1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
502 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
505 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
506 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
508 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
509 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
510 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
512 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
513 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
514 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
515 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
517 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
518 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
520 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
522 holder_signer: Signer,
523 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
524 destination_script: Script,
526 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
527 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
528 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
530 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
532 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
533 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
534 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
535 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
537 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
538 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
539 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
540 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
541 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
542 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
544 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
546 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
547 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
548 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
550 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
551 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
552 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
553 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
554 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
555 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
556 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
558 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
560 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
561 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
562 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
563 // HTLCs with similar state.
564 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
565 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
566 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
567 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
568 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
569 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
570 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
571 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
575 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
576 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
577 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
579 update_time_counter: u32,
581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
582 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
586 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
588 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
589 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
591 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
592 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
593 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
594 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
596 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
597 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
599 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
603 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
604 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
605 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
606 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
607 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
608 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
610 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
611 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
612 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
613 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
614 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
616 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
617 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
618 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
619 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
620 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
621 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
622 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
623 channel_creation_height: u32,
625 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
630 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
635 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
643 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
646 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
650 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
653 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
657 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
659 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
661 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
662 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
666 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
673 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
674 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
675 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
677 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
678 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
679 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
681 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
682 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
683 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
685 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
686 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
687 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
688 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
692 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
694 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
695 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
696 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
697 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
698 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
700 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
701 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
704 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
705 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
706 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
707 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
708 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
709 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
710 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
712 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
713 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
715 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
716 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
717 // the channel's funding UTXO.
719 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
720 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
721 // associated channel mapping.
723 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
724 // to store all of them.
725 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
727 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
728 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
729 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
730 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
731 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
733 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
734 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
736 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
737 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
739 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
740 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
741 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
743 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
744 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
745 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
746 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
747 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
751 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
753 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
754 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
755 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
759 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
761 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
764 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
768 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
770 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
772 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
774 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
775 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
776 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
777 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
778 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
780 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
781 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
783 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
785 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
786 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
788 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
789 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
790 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
791 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
792 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
793 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
795 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
796 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
798 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
799 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
800 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
801 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
802 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
804 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
805 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
807 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
808 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
810 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
811 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
812 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
813 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
819 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
820 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
822 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
823 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
824 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
829 macro_rules! secp_check {
830 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
833 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
838 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
839 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
840 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
843 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
846 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
847 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
849 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
852 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
854 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
857 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
858 /// required by us according to the configured or default
859 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
861 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
863 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
864 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
865 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
866 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
870 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
871 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
872 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
873 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
874 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
875 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
876 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
879 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
880 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
883 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
884 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
885 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
886 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
887 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
888 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
889 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
890 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
891 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
892 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
895 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
896 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
897 // `only_static_remotekey`.
899 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
900 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
901 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
902 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
909 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
910 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
911 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
912 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
913 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
914 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
915 // We've exhausted our options
918 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
919 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
922 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
923 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
924 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
925 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
927 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
929 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
930 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
931 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
932 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
934 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
936 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
940 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
941 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
942 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
943 outbound_scid_alias: u64
944 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
945 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
946 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
949 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
950 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
951 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
952 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
954 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
957 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
960 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
961 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
964 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
967 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
968 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
969 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
970 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
974 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
975 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
977 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
979 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
980 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
981 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
985 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
986 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
988 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
989 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
992 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
993 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
994 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
998 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1003 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1004 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1005 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1006 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1011 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1013 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1014 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1015 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1016 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1018 channel_value_satoshis,
1020 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1023 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1024 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1026 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1027 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1030 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1031 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1033 pending_update_fee: None,
1034 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1035 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1036 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1037 update_time_counter: 1,
1039 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1041 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1042 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1043 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1044 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1045 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1046 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1048 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1049 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1050 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1051 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1053 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1054 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1055 closing_fee_limits: None,
1056 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1058 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1060 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1061 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1062 short_channel_id: None,
1063 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1065 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1066 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1067 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1068 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1069 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1070 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1071 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1072 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1073 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1074 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1075 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1076 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1078 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1080 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1081 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1082 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1083 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1084 counterparty_parameters: None,
1085 funding_outpoint: None,
1086 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1087 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1089 funding_transaction: None,
1091 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1092 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1093 counterparty_node_id,
1095 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1097 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1099 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1100 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1102 announcement_sigs: None,
1104 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1105 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1106 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1107 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1109 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1111 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1112 outbound_scid_alias,
1114 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1115 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1118 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1123 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1127 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1128 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1129 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1131 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1132 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1133 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1134 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1135 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1136 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1137 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1140 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1141 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1142 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1143 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1144 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1145 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1146 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1147 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1149 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1150 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1159 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1160 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1161 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1162 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1163 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1164 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1165 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1166 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1167 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1168 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1169 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1172 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1174 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1175 // support this channel type.
1176 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1177 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1181 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1182 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1183 // `static_remote_key`.
1184 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1187 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1188 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1191 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1194 channel_type.clone()
1196 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1197 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1202 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1204 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1205 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1206 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1207 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1208 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1209 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1210 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1211 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1212 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1215 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1219 // Check sanity of message fields:
1220 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1223 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1229 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1230 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1233 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1236 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1239 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1241 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1242 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1245 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1248 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1252 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1253 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1259 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1262 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1265 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1268 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1271 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1275 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1277 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1278 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1283 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1284 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1285 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1286 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1289 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1292 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1293 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1294 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1296 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1300 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1301 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1302 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1303 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1304 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1308 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1309 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1310 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1311 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1315 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1316 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1317 &Some(ref script) => {
1318 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1319 if script.len() == 0 {
1322 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1325 Some(script.clone())
1328 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1335 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1336 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1339 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1340 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1345 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1346 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1348 let chan = Channel {
1351 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1352 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1354 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1359 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1361 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1362 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1363 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1364 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1367 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1370 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1371 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1373 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1374 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1375 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1377 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1378 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1379 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1380 pending_update_fee: None,
1381 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1382 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1383 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1384 update_time_counter: 1,
1386 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1388 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1389 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1390 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1391 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1392 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1393 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1395 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1396 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1397 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1398 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1400 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1401 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1402 closing_fee_limits: None,
1403 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1405 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1407 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1408 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1409 short_channel_id: None,
1410 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1412 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1413 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1414 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1415 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1416 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1417 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1418 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1419 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1420 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1421 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1422 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1423 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1424 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1426 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1428 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1429 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1430 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1431 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1432 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1433 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1434 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1436 funding_outpoint: None,
1437 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1438 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1440 funding_transaction: None,
1442 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1443 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1444 counterparty_node_id,
1446 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1448 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1450 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1451 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1453 announcement_sigs: None,
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1457 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1458 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1460 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1462 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1463 outbound_scid_alias,
1465 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1466 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1469 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1474 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1480 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1481 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1482 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1483 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1484 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1486 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1487 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1488 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1489 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1490 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1491 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1492 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1494 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1495 where L::Target: Logger
1497 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1498 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1499 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1501 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1502 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1503 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1504 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1506 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1507 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1508 if match update_state {
1509 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1510 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1511 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1512 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1513 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1515 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1519 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1520 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1521 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1522 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1524 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1525 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1526 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1528 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1529 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1530 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1531 transaction_output_index: None
1536 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1537 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1538 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1539 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1540 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1543 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1545 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1546 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1547 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1549 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1550 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1553 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1554 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1557 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1559 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1560 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1561 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1563 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1564 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1570 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1571 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1572 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1573 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1574 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1575 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1576 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1580 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1581 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1583 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1585 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1586 if generated_by_local {
1587 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1588 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1597 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1599 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1600 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1601 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1602 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1603 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1604 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1605 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1608 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1609 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1610 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1611 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1615 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1616 preimages.push(preimage);
1620 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1621 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1623 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1625 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1626 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1628 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1629 if !generated_by_local {
1630 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1638 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1639 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1640 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1641 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1642 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1643 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1644 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1645 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1647 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1649 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1650 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1651 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1652 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1654 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1656 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1657 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1658 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1659 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1662 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1663 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1664 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1665 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1667 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1670 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1671 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1672 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1673 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1675 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1678 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1679 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1684 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1685 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1690 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1692 let channel_parameters =
1693 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1694 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1695 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1698 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1703 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1706 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1707 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1708 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1709 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1711 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1712 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1713 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1721 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1722 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1728 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1729 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1730 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1731 // outside of those situations will fail.
1732 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1736 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1741 1 + // script length (0)
1745 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1746 2 + // witness marker and flag
1747 1 + // witness element count
1748 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1749 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1750 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1751 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1752 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1753 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1755 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1756 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1757 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1763 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1764 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1765 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1766 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1768 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1769 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1770 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1772 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1773 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1774 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1775 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1776 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1777 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1780 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1781 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1784 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1785 value_to_holder = 0;
1788 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1789 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1790 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1791 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1793 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1794 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1797 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1798 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1802 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1803 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1804 /// our counterparty!)
1805 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1806 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1807 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1808 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1809 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1810 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1811 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1813 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1817 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1818 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1819 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1820 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1821 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1822 //may see payments to it!
1823 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1824 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1825 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1827 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1830 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1831 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1832 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1833 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1834 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1837 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1840 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1841 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1843 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1845 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1846 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1847 where L::Target: Logger {
1848 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1849 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1850 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1851 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1852 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1853 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1854 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1855 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1859 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1860 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1861 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1862 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1864 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1865 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1867 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1869 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1871 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1872 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1873 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1875 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1876 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1877 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1878 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1879 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1881 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1882 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1883 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1885 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1886 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1888 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1891 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1892 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1896 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1900 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1902 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1903 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1904 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1905 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1908 // Now update local state:
1910 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1911 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1912 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1913 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1914 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1915 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1916 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1920 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1921 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1922 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1923 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1924 // do not not get into this branch.
1925 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1926 match pending_update {
1927 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1928 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1929 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1930 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1932 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1933 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1936 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1937 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1938 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1939 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1940 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1941 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1948 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1949 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1950 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1952 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1953 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1954 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1956 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1957 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1960 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1961 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1963 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1966 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1967 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1970 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1973 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1974 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1975 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1976 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1981 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1982 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1983 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1984 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1985 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1986 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1987 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1988 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1989 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1990 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1991 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1992 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1996 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1997 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1998 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1999 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2000 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
2004 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2008 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2009 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2010 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2011 /// before we fail backwards.
2013 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2014 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2015 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2016 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2017 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2018 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2019 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2022 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2023 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2024 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2025 /// before we fail backwards.
2027 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2028 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2029 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2030 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2031 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2032 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2033 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2035 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2037 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2038 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2039 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2041 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2042 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2043 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2045 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2046 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2047 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2049 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2054 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2061 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2062 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2063 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2064 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2065 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2069 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2070 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2071 force_holding_cell = true;
2074 // Now update local state:
2075 if force_holding_cell {
2076 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2077 match pending_update {
2078 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2079 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2080 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2081 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2085 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2086 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2087 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2088 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2094 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2095 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2096 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2102 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2104 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2105 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2108 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2109 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2110 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2115 // Message handlers:
2117 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2118 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2120 // Check sanity of message fields:
2121 if !self.is_outbound() {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2124 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2127 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2130 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2133 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2136 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2138 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2140 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2141 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2144 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2145 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2148 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2151 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2155 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2156 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2159 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2162 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2165 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2166 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2168 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2171 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2174 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2178 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2179 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2182 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2183 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2185 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2186 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2189 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2192 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2193 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2194 &Some(ref script) => {
2195 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2196 if script.len() == 0 {
2199 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2202 Some(script.clone())
2205 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2212 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2213 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2214 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2215 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2216 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2218 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2219 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2221 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2224 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2225 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2226 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2227 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2228 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2229 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2232 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2233 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2234 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2237 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2238 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2240 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2241 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2246 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2247 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2249 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2250 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2252 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2253 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2254 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2255 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2257 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2258 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2259 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2260 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2263 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2264 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2266 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2267 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2268 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2269 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2271 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2272 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2274 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2275 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2278 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2279 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2282 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2283 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2284 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2286 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2289 if self.is_outbound() {
2290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2292 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2293 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2294 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2298 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2301 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2302 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2303 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2304 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2307 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2308 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2309 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2310 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2311 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2313 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2315 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2316 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2320 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2321 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2322 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2326 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2327 initial_commitment_tx,
2330 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2331 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2334 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2335 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2337 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2339 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2340 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2341 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2342 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2343 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2344 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2345 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2346 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2347 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2348 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2349 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2351 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2353 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2355 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2356 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2358 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2360 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2362 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2363 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2365 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2366 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2369 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2370 }, channel_monitor))
2373 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2374 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2375 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2376 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2377 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2379 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2382 if !self.is_outbound() {
2383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2385 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2388 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2389 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2390 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2391 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2394 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2396 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2397 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2398 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2399 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2401 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2402 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2404 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2405 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2407 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2408 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2409 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2410 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2411 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2416 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2417 initial_commitment_tx,
2420 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2421 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2424 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2425 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2428 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2429 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2430 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2431 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2432 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2433 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2434 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2435 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2436 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2437 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2438 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2439 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2441 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2443 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2445 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2446 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2447 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2448 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2450 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2452 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2453 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2457 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2458 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2460 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2461 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2462 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2463 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2465 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2468 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2469 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2470 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2473 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2474 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2475 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2476 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2477 // when routing outbound payments.
2478 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2482 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2484 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2485 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2486 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2487 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2488 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2489 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2490 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2491 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2492 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2494 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2495 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2496 let expected_point =
2497 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2498 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2500 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2501 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2502 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2503 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2504 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2505 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2507 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2508 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2509 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2510 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2511 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2513 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2514 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2518 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2521 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2522 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2524 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2526 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2529 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2530 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2531 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2532 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2538 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2539 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2540 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2541 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2542 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2543 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2544 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2545 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2546 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2549 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2552 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2553 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2554 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2556 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2557 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2559 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2560 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2561 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2563 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2564 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2570 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2571 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2572 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2573 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2574 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2575 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2576 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2577 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2578 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2581 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2584 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2585 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2586 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2588 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2589 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2590 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2591 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2593 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2595 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2596 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2600 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2601 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2602 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2603 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2604 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2605 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2606 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2608 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2609 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2611 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2618 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2619 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2620 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2621 /// corner case properly.
2622 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2623 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2624 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2626 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2627 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2628 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2629 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2632 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2634 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2635 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2636 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2639 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2640 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2641 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2642 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2644 outbound_capacity_msat,
2645 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2646 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2647 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2653 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2654 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2657 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2658 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2659 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2660 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2661 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2662 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2665 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2666 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2668 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2669 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2672 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2673 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2674 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2676 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2677 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2679 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2682 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2683 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2685 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2686 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2688 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2689 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2691 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2692 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2696 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2697 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2703 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2704 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2705 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2708 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2709 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2710 included_htlcs += 1;
2713 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2714 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2718 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2719 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2720 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2721 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2722 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2723 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2728 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2730 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2731 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2736 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2737 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2741 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2742 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2743 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2746 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2747 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2749 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2750 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2751 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2753 total_pending_htlcs,
2754 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2755 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2756 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2758 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2759 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2760 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2762 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2764 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2769 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2770 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2771 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2773 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2774 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2776 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2779 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2780 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2782 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2783 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2785 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2786 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2788 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2789 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2793 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2794 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2800 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2801 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2802 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2803 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2804 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2805 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2808 included_htlcs += 1;
2811 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2812 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2815 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2816 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2818 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2819 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2820 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2825 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2826 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2827 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2830 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2831 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2833 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2834 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2836 total_pending_htlcs,
2837 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2838 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2839 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2841 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2842 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2843 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2845 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2847 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2852 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2853 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2854 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2855 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2856 if local_sent_shutdown {
2857 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2859 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2860 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2861 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2864 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2867 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2870 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2873 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2874 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2877 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2878 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2879 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2882 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2885 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2886 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2887 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2888 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2889 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2890 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2891 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2892 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2893 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2894 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2895 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2897 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2898 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2899 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2900 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2901 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2902 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2906 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2909 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2910 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2911 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2913 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2914 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2915 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2916 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2917 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2918 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2919 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2923 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2924 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2925 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2926 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2927 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2928 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2929 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2933 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2934 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2935 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2936 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2937 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2941 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2942 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2943 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2944 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2945 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2947 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2951 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2955 if !self.is_outbound() {
2956 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2957 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2958 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2959 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2960 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2961 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2962 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2963 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2964 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2965 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2966 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2967 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2968 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2969 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2970 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2973 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2974 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2975 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2976 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2980 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2983 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2987 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2988 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2989 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2993 // Now update local state:
2994 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2995 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2996 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2997 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2998 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2999 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3000 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3005 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3007 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3008 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3009 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3010 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3011 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3012 None => fail_reason.into(),
3013 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3014 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3015 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3018 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3022 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3024 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3025 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3027 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3033 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3036 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3037 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3040 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3044 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3047 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3048 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3051 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3055 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3059 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3060 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3063 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3067 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3071 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3072 where L::Target: Logger
3074 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3077 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3080 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3084 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3086 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3088 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3089 let commitment_txid = {
3090 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3091 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3092 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3094 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3095 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3096 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3097 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3098 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3103 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3105 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3106 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3107 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3108 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3111 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3112 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3113 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3119 if self.is_outbound() {
3120 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3121 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3122 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3123 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3124 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3125 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3126 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3127 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3128 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3129 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3135 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3139 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3140 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3141 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3142 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3143 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3144 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3145 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3146 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3147 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3148 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3149 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3150 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3151 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3154 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3155 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3156 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3157 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3158 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3159 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3160 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3162 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3163 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3164 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3165 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3166 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3167 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3168 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3171 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3172 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3175 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3177 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3178 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3179 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3182 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3185 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3186 commitment_stats.tx,
3188 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3189 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3190 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3193 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3194 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3196 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3197 let mut need_commitment = false;
3198 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3199 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3200 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3201 need_commitment = true;
3205 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3206 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3207 Some(forward_info.clone())
3209 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3210 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3211 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3212 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3213 need_commitment = true;
3216 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3217 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3218 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3219 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3220 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3221 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3222 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3223 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3224 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3225 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3226 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3227 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3228 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3229 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3231 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3233 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3234 need_commitment = true;
3238 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3239 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3240 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3241 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3242 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3243 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3245 nondust_htlc_sources,
3249 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3250 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3251 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3252 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3254 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3255 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3256 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3257 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3258 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3259 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3260 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3261 // includes the right HTLCs.
3262 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3263 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3264 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3265 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3266 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3267 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3269 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3270 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3271 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3272 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3275 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3276 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3277 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3278 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3279 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3280 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3281 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3282 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3283 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3287 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3288 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3289 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3290 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3291 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3294 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3295 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3296 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3297 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3298 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3299 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3300 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3301 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3304 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3305 /// for our counterparty.
3306 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3307 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3308 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3309 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3310 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3312 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3313 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3314 updates: Vec::new(),
3317 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3318 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3319 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3320 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3321 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3322 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3323 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3324 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3325 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3326 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3327 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3328 // to rebalance channels.
3329 match &htlc_update {
3330 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3331 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3332 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3335 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3336 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3337 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3338 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3339 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3340 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3341 // into the holding cell without ever being
3342 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3343 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3344 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3347 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3354 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3355 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3356 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3357 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3358 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3359 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3360 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3361 (msg, monitor_update)
3362 } else { unreachable!() };
3363 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3364 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3366 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3367 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3368 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3369 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3370 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3371 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3372 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3373 // for a full revocation before failing.
3374 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3377 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3379 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3386 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3387 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3389 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3390 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3395 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3396 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3397 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3398 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3399 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3401 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3402 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3403 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3405 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3406 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3407 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3413 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3414 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3415 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3416 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3417 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3418 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3419 where L::Target: Logger,
3421 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3424 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3427 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3431 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3433 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3434 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3439 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3440 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3441 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3442 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3443 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3444 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3445 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3446 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3450 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3452 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3453 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3456 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3457 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3459 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3461 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3462 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3463 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3464 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3465 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3466 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3467 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3468 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3472 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3473 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3474 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3475 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3476 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3477 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3478 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3479 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3481 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3482 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3485 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3486 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3487 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3488 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3489 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3490 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3491 let mut require_commitment = false;
3492 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3495 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3496 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3497 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3499 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3500 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3501 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3502 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3503 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3504 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3509 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3510 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3511 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3512 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3513 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3515 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3516 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3517 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3522 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3523 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3525 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3529 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3530 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3532 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3533 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3534 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3535 require_commitment = true;
3536 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3537 match forward_info {
3538 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3540 require_commitment = true;
3542 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3543 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3544 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3546 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3547 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3548 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3552 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3553 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3554 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3555 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3561 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3562 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3563 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3564 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3566 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3567 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3568 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3569 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3570 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3571 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3572 require_commitment = true;
3576 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3578 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3579 match update_state {
3580 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3581 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3582 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3583 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3584 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3586 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3587 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3588 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3589 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3590 require_commitment = true;
3591 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3592 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3597 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3598 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3599 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3600 if require_commitment {
3601 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3602 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3603 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3604 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3605 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3606 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3607 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3608 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3609 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3611 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3612 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3613 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3614 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3615 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3616 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3619 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3620 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3621 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3622 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3623 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3624 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3625 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3627 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3628 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3629 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3631 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3632 if require_commitment {
3633 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3635 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3636 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3637 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3638 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3640 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3641 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3642 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3643 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3644 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3646 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3647 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3648 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3649 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3655 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3656 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3657 /// commitment update.
3658 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3659 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3660 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3663 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3664 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3665 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3666 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3668 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3669 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3670 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3671 if !self.is_outbound() {
3672 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3674 if !self.is_usable() {
3675 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3677 if !self.is_live() {
3678 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3681 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3682 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3683 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3684 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3685 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3686 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3687 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3688 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3689 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3690 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3694 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3695 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3696 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3697 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3698 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3701 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3702 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3706 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3707 force_holding_cell = true;
3710 if force_holding_cell {
3711 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3715 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3716 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3718 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3719 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3724 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3725 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3727 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3729 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3730 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3731 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3732 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3736 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3737 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3738 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3742 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3743 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3746 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3747 // will be retransmitted.
3748 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3749 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3750 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3752 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3753 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3755 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3756 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3757 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3758 // this HTLC accordingly
3759 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3762 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3763 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3764 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3765 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3768 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3769 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3770 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3771 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3772 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3773 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3778 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3780 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3781 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3782 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3783 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3787 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3788 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3789 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3790 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3791 // the update upon reconnection.
3792 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3796 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3797 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3800 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3801 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3802 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3803 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3804 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3805 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3806 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3808 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3809 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3810 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3811 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3812 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3813 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3814 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3816 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3817 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3818 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3819 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3820 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3821 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3822 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3825 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3826 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3827 /// to the remote side.
3828 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3829 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3830 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3831 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3834 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3836 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3837 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3838 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3840 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3841 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3842 // first received the funding_signed.
3843 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3844 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3845 self.funding_transaction.take()
3847 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3848 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3849 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3850 funding_broadcastable = None;
3853 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3854 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3855 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3856 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3857 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3858 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3859 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3860 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3861 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3862 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3863 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3864 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3865 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3866 next_per_commitment_point,
3867 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3871 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3873 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3874 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3875 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3876 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3877 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3878 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3880 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3881 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3882 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3883 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3884 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3885 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3889 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3890 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3892 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3893 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3896 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3897 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3898 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3899 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3900 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3901 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3902 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3903 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3904 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3908 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3909 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3911 if self.is_outbound() {
3912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3914 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3917 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3918 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3920 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3921 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3922 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3923 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3924 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3925 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3926 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3927 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3928 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3929 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3930 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3932 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3934 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3936 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3942 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3943 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3944 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3945 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3946 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3947 per_commitment_secret,
3948 next_per_commitment_point,
3950 next_local_nonce: None,
3954 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3955 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3956 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3957 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3958 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3960 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3961 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3962 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3963 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3964 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3965 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3966 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3967 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3968 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3973 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3974 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3976 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3977 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3978 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3979 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3980 reason: err_packet.clone()
3983 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3984 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3985 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3986 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3987 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3988 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3991 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3992 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3993 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3994 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3995 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4002 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4003 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4004 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4005 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4009 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4010 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4011 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4012 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4013 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4014 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4018 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4019 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4021 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4022 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4023 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4024 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4025 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4026 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4027 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4028 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4031 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4033 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4034 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4035 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4036 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4040 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4041 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4045 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4046 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4047 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4048 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4049 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4052 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4053 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4054 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4055 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4056 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4059 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4060 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4061 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4062 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4063 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4064 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4065 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4066 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4070 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4071 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4072 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4073 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4075 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4079 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4080 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4081 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4083 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4084 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4085 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4086 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4087 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4091 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4093 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4094 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4095 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4096 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4097 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4100 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4101 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4102 channel_ready: None,
4103 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4104 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4105 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4109 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4110 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4111 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4112 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4113 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4114 next_per_commitment_point,
4115 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4117 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4118 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4119 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4123 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4124 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4125 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4127 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4128 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4129 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4132 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4138 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4139 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4140 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4141 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4142 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4144 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4145 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4146 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4147 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4148 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4149 next_per_commitment_point,
4150 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4154 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4155 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4156 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4158 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4161 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4162 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4163 raa: required_revoke,
4164 commitment_update: None,
4165 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4167 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4168 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4169 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4171 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4174 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4175 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4176 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4177 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4178 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4179 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4182 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4183 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4184 raa: required_revoke,
4185 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4186 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4190 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4194 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4195 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4196 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4197 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4199 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4201 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4203 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4204 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4205 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4206 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4207 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4208 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4210 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4211 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4212 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4213 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4214 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4216 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4217 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4218 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4219 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4222 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4223 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4224 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4225 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4226 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4227 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4228 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4229 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4230 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4231 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4232 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4233 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4234 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4235 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4236 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4238 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4241 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4242 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4245 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4246 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4247 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4248 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4249 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4250 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4251 self.channel_state &
4252 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4253 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4254 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4255 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4258 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4259 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4260 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4261 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4262 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4263 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4266 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4272 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4273 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4274 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4275 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4277 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4278 return Ok((None, None));
4281 if !self.is_outbound() {
4282 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4283 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4285 return Ok((None, None));
4288 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4290 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4291 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4292 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4293 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4295 let sig = self.holder_signer
4296 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4297 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4299 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4300 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4301 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4302 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4304 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4305 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4306 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4311 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4312 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4313 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4314 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4316 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4319 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4320 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4321 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4322 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4325 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4326 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4330 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4332 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4336 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4337 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4338 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4341 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4344 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4345 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4346 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4347 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4349 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4352 assert!(send_shutdown);
4353 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4354 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4357 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4362 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4364 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4365 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4367 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4368 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4369 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4370 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4371 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4372 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4375 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4376 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4377 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4379 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4380 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4381 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4382 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4386 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4387 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4388 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4389 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4390 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4391 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4393 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4394 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4401 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4402 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4404 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4407 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4408 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4410 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4412 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4413 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4414 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4415 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4416 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4417 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4418 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4419 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4420 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4422 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4423 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4426 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4430 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4431 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4432 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4433 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4435 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4438 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4441 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4444 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4448 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4452 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4453 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4454 return Ok((None, None));
4457 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4458 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4459 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4462 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4464 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4467 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4468 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4469 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4470 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4471 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4475 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4476 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4481 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4482 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4483 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4484 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4485 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4486 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4487 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4491 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4493 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4494 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4495 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4496 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4498 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4501 let sig = self.holder_signer
4502 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4503 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4505 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4506 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4507 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4508 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4512 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4513 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4514 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4515 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4517 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4518 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4519 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4525 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4526 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4529 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4530 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4532 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4533 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4536 if !self.is_outbound() {
4537 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4538 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4539 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4540 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4542 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4544 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4546 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4547 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4550 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4551 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4552 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4553 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4554 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4555 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4556 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4557 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4562 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4563 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4564 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4565 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4571 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4572 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4573 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4574 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4576 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4582 // Public utilities:
4584 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4588 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4590 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4591 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4592 self.temporary_channel_id
4595 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4599 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4600 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4601 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4605 /// Gets the channel's type
4606 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4610 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4611 /// is_usable() returns true).
4612 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4613 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4614 self.short_channel_id
4617 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4618 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4619 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4622 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4623 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4624 self.outbound_scid_alias
4626 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4627 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4628 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4629 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4630 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4633 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4634 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4635 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4636 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4639 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4640 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4641 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4644 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4645 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4646 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4647 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4651 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4654 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4655 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4658 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4659 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4662 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4663 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4664 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4667 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4668 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4671 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4672 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4673 self.counterparty_node_id
4676 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4677 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4678 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4681 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4682 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4683 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4686 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4687 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4689 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4690 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4691 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4692 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4694 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4698 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4699 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4700 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4703 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4704 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4705 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4708 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4709 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4710 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4712 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4713 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4718 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4719 self.channel_value_satoshis
4722 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4723 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4726 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4727 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4730 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4731 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4734 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4735 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4736 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4739 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4740 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4741 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4744 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4745 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4746 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4749 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4750 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4751 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4754 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4755 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4756 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4759 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4760 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4761 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4764 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4765 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4766 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4767 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4768 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4771 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4773 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4774 self.prev_config = None;
4778 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4779 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4783 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4784 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4785 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4786 let did_channel_update =
4787 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4788 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4789 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4790 if did_channel_update {
4791 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4792 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4793 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4794 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4796 self.config.options = *config;
4800 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4801 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4802 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4803 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4804 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4805 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4806 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4808 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4809 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4812 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4814 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4815 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4821 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4822 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4823 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4824 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4825 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4826 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4827 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4829 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4830 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4837 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4841 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4842 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4843 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4844 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4845 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4846 // which are near the dust limit.
4847 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4848 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4849 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4850 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4851 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4853 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4854 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4856 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4859 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4860 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4863 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4864 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4867 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4868 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4872 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4877 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4879 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4880 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4881 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4882 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4883 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4884 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4886 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4888 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4896 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4897 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4901 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4902 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4903 self.update_time_counter
4906 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4907 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4910 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4911 self.config.announced_channel
4914 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4915 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4918 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4919 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4920 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4921 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4924 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4925 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4926 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4929 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4930 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4931 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4932 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4933 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4936 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4937 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4938 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4939 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4940 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4943 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4945 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4946 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4949 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4950 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4953 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4954 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4955 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4958 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4959 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4960 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4962 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4963 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4964 if self.channel_state &
4965 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4966 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4967 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4968 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4969 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4972 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4973 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4974 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4975 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4976 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4977 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4979 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4980 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4981 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4983 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4984 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4985 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4986 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4987 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4988 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4994 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4995 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4996 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4999 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5000 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5001 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5004 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5005 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5006 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5009 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5010 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5011 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5012 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5013 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5014 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5019 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5020 self.channel_update_status
5023 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5024 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5025 self.channel_update_status = status;
5028 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5030 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5031 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5032 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5036 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5037 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5038 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5041 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5045 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5046 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5047 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5049 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5050 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5051 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5053 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5054 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5057 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5058 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5059 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5060 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5061 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5062 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5063 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5064 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5065 self.channel_state);
5067 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5071 if need_commitment_update {
5072 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5073 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5074 let next_per_commitment_point =
5075 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5076 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5077 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5078 next_per_commitment_point,
5079 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5083 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5089 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5090 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5091 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5092 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5093 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5094 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5095 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5097 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5100 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5101 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5102 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5103 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5104 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5105 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5106 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5107 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5108 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5109 if self.is_outbound() {
5110 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5111 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5112 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5113 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5114 // channel and move on.
5115 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5116 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5118 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5119 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5120 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5122 if self.is_outbound() {
5123 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5124 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5125 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5126 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5127 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5128 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5132 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5133 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5134 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5135 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5136 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5140 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5141 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5142 // may have already happened for this block).
5143 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5144 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5145 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5146 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5149 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5150 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5151 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5152 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5160 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5161 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5162 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5163 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5165 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5166 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5169 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5171 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5172 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5173 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5174 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5176 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5179 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5182 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5183 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5184 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5185 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5190 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5191 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5192 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5194 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5195 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5197 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5198 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5199 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5207 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5209 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5210 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5211 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5213 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5214 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5217 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5218 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5219 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5220 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5221 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5222 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5223 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5224 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5225 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5228 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5229 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5230 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5231 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5233 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5234 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5235 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5237 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5238 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5239 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5240 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5242 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5243 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5244 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5245 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5246 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5247 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5248 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5251 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5252 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5254 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5257 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5258 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5259 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5260 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5261 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5262 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5263 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5264 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5265 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5266 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5267 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5268 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5269 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5270 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5271 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5272 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5273 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5279 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5284 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5285 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5287 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5288 if !self.is_outbound() {
5289 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5291 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5292 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5295 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5296 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5299 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5300 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5304 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5305 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5306 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5307 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5308 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5309 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5310 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5311 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5312 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5313 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5314 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5315 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5316 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5317 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5318 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5319 first_per_commitment_point,
5320 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5321 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5322 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5323 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5325 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5329 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5330 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5333 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5334 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5335 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5336 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5339 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5340 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5342 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5343 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5344 if self.is_outbound() {
5345 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5347 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5348 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5350 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5351 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5353 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5354 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5357 self.user_id = user_id;
5358 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5360 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5363 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5364 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5365 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5367 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5368 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5369 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5370 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5372 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5373 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5374 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5375 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5376 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5377 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5378 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5379 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5380 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5381 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5382 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5383 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5384 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5385 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5386 first_per_commitment_point,
5387 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5388 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5389 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5391 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5393 next_local_nonce: None,
5397 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5398 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5400 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5402 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5403 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5406 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5407 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5408 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5409 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5410 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5411 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5414 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5415 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5416 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5417 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5418 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5419 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5420 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5421 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5422 if !self.is_outbound() {
5423 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5425 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5426 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5428 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5429 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5430 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5431 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5434 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5435 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5437 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5440 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5441 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5446 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5448 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5450 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5451 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5452 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5454 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5455 temporary_channel_id,
5456 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5457 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5460 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5462 next_local_nonce: None,
5466 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5467 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5468 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5469 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5471 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5474 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5475 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5476 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5477 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5478 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5479 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5481 if !self.is_usable() {
5482 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5485 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5486 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5487 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5488 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5490 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5491 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5493 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5494 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5495 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5496 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5497 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5498 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5504 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5505 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5506 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5507 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5509 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5512 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5516 if !self.is_usable() {
5520 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5521 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5525 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5529 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5530 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5533 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5537 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5539 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5544 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5546 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5551 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5553 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5554 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5555 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5556 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5557 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5561 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5563 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5564 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5565 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5566 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5567 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5568 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5569 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5571 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5572 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5573 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5574 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5575 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5576 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5577 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5578 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5579 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5580 contents: announcement,
5583 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5587 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5588 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5589 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5590 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5591 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5592 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5593 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5594 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5596 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5598 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5599 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5600 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5601 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5603 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5605 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5606 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5609 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5610 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5611 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5612 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5615 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5618 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5619 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5620 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5621 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5622 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5623 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5626 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5628 Err(_) => return None,
5630 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5631 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5636 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5637 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5638 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5639 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5640 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5641 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5642 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5643 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5644 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5645 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5646 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5647 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5648 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5649 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5650 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5651 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5654 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5657 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5658 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5659 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5660 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5661 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5662 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5663 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5664 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5666 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5667 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5668 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5669 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5670 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5671 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5672 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5673 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5674 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5676 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5677 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5678 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5683 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5685 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5686 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5687 /// commitment update.
5689 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5690 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5691 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5692 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5694 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5695 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5697 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5698 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5703 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5704 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5706 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5708 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5709 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5711 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5712 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5713 /// regenerate them.
5715 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5716 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5718 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5719 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5720 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5721 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5722 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5723 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5725 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5726 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5727 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5730 if amount_msat == 0 {
5731 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5734 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5735 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5738 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5739 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5740 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5741 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5742 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5743 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5744 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5745 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5748 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5749 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5750 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5751 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5753 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5754 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5755 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5758 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5759 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5760 if !self.is_outbound() {
5761 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5762 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5763 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5764 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5765 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5766 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5770 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5773 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5774 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5775 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5777 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5778 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5779 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5780 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5781 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5782 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5786 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5787 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5788 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5789 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5790 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5791 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5795 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5796 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5797 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5800 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5801 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5802 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5803 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5805 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5806 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5809 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5810 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5811 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5812 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5816 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5817 force_holding_cell = true;
5820 // Now update local state:
5821 if force_holding_cell {
5822 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5827 onion_routing_packet,
5832 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5833 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5835 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5837 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5841 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5842 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5843 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5847 onion_routing_packet,
5849 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5854 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5855 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5856 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5857 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5859 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5860 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5861 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5863 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5864 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5868 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5869 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5870 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5871 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5872 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5873 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5874 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5877 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5878 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5879 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5880 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5881 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5882 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5885 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5887 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5888 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5889 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5891 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5892 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5895 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5896 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5897 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5898 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5899 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5900 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5901 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5902 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5905 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5909 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5910 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5911 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5912 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5914 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5916 if !self.is_outbound() {
5917 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5918 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5919 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5920 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5921 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5922 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5923 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5924 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5925 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5926 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5932 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5935 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5936 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5937 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5938 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5939 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5940 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5942 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5943 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5944 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5945 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5948 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5949 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5953 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5954 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5956 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5958 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5959 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5960 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5961 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5963 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5964 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5965 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5966 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5967 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5968 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5972 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5973 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5977 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5978 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5981 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5982 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5984 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5985 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5986 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5987 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5988 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5991 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5992 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5993 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5994 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
6000 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6001 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6002 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6005 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6006 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6009 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6010 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6011 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6012 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6018 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6019 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6021 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6022 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6023 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6024 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
6025 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6026 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6027 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6028 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6032 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6033 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6034 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6036 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6037 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6040 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6041 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6042 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6045 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6046 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6047 let mut chan_closed = false;
6048 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6052 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6054 None if !chan_closed => {
6055 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6056 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6057 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6059 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6065 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6066 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6067 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6068 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6070 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6072 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6074 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6075 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6076 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6077 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6078 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6079 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6082 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6083 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6084 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6086 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6087 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6088 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6091 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6092 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6093 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6094 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6095 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6097 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6098 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6105 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6106 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6108 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6111 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6112 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6113 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6114 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6115 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6116 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6117 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6118 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6119 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6120 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6121 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6123 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6124 // return them to fail the payment.
6125 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6126 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6127 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6129 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6130 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6135 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6136 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6137 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6138 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6139 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6140 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6141 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6142 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6143 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6144 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6145 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6146 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6147 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6152 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6153 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6154 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6157 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6158 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6159 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6161 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6162 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6166 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6170 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6171 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6179 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6181 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6182 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6183 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6185 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6186 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6187 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6188 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6194 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6195 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6196 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6197 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6198 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6199 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6204 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6205 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6206 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6207 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6209 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6210 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6211 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6212 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6217 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6218 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6219 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6220 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6221 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6222 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6227 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6228 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6229 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6232 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6234 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6235 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6236 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6237 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6238 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6240 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6241 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6242 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6243 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6245 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6246 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6247 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6249 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6251 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6252 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6253 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6254 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6255 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6256 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6258 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6259 // deserialized from that format.
6260 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6261 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6262 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6264 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6266 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6267 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6268 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6270 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6271 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6272 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6273 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6276 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6277 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6278 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6281 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6282 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6283 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6284 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6286 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6287 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6289 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6291 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6293 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6295 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6298 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6300 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6305 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6307 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6308 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6309 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6310 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6311 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6312 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6313 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6315 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6317 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6319 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6322 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6323 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6324 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6327 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6329 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6330 preimages.push(preimage);
6332 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6333 reason.write(writer)?;
6335 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6337 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6338 preimages.push(preimage);
6340 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6341 reason.write(writer)?;
6346 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6347 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6349 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6351 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6352 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6353 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6354 source.write(writer)?;
6355 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6357 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6359 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6360 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6362 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6364 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6365 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6370 match self.resend_order {
6371 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6372 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6375 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6376 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6377 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6379 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6380 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6381 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6382 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6385 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6386 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6387 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6388 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6389 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6392 if self.is_outbound() {
6393 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6394 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6395 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6397 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6398 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6399 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6401 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6403 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6404 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6405 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6406 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6408 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6409 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6410 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6411 // consider the stale state on reload.
6414 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6415 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6416 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6418 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6419 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6420 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6422 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6423 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6425 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6426 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6427 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6429 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6430 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6432 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6435 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6436 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6437 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6439 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6442 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6443 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6445 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6446 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6447 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6449 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6451 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6453 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6456 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6457 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6458 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6459 htlc.write(writer)?;
6462 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6463 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6464 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6466 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6467 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6469 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6470 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6471 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6472 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6473 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6474 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6475 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6477 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6478 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6479 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6480 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6481 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6483 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6484 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6486 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6487 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6488 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6489 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6491 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6493 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6494 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6495 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6496 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6497 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6498 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6499 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6501 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6502 (2, chan_type, option),
6503 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6504 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6505 (5, self.config, required),
6506 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6507 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6508 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6509 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6510 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6511 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6512 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6513 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6514 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6515 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6516 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6517 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6518 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6519 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6520 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6527 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6528 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6530 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6531 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6533 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6534 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6535 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6537 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6538 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6539 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6540 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6542 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6544 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6545 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6547 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6548 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6550 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6551 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6554 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6558 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6560 let mut keys_data = None;
6562 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6563 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6564 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6565 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6566 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6567 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6568 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6569 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6570 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6571 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6575 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6576 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6577 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6580 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6582 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6583 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6589 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6590 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6591 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6593 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6594 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6595 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6596 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6597 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6598 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6599 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6600 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6605 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6607 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6608 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6609 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6610 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6611 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6612 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6613 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6614 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6615 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6616 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6618 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6622 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6626 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6627 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6629 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6634 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6636 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6637 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6638 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6639 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6640 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6641 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6642 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6643 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6645 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6646 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6647 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6649 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6650 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6651 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6653 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6657 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6658 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6659 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6660 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6663 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6669 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6670 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6673 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6675 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6676 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6679 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6681 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6685 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6688 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6689 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6690 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6691 // consider the stale state on reload.
6692 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6695 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6697 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6699 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6702 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6703 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6704 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6707 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6708 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6709 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6711 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6712 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6714 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6715 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6719 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6721 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6723 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6724 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6726 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6727 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6730 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6732 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6733 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6734 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6735 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6737 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6740 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6748 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6754 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6755 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6757 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6758 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6759 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6763 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6764 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6765 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6767 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6773 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6774 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6775 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6776 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6777 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6778 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6779 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6780 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6781 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6782 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6784 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6785 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6786 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6787 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6788 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6789 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6790 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6792 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6793 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6794 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6795 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6797 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6798 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6799 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6800 (2, channel_type, option),
6801 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6802 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6803 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6804 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6805 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6806 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6807 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6808 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6809 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6810 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6811 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6812 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6813 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6814 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6815 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6816 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6817 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6818 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6821 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6822 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6823 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6824 // required channel parameters.
6825 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6826 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6827 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6829 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6831 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6832 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6833 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6834 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6837 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6838 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6839 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6841 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6842 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6844 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6845 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6850 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6851 if iter.next().is_some() {
6852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6856 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6857 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6858 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6859 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6860 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6863 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6864 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6866 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6867 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6868 // separate u64 values.
6869 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6871 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
6876 config: config.unwrap(),
6880 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6881 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6882 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6885 temporary_channel_id,
6887 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6889 channel_value_satoshis,
6891 latest_monitor_update_id,
6894 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6897 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6898 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6901 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6902 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6903 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6904 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6908 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6909 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6910 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6911 monitor_pending_forwards,
6912 monitor_pending_failures,
6913 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6916 holding_cell_update_fee,
6917 next_holder_htlc_id,
6918 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6919 update_time_counter,
6922 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6923 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6924 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6925 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6927 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6928 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6929 closing_fee_limits: None,
6930 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6932 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6934 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6935 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6937 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6939 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6940 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6941 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6942 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6943 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6944 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6945 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6946 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6947 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6950 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6952 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6953 funding_transaction,
6955 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6956 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6957 counterparty_node_id,
6959 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6963 channel_update_status,
6964 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6968 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6969 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6970 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6971 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6973 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6975 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6976 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6977 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6979 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6980 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6982 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6983 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6985 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6988 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6996 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6997 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6998 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6999 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7000 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7002 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7003 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7005 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7006 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7007 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7008 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7009 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7010 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7011 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7012 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7013 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7014 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7015 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7016 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7017 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7018 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7019 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7020 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7021 use crate::util::test_utils;
7022 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7023 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7024 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7025 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7026 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7027 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7028 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7029 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7030 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7031 use crate::prelude::*;
7033 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7036 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7037 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7043 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7044 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7045 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7046 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7050 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7051 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7052 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7053 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7054 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7055 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7056 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7060 signer: InMemorySigner,
7063 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7064 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7067 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7068 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7070 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7071 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7074 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7078 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7080 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7081 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7082 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7083 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7084 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7087 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7088 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7089 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7090 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7094 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7095 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7096 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7100 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7101 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7102 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7103 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7105 let seed = [42; 32];
7106 let network = Network::Testnet;
7107 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7108 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7109 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7112 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7113 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7114 let config = UserConfig::default();
7115 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7116 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7117 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7119 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7120 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7124 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7125 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7127 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7128 let original_fee = 253;
7129 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7130 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7131 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7132 let seed = [42; 32];
7133 let network = Network::Testnet;
7134 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7136 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7137 let config = UserConfig::default();
7138 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7140 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7141 // same as the old fee.
7142 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7143 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7144 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7148 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7149 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7150 // dust limits are used.
7151 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7153 let seed = [42; 32];
7154 let network = Network::Testnet;
7155 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7156 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7158 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7159 // they have different dust limits.
7161 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7162 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7163 let config = UserConfig::default();
7164 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7166 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7167 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7168 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7169 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7170 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7172 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7173 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7174 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7175 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7176 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7178 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7179 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7180 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7182 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7183 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7184 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7185 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7188 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7190 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7191 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7192 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7193 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7194 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7195 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7196 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7197 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7198 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7202 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7203 // the dust limit check.
7204 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7205 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7206 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7207 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7209 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7210 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7211 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7212 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7213 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7214 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7215 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7219 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7220 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7221 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7222 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7223 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7224 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7226 let seed = [42; 32];
7227 let network = Network::Testnet;
7228 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7230 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7231 let config = UserConfig::default();
7232 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7234 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7235 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7237 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7238 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7239 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7240 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7241 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7242 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7244 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7245 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7246 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7247 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7248 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7250 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7252 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7253 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7254 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7255 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7256 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7258 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7259 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7260 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7261 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7262 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7266 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7267 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7268 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7269 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7270 let seed = [42; 32];
7271 let network = Network::Testnet;
7272 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7273 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7274 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7276 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7278 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7279 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7280 let config = UserConfig::default();
7281 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7283 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7284 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7285 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7286 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7288 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7289 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7290 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7292 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7293 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7294 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7295 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7297 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7298 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7299 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7301 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7302 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7304 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7305 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7306 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7307 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7308 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7309 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7310 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7312 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7314 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7315 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7316 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7317 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7318 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7322 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7323 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7324 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7325 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7326 let seed = [42; 32];
7327 let network = Network::Testnet;
7328 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7329 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7330 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7332 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7333 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7334 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7335 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7336 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7337 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7338 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7339 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7341 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7342 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7343 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7344 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7345 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7346 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7348 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7349 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7350 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7351 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7353 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7355 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7356 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7357 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7358 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7359 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7360 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7362 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7363 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7364 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7365 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7367 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7368 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7369 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7370 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7371 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7373 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7374 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7376 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7377 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7378 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7380 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7381 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7382 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7383 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7384 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7386 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7387 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7389 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7390 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7391 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7395 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7397 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7398 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7399 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7401 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7402 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7403 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7404 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7406 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7407 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7408 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7410 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7412 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7413 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7416 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7417 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7418 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7420 let seed = [42; 32];
7421 let network = Network::Testnet;
7422 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7423 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7424 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7427 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7428 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7429 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7431 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7432 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7434 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7435 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7436 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7438 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7439 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7441 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7443 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7444 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7446 // Channel Negotiations failed
7447 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7448 assert!(result.is_err());
7453 fn channel_update() {
7454 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7455 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7456 let seed = [42; 32];
7457 let network = Network::Testnet;
7458 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7459 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7461 // Create a channel.
7462 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7463 let config = UserConfig::default();
7464 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7465 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7466 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7467 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7469 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7470 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7471 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7473 short_channel_id: 0,
7476 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7477 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7478 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7480 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7481 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7483 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7485 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7487 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7488 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7489 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7490 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7492 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7493 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7494 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7496 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7500 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7502 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7503 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7504 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7505 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7506 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7507 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7508 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7509 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7510 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7511 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7512 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7513 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7514 use crate::sync::Arc;
7516 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7517 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7518 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7519 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7521 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7523 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7524 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7525 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7526 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7527 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7529 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7530 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7536 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7537 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7538 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7540 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7541 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7542 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7543 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7544 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7545 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7547 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7549 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7550 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7551 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7552 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7553 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7554 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7556 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7557 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7558 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7559 selected_contest_delay: 144
7561 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7562 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7564 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7565 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7567 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7568 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7570 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7571 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7573 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7574 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7575 // build_commitment_transaction.
7576 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7577 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7578 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7579 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7580 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7582 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7583 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7584 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7585 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7589 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7590 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7591 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7592 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7596 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7597 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7598 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7600 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7601 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7603 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7604 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7606 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7608 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7609 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7610 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7611 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7612 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7613 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7614 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7616 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7617 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7618 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7619 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7621 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7622 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7623 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7625 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7627 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7628 commitment_tx.clone(),
7629 counterparty_signature,
7630 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7631 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7632 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7634 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7635 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7637 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7638 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7639 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7641 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7642 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7645 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7646 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7648 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7649 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7650 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7651 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7652 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7653 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7654 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7655 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7657 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7660 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7661 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7662 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7666 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7669 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7670 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7671 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7673 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7674 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7675 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7676 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7677 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7678 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7679 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7680 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7682 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7686 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7687 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7688 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7689 "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", {});
7691 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7692 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7694 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7695 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7696 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7698 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7699 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7700 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7701 "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", {});
7703 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7704 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7706 amount_msat: 1000000,
7708 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7709 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7711 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7714 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7715 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7717 amount_msat: 2000000,
7719 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7720 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7722 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7725 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7726 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7728 amount_msat: 2000000,
7730 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7731 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7732 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7734 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7737 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7738 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7740 amount_msat: 3000000,
7742 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7743 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7744 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7746 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7749 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7750 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7752 amount_msat: 4000000,
7754 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7755 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7757 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7761 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7762 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7763 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7765 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7766 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7767 "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", {
7770 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7771 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7772 "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" },
7775 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7776 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7777 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7780 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7781 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7782 "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" },
7785 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7786 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7787 "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" },
7790 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7791 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7792 "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" }
7795 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7796 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7797 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7799 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7800 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7801 "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", {
7804 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7805 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7806 "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" },
7809 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7810 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7811 "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" },
7814 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7815 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7816 "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" },
7819 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7820 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7821 "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" },
7824 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7825 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7826 "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" }
7829 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7830 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7831 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7833 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7834 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7835 "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", {
7838 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7839 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7840 "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" },
7843 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7844 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7845 "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" },
7848 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7849 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7850 "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" },
7853 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7854 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7855 "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" }
7858 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7859 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7860 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7861 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7863 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7864 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7865 "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", {
7868 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7869 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7870 "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" },
7873 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7874 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7875 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7878 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7879 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7880 "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" },
7883 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7884 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7885 "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" }
7888 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7889 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7890 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7891 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7893 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7894 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7895 "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", {
7898 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7899 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7900 "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" },
7903 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7904 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7905 "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" },
7908 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7909 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7910 "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" },
7913 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7914 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7915 "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" }
7918 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7919 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7920 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7922 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7923 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7924 "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", {
7927 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7928 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7929 "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" },
7932 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7933 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7934 "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" },
7937 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7938 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7939 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7942 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7943 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7944 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7946 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7947 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7948 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7951 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7952 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7953 "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" },
7956 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7957 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7958 "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" },
7961 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7962 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7963 "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" }
7966 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7967 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7968 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7970 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7971 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7972 "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", {
7975 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7976 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7977 "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" },
7980 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7981 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7982 "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" }
7985 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7986 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7987 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7988 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7990 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7991 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7992 "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", {
7995 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7996 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7997 "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" },
8000 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8001 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8002 "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" }
8005 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8006 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8007 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8008 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8010 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8011 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8012 "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", {
8015 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8016 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8017 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8020 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8021 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8022 "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" }
8025 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8026 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8027 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8029 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8030 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8031 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8034 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8035 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8036 "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" }
8039 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8040 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8041 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8042 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8044 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8045 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8046 "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", {
8049 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8050 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8051 "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" }
8054 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8055 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8056 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8057 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8059 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8060 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8061 "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", {
8064 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8065 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8066 "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" }
8069 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8070 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8071 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8072 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8074 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8075 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8076 "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", {});
8078 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8079 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8080 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8081 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8083 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8084 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8085 "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", {});
8087 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8088 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8089 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8090 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8092 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8093 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8094 "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", {});
8096 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8097 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8098 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8100 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8101 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8102 "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", {});
8104 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8105 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8106 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8107 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8109 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8110 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8111 "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", {});
8113 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8114 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8115 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8116 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8118 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8119 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8120 "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", {});
8122 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8123 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8124 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8125 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8126 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8127 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8129 amount_msat: 2000000,
8131 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8132 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8134 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8137 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8138 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8139 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8141 amount_msat: 5000001,
8143 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8144 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8145 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8147 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8150 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8151 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8153 amount_msat: 5000000,
8155 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8156 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8157 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8159 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8163 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8164 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8165 "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", {
8168 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8169 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8170 "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" },
8172 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8173 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8174 "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" },
8176 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8177 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8178 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8181 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8182 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8183 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8186 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8187 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8188 "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" },
8190 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8191 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8192 "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" },
8194 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8195 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8196 "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" }
8201 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8202 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8204 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8205 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8206 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8207 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8209 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8210 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8211 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8213 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8214 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8216 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8217 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8219 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8220 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8221 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8225 fn test_key_derivation() {
8226 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8227 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8229 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8230 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8232 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8233 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8235 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8236 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8238 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8239 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8241 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8242 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8244 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8245 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8247 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8248 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8252 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8253 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8254 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8255 let seed = [42; 32];
8256 let network = Network::Testnet;
8257 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8258 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8260 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8261 let config = UserConfig::default();
8262 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8263 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8265 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8266 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8268 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8269 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8270 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8271 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8272 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8273 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8274 assert!(res.is_ok());
8279 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8280 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8281 // resulting `channel_type`.
8282 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8283 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8284 let network = Network::Testnet;
8285 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8286 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8288 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8289 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8291 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8292 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8294 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8295 // need to signal it.
8296 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8297 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8298 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8301 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8303 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8304 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8305 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8307 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8308 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8309 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8312 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8313 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8314 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8315 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8316 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8319 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8320 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8325 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8326 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8327 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8328 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8329 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8330 let network = Network::Testnet;
8331 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8332 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8334 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8335 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8337 let config = UserConfig::default();
8339 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8340 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8341 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8342 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8343 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8345 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8346 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8347 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8350 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8351 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8352 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8354 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8355 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8356 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8357 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8358 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8359 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8361 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8366 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8367 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8369 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8370 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8371 let network = Network::Testnet;
8372 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8373 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8375 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8376 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8378 let config = UserConfig::default();
8380 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8381 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8382 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8383 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8384 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8385 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8386 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8387 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8389 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8390 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8391 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8392 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8393 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8394 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8397 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8398 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8400 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8401 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8402 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8403 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8405 assert!(res.is_err());
8407 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8408 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8409 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8411 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8412 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8413 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8416 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8418 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8419 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8420 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8421 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8424 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8425 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8427 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8428 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8430 assert!(res.is_err());