2642 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2643 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2644 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2647 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2650 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2651 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2652 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2654 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2655 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2656 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2657 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2658 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2659 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2661 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2662 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2668 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2669 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2670 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2671 pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2672 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2673 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2674 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2675 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2676 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2679 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2682 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2683 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2684 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2686 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2687 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2688 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2689 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2690 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2691 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2693 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2694 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2698 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2699 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2700 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2701 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2702 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2703 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2704 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2706 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2707 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2709 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2716 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2717 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2718 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2719 /// corner case properly.
2720 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2721 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2722 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2723 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2725 let mut balance_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat;
2726 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2727 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2728 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2731 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2733 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat
2734 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2736 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2738 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2740 if self.is_outbound() {
2741 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2742 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2744 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2745 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2747 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2748 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2749 if !self.context.opt_anchors() {
2750 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2753 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2754 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2755 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2756 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2758 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2759 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2760 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2761 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2762 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2763 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2764 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2765 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2766 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2767 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2769 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2772 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2773 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2774 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2775 if !self.context.opt_anchors() {
2776 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2779 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2780 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2782 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2783 let remote_balance_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat)
2784 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2786 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
2787 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2788 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2789 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2793 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2795 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2796 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2797 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2798 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2799 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2800 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2802 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2803 (self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2805 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2806 (self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2807 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2809 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2810 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2811 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2812 Some(self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2813 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2816 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2817 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2818 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2819 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2820 self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2821 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2824 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2825 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2826 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2828 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2832 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2833 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2835 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2836 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2840 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2841 - self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2842 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2843 - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2845 outbound_capacity_msat,
2846 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2847 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2852 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2853 (self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2856 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2857 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2858 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2859 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2860 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2861 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2864 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2865 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2867 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2868 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2871 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2872 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2874 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2875 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2877 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2878 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2880 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2881 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2882 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2884 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2887 (self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2888 self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2890 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2891 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2893 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2894 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2896 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2897 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2901 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2902 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2908 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2909 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2913 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2914 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2915 included_htlcs += 1;
2918 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2919 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2923 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2924 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2925 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2926 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2927 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2928 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2933 for htlc in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2935 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2936 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2941 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2942 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2946 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2947 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
2948 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2951 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2952 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.context.opt_anchors());
2954 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2955 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2956 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2958 total_pending_htlcs,
2959 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2960 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2961 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2963 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2964 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2965 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2967 feerate: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
2969 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2974 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2975 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2977 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2978 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2980 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2981 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2983 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2984 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2985 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2987 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2990 (self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2991 self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2993 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2994 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2996 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2997 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2999 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3000 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3004 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3005 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3011 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3012 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3013 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3014 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3015 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3016 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3019 included_htlcs += 1;
3022 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3023 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3026 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3027 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3029 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3030 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3031 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3036 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3037 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
3038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3041 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3042 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.context.opt_anchors());
3044 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3045 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3047 total_pending_htlcs,
3048 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3049 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3050 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3052 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3053 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3054 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3056 feerate: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
3058 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3063 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3064 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3065 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3066 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3067 if local_sent_shutdown {
3068 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3070 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3071 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3072 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3075 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3078 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3081 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3084 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3088 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3089 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3090 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3093 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3096 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3097 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3098 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3099 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3100 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3101 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3102 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3103 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3104 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3105 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3106 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3108 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3109 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3110 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3111 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3112 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3113 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3117 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3120 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3121 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3122 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3124 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3125 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3126 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3127 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3128 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3129 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3130 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3134 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3135 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3136 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3137 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3138 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3139 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3140 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3144 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3145 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3146 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3147 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3148 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3152 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3153 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3154 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3155 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3156 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3158 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3162 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3163 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3166 if !self.is_outbound() {
3167 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3168 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3169 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3170 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3171 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3172 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3173 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3174 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3175 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3176 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3177 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3178 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3179 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3180 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3181 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3184 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3185 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3186 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3187 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3191 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3194 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3198 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3199 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3200 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3204 // Now update local state:
3205 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3206 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3207 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3208 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3209 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3210 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3211 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3216 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3218 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3219 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3220 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3221 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3222 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3223 None => fail_reason.into(),
3224 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3225 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3226 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3229 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3233 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3235 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3236 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3238 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3244 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3247 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3248 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3251 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3255 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3258 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3259 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3260 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3262 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3266 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3270 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3271 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3274 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3278 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3282 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3283 where L::Target: Logger
3285 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3288 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3291 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3295 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3297 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3299 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3300 let commitment_txid = {
3301 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3302 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3303 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3305 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3306 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3307 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3308 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3309 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3314 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3316 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3317 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3318 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3319 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3322 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3323 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3324 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3328 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3330 if self.is_outbound() {
3331 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3332 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3333 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3334 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3335 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3336 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3337 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3338 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3339 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3340 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3346 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3350 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3351 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3352 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3353 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3354 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3355 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3356 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3357 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3358 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3359 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3360 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3361 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3362 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3365 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3366 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3367 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3368 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3369 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3370 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
3371 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3373 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3374 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3375 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3376 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3377 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3378 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3379 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3382 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3383 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3386 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3388 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3389 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3390 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3393 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3396 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3397 commitment_stats.tx,
3399 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3400 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3401 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3404 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3405 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3407 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3408 let mut need_commitment = false;
3409 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3410 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3411 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3412 need_commitment = true;
3416 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3417 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3418 Some(forward_info.clone())
3420 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3421 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3422 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3423 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3424 need_commitment = true;
3427 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3428 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3429 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3430 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3431 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3432 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3433 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3434 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3435 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3436 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3437 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3438 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3439 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3440 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3442 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3444 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3445 need_commitment = true;
3449 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3450 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3451 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3452 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3453 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3454 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3456 nondust_htlc_sources,
3460 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3461 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3462 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3463 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3465 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3466 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3467 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3468 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3469 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3470 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3471 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3472 // includes the right HTLCs.
3473 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3474 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3475 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3476 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3477 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3478 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3480 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3481 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3482 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3485 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3486 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3487 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3488 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3489 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3490 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3491 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3492 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3493 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3497 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3498 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3499 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3500 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3503 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3504 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3505 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3506 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3507 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3508 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3509 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3510 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3513 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3514 /// for our counterparty.
3515 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3516 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3517 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3518 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3519 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3521 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3522 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3523 updates: Vec::new(),
3526 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3527 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3528 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3529 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3530 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3531 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3532 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3533 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3534 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3535 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3536 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3537 // to rebalance channels.
3538 match &htlc_update {
3539 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3540 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3541 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3544 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3545 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3546 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3547 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3548 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3549 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3550 // into the holding cell without ever being
3551 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3552 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3553 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3556 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3562 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3563 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3564 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3565 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3566 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3567 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3568 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3569 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3570 (msg, monitor_update)
3571 } else { unreachable!() };
3572 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3573 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3575 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3576 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3577 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3578 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3579 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3580 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3581 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3582 // for a full revocation before failing.
3583 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3586 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3588 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3595 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3596 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3598 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3599 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3604 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3605 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3606 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3607 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3608 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3610 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3611 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3612 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3614 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3615 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3621 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3622 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3623 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3624 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3625 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3626 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3627 where L::Target: Logger,
3629 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3630 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3632 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3635 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3636 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3639 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3641 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3642 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3647 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3648 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3649 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3650 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3651 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3652 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3653 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3654 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3658 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3660 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3661 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3664 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3665 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3667 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3669 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3670 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3671 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3672 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3673 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3674 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3675 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3676 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3680 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3681 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3682 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3683 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3684 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3685 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3686 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3687 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3688 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3690 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3691 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3694 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3695 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3696 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3697 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3698 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3699 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3700 let mut require_commitment = false;
3701 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3704 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3705 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3706 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3708 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3709 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3710 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3711 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3712 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3713 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3718 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3719 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3720 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3721 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3722 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3724 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3725 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3726 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3731 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3732 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3734 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3738 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3739 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3741 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3742 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3743 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3744 require_commitment = true;
3745 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3746 match forward_info {
3747 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3748 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3749 require_commitment = true;
3751 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3752 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3753 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3755 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3756 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3757 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3761 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3762 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3763 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3764 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3770 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3771 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3772 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3773 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3775 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3776 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3777 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3778 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3779 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3780 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3781 require_commitment = true;
3785 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3787 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3788 match update_state {
3789 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3790 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3791 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3792 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3793 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3795 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3796 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3797 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3798 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3799 require_commitment = true;
3800 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3801 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3806 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3807 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3808 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3809 if require_commitment {
3810 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3811 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3812 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3813 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3814 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3815 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3816 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3817 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3818 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3820 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3821 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3822 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3823 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3824 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3827 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3828 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3829 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3830 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3831 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3832 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3833 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3835 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3836 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3838 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3839 if require_commitment {
3840 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3842 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3843 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3844 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3845 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3847 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3848 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3849 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3850 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3852 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3853 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3854 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3860 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3861 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3862 /// commitment update.
3863 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3864 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3865 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3868 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3869 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3870 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3871 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3873 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3874 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3875 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3876 if !self.is_outbound() {
3877 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3879 if !self.is_usable() {
3880 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3882 if !self.is_live() {
3883 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3886 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3887 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3888 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3889 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3890 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3891 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3892 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3893 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3894 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3895 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3899 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3900 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3901 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3902 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3903 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3906 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3907 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3911 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3912 force_holding_cell = true;
3915 if force_holding_cell {
3916 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3920 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3921 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3923 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3924 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3929 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3930 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3932 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3934 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3935 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3936 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3937 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3941 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3942 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3943 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3947 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3948 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3951 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3952 // will be retransmitted.
3953 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3954 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3955 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3957 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3958 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3960 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3961 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3962 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3963 // this HTLC accordingly
3964 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3967 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3968 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3969 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3970 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3973 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3974 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3975 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3976 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3977 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3978 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3983 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3985 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3986 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3987 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3988 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3992 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3993 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3994 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3995 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3996 // the update upon reconnection.
3997 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4001 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4003 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
4004 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4007 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4008 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4009 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4010 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4011 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4012 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4013 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4015 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4016 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4017 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4018 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4019 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4020 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4021 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4023 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4024 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4025 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4026 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4027 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4028 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4029 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
4032 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4033 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4034 /// to the remote side.
4035 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4036 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4037 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4038 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4041 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4043 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4044 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4045 let mut found_blocked = false;
4046 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4047 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
4048 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
4052 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4053 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4054 // first received the funding_signed.
4055 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4056 if self.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4057 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4059 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4060 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4061 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4062 funding_broadcastable = None;
4065 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4066 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4067 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4068 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4069 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4070 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4071 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4072 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4073 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4074 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4075 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4076 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4077 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4078 next_per_commitment_point,
4079 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4083 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4085 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4086 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4087 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4088 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4089 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4090 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4092 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4093 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4094 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4095 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4096 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4097 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4101 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4102 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4104 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4105 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4106 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4109 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4110 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4111 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4112 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4113 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4114 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4115 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4116 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4117 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4121 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4122 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4124 if self.is_outbound() {
4125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4127 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4130 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4131 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4133 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4134 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4135 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4136 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4137 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4138 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4139 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4140 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4141 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4142 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4143 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4145 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4147 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4149 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4155 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4156 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4157 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4158 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4159 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4160 per_commitment_secret,
4161 next_per_commitment_point,
4163 next_local_nonce: None,
4167 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4168 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4169 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4170 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4171 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4173 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4174 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4175 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4176 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4177 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4178 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4179 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4180 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4181 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4186 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4187 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4189 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4190 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4191 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4192 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4193 reason: err_packet.clone()
4196 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4197 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4198 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4199 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4200 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4201 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4204 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4205 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4206 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4207 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4208 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4215 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4216 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4217 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4218 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4222 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4223 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4224 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4225 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4226 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4227 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4231 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4232 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4234 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4235 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4236 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4237 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4238 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4239 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4240 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4241 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4244 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4246 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4247 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4248 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4249 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4253 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4254 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4258 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4259 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4260 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4261 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4262 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4265 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4266 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4267 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4268 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4269 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4272 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4273 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4274 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4275 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4276 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4277 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4278 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4279 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4283 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4284 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4285 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4286 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4288 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4292 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4293 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4294 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4295 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4297 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4298 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4299 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4300 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4301 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4305 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4307 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4308 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4309 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4310 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4311 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4314 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4315 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4316 channel_ready: None,
4317 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4318 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4319 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4323 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4324 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4325 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4326 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4327 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4328 next_per_commitment_point,
4329 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4331 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4332 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4333 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4337 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4338 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4339 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4341 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4342 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4343 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4346 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4352 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4353 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4354 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4355 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4356 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4357 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4358 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4360 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4362 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4363 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4364 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4365 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4366 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4367 next_per_commitment_point,
4368 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4372 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4373 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4374 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4376 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4379 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4380 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4381 raa: required_revoke,
4382 commitment_update: None,
4383 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4385 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4386 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4387 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4389 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4392 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4393 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4394 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4395 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4396 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4397 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4400 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4401 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4402 raa: required_revoke,
4403 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4404 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4408 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4412 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4413 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4414 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4415 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4417 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4419 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4421 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4422 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4423 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4424 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4425 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4426 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4428 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4429 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4430 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4431 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4432 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4434 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4435 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4436 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4437 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4440 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4441 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4442 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4443 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4444 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4445 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4446 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4447 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4448 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4449 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4450 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4451 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4452 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4453 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4454 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4456 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4459 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4460 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4463 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4464 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4465 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4466 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4467 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4468 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4469 self.context.channel_state &
4470 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4471 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4472 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4473 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4476 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4477 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4478 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4479 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4480 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4481 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4484 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4490 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4491 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4492 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4493 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4495 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4496 return Ok((None, None));
4499 if !self.is_outbound() {
4500 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4501 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4503 return Ok((None, None));
4506 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4508 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4509 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4510 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4511 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4513 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4514 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4515 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4517 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4518 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4519 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4520 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4522 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4523 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4524 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4529 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4530 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4532 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4533 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4536 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4537 /// within our expected timeframe.
4539 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4540 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4541 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4544 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4547 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4548 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4551 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4552 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4553 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4554 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4556 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4559 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4560 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4561 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4562 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4565 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4566 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4570 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4572 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4573 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4576 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4577 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4578 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4581 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4584 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4585 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4586 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4587 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4589 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4592 assert!(send_shutdown);
4593 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4594 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4595 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4597 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4600 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4605 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4607 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4608 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4610 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4611 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4612 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4613 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4614 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4615 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4618 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4619 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4620 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4623 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4624 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4625 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4626 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4630 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4631 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4632 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4633 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4634 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4635 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4637 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4638 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4645 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4646 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4648 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4651 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4652 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4654 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4656 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4657 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4658 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4659 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4660 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4661 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4662 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4663 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4664 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4666 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4667 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4670 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4674 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4675 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4676 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4677 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4679 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4682 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4683 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4685 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4688 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4692 if self.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4696 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4697 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4698 return Ok((None, None));
4701 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4702 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4703 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4706 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4708 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4711 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4712 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4713 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4714 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4715 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4719 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4720 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4725 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4726 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4727 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4728 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4729 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4730 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4731 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4735 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4737 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4738 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4739 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4740 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4742 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4745 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4746 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4747 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4749 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4750 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4751 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4752 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4756 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4757 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4758 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4759 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4761 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4762 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4763 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4769 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4770 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4773 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4776 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4777 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4780 if !self.is_outbound() {
4781 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4782 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4783 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4784 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4786 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4787 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4788 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4790 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4791 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4794 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4795 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4796 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4797 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4798 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4799 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4800 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4801 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4806 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4807 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4808 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4809 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4815 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4816 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4817 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4818 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4820 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4826 // Public utilities:
4828 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4829 self.context.channel_id
4832 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4834 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4835 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4836 self.context.temporary_channel_id
4839 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4840 self.context.minimum_depth
4843 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4844 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4845 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4846 self.context.user_id
4849 /// Gets the channel's type
4850 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4851 &self.context.channel_type
4854 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4855 /// is_usable() returns true).
4856 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4857 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4858 self.context.short_channel_id
4861 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4862 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4863 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4866 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4867 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4868 self.context.outbound_scid_alias
4870 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4871 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4872 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4873 assert_eq!(self.context.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4874 self.context.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4877 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4878 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4879 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4880 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4883 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4884 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4885 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4888 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4889 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4890 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4891 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4895 height.checked_sub(self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4898 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4899 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4902 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4903 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4906 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4907 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4908 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4911 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4912 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4915 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4916 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4917 self.context.counterparty_node_id
4920 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4921 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4922 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4925 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4926 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4927 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4930 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4931 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4933 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4934 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4935 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4936 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4938 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4942 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4943 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4944 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4947 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4948 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4949 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4952 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4953 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4954 let holder_reserve = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4956 (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4957 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4962 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4963 self.context.channel_value_satoshis
4966 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4967 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4970 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4971 cmp::max(self.context.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4974 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4975 self.context.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4978 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4979 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4980 self.context.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4983 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4984 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4985 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted
4988 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4989 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4990 self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted
4993 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4994 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4995 self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4998 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4999 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
5000 self.is_usable() && !self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted
5003 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
5004 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
5005 self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
5008 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
5009 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
5010 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
5011 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
5012 if self.context.prev_config.is_none() {
5015 let prev_config = self.context.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
5017 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
5018 self.context.prev_config = None;
5022 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
5023 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
5024 self.context.config.options
5027 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
5028 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
5029 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
5030 let did_channel_update =
5031 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
5032 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
5033 self.context.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
5034 if did_channel_update {
5035 self.context.prev_config = Some((self.context.config.options, 0));
5036 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
5037 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
5038 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5040 self.context.config.options = *config;
5044 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5045 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5046 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5047 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5048 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5049 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5050 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5052 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5053 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5056 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5058 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5059 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5065 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5066 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5067 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5068 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5069 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5070 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5071 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
5073 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
5074 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5081 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
5082 self.context.feerate_per_kw
5085 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
5086 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
5087 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
5088 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
5089 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
5090 // which are near the dust limit.
5091 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.context.feerate_per_kw;
5092 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
5093 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
5094 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5095 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5097 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
5098 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5100 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
5103 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5104 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5107 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5108 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
5111 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5112 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5116 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
5117 &self.context.holder_signer
5121 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5123 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5124 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5125 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5126 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5127 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5128 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5130 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5132 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5140 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5141 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5145 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5146 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5147 self.context.update_time_counter
5150 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5151 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id
5154 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5155 self.context.config.announced_channel
5158 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5159 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5162 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5163 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5164 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5165 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5168 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5169 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5170 self.context.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5173 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5174 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5175 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5176 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5177 (self.context.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5180 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5181 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5182 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5183 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5184 self.is_usable() && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5187 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5188 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5189 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5190 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5193 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5194 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5195 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5198 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5199 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5200 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5201 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5202 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5203 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5204 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5205 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5211 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5212 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5213 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5214 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5215 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5216 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5221 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5222 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5224 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5225 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5226 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5227 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5230 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5231 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5234 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5235 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5236 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5237 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5243 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5244 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5247 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5248 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5249 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5250 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5253 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5254 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5255 self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5258 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5259 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5260 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5262 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5263 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5264 if self.context.channel_state &
5265 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5266 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5267 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5268 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5269 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5272 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5273 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5274 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5275 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5276 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5277 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5279 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5280 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5281 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5283 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5284 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5285 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5286 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5287 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5288 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5294 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5295 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5296 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5299 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5300 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5301 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5304 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5305 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5306 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5309 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5310 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5311 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5312 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5313 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5314 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5319 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5320 self.context.channel_update_status
5323 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5324 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5325 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5328 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5330 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5331 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5332 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5336 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5337 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5338 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5341 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5345 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5346 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5347 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5349 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5350 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5351 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5353 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5354 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5357 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5358 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5359 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5360 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5361 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5362 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5363 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5364 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5365 self.context.channel_state);
5367 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5371 if need_commitment_update {
5372 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5373 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5374 let next_per_commitment_point =
5375 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5376 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5377 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5378 next_per_commitment_point,
5379 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5383 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5389 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5390 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5391 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5392 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5393 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5394 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5395 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5397 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5400 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5401 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5402 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5403 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5404 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5405 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5406 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5407 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5408 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5409 if self.is_outbound() {
5410 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5411 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5412 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5413 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5414 // channel and move on.
5415 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5416 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5418 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5419 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5420 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5422 if self.is_outbound() {
5423 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5424 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5425 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5426 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5427 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5428 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5432 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5433 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5434 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5435 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5436 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5440 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5441 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5442 // may have already happened for this block).
5443 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5444 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5445 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5446 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5449 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5450 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5451 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5452 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5460 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5461 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5462 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5463 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5465 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5466 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5469 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5471 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5472 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5473 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5474 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5476 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5479 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5482 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5483 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5484 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5485 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5487 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5490 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5491 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5492 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5494 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5495 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5497 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5498 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5499 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5507 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5509 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5510 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5511 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5513 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5514 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5517 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5518 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5519 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5520 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5521 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5522 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5523 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5524 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5525 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5528 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5529 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5530 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5531 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5533 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5534 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5535 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5537 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5538 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5539 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5540 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5542 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5543 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5544 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5545 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5546 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5547 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5548 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5551 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5552 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5554 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5557 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5558 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5559 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5560 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5561 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5562 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5563 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5564 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5565 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5566 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5567 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5568 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5569 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5570 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5571 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5572 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5573 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5579 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5584 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5585 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5587 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5588 if !self.is_outbound() {
5589 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5591 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5592 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5595 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5596 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5599 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5600 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5604 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5605 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5606 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5607 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5608 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5609 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5610 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5611 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5612 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5613 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5614 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5615 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5616 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5617 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5618 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5619 first_per_commitment_point,
5620 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5621 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5622 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5623 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5625 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5629 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5630 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
5633 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5634 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5635 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5636 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5639 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5640 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5642 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5643 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5644 if self.is_outbound() {
5645 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5647 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5648 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5650 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5651 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5653 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5654 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5657 self.context.user_id = user_id;
5658 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5660 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5663 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5664 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5665 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5667 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5668 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5669 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5670 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5672 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5673 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5674 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5675 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5676 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5677 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5678 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5679 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5680 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5681 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5682 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5683 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5684 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5685 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5686 first_per_commitment_point,
5687 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5688 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5689 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5691 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5693 next_local_nonce: None,
5697 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5698 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5700 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5702 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5703 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5706 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5707 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5708 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5709 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5710 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5711 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5714 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5715 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5716 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5717 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5718 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5719 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5720 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5721 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5722 if !self.is_outbound() {
5723 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5725 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5726 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5728 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5729 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5730 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5731 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5734 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5735 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5737 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5740 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5741 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5746 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5748 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5750 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5751 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5752 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5754 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5755 temporary_channel_id,
5756 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5757 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5760 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5762 next_local_nonce: None,
5766 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5767 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5768 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5769 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5771 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5774 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5775 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5776 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5777 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5778 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5779 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5781 if !self.is_usable() {
5782 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5785 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5786 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5787 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5788 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5790 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5791 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5793 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5794 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5795 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5796 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5797 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5798 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5804 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5805 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5806 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5807 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5809 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5812 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5816 if !self.is_usable() {
5820 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5821 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5825 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5829 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5830 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5833 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5837 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5839 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5844 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5846 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5851 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5853 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5854 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5855 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5856 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5857 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5861 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5863 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5864 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5865 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5866 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5867 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5868 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5869 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5871 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5872 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5873 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5874 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5875 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5876 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5877 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5878 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5879 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5880 contents: announcement,
5883 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5887 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5888 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5889 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5890 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5891 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5892 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5893 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5894 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5896 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5898 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5900 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5901 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5903 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5905 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5906 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5909 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5910 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5912 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5915 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5918 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5919 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5920 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5921 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5922 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5923 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5926 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5928 Err(_) => return None,
5930 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5931 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5936 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5937 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5938 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5939 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5940 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5941 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5942 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5943 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5944 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5945 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5946 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5947 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5948 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5949 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5950 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5951 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5954 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5957 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5958 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5959 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5960 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5961 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5962 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5963 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5964 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5965 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5967 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5968 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5969 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5970 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5971 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5972 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5973 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5974 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5975 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5977 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5978 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5979 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5980 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5981 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5982 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5983 next_funding_txid: None,
5988 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5990 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5991 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5992 /// commitment update.
5994 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5995 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5996 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5997 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5999 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
6000 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6002 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6003 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6008 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6009 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6011 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6013 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6014 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6016 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6017 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6018 /// regenerate them.
6020 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6021 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6023 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6024 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6025 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
6026 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6027 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6030 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6031 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6035 if amount_msat == 0 {
6036 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6039 let available_balances = self.get_available_balances();
6040 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6042 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6045 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6046 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6047 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6050 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
6051 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6052 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6053 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6054 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6055 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6056 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6060 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
6061 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
6062 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6063 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6064 else { "to peer" });
6066 if need_holding_cell {
6067 force_holding_cell = true;
6070 // Now update local state:
6071 if force_holding_cell {
6072 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6077 onion_routing_packet,
6082 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6083 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6085 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6087 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6091 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6093 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6097 onion_routing_packet,
6099 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6104 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6105 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6106 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6107 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6109 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6110 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6111 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6113 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6114 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6118 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6119 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6120 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6121 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6122 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6123 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6124 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6127 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6128 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6129 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6130 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6131 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6132 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6135 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6137 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6138 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6139 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6141 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6142 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6145 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6146 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6147 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6148 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6149 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6150 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6151 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6152 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6155 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6159 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6160 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6161 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6162 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6164 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6166 if !self.is_outbound() {
6167 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6168 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6169 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6170 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6171 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6172 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6173 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6174 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6175 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
6176 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6182 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6185 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6186 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6187 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6188 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6189 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6190 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6192 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6193 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6194 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6195 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6198 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6199 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6203 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6204 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6206 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6208 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6209 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6210 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6211 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6213 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6214 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6215 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6216 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6217 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6218 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6222 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6223 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6227 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6228 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6231 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6232 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6234 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6235 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6236 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6237 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6238 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6241 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6242 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6243 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6249 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6250 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6251 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6254 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6255 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6258 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6259 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6260 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6261 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6267 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6268 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6270 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6271 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6272 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6273 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6274 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6275 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6276 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6277 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6278 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6281 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6282 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6283 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6285 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6286 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6289 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6290 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6292 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6293 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6294 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6297 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6298 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6299 let mut chan_closed = false;
6300 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6304 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6306 None if !chan_closed => {
6307 // use override shutdown script if provided
6308 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6309 Some(script) => script,
6311 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6312 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6313 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6314 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6318 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6319 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6321 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6327 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6328 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6329 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6330 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6332 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6334 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6336 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6337 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6338 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6339 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6340 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6341 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6344 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6345 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6346 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6349 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6350 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6351 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6354 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6355 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6356 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6357 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6358 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6360 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6361 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6368 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6369 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6371 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6374 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6375 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6376 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6377 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6378 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6379 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6380 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6381 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6382 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6383 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6384 assert!(self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6386 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6387 // return them to fail the payment.
6388 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6389 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6390 for htlc_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6392 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6393 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id));
6398 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6399 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6400 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6401 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6402 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6403 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6404 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6405 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6406 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6407 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6408 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6409 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6410 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6415 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6416 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6417 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6420 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6421 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6422 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6424 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6425 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6429 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6433 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6434 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6442 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6443 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6444 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6445 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6446 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6448 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6449 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6450 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6451 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6457 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6458 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6459 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6460 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6461 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6462 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6467 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6468 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6469 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6470 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6472 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6473 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6474 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6475 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6480 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6481 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6482 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6483 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6484 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6490 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6491 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6492 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6495 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6497 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6498 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6499 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6500 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6501 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6503 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6504 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6505 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6506 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6508 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6509 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6510 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6512 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6514 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6515 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6516 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6517 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6518 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6519 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6521 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6522 // deserialized from that format.
6523 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6524 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6525 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6527 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6529 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6530 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6531 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6533 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6534 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6535 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6536 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6539 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6540 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6541 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6544 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6545 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6546 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6547 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6549 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6550 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6552 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6554 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6556 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6558 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6561 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6563 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6568 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6570 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6571 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6572 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6573 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6574 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6575 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6576 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6578 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6580 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6582 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6585 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6586 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6587 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6590 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6592 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6593 preimages.push(preimage);
6595 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6596 reason.write(writer)?;
6598 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6600 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6601 preimages.push(preimage);
6603 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6604 reason.write(writer)?;
6609 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6610 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6612 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6614 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6615 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6616 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6617 source.write(writer)?;
6618 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6620 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6622 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6623 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6627 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6628 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6633 match self.context.resend_order {
6634 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6635 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6638 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6639 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6640 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6642 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6643 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6644 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6645 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6648 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6649 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6650 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6651 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6652 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6655 if self.is_outbound() {
6656 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6657 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6658 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6660 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6661 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6662 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6664 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6666 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6667 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6668 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6669 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6671 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6672 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6673 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6674 // consider the stale state on reload.
6677 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6678 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6679 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6681 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6682 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6683 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6685 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6686 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6688 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6689 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6692 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6693 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6695 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6698 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6699 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6700 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6702 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6705 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6706 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6708 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6709 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6714 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6716 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6719 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6721 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6722 htlc.write(writer)?;
6725 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6726 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6727 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6729 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6730 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6732 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6733 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6734 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6735 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6736 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6737 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6738 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6740 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6741 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6742 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6743 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6744 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6746 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6747 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6749 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6750 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6751 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6752 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6754 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6757 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6758 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6759 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6760 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6761 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6762 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6764 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6765 (2, chan_type, option),
6766 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6767 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6768 (5, self.context.config, required),
6769 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6770 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6771 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6772 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6773 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6774 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6775 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6776 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6777 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6778 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6779 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6780 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6781 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6782 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6783 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6784 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6791 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6792 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6794 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6795 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6797 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6798 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6799 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6801 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6802 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6803 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6804 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6808 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6809 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6810 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6812 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6815 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6822 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6824 let mut keys_data = None;
6826 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6827 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6828 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6830 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6831 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6832 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6833 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6834 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6835 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6839 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6840 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6841 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6844 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6847 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6853 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6854 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6855 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6856 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6857 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6858 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6859 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6860 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6861 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6862 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6863 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6864 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6869 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6871 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6872 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6873 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6875 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6876 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6877 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6879 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6880 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6882 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6886 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6890 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6893 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6898 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6900 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6901 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6902 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6903 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6904 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6905 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6906 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6907 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6909 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6910 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6911 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6914 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6915 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6917 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6921 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6922 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6923 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6924 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6927 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6931 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6933 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6934 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6937 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6939 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6940 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6943 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6948 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6952 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6953 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6954 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6955 // consider the stale state on reload.
6956 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6959 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6961 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6966 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6975 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6976 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6978 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6979 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6987 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6988 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6990 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6991 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6996 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6997 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6998 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7001 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7004 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7018 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7019 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7021 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7023 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7027 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7028 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7029 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7031 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7037 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7038 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7039 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7040 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7041 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7042 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7043 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7044 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7045 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7046 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7048 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7049 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7050 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7051 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7052 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7053 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7054 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7056 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7057 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7058 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7059 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7061 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7063 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7064 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7065 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7066 (2, channel_type, option),
7067 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7068 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7069 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7070 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7071 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7072 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7073 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7074 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7075 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7076 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7077 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7078 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7079 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7080 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7081 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7082 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7083 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7084 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7085 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7088 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7089 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7090 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7091 // required channel parameters.
7092 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7093 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7094 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7096 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7098 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7099 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7100 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7101 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7104 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7105 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7106 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7108 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7109 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7111 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7112 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7117 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7118 if iter.next().is_some() {
7119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7123 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7124 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7125 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7126 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7127 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7130 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7131 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7133 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7134 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7135 // separate u64 values.
7136 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7138 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7141 context: ChannelContext {
7144 config: config.unwrap(),
7148 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7149 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7150 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7153 temporary_channel_id,
7155 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7157 channel_value_satoshis,
7159 latest_monitor_update_id,
7162 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7165 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7166 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7169 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7170 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7171 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7172 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7176 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7177 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7178 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7179 monitor_pending_forwards,
7180 monitor_pending_failures,
7181 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7184 holding_cell_update_fee,
7185 next_holder_htlc_id,
7186 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7187 update_time_counter,
7190 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7191 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7192 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7193 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7195 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7196 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7197 closing_fee_limits: None,
7198 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7200 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7202 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7203 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7205 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7207 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7208 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7209 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7210 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7211 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7212 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7213 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7214 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7215 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7218 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7220 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7221 funding_transaction,
7223 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7224 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7225 counterparty_node_id,
7227 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7231 channel_update_status,
7232 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7237 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7238 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7239 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7241 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7242 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7244 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7245 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7246 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7248 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7249 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7251 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7252 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7254 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7257 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7266 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7267 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7268 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7269 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7270 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7272 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7273 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7275 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7276 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7277 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7278 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7279 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7280 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7281 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7282 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7283 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7284 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7285 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7286 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7287 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7288 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7289 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7290 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7291 use crate::util::test_utils;
7292 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7293 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7294 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7295 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7296 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7297 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7298 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7299 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7300 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7301 use crate::prelude::*;
7303 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7306 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7307 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7313 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7314 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7315 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7316 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7320 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7321 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7322 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7323 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7324 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7325 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7326 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7330 signer: InMemorySigner,
7333 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7334 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7337 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7338 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7340 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7341 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7344 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7348 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7350 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7351 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7352 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7353 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7354 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7357 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7358 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7359 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7360 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7364 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7365 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7366 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7370 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7371 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7372 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7373 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7375 let seed = [42; 32];
7376 let network = Network::Testnet;
7377 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7378 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7379 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7383 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7384 let config = UserConfig::default();
7385 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7386 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7387 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7389 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7390 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7394 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7395 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7397 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7398 let original_fee = 253;
7399 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7400 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7401 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7402 let seed = [42; 32];
7403 let network = Network::Testnet;
7404 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7406 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7407 let config = UserConfig::default();
7408 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7410 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7411 // same as the old fee.
7412 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7413 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7414 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7418 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7419 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7420 // dust limits are used.
7421 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7423 let seed = [42; 32];
7424 let network = Network::Testnet;
7425 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7426 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7428 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7429 // they have different dust limits.
7431 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7432 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7433 let config = UserConfig::default();
7434 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7436 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7437 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7438 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7439 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7440 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7442 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7443 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7444 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7445 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7446 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7448 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7449 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7450 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7452 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7453 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7454 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7455 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7458 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7460 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7461 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7462 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7463 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7464 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7465 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7466 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7467 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7468 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7472 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7473 // the dust limit check.
7474 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7475 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7476 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7477 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7479 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7480 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7481 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7482 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7483 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7484 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7485 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7489 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7490 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7491 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7492 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7493 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7494 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7496 let seed = [42; 32];
7497 let network = Network::Testnet;
7498 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7500 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7501 let config = UserConfig::default();
7502 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7504 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7505 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7507 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7508 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7509 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7510 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7511 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7512 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7514 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7515 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7516 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7517 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7518 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7520 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7522 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7523 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7524 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7525 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7526 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7528 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7529 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7530 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7531 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7532 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7536 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7537 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7538 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7539 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7540 let seed = [42; 32];
7541 let network = Network::Testnet;
7542 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7543 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7544 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7546 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7548 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7549 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7550 let config = UserConfig::default();
7551 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7553 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7554 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7555 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7556 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7558 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7559 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7560 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7562 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7563 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7564 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7565 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7567 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7568 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7569 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7571 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7572 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7574 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7575 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7576 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7577 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7578 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7579 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7580 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7582 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7584 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7585 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7586 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7587 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7588 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7592 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7593 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7594 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7595 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7596 let seed = [42; 32];
7597 let network = Network::Testnet;
7598 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7599 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7600 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7602 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7603 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7604 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7605 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7606 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7607 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7608 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7609 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7611 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7612 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7613 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7614 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7615 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7616 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7618 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7619 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7620 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7621 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7623 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7625 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7626 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7627 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7628 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7629 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7630 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7632 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7633 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7634 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7635 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7637 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7638 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7639 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7640 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7641 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7643 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7644 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7646 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7647 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7648 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7650 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7651 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7652 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7653 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7654 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7656 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7657 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7659 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7660 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7661 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7665 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7667 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7668 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7669 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7671 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7672 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7673 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7674 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7676 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7677 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7678 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7680 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7682 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7683 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7686 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7687 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7688 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7689 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7690 let seed = [42; 32];
7691 let network = Network::Testnet;
7692 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7693 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7694 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7697 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7698 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7699 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7701 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7702 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7704 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7705 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7706 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7708 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7709 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7711 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7713 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7714 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7716 // Channel Negotiations failed
7717 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7718 assert!(result.is_err());
7723 fn channel_update() {
7724 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7726 let seed = [42; 32];
7727 let network = Network::Testnet;
7728 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7729 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7731 // Create a channel.
7732 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7733 let config = UserConfig::default();
7734 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7735 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7736 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7737 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7739 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7740 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7741 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7743 short_channel_id: 0,
7746 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7747 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7748 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7750 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7751 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7753 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7755 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7757 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7758 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7759 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7760 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7762 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7763 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7764 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7766 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7770 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7772 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7773 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7774 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7775 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7776 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7777 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7778 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7779 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7780 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7781 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7782 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7783 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7784 use crate::sync::Arc;
7786 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7787 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7788 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7791 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7793 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7794 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7795 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7796 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7797 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7799 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7800 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7806 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7807 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7808 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7810 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7811 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7812 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7813 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7814 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7815 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7817 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7819 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7820 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7821 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7822 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7823 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7824 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7826 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7827 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7828 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7829 selected_contest_delay: 144
7831 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7832 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7834 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7835 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7837 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7838 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7840 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7841 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7843 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7844 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7845 // build_commitment_transaction.
7846 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7847 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7848 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7849 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7850 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7852 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7853 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7854 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7855 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7859 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7860 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7861 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7862 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7866 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7867 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7868 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7870 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7871 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7873 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7874 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7876 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7878 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7879 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7880 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7881 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7882 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7883 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7884 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7886 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7887 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7888 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7889 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7891 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7892 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7893 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7895 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7897 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7898 commitment_tx.clone(),
7899 counterparty_signature,
7900 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7901 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7902 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7904 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7905 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7907 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7908 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7909 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7911 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7912 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7915 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7916 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7918 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7919 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7920 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7921 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7922 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7923 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7924 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7925 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7927 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7930 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7931 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7932 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7936 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7939 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7940 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7941 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7943 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7944 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7945 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7946 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7947 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7948 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7949 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7950 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7952 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7956 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7957 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7958 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7959 "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", {});
7961 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7962 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7964 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7965 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7966 "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", {});
7968 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7969 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7970 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7971 "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", {});
7973 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7974 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7976 amount_msat: 1000000,
7978 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7979 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7981 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7984 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7985 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7987 amount_msat: 2000000,
7989 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7990 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7992 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7995 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7996 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7998 amount_msat: 2000000,
8000 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8001 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8002 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8004 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8007 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8008 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8010 amount_msat: 3000000,
8012 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8013 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8014 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8016 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8019 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8020 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8022 amount_msat: 4000000,
8024 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8025 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8027 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8031 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8032 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8033 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8035 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8036 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8037 "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", {
8040 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8041 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8042 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8045 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8046 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8047 "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" },
8050 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8051 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8052 "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" },
8055 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8056 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8057 "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" },
8060 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8061 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8062 "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" }
8065 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8066 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8067 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8069 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8070 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8071 "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", {
8074 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8075 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8076 "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" },
8079 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8080 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8081 "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" },
8084 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8085 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8086 "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" },
8089 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8090 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8091 "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" },
8094 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8095 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8096 "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" }
8099 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8100 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8101 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8103 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8104 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8105 "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", {
8108 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8109 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8110 "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" },
8113 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8114 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8115 "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" },
8118 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8119 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8120 "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" },
8123 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8124 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8125 "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" }
8128 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8129 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8130 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8131 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8133 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8134 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8135 "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", {
8138 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8139 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8140 "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" },
8143 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8144 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8145 "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" },
8148 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8149 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8150 "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" },
8153 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8154 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8155 "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" }
8158 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8159 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8160 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8161 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8163 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8164 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8165 "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", {
8168 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8169 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8170 "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" },
8173 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8174 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8175 "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" },
8178 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8179 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8180 "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" },
8183 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8184 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8185 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8188 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8189 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8190 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8192 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8193 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8194 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8197 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8198 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8199 "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" },
8202 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8203 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8204 "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" },
8207 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8208 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8209 "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" }
8212 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8213 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8214 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8216 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8217 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8218 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8221 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8222 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8223 "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" },
8226 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8227 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8228 "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" },
8231 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8232 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8233 "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" }
8236 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8237 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8238 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8240 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8241 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8242 "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", {
8245 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8246 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8247 "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" },
8250 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8251 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8252 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8255 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8256 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8257 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8258 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8260 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8261 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8262 "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", {
8265 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8266 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8267 "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" },
8270 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8271 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8272 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8275 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8276 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8277 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8278 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8280 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8281 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8282 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8285 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8286 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8287 "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" },
8290 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8291 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8292 "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" }
8295 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8296 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8297 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8299 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8300 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8301 "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", {
8304 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8305 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8306 "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" }
8309 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8310 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8311 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8312 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8314 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8315 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8316 "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", {
8319 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8320 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8321 "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" }
8324 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8325 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8326 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8327 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8329 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8330 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8331 "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", {
8334 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8335 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8336 "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" }
8339 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8340 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8341 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8342 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8344 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8345 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8346 "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", {});
8348 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8349 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8350 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8351 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8353 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8354 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8355 "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", {});
8357 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8358 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8359 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8360 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8362 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8363 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8364 "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", {});
8366 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8367 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8368 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8370 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8371 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8372 "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", {});
8374 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8375 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8376 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8377 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8379 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8380 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8381 "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", {});
8383 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8384 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8385 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8386 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8388 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8389 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8390 "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", {});
8392 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8393 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8394 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8395 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8396 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8397 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8399 amount_msat: 2000000,
8401 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8402 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8404 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8407 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8408 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8409 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8411 amount_msat: 5000001,
8413 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8414 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8415 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8417 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8420 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8421 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8423 amount_msat: 5000000,
8425 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8426 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8427 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8429 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8433 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8434 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8435 "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", {
8438 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8439 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8440 "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" },
8442 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8443 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8444 "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" },
8446 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8447 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8448 "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" }
8451 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8452 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8453 "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", {
8456 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8457 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8458 "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" },
8460 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8461 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8462 "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" },
8464 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8465 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8466 "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" }
8471 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8472 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8474 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8475 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8476 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8477 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8479 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8480 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8481 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8483 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8484 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8486 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8487 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8489 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8490 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8491 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8495 fn test_key_derivation() {
8496 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8499 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8500 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8502 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8503 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8505 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8506 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8508 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8509 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8511 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8512 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8514 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8515 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8517 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8518 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8522 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8523 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8524 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8525 let seed = [42; 32];
8526 let network = Network::Testnet;
8527 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8528 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8530 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8531 let config = UserConfig::default();
8532 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8533 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8535 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8536 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8538 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8539 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8540 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8541 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8542 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8543 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8544 assert!(res.is_ok());
8549 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8550 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8551 // resulting `channel_type`.
8552 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8553 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8554 let network = Network::Testnet;
8555 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8556 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8558 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8559 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8561 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8562 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8564 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8565 // need to signal it.
8566 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8567 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8568 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8571 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8573 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8574 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8575 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8577 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8578 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8579 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8582 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8583 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8584 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8585 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8586 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8589 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8590 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8595 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8596 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8597 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8599 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8600 let network = Network::Testnet;
8601 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8602 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8604 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8605 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8607 let config = UserConfig::default();
8609 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8610 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8611 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8612 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8613 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8615 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8616 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8617 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8620 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8621 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8622 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8624 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8625 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8626 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8627 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8628 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8629 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8631 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8636 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8637 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8640 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8641 let network = Network::Testnet;
8642 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8643 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8645 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8646 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8648 let config = UserConfig::default();
8650 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8651 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8652 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8653 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8654 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8655 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8656 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8657 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8659 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8660 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8661 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8662 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8663 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8664 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8667 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8668 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8670 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8671 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8672 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8673 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8675 assert!(res.is_err());
8677 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8678 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8679 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8681 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8682 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8683 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8686 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8688 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8689 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8690 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8691 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8694 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8695 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8697 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8698 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8700 assert!(res.is_err());