1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`KeysInterface::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
893 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
894 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
895 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
896 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
897 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
898 // We've exhausted our options
901 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
902 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
906 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
907 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
908 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
909 outbound_scid_alias: u64
910 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
911 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
914 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
916 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
917 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
918 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
919 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
921 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
924 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
927 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
928 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
929 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
931 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
934 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
935 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
936 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
937 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
941 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
943 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
944 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
945 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
949 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
950 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
952 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
953 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
956 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
957 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
958 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
965 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
966 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
967 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
968 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
973 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
975 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
976 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
977 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
979 channel_value_satoshis,
981 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
984 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
985 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
987 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
988 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
991 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
992 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
993 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
994 pending_update_fee: None,
995 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
996 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
997 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
998 update_time_counter: 1,
1000 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1002 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1003 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1004 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1005 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1006 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1007 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1009 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1010 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1011 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1012 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1014 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1015 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1016 closing_fee_limits: None,
1017 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1019 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1021 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1022 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1023 short_channel_id: None,
1024 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1026 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1027 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1028 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1029 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1030 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1031 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1032 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1033 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1034 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1035 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1036 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1038 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1040 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1041 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1042 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1043 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1044 counterparty_parameters: None,
1045 funding_outpoint: None,
1046 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1047 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1049 funding_transaction: None,
1051 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1052 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1053 counterparty_node_id,
1055 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1057 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1059 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1060 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1062 announcement_sigs: None,
1064 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1065 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1066 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1067 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1069 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1071 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1072 outbound_scid_alias,
1074 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1076 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1077 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1079 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1084 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1085 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1086 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1088 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1089 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1090 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1091 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1092 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1093 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1094 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1097 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1098 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1099 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1100 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1101 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1102 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1103 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1104 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1106 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1107 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1116 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1117 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1118 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1119 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1120 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1121 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1122 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1123 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1127 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1128 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1130 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1131 // support this channel type.
1132 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1133 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1137 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1141 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1142 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1143 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1144 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1145 // publicly announced.
1146 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1147 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1151 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1155 channel_type.clone()
1157 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1159 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1163 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1164 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1165 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1166 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1167 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1168 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1169 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1170 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1171 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1174 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1178 // Check sanity of message fields:
1179 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1182 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1188 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1189 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1195 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1198 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1200 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1201 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1204 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1207 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1211 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1212 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1215 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1218 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1221 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1224 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1227 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1230 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1234 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1236 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1237 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1242 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1243 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1244 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1245 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1248 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1252 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1253 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1255 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1259 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1260 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1261 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1262 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1263 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1267 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1268 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1269 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1270 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1274 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1275 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1276 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1277 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1278 if script.len() == 0 {
1281 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1284 Some(script.clone())
1287 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1288 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1294 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1295 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1298 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1299 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1304 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1305 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1307 let chan = Channel {
1310 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1311 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1313 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1318 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1320 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1321 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1322 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1325 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1328 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1329 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1331 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1332 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1333 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1335 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1337 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1338 pending_update_fee: None,
1339 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1340 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1341 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1342 update_time_counter: 1,
1344 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1346 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1347 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1348 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1349 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1350 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1351 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1353 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1354 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1355 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1356 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1358 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1359 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1360 closing_fee_limits: None,
1361 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1363 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1365 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1366 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1367 short_channel_id: None,
1368 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1370 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1371 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1372 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1373 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1374 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1375 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1376 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1377 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1378 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1379 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1380 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1381 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1383 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1385 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1386 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1387 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1388 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1389 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1390 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1391 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1393 funding_outpoint: None,
1394 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1395 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1397 funding_transaction: None,
1399 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1400 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1401 counterparty_node_id,
1403 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1405 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1407 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1408 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1410 announcement_sigs: None,
1412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1413 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1415 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1417 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1419 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1420 outbound_scid_alias,
1422 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1425 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1434 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1435 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1436 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1437 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1438 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1440 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1441 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1442 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1443 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1444 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1445 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1446 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1448 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1449 where L::Target: Logger
1451 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1452 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1453 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1455 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1456 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1457 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1458 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1460 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1461 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1462 if match update_state {
1463 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1464 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1465 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1466 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1467 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1469 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1473 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1474 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1475 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1476 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1478 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1479 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1480 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1482 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1483 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1484 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1485 transaction_output_index: None
1490 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1491 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1492 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1493 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1494 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1497 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1499 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1500 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1501 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1503 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1504 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1507 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1508 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1511 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1513 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1514 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1515 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1517 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1518 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1524 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1525 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1526 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1527 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1528 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1530 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1534 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1535 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1539 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1540 if generated_by_local {
1541 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1542 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1551 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1553 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1554 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1555 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1556 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1557 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1562 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1563 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1565 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1569 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1570 preimages.push(preimage);
1574 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1575 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1579 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1580 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1582 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1583 if !generated_by_local {
1584 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1593 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1594 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1595 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1596 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1597 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1598 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1599 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1603 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1604 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1605 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1606 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1608 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1610 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1611 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1612 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1613 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1616 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1617 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1618 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1619 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1621 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1624 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1625 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1626 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1627 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1629 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1632 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1638 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1639 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1644 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1646 let channel_parameters =
1647 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1648 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1649 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1652 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1657 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1660 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1661 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1662 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1663 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1665 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1666 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1667 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1675 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1676 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1682 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1683 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1684 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1685 // outside of those situations will fail.
1686 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1690 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1695 1 + // script length (0)
1699 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1700 2 + // witness marker and flag
1701 1 + // witness element count
1702 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1703 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1704 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1705 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1706 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1707 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1709 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1710 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1711 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1717 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1718 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1719 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1720 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1722 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1723 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1724 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1726 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1727 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1728 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1729 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1730 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1731 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1734 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1735 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1738 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1739 value_to_holder = 0;
1742 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1743 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1744 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1745 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1747 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1748 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1751 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1752 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1756 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1757 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1758 /// our counterparty!)
1759 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1760 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1761 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1762 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1763 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1764 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1765 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1767 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1771 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1772 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1773 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1774 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1775 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1776 //may see payments to it!
1777 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1778 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1779 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1781 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1784 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1785 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1786 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1787 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1788 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1791 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1794 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1795 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1797 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1799 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1800 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1801 where L::Target: Logger {
1802 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1803 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1804 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1805 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1806 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1807 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1808 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1809 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1813 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1814 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1815 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1816 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1818 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1819 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1821 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1823 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1825 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1826 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1827 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1829 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1830 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1831 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1832 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1833 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1835 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1836 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1837 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1839 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1840 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1842 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1845 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1846 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1850 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1854 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1855 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1857 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1858 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1859 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1862 // Now update local state:
1864 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1865 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1866 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1867 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1868 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1869 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1870 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1874 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1875 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1876 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1877 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1878 // do not not get into this branch.
1879 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1880 match pending_update {
1881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1883 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1886 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1887 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1890 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1891 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1892 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1893 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1894 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1895 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1896 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1902 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1903 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1907 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1908 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1911 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1914 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1915 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1918 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1920 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1921 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1924 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1927 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1928 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1929 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1930 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1935 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1936 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1937 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1938 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1939 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1942 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1943 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1944 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1945 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1946 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1948 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1949 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1950 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1954 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1955 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1956 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1957 /// before we fail backwards.
1958 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1959 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1960 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1961 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1962 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1964 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1966 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1967 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1968 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1970 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1971 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1972 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1974 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1975 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1976 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1978 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1983 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1984 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1990 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1991 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1992 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1993 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1994 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1998 // Now update local state:
1999 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2000 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2001 match pending_update {
2002 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2003 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2004 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2005 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2009 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2010 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2011 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2012 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2018 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2019 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2020 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2026 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2028 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2029 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2032 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2033 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2034 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2039 // Message handlers:
2041 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2042 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2044 // Check sanity of message fields:
2045 if !self.is_outbound() {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2048 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2051 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2054 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2057 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2060 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2062 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2064 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2065 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2068 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2069 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2072 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2075 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2079 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2080 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2083 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2086 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2089 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2092 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2095 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2098 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2102 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2103 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2106 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2107 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2109 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2112 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2113 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2114 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2115 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2116 if script.len() == 0 {
2119 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2122 Some(script.clone())
2125 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2126 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2132 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2133 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2134 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2136 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2138 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2139 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2141 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2144 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2145 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2146 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2147 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2148 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2149 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2152 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2153 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2154 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2157 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2158 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2160 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2161 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2166 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2167 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2169 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2170 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2172 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2173 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2174 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2175 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2176 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2177 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2178 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2179 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2180 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2183 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2184 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2186 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2187 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2188 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2189 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2191 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2192 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2194 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2195 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2198 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2199 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2202 pub fn funding_created<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2203 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2204 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2206 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2209 if self.is_outbound() {
2210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2212 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2213 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2214 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2218 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2221 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2222 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2223 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2224 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2227 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2228 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2229 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2230 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2231 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2233 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2235 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2236 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2240 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2241 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2242 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2246 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2247 initial_commitment_tx,
2250 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2251 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2254 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2255 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2257 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2259 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2260 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2261 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2262 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2263 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2264 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2265 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2266 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2267 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2268 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2269 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2271 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2273 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2275 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2276 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2277 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2278 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2280 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2282 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2283 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2285 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2288 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2289 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2290 pub fn funding_signed<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2291 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2292 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2294 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2297 if !self.is_outbound() {
2298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2300 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2303 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2304 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2305 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2306 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2309 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2311 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2312 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2313 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2314 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2316 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2317 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2319 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2320 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2322 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2323 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2324 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2325 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2326 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2331 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2332 initial_commitment_tx,
2335 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2336 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2339 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2340 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2343 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2344 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2345 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2346 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2347 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2348 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2349 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2350 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2351 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2352 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2353 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2354 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2356 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2358 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2360 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2361 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2362 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2363 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2365 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2367 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2370 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2371 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2373 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2374 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2375 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2376 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2379 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2380 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2381 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2382 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2383 // when routing outbound payments.
2384 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2388 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2390 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2391 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2392 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2393 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2394 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2395 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2396 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2397 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2398 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2400 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2401 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2402 let expected_point =
2403 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2404 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2406 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2408 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2409 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2410 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2411 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2412 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2414 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2422 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2423 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2425 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2427 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2430 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2431 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2432 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2433 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2439 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2440 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2441 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2442 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2443 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2444 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2445 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2446 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2447 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2450 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2453 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2454 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2455 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2457 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2458 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2459 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2460 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2461 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2462 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2464 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2465 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2471 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2472 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2473 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2474 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2475 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2476 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2477 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2478 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2479 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2482 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2485 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2486 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2487 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2489 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2490 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2491 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2492 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2493 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2494 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2496 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2497 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2501 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2502 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2503 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2504 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2505 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2506 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2507 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2509 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2510 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2512 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2519 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2520 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2521 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2522 /// corner case properly.
2523 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2524 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2525 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2527 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2528 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2529 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2530 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2533 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2535 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2536 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2537 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2540 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2541 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2542 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2543 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2545 outbound_capacity_msat,
2546 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2547 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2548 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2554 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2555 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2558 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2559 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2560 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2561 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2562 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2563 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2566 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2567 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2569 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2570 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2573 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2574 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2575 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2577 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2578 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2580 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2583 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2584 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2586 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2587 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2589 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2590 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2592 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2593 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2597 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2604 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2605 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2606 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2609 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2610 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2611 included_htlcs += 1;
2614 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2619 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2620 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2621 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2622 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2623 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2624 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2629 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2631 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2632 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2637 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2638 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2642 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2643 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2644 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2647 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2648 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2650 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2651 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2652 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2654 total_pending_htlcs,
2655 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2656 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2657 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2659 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2660 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2661 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2663 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2665 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2670 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2671 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2672 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2674 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2675 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2677 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2680 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2681 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2683 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2684 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2686 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2687 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2689 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2690 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2694 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2695 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2701 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2702 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2703 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2704 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2705 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2706 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2709 included_htlcs += 1;
2712 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2713 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2716 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2717 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2719 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2720 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2721 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2726 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2727 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2728 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2731 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2732 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2734 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2735 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2737 total_pending_htlcs,
2738 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2739 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2740 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2742 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2743 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2744 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2746 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2748 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2753 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2754 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2755 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2756 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2757 if local_sent_shutdown {
2758 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2760 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2761 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2762 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2765 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2768 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2771 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2774 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2778 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2779 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2780 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2781 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2783 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2786 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2787 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2788 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2789 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2790 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2791 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2792 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2793 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2794 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2795 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2796 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2798 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2799 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2800 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2801 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2802 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2803 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2807 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2810 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2811 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2812 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2814 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2815 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2816 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2817 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2818 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2819 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2820 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2824 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2825 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2826 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2827 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2828 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2829 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2830 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2834 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2835 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2836 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2837 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2838 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2842 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2843 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2844 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2845 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2846 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2848 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2852 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2856 if !self.is_outbound() {
2857 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2858 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2859 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2860 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2861 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2862 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2863 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2864 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2865 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2866 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2867 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2868 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2869 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2870 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2871 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2874 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2875 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2876 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2877 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2881 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2884 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2888 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2889 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2890 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2894 // Now update local state:
2895 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2896 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2897 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2898 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2899 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2900 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2901 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2906 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2908 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2909 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2910 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2911 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2912 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2913 None => fail_reason.into(),
2914 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2915 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2916 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2919 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2923 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2925 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2926 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2928 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2934 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2937 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2938 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2941 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2945 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2948 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2949 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2952 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2956 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2960 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2961 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2968 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2972 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2973 where L::Target: Logger
2975 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2976 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2978 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2979 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2981 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2982 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2985 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2987 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2989 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2990 let commitment_txid = {
2991 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2992 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2993 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2995 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2996 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2997 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2998 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2999 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3000 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3004 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3006 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3007 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3008 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3009 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3012 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3013 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3014 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3015 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3018 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3020 if self.is_outbound() {
3021 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3022 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3023 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3024 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3025 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3026 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3027 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3028 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3029 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3030 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3036 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3037 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3040 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3041 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3042 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3043 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3044 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3045 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3046 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3048 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3049 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3050 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3051 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3052 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3053 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3054 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3055 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3057 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3059 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3063 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3064 commitment_stats.tx,
3066 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3067 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3068 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3071 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3072 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3073 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3074 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3076 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3077 let mut need_commitment = false;
3078 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3079 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3080 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3081 need_commitment = true;
3085 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3086 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3087 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3088 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3089 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3090 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3094 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3095 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3096 Some(forward_info.clone())
3098 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3099 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3100 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3101 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3102 need_commitment = true;
3105 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3106 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3107 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3108 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3109 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3110 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3111 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3112 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3113 need_commitment = true;
3117 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3118 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3119 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3120 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3122 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3123 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3124 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3125 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3126 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3127 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3128 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3129 // includes the right HTLCs.
3130 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3131 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3132 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3133 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3134 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3135 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3137 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3138 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3139 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3142 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3143 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3144 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3145 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3146 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3147 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3148 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3149 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3150 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3154 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3155 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3157 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3158 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3159 per_commitment_secret,
3160 next_per_commitment_point,
3161 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3164 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3165 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3166 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3167 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3168 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3169 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3170 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3171 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3174 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3175 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3176 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3177 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3178 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3179 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3180 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3182 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3183 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3184 updates: Vec::new(),
3187 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3188 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3189 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3190 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3191 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3192 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3193 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3194 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3195 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3196 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3197 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3198 // to rebalance channels.
3199 match &htlc_update {
3200 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3201 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3202 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3205 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3206 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3207 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3208 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3209 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3210 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3211 // into the holding cell without ever being
3212 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3213 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3214 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3217 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3223 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3224 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3225 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3226 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3227 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3228 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3229 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3230 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3231 (msg, monitor_update)
3232 } else { unreachable!() };
3233 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3234 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3236 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3237 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3238 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3239 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3240 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3241 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3242 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3243 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3244 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3247 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3249 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3256 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3257 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3259 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3260 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3265 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3266 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3267 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3268 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3269 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3271 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3272 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3273 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3275 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3277 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3279 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3282 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3284 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3288 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3289 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3290 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3291 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3292 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3293 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3294 where L::Target: Logger,
3296 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3299 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3302 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3306 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3308 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3309 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3314 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3315 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3316 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3317 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3318 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3319 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3320 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3321 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3325 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3327 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3328 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3331 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3332 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3334 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3336 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3337 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3338 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3339 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3340 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3341 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3342 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3343 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3347 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3348 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3349 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3350 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3351 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3352 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3353 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3354 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3356 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3357 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3360 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3361 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3362 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3363 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3364 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3365 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3366 let mut require_commitment = false;
3367 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3370 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3371 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3372 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3374 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3375 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3376 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3377 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3378 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3379 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3384 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3385 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3386 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3387 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3388 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3390 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3391 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3392 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3397 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3398 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3400 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3404 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3405 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3407 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3409 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3410 require_commitment = true;
3411 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3412 match forward_info {
3413 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3414 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3415 require_commitment = true;
3417 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3418 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3419 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3421 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3422 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3423 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3427 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3428 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3429 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3430 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3436 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3437 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3438 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3439 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3441 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3442 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3443 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3444 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3445 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3446 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3447 require_commitment = true;
3451 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3453 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3454 match update_state {
3455 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3456 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3457 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3458 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3459 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3461 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3462 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3463 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3464 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3465 require_commitment = true;
3466 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3467 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3472 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3473 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3474 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3475 if require_commitment {
3476 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3477 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3478 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3479 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3480 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3481 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3482 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3483 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3484 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3486 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3487 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3488 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3489 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3490 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3491 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3492 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3494 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3498 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3499 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3500 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3501 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3502 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3504 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3505 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3506 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3509 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3510 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3511 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3512 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3515 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3516 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3517 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3518 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3520 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3523 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3524 if require_commitment {
3525 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3527 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3528 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3529 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3530 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3532 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3533 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3535 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3536 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3537 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3539 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3543 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3544 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3545 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3548 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3550 commitment_update: None,
3551 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3552 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3553 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3560 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3561 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3562 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3563 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3564 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3565 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3566 if !self.is_outbound() {
3567 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3569 if !self.is_usable() {
3570 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3572 if !self.is_live() {
3573 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3576 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3577 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3578 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3579 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3580 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3581 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3582 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3583 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3584 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3585 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3589 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3590 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3591 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3592 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3593 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3596 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3597 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3601 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3602 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3606 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3607 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3609 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3610 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3615 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3616 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3617 Some(update_fee) => {
3618 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3619 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3625 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3626 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3628 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3630 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3631 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3632 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3633 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3637 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3638 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3639 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3643 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3644 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3647 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3648 // will be retransmitted.
3649 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3650 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3651 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3653 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3654 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3656 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3657 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3658 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3659 // this HTLC accordingly
3660 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3663 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3664 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3665 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3666 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3669 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3670 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3671 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3672 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3673 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3674 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3679 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3681 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3682 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3683 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3684 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3688 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3689 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3690 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3691 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3692 // the update upon reconnection.
3693 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3697 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3698 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3701 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3702 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3703 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3704 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3705 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3706 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3708 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3709 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3710 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3711 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3712 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3713 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3715 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3716 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3717 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3718 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3719 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3720 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3721 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3724 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3725 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3726 /// to the remote side.
3727 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3728 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3729 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3731 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3732 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3733 // first received the funding_signed.
3734 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3735 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3736 self.funding_transaction.take()
3738 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3739 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3740 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3741 funding_broadcastable = None;
3744 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3745 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3746 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3747 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3748 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3749 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3750 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3751 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3752 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3753 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3754 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3755 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3756 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3757 next_per_commitment_point,
3758 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3762 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3764 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3765 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3766 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3767 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3768 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3769 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3771 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3772 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3773 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3774 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3775 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3776 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3780 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3781 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3783 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3784 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3787 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3788 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3789 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3790 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3791 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3792 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3793 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3794 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3795 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3799 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3800 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3802 if self.is_outbound() {
3803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3805 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3808 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3809 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3811 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3812 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3813 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3814 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3815 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3816 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3817 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3818 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3819 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3820 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3821 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3823 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3825 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3827 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3833 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3834 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3835 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3836 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3837 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3838 per_commitment_secret,
3839 next_per_commitment_point,
3843 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3844 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3845 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3846 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3847 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3849 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3850 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3851 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3852 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3853 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3854 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3855 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3856 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3857 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3862 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3863 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3865 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3866 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3867 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3868 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3869 reason: err_packet.clone()
3872 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3873 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3874 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3875 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3876 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3877 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3880 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3881 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3882 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3883 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3884 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3891 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3892 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3893 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3894 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3898 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3899 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3900 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3901 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3902 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3903 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3907 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3908 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3910 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3911 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3912 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3913 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3914 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3915 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3916 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3917 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3918 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3919 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3920 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3924 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3925 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3929 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3930 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3931 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3932 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3933 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3934 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3935 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3938 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3939 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3940 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3941 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3942 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3945 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3946 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3947 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3948 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3949 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3950 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3951 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3952 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3955 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3959 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3960 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3961 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3962 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3964 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3968 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3969 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3970 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3972 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3973 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3974 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3975 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3976 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3980 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3983 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3984 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3985 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3986 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3989 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3990 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3991 channel_ready: None,
3992 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3993 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3994 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3998 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3999 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4000 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4001 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4002 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4003 next_per_commitment_point,
4004 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4006 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4007 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4008 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4012 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4013 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4014 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4016 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4017 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4018 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4021 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4024 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4027 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4028 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4029 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4030 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4031 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4033 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4034 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4035 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4036 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4037 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4038 next_per_commitment_point,
4039 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4043 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4044 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4045 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4047 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4050 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4051 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4052 raa: required_revoke,
4053 commitment_update: None,
4054 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4056 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4057 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4058 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4060 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4063 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4064 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4065 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4066 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4067 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4068 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4071 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4072 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4073 raa: required_revoke,
4074 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4075 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4079 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4083 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4084 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4085 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4086 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4088 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4090 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4092 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4093 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4094 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4095 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4096 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4097 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4099 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4100 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4101 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4102 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4103 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4105 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4106 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4107 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4108 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4111 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4112 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4113 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4114 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4115 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4116 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4117 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4118 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4119 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4120 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4121 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4122 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4123 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4124 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4125 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4127 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4130 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4131 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4134 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4135 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4136 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4137 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4138 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4139 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4140 self.channel_state &
4141 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4142 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4143 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4144 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4147 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4148 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4149 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4150 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4151 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4152 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4155 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4161 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4162 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4163 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4164 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4166 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4167 return Ok((None, None));
4170 if !self.is_outbound() {
4171 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4172 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4174 return Ok((None, None));
4177 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4179 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4180 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4181 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4182 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4184 let sig = self.holder_signer
4185 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4186 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4188 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4189 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4190 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4191 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4193 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4194 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4195 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4200 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4201 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4202 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4203 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4205 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4208 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4209 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4210 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4211 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4214 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4215 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4219 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4221 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4225 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4226 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4230 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4233 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4234 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4235 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4236 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4238 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4241 assert!(send_shutdown);
4242 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4243 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4246 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4251 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4253 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4254 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4256 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4257 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4258 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4259 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4260 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4261 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4265 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4266 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4267 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4268 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4272 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4273 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4274 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4275 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4276 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4277 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4279 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4280 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4287 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4288 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4290 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4293 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4294 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4296 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4298 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4299 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4300 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4301 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4302 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4303 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4304 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4305 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4306 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4308 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4309 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4312 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4316 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4317 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4318 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4319 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4321 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4324 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4327 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4328 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4330 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4334 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4338 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4339 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4340 return Ok((None, None));
4343 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4344 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4345 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4348 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4350 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4353 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4354 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4355 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4356 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4357 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4361 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4362 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4367 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4368 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4369 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4370 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4371 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4372 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4373 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4377 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4379 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4380 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4381 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4382 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4384 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4387 let sig = self.holder_signer
4388 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4389 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4391 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4392 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4393 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4394 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4398 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4399 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4400 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4401 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4403 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4404 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4405 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4411 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4412 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4415 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4418 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4419 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4422 if !self.is_outbound() {
4423 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4424 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4425 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4426 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4428 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4430 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4432 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4433 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4436 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4437 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4438 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4439 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4440 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4441 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4442 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4443 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4445 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4448 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4449 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4450 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4451 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4453 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4457 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4458 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4459 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4460 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4462 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4468 // Public utilities:
4470 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4474 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4478 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4479 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4480 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4484 /// Gets the channel's type
4485 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4489 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4490 /// is_usable() returns true).
4491 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4492 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4493 self.short_channel_id
4496 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4497 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4498 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4501 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4502 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4503 self.outbound_scid_alias
4505 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4506 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4507 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4508 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4509 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4512 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4513 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4514 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4515 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4518 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4519 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4520 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4523 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4524 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4525 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4526 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4530 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4533 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4534 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4537 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4538 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4541 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4542 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4543 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4546 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4547 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4550 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4551 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4552 self.counterparty_node_id
4555 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4556 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4557 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4560 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4561 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4562 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4565 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4566 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4568 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4569 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4570 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4571 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4573 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4577 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4578 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4579 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4582 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4583 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4584 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4587 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4588 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4589 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4591 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4592 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4597 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4598 self.channel_value_satoshis
4601 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4602 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4605 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4606 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4609 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4610 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4613 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4614 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4615 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4618 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4619 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4620 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4623 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4624 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4625 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4628 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4629 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4630 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4631 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4632 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4635 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4637 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4638 self.prev_config = None;
4642 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4643 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4647 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4648 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4649 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4650 let did_channel_update =
4651 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4652 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4653 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4654 if did_channel_update {
4655 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4656 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4657 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4658 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4660 self.config.options = *config;
4664 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4665 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4666 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4667 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4668 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4669 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4670 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4672 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4673 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4676 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4678 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4679 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4685 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4686 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4687 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4688 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4689 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4690 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4691 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4693 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4694 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4701 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4705 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4706 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4707 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4708 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4709 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4710 // which are near the dust limit.
4711 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4712 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4713 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4714 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4715 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4717 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4718 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4720 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4723 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4724 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4727 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4728 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4731 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4732 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4736 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4741 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4743 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4744 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4745 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4746 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4747 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4748 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4750 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4752 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4760 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4761 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4765 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4766 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4767 self.update_time_counter
4770 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4771 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4774 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4775 self.config.announced_channel
4778 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4779 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4782 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4783 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4784 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4785 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4788 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4789 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4790 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4793 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4794 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4795 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4796 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4797 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4800 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4801 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4802 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4803 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4804 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4807 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4808 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4809 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4810 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4813 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4814 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4815 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4818 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4819 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4820 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4822 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4823 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4824 if self.channel_state &
4825 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4826 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4827 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4828 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4829 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4832 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4833 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4834 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4835 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4836 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4837 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4839 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4840 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4841 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4843 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4844 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4845 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4846 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4847 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4848 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4854 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4855 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4856 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4859 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4860 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4861 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4864 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4865 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4866 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4869 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4870 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4871 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4872 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4873 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4874 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4879 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4880 self.channel_update_status
4883 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4884 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4885 self.channel_update_status = status;
4888 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4890 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4891 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4892 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4896 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4897 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4898 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4901 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4905 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4906 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4907 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4909 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4910 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4911 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4913 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4914 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4917 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4918 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4919 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4920 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4921 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4922 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4923 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4924 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4925 self.channel_state);
4927 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4931 if need_commitment_update {
4932 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4933 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4934 let next_per_commitment_point =
4935 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4936 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4937 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4938 next_per_commitment_point,
4939 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4943 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4949 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4950 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4951 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4952 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4953 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4954 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4955 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4956 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4957 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4958 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4959 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4960 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4961 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4962 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4963 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4964 if self.is_outbound() {
4965 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4966 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4967 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4968 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4969 // channel and move on.
4970 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4971 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4973 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4974 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4975 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4977 if self.is_outbound() {
4978 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4979 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4980 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4981 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4982 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4983 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4987 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4988 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4989 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4990 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4991 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4995 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4996 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4997 // may have already happened for this block).
4998 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4999 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5000 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
5001 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5004 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5005 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5006 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5007 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5015 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5016 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5017 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5018 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5020 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5021 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5024 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5026 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5027 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5028 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5031 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5032 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5033 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5034 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5035 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5037 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5038 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5040 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5041 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5042 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5050 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5052 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5053 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5054 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5056 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5057 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5060 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5061 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5062 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5063 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5064 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5065 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5066 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5067 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5068 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5071 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5072 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5073 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5074 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5076 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5077 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5078 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5080 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5081 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5082 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5083 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5085 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5086 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5087 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5088 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5089 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5090 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5091 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5094 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5095 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5097 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5100 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5101 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5102 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5103 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5104 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5105 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5106 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5107 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5108 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5109 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5110 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5111 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5112 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5113 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5114 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5115 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5116 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5122 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5127 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5128 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5130 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5131 if !self.is_outbound() {
5132 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5134 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5135 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5138 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5139 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5142 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5143 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5147 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5148 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5149 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5150 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5151 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5152 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5153 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5154 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5155 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5156 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5157 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5158 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5159 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5160 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5161 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5162 first_per_commitment_point,
5163 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5164 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5165 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5166 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5168 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5172 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5173 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5176 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5177 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5178 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5179 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5182 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5183 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5185 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5186 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5187 if self.is_outbound() {
5188 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5190 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5191 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5193 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5194 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5196 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5197 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5200 self.user_id = user_id;
5201 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5203 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5206 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5207 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5208 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5210 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5211 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5212 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5213 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5215 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5216 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5217 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5218 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5219 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5220 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5221 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5222 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5223 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5224 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5225 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5226 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5227 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5228 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5229 first_per_commitment_point,
5230 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5231 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5232 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5234 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5238 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5239 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5241 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5243 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5244 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5247 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5248 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5249 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5250 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5251 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5252 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5255 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5256 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5257 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5258 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5259 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5260 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5261 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5262 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5263 if !self.is_outbound() {
5264 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5266 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5267 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5269 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5270 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5271 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5272 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5275 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5276 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5278 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5281 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5282 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5287 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5289 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5291 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5292 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5293 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5295 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5296 temporary_channel_id,
5297 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5298 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5303 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5304 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5305 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5306 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5308 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5311 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5312 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5313 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5314 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5316 if !self.is_usable() {
5317 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5320 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5322 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5323 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5325 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5326 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5327 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5328 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5329 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5330 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5336 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5337 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5338 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5342 if !self.is_usable() {
5346 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5347 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5351 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5355 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5356 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5359 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5363 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5365 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5370 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5372 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5373 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5374 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5375 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5376 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5380 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5382 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5383 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5384 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5386 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5387 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5388 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5389 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5390 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5391 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5392 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5393 contents: announcement,
5396 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5400 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5401 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5402 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5403 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5404 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5406 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5408 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5409 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5410 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5411 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5413 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5414 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5415 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5416 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5419 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5420 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5421 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5422 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5425 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5428 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5429 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5430 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5431 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5434 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5436 Err(_) => return None,
5438 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5439 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5444 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5445 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5446 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5447 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5448 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5449 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5450 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5451 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5452 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5453 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5454 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5455 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5456 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5457 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5458 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5459 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5460 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5461 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5462 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5465 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5466 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5467 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5468 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5471 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5472 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5473 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5474 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5475 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5476 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5477 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5478 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5480 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5481 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5482 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5483 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5484 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5485 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5486 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5487 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5488 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5490 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5496 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5498 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5499 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5501 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5503 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5504 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5506 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5507 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5508 /// regenerate them.
5510 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5512 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5513 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5514 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5517 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5518 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5519 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5522 if amount_msat == 0 {
5523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5526 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5530 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5531 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5532 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5533 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5534 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5535 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5536 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5537 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5540 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5541 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5542 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5543 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5545 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5546 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5547 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5550 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5551 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5552 if !self.is_outbound() {
5553 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5554 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5555 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5556 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5557 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5558 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5562 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5565 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5566 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5567 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5569 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5570 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5571 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5572 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5573 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5574 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5578 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5579 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5580 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5581 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5582 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5583 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5587 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5588 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5589 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5592 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5593 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5594 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5595 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5597 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5598 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5601 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5602 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5603 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5604 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5605 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5608 // Now update local state:
5609 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5610 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5615 onion_routing_packet,
5620 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5621 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5623 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5625 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5629 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5630 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5631 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5635 onion_routing_packet,
5637 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5642 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5643 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5644 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5645 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5646 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5647 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5648 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5650 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5651 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5653 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5654 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5656 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5657 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5659 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5660 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5661 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5662 have_updates = true;
5664 if have_updates { break; }
5666 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5667 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5668 have_updates = true;
5670 if have_updates { break; }
5673 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5675 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5677 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5678 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5679 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5680 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5681 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5683 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5684 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5685 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5687 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5688 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5692 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5693 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5694 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5695 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5696 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5697 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5698 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5701 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5702 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5703 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5704 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5705 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5706 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5709 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5711 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5712 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5713 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5714 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5715 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5716 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5718 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5721 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5722 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5725 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5726 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5727 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5728 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5729 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5730 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5731 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5732 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5735 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5736 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5739 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5740 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5741 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5742 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5743 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5744 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5745 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5749 if !self.is_outbound() {
5750 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5751 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5752 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5753 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5754 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5755 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5756 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5757 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5758 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5759 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5766 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5767 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5771 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5772 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5774 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5776 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5777 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5778 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5779 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5781 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5782 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5783 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5784 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5785 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5786 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5790 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5791 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5794 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5797 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5798 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5799 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5801 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5802 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5803 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5804 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5805 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5811 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5812 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5813 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5816 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5817 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5820 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5821 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5822 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5823 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5829 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5830 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5831 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5832 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5833 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5834 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5835 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5839 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5840 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5841 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5843 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5844 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5847 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5848 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5849 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5852 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5855 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5856 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5857 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5859 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5864 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5865 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5866 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5867 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5869 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5871 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5873 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5874 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5875 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5876 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5877 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5878 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5882 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5883 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5884 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5887 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5888 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5889 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5890 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5891 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5893 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5894 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5901 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5904 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5905 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5906 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5907 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5908 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5909 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5910 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5911 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5912 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5913 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5914 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5916 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5917 // return them to fail the payment.
5918 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5919 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5920 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5922 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5923 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5928 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5929 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5930 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5931 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5932 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5933 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5934 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5935 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5936 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5937 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5938 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5939 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5940 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5945 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5946 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5947 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5950 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5951 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5952 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5954 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5955 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5959 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5963 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
5964 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5966 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5972 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5974 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5975 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5976 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5978 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5979 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5980 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5981 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5987 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5988 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5989 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5990 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5991 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5992 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5997 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5998 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5999 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6000 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6002 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6003 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6004 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6005 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6010 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6011 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6012 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6013 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6014 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6015 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6020 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6021 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6022 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6025 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6027 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6028 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6029 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6030 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6031 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6033 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6034 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6035 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6036 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6038 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6039 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6040 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6042 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6044 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6045 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6046 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6047 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6048 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6049 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6051 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6052 // deserialized from that format.
6053 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6054 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6055 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6057 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6059 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6060 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6061 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6063 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6064 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6065 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6066 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6069 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6070 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6071 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6074 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6075 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6076 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6077 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6079 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6080 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6082 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6084 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6086 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6088 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6091 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6093 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6098 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6100 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6101 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6102 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6103 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6104 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6105 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6106 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6108 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6110 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6112 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6115 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6116 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6117 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6120 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6122 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6123 preimages.push(preimage);
6125 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6126 reason.write(writer)?;
6128 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6130 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6131 preimages.push(preimage);
6133 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6134 reason.write(writer)?;
6139 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6140 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6144 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6145 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6146 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6147 source.write(writer)?;
6148 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6150 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6152 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6153 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6155 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6157 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6158 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6163 match self.resend_order {
6164 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6165 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6168 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6169 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6170 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6172 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6173 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6174 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6175 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6178 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6179 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6180 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6181 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6182 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6185 if self.is_outbound() {
6186 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6187 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6188 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6190 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6191 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6192 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6194 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6196 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6197 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6198 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6199 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6201 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6202 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6203 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6204 // consider the stale state on reload.
6207 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6208 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6209 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6211 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6212 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6213 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6215 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6216 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6218 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6219 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6220 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6222 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6223 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6225 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6228 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6229 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6230 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6232 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6235 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6236 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6238 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6239 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6240 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6242 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6244 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6246 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6248 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6249 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6251 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6252 htlc.write(writer)?;
6255 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6256 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6257 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6259 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6260 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6262 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6263 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6264 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6265 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6266 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6267 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6268 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6270 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6271 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6272 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6273 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6274 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6276 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6278 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6279 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6280 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6281 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6283 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6284 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6285 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6286 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6287 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6288 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6289 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6291 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6292 (2, chan_type, option),
6293 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6294 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6295 (5, self.config, required),
6296 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6297 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6298 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6299 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6300 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6301 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6302 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6303 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6304 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6305 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6306 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6307 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6314 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6315 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6316 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6317 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6318 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6319 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6321 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6322 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6323 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6324 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6326 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6328 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6329 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6330 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6331 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6332 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6334 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6335 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6338 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6339 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6340 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6344 let mut keys_data = None;
6346 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6347 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6348 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6350 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6351 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6352 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6353 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6354 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6355 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6359 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6360 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6361 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6364 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6367 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6368 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6371 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6372 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6373 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6374 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6375 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6376 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6377 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6378 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6379 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6380 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6381 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6382 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6388 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6389 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6390 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6391 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6392 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6393 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6394 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6395 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6396 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6397 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6398 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6399 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6401 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6402 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6405 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6406 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6409 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6410 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6417 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6418 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6419 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6420 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6421 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6422 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6423 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6424 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6425 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6426 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6428 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6429 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6430 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6432 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6433 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6434 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6436 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6440 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6441 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6442 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6446 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6448 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6452 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6453 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6456 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6458 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6459 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6462 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6472 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6473 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6474 // consider the stale state on reload.
6475 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6478 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6485 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6494 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6495 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6497 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6498 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6506 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6507 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6509 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6510 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6515 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6516 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6517 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6518 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6520 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6523 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6528 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6532 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6534 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6537 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6538 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6540 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6542 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6546 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6547 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6548 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6550 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6556 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6557 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6558 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6559 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6560 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6561 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6562 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6563 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6564 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6565 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6567 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6568 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6569 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6570 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6571 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6572 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6574 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6575 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6577 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6578 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6579 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6580 (2, channel_type, option),
6581 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6582 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6583 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6584 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6585 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6586 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6587 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6588 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6589 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6590 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6591 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6592 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6593 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6594 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6595 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6598 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6599 let mut holder_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6600 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6601 // required channel parameters.
6602 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6603 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6604 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6606 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6608 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6609 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6610 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6611 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6614 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6615 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6616 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6618 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6619 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6621 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6627 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6628 if iter.next().is_some() {
6629 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6633 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6634 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6635 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6636 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6637 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6640 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6641 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6645 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6646 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6648 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6649 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6650 // separate u64 values.
6651 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6656 config: config.unwrap(),
6660 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6661 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6662 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6666 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6668 channel_value_satoshis,
6670 latest_monitor_update_id,
6673 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6676 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6677 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6680 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6681 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6682 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6686 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6687 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6688 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6689 monitor_pending_forwards,
6690 monitor_pending_failures,
6691 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6694 holding_cell_update_fee,
6695 next_holder_htlc_id,
6696 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6697 update_time_counter,
6700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6701 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6702 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6703 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6705 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6706 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6707 closing_fee_limits: None,
6708 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6710 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6712 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6713 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6715 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6717 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6718 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6719 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6720 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6721 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6722 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6723 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6724 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6725 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6728 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6730 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6731 funding_transaction,
6733 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6734 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6735 counterparty_node_id,
6737 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6741 channel_update_status,
6742 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6747 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6748 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6749 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6751 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6753 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6754 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6755 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6757 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6760 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6762 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6771 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6772 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6773 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6774 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6775 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6777 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6778 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6779 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6780 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6781 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6782 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6783 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6784 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6785 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6786 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6787 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6788 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6789 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6790 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6791 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6792 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6793 use crate::util::test_utils;
6794 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6795 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6796 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6797 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6798 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6799 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6800 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6801 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6802 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6803 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6804 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6805 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6806 use crate::prelude::*;
6808 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6811 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6812 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6818 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6819 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6820 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6821 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6825 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6826 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6827 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6828 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6829 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6830 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6831 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6835 signer: InMemorySigner,
6837 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6838 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6840 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6841 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6842 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6843 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6844 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6845 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6846 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6847 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6850 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6852 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6853 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6856 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6857 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6859 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6862 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6863 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6864 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6867 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6868 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6869 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6873 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6874 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6875 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6876 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6878 let seed = [42; 32];
6879 let network = Network::Testnet;
6880 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6881 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6882 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6885 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6886 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6887 let config = UserConfig::default();
6888 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6889 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6890 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6892 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6893 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6897 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6898 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6900 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6901 let original_fee = 253;
6902 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6903 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6904 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6905 let seed = [42; 32];
6906 let network = Network::Testnet;
6907 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6909 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6910 let config = UserConfig::default();
6911 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6913 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6914 // same as the old fee.
6915 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6916 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6917 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6921 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6922 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6923 // dust limits are used.
6924 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6925 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6926 let seed = [42; 32];
6927 let network = Network::Testnet;
6928 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6929 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6931 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6932 // they have different dust limits.
6934 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6935 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6936 let config = UserConfig::default();
6937 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6939 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6940 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6941 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6942 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6943 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6945 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6946 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6947 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6948 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6949 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6951 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6952 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6953 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6955 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6956 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6957 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6958 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6961 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6963 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6964 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6965 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6966 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6967 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6969 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6970 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6971 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6972 payment_secret: None,
6973 payment_params: None,
6977 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6978 // the dust limit check.
6979 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6980 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6981 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6982 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6984 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6985 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6986 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6987 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6988 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6989 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6990 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6994 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6995 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6996 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6997 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6998 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6999 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7000 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7001 let seed = [42; 32];
7002 let network = Network::Testnet;
7003 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7005 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7006 let config = UserConfig::default();
7007 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7009 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7010 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7012 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7013 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7014 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7015 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7016 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7017 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7019 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7020 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7021 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7022 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7023 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7025 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7027 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7028 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7029 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7030 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7031 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7033 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7034 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7035 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7036 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7037 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7041 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7042 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7043 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7044 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7045 let seed = [42; 32];
7046 let network = Network::Testnet;
7047 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7048 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7049 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7051 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7053 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7054 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7055 let config = UserConfig::default();
7056 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7058 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7059 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7060 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7061 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7063 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7064 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7065 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7067 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7068 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7069 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7070 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7072 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7073 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7074 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7076 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7077 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7079 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7080 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7081 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7082 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7083 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7084 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7085 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7086 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7087 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7092 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7094 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7095 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7096 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7097 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7098 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7099 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7100 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7107 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7108 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7109 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7110 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7111 let seed = [42; 32];
7112 let network = Network::Testnet;
7113 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7114 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7115 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7117 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7118 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7119 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7120 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7121 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7122 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7123 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7124 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7126 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7127 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7128 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7129 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7130 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7131 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7133 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7134 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7135 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7136 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7138 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7140 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7141 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7142 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7143 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7144 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7145 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7147 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7148 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7149 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7150 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7152 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7153 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7154 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7155 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7156 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7158 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7159 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7161 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7162 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7163 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7165 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7166 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7167 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7168 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7169 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7171 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7172 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7174 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7175 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7176 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7180 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7182 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7183 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7184 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7186 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7187 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7188 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7189 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7191 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7192 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7193 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7195 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7197 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7198 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7201 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7202 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7203 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7205 let seed = [42; 32];
7206 let network = Network::Testnet;
7207 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7208 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7209 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7212 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7213 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7214 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7216 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7217 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7219 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7220 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7221 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7223 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7224 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7226 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7228 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7229 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7231 // Channel Negotiations failed
7232 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7233 assert!(result.is_err());
7238 fn channel_update() {
7239 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7240 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7241 let seed = [42; 32];
7242 let network = Network::Testnet;
7243 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7244 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7246 // Create a channel.
7247 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7248 let config = UserConfig::default();
7249 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7250 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7251 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7252 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7254 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7255 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7256 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7258 short_channel_id: 0,
7261 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7262 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7263 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7265 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7266 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7268 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7270 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7272 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7273 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7274 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7275 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7277 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7278 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7279 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7281 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7285 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7287 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7288 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7289 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7290 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7291 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7292 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7293 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7294 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7295 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7296 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7297 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7298 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7299 use crate::sync::Arc;
7301 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7302 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7303 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7304 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7306 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7308 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7309 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7310 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7311 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7312 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7313 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7315 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7316 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7321 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7322 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7323 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7325 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7326 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7327 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7328 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7329 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7330 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7332 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7334 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7335 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7336 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7337 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7338 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7339 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7341 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7342 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7343 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7344 selected_contest_delay: 144
7346 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7347 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7349 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7350 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7352 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7353 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7355 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7356 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7358 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7359 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7360 // build_commitment_transaction.
7361 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7362 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7363 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7364 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7365 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7367 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7368 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7369 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7370 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7374 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7375 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7376 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7377 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7381 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7382 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7383 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7385 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7386 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7388 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7389 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7391 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7393 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7394 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7395 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7396 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7397 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7398 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7399 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7401 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7402 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7403 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7404 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7406 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7407 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7408 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7410 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7412 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7413 commitment_tx.clone(),
7414 counterparty_signature,
7415 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7416 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7417 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7419 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7420 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7422 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7423 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7424 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7426 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7427 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7430 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7431 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7433 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7434 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7435 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7436 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7437 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7438 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7439 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7440 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7442 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7445 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7446 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7447 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7451 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7454 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7455 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7456 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7458 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7459 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7460 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7461 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7462 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7463 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7464 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7465 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7467 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7471 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7472 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7474 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7475 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7476 "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", {});
7478 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7479 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7480 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7481 "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", {});
7483 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7484 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7486 amount_msat: 1000000,
7488 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7489 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7491 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7494 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7495 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7497 amount_msat: 2000000,
7499 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7500 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7502 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7505 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7506 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7508 amount_msat: 2000000,
7510 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7511 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7512 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7514 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7517 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7518 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7520 amount_msat: 3000000,
7522 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7523 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7524 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7526 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7529 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7530 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7532 amount_msat: 4000000,
7534 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7535 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7537 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7541 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7542 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7543 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7545 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7546 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7547 "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", {
7550 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7551 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7552 "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" },
7555 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7556 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7557 "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" },
7560 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7561 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7562 "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" },
7565 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7566 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7567 "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" },
7570 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7571 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7572 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7575 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7576 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7577 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7579 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7580 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7581 "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", {
7584 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7585 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7586 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7589 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7590 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7591 "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" },
7594 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7595 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7596 "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" },
7599 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7600 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7601 "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" },
7604 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7605 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7606 "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" }
7609 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7610 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7611 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7613 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7614 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7615 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7618 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7619 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7620 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7623 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7624 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7625 "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" },
7628 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7629 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7630 "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" },
7633 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7634 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7635 "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" }
7638 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7639 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7640 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7641 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7643 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7644 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7645 "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", {
7648 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7649 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7650 "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" },
7653 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7654 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7655 "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" },
7658 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7659 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7660 "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" },
7663 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7664 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7665 "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" }
7668 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7669 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7670 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7671 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7673 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7674 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7675 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7678 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7679 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7680 "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" },
7683 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7684 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7685 "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" },
7688 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7689 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7690 "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" },
7693 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7694 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7695 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7698 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7699 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7700 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7702 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7703 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7704 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7707 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7708 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7709 "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" },
7712 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7713 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7714 "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" },
7717 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7718 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7719 "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" }
7722 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7723 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7724 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7726 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7727 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7728 "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", {
7731 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7732 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7733 "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" },
7736 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7737 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7738 "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" },
7741 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7742 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7743 "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" }
7746 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7747 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7748 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7750 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7751 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7752 "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", {
7755 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7756 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7757 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7760 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7761 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7762 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7765 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7766 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7767 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7768 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7770 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7771 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7772 "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", {
7775 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7776 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7777 "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" },
7780 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7781 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7782 "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" }
7785 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7786 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7787 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7788 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7790 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7791 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7792 "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", {
7795 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7796 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7797 "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" },
7800 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7801 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7802 "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" }
7805 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7806 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7807 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7809 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7810 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7811 "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", {
7814 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7815 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7816 "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" }
7819 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7822 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7824 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7825 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7826 "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", {
7829 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7830 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7831 "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" }
7834 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7835 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7836 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7837 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7839 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7840 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7841 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7844 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7845 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7846 "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" }
7849 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7852 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7854 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7855 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7856 "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", {});
7858 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7859 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7860 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7861 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7863 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7864 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7865 "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", {});
7867 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7868 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7869 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7870 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7872 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7873 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7874 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7876 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7877 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7878 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7880 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7881 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7882 "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", {});
7884 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7885 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7886 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7887 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7889 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7890 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7891 "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", {});
7893 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7894 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7895 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7896 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7898 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7899 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7900 "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", {});
7902 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7903 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7904 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7905 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7906 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7907 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7909 amount_msat: 2000000,
7911 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7912 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7914 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7917 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7918 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7919 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7921 amount_msat: 5000000,
7923 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7924 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7925 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7927 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7930 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7931 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7933 amount_msat: 5000000,
7935 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7936 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7937 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7939 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7943 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7944 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7945 "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", {
7948 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7949 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7950 "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" },
7952 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7953 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7954 "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" },
7956 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7957 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7958 "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" }
7961 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7962 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7963 "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", {
7966 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7967 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7968 "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" },
7970 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7971 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7972 "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" },
7974 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7975 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7976 "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" }
7981 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7982 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7984 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7985 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7986 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7987 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7989 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7990 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7991 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7993 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7994 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7996 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7997 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7999 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8000 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8001 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8005 fn test_key_derivation() {
8006 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8007 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8009 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8010 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8012 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8013 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8015 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8016 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8018 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8019 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8021 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8022 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8024 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8025 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8027 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8028 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8032 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8033 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8034 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8035 let seed = [42; 32];
8036 let network = Network::Testnet;
8037 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8038 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8040 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8041 let config = UserConfig::default();
8042 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8043 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8045 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8046 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8048 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8049 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8050 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8051 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8052 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8053 assert!(res.is_ok());