1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
743 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
744 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
746 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
747 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
748 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
752 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
754 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
755 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
756 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
757 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
761 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
765 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
767 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
768 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
769 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
770 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
771 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
773 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
774 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
776 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
778 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
779 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
781 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
782 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
783 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
784 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
785 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
786 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
788 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
789 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
791 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
792 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
793 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
794 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
795 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
797 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
798 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
800 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
801 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
803 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
804 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
805 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
806 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
812 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
813 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
815 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
816 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
817 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
822 macro_rules! secp_check {
823 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
826 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
831 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
832 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
833 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
834 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
836 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
839 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
840 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
842 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
845 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
847 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
850 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
851 /// required by us according to the configured or default
852 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
854 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
856 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
857 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
858 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
859 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
860 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
863 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
864 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
865 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
866 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
867 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
868 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
869 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
872 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
873 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
876 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
877 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
878 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
879 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
880 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
881 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
882 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
883 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
888 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
889 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
890 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
891 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
892 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
893 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
894 // We've exhausted our options
897 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
898 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
902 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
903 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
904 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
905 outbound_scid_alias: u64
906 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
907 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
908 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
910 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
912 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
913 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
914 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
916 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
919 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
922 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
923 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
926 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
927 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
929 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
930 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
931 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
932 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
936 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
938 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
939 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
940 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
941 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
944 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
945 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
947 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
948 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
951 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
952 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
953 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
960 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
961 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
962 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
963 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
968 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
970 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
971 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
972 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
974 channel_value_satoshis,
976 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
979 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
980 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
982 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
983 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
986 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
987 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
988 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
989 pending_update_fee: None,
990 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
991 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
992 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
993 update_time_counter: 1,
995 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
997 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
998 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
999 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1000 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1001 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1002 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1005 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1006 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1007 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1009 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1010 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1011 closing_fee_limits: None,
1012 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1014 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1016 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1017 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1018 short_channel_id: None,
1019 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1021 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1022 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1023 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1024 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1025 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1026 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1027 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1028 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1029 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1030 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1031 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1033 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1035 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1036 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1037 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1038 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1039 counterparty_parameters: None,
1040 funding_outpoint: None,
1041 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1042 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1044 funding_transaction: None,
1046 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1048 counterparty_node_id,
1050 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1052 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1054 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1055 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1057 announcement_sigs: None,
1059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1060 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1062 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1064 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1066 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1067 outbound_scid_alias,
1069 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1072 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1074 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1078 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1079 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1080 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1082 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1083 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1084 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1085 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1086 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1087 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1088 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1091 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1092 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1093 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1094 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1095 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1096 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1097 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1098 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1100 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1101 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1110 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1111 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1112 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1113 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1114 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1115 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1116 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1117 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1121 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1122 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1124 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1125 // support this channel type.
1126 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1127 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1131 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1135 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1136 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1137 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1138 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1139 // publicly announced.
1140 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1141 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1145 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1149 channel_type.clone()
1151 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1153 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1157 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1158 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1159 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1160 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1161 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1162 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1163 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1164 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1167 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1171 // Check sanity of message fields:
1172 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1175 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1178 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1181 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1182 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1185 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1188 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1191 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1193 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1194 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1197 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1200 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1204 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1205 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1208 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1211 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1214 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1220 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1227 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1229 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1230 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1235 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1236 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1237 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1238 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1241 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1244 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1245 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1246 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1248 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1252 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1253 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1254 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1255 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1256 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1260 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1261 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1262 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1263 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1267 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1268 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1269 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1270 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1271 if script.len() == 0 {
1274 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1277 Some(script.clone())
1280 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1281 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1287 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1288 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1291 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1292 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1297 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1298 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1300 let chan = Channel {
1303 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1304 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1306 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1311 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1313 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1314 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1315 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1318 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1321 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1322 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1324 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1325 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1326 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1328 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1330 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1331 pending_update_fee: None,
1332 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1333 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1334 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1335 update_time_counter: 1,
1337 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1339 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1340 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1341 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1342 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1343 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1344 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1346 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1347 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1348 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1349 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1351 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1352 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1353 closing_fee_limits: None,
1354 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1356 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1358 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1359 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1360 short_channel_id: None,
1361 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1363 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1364 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1365 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1366 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1367 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1368 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1369 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1370 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1371 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1372 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1373 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1374 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1376 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1378 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1379 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1380 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1381 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1382 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1383 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1384 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1386 funding_outpoint: None,
1387 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1388 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1390 funding_transaction: None,
1392 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1393 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1394 counterparty_node_id,
1396 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1398 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1400 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1401 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1403 announcement_sigs: None,
1405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1406 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1407 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1408 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1410 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1412 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1413 outbound_scid_alias,
1415 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1417 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1418 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1426 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1427 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1428 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1429 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1430 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1432 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1433 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1434 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1435 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1436 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1437 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1438 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1440 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1441 where L::Target: Logger
1443 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1444 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1445 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1447 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1448 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1449 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1450 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1452 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1453 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1454 if match update_state {
1455 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1456 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1457 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1458 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1459 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1461 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1465 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1466 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1467 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1468 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1470 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1471 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1472 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1474 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1475 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1476 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1477 transaction_output_index: None
1482 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1483 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1484 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1485 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1486 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1489 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1491 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1492 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1493 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1495 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1496 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1499 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1500 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1503 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1505 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1506 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1507 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1509 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1510 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1516 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1517 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1518 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1519 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1520 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1521 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1522 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1526 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1527 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1529 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1531 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1532 if generated_by_local {
1533 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1534 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1543 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1545 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1546 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1547 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1548 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1549 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1550 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1551 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1554 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1555 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1561 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1562 preimages.push(preimage);
1566 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1567 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1571 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1572 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1574 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1575 if !generated_by_local {
1576 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1584 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1585 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1586 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1587 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1588 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1589 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1590 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1591 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1593 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1595 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1596 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1597 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1598 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1600 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1602 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1603 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1604 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1605 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1608 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1609 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1610 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1611 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1613 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1616 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1617 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1618 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1619 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1621 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1624 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1625 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1630 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1631 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1636 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1638 let channel_parameters =
1639 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1640 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1641 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1644 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1649 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1652 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1653 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1654 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1655 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1657 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1658 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1659 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1667 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1668 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1674 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1675 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1676 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1677 // outside of those situations will fail.
1678 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1682 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1687 1 + // script length (0)
1691 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1692 2 + // witness marker and flag
1693 1 + // witness element count
1694 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1695 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1696 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1697 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1698 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1699 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1701 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1702 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1703 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1709 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1710 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1711 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1712 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1714 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1715 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1716 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1718 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1719 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1720 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1721 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1722 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1723 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1726 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1727 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1730 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1731 value_to_holder = 0;
1734 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1735 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1736 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1737 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1739 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1740 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1743 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1744 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1748 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1749 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1750 /// our counterparty!)
1751 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1752 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1753 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1754 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1755 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1756 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1757 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1759 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1763 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1764 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1765 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1766 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1767 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1768 //may see payments to it!
1769 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1770 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1771 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1773 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1776 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1777 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1778 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1779 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1780 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1783 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1786 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1787 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1789 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1791 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1792 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1793 where L::Target: Logger {
1794 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1795 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1796 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1797 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1798 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1799 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1800 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1801 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1805 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1806 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1807 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1808 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1810 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1811 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1813 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1815 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1817 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1818 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1819 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1821 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1822 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1823 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1824 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1825 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1827 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1828 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1829 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1831 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1832 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1834 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1837 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1838 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1842 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1846 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1847 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1848 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1849 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1850 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1851 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1854 // Now update local state:
1856 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1857 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1858 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1859 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1860 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1861 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1862 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1866 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1867 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1868 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1869 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1870 // do not not get into this branch.
1871 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1872 match pending_update {
1873 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1874 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1875 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1876 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1877 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1878 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1879 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1882 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1883 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1884 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1885 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1886 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1887 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1888 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1894 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1895 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1896 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1899 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1900 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1903 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1906 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1907 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1909 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1910 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1912 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1913 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1916 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1919 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1920 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1921 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1922 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1927 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1928 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1929 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1930 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1931 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1934 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1935 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1936 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1937 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1938 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1940 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1941 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1942 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1946 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1947 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1948 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1949 /// before we fail backwards.
1950 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1951 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1952 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1953 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1954 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1956 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1958 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1959 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1960 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1962 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1963 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1964 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1966 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1967 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1968 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1970 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1975 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1976 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1982 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1983 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1984 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1985 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1986 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1990 // Now update local state:
1991 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1992 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1993 match pending_update {
1994 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1995 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1996 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1997 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2001 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2002 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2003 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2004 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2010 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2011 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2012 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2018 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2020 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2021 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2024 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2025 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2026 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2031 // Message handlers:
2033 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2034 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2036 // Check sanity of message fields:
2037 if !self.is_outbound() {
2038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2040 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2043 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2046 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2049 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2052 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2054 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2056 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2057 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2060 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2061 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2064 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2067 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2071 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2072 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2075 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2078 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2081 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2084 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2087 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2090 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2094 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2095 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2098 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2099 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2101 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2104 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2105 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2106 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2107 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2108 if script.len() == 0 {
2111 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2114 Some(script.clone())
2117 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2118 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2124 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2125 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2126 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2127 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2128 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2130 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2131 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2133 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2136 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2137 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2138 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2139 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2140 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2141 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2144 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2145 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2146 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2149 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2150 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2152 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2153 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2158 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2159 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2161 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2162 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2164 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2165 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2166 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2167 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2168 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2169 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2170 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2171 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2172 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2175 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2176 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2178 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2179 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2180 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2181 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2183 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2184 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2186 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2187 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2190 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2191 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2194 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2195 if self.is_outbound() {
2196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2198 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2199 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2200 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2204 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2207 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2208 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2209 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2210 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2213 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2214 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2215 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2216 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2217 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2219 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2221 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2222 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2226 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2227 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2228 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2232 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2233 initial_commitment_tx,
2236 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2237 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2240 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2241 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2243 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2245 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2246 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2247 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2248 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2249 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2250 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2251 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2252 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2253 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2255 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2257 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2259 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2260 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2261 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2262 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2264 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2266 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2267 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2269 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2272 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2273 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2274 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2275 if !self.is_outbound() {
2276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2278 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2281 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2282 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2283 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2284 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2287 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2289 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2290 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2291 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2292 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2294 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2295 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2297 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2298 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2300 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2301 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2302 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2303 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2304 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2309 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2310 initial_commitment_tx,
2313 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2314 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2317 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2318 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2321 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2322 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2323 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2324 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2325 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2326 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2327 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2328 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2329 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2330 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2332 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2334 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2336 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2337 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2338 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2339 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2341 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2343 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2346 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2347 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2349 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2350 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2351 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2352 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2355 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2356 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2357 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2358 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2359 // when routing outbound payments.
2360 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2364 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2366 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2367 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2368 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2369 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2370 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2371 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2372 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2373 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2374 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2376 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2377 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2378 let expected_point =
2379 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2380 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2382 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2384 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2385 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2386 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2387 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2388 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2390 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2398 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2399 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2401 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2403 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2406 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2407 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2408 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2409 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2415 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2416 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2417 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2418 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2419 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2420 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2421 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2422 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2423 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2426 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2429 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2430 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2431 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2433 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2434 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2435 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2436 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2437 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2438 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2440 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2441 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2447 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2448 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2449 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2450 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2451 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2452 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2453 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2454 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2455 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2458 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2461 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2462 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2463 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2465 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2466 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2467 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2468 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2469 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2470 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2472 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2473 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2477 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2478 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2479 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2480 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2481 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2482 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2483 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2485 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2486 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2488 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2495 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2496 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2497 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2498 /// corner case properly.
2499 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2500 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2501 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2503 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2504 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2505 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2506 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2509 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2511 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2512 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2513 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2516 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2517 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2518 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2519 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2521 outbound_capacity_msat,
2522 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2523 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2524 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2530 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2531 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2534 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2535 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2536 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2537 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2538 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2539 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2542 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2543 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2545 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2546 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2549 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2550 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2551 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2553 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2554 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2556 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2559 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2560 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2562 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2563 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2565 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2566 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2568 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2569 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2573 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2574 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2580 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2581 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2582 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2585 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2586 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2587 included_htlcs += 1;
2590 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2591 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2595 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2596 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2597 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2598 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2599 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2600 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2605 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2607 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2608 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2613 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2614 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2618 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2619 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2620 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2623 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2624 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2626 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2627 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2628 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2630 total_pending_htlcs,
2631 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2632 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2633 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2635 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2636 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2637 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2639 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2641 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2646 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2647 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2648 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2650 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2651 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2653 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2656 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2657 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2659 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2660 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2662 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2663 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2665 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2666 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2670 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2671 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2677 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2678 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2679 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2680 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2681 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2682 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2685 included_htlcs += 1;
2688 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2689 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2692 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2693 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2697 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2702 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2703 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2707 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2708 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2710 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2711 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2713 total_pending_htlcs,
2714 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2715 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2716 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2718 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2719 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2720 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2722 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2724 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2729 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2730 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2731 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2732 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2733 if local_sent_shutdown {
2734 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2736 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2737 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2738 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2741 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2744 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2747 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2750 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2754 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2755 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2756 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2759 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2762 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2763 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2764 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2765 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2766 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2767 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2768 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2769 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2770 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2771 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2772 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2774 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2775 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2776 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2777 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2778 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2779 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2783 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2786 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2787 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2788 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2790 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2791 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2792 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2793 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2794 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2795 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2796 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2800 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2801 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2802 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2803 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2804 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2805 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2806 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2810 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2811 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2812 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2813 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2814 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2818 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2819 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2820 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2821 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2822 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2824 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2828 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2832 if !self.is_outbound() {
2833 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2834 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2835 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2836 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2837 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2838 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2839 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2840 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2841 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2842 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2843 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2844 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2845 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2846 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2847 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2850 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2851 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2852 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2853 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2857 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2860 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2864 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2865 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2866 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2870 // Now update local state:
2871 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2872 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2873 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2874 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2875 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2876 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2877 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2882 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2884 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2885 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2886 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2887 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2888 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2889 None => fail_reason.into(),
2890 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2891 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2892 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2893 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2895 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2899 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2901 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2902 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2904 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2910 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2913 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2914 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2917 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2921 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2924 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2925 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2932 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2936 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2937 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2944 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2948 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2949 where L::Target: Logger
2951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2952 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2954 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2955 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2957 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2958 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2961 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2963 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2965 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2966 let commitment_txid = {
2967 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2968 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2969 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2971 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2972 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2973 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2974 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2975 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2976 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2980 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2982 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2983 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2984 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2985 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2988 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2989 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2990 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2991 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2994 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2996 if self.is_outbound() {
2997 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2998 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2999 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3000 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3001 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3002 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3003 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3004 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3005 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3006 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3012 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3013 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3016 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3017 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3018 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3019 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3020 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3021 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3022 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3024 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3025 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3026 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3027 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3028 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3029 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3030 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3031 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3033 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3035 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3039 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3040 commitment_stats.tx,
3042 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3043 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3044 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3047 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3048 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3049 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3050 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3052 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3053 let mut need_commitment = false;
3054 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3055 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3056 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3057 need_commitment = true;
3061 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3062 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3063 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3064 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3065 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3066 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3070 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3071 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3072 Some(forward_info.clone())
3074 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3075 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3076 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3077 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3078 need_commitment = true;
3081 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3082 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3083 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3084 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3085 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3086 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3087 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3088 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3089 need_commitment = true;
3093 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3094 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3095 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3096 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3098 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3099 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3100 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3101 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3102 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3103 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3104 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3105 // includes the right HTLCs.
3106 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3107 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3108 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3109 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3110 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3111 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3113 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3114 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3115 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3118 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3119 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3120 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3121 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3122 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3123 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3124 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3125 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3126 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3130 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3131 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3133 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3134 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3135 per_commitment_secret,
3136 next_per_commitment_point,
3137 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3140 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3141 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3142 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3143 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3144 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3145 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3146 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3147 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3150 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3151 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3152 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3153 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3154 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3155 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3156 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3158 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3159 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3160 updates: Vec::new(),
3163 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3164 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3165 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3166 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3167 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3168 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3169 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3170 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3171 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3172 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3173 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3174 // to rebalance channels.
3175 match &htlc_update {
3176 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3177 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3178 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3181 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3182 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3183 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3184 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3185 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3186 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3187 // into the holding cell without ever being
3188 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3189 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3190 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3193 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3199 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3200 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3201 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3202 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3203 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3204 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3205 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3206 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3207 (msg, monitor_update)
3208 } else { unreachable!() };
3209 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3210 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3213 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3214 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3215 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3216 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3217 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3218 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3219 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3220 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3223 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3225 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3232 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3233 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3235 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3236 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3241 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3242 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3243 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3244 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3245 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3247 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3248 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3249 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3251 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3253 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3255 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3258 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3260 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3264 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3265 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3266 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3267 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3268 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3269 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3270 where L::Target: Logger,
3272 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3275 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3278 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3282 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3284 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3285 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3290 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3291 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3292 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3293 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3294 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3295 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3296 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3297 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3301 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3303 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3304 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3307 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3308 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3310 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3312 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3314 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3315 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3316 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3317 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3318 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3319 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3323 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3324 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3325 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3326 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3327 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3328 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3329 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3330 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3332 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3333 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3336 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3337 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3338 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3339 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3340 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3341 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3342 let mut require_commitment = false;
3343 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3346 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3347 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3348 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3350 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3351 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3352 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3353 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3354 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3355 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3360 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3361 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3362 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3363 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3364 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3366 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3367 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3368 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3373 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3374 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3376 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3380 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3381 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3383 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3384 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3385 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3386 require_commitment = true;
3387 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3388 match forward_info {
3389 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3390 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3391 require_commitment = true;
3393 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3394 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3395 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3397 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3398 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3399 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3403 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3404 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3405 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3406 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3412 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3413 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3414 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3415 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3417 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3418 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3419 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3420 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3421 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3422 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3423 require_commitment = true;
3427 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3429 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3430 match update_state {
3431 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3432 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3433 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3434 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3435 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3437 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3438 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3439 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3440 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3441 require_commitment = true;
3442 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3443 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3448 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3449 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3450 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3451 if require_commitment {
3452 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3453 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3454 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3455 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3456 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3457 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3458 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3459 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3460 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3462 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3463 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3464 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3465 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3466 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3467 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3468 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3470 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3474 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3475 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3476 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3477 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3478 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3480 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3481 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3482 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3485 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3486 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3487 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3488 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3491 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3492 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3493 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3494 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3496 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3499 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3500 if require_commitment {
3501 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3503 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3504 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3505 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3506 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3508 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3509 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3511 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3512 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3513 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3515 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3519 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3520 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3521 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3524 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3526 commitment_update: None,
3527 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3528 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3529 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3536 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3537 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3538 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3539 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3540 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3541 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3542 if !self.is_outbound() {
3543 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3545 if !self.is_usable() {
3546 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3548 if !self.is_live() {
3549 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3552 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3553 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3554 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3555 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3556 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3557 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3558 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3559 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3560 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3561 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3565 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3566 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3567 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3568 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3569 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3572 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3573 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3577 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3578 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3582 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3583 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3585 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3586 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3591 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3592 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3593 Some(update_fee) => {
3594 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3595 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3601 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3602 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3604 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3606 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3607 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3608 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3609 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3613 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3614 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3615 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3619 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3620 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3623 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3624 // will be retransmitted.
3625 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3626 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3627 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3629 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3630 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3632 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3633 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3634 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3635 // this HTLC accordingly
3636 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3639 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3640 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3641 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3642 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3645 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3646 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3647 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3648 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3649 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3650 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3655 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3657 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3658 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3659 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3660 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3664 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3665 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3666 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3667 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3668 // the update upon reconnection.
3669 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3673 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3674 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3677 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3678 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3679 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3680 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3681 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3682 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3684 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3685 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3686 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3687 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3688 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3689 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3691 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3692 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3693 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3694 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3695 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3696 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3697 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3700 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3701 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3702 /// to the remote side.
3703 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3704 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3705 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3707 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3708 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3709 // first received the funding_signed.
3710 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3711 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3712 self.funding_transaction.take()
3714 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3715 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3716 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3717 funding_broadcastable = None;
3720 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3721 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3722 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3723 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3724 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3725 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3726 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3727 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3728 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3729 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3730 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3731 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3732 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3733 next_per_commitment_point,
3734 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3738 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3740 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3741 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3742 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3743 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3744 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3745 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3747 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3748 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3749 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3750 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3751 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3752 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3756 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3757 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3759 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3760 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3763 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3764 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3765 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3766 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3767 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3768 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3769 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3770 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3771 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3775 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3776 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3778 if self.is_outbound() {
3779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3781 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3784 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3785 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3787 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3788 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3789 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3790 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3791 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3792 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3793 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3794 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3795 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3796 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3797 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3798 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3799 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3801 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3803 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3809 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3810 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3811 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3812 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3813 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3814 per_commitment_secret,
3815 next_per_commitment_point,
3819 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3820 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3823 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3825 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3826 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3827 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3828 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3829 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3830 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3831 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3832 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3833 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3838 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3839 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3841 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3842 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3843 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3844 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3845 reason: err_packet.clone()
3848 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3849 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3850 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3851 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3852 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3853 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3856 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3857 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3858 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3859 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3860 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3867 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3868 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3869 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3870 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3874 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3875 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3876 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3877 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3878 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3879 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3883 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3884 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3886 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3887 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3888 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3889 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3890 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3891 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3892 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3893 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3894 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3895 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3896 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3900 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3901 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3905 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3906 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3907 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3908 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3909 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3910 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3911 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3914 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3915 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3916 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3917 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3918 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3921 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3922 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3923 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3924 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3925 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3926 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3927 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3928 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3931 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3935 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3936 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3937 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3938 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3940 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3944 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3945 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3946 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3948 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3949 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3950 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3951 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3952 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3956 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3958 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3959 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3961 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3962 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3965 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3966 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3967 channel_ready: None,
3968 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3969 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3970 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3974 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3975 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3976 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3977 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3978 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3979 next_per_commitment_point,
3980 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3982 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3983 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3984 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3988 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3989 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3990 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3992 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3994 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3997 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4003 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4004 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4005 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4006 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4007 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4009 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4010 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4011 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4012 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4013 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4014 next_per_commitment_point,
4015 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4019 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4020 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4021 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4023 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4026 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4027 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4028 raa: required_revoke,
4029 commitment_update: None,
4030 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4032 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4033 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4034 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4036 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4039 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4040 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4041 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4042 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4043 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4044 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4047 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4048 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4049 raa: required_revoke,
4050 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4051 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4055 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4059 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4060 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4061 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4062 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4064 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4066 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4068 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4069 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4070 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4071 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4072 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4073 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4075 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4076 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4077 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4078 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4079 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4081 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4082 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4083 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4084 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4087 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4088 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4089 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4090 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4091 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4092 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4093 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4094 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4095 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4096 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4097 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4098 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4099 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4100 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4101 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4103 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4106 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4107 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4110 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4111 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4112 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4113 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4114 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4115 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4116 self.channel_state &
4117 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4118 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4119 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4120 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4123 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4124 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4125 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4126 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4127 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4128 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4131 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4137 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4138 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4139 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4140 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4142 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4143 return Ok((None, None));
4146 if !self.is_outbound() {
4147 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4148 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4150 return Ok((None, None));
4153 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4155 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4156 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4157 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4158 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4160 let sig = self.holder_signer
4161 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4162 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4164 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4165 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4166 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4167 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4169 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4170 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4171 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4176 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4177 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4178 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4179 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4181 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4184 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4185 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4186 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4187 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4190 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4191 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4195 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4197 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4201 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4202 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4206 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4209 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4210 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4211 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4212 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4214 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4217 assert!(send_shutdown);
4218 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4219 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4222 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4227 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4229 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4230 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4232 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4233 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4234 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4235 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4236 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4237 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4241 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4242 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4243 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4244 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4248 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4249 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4250 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4251 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4252 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4253 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4255 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4256 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4263 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4264 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4266 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4269 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4270 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4272 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4274 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4275 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4276 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4277 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4278 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4279 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4280 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4281 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4282 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4284 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4285 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4288 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4292 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4293 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4294 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4295 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4297 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4300 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4303 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4306 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4310 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4314 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4315 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4316 return Ok((None, None));
4319 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4320 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4321 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4324 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4326 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4329 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4330 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4331 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4332 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4333 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4337 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4338 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4343 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4344 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4345 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4346 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4347 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4348 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4349 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4353 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4355 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4356 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4357 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4358 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4360 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4363 let sig = self.holder_signer
4364 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4365 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4367 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4368 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4369 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4370 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4374 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4375 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4376 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4377 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4379 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4380 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4381 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4387 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4388 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4391 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4394 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4395 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4398 if !self.is_outbound() {
4399 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4400 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4401 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4402 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4404 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4406 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4408 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4409 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4412 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4413 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4414 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4415 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4416 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4417 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4418 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4419 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4424 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4425 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4426 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4427 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4433 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4434 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4435 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4436 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4438 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4444 // Public utilities:
4446 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4450 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4454 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4455 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4456 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4460 /// Gets the channel's type
4461 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4465 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4466 /// is_usable() returns true).
4467 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4468 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4469 self.short_channel_id
4472 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4473 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4474 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4477 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4478 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4479 self.outbound_scid_alias
4481 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4482 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4483 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4484 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4485 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4488 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4489 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4490 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4491 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4494 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4495 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4496 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4499 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4500 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4501 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4502 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4506 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4509 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4510 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4513 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4514 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4517 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4518 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4519 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4522 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4523 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4526 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4527 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4528 self.counterparty_node_id
4531 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4532 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4533 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4536 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4537 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4538 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4541 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4542 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4544 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4545 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4546 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4547 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4549 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4553 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4554 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4555 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4558 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4559 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4560 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4563 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4564 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4565 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4567 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4568 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4573 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4574 self.channel_value_satoshis
4577 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4578 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4581 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4582 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4585 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4586 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4589 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4590 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4591 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4594 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4595 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4596 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4599 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4600 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4601 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4604 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4605 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4606 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4607 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4608 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4611 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4613 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4614 self.prev_config = None;
4618 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4619 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4623 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4624 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4625 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4626 let did_channel_update =
4627 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4628 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4629 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4630 if did_channel_update {
4631 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4632 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4633 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4634 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4636 self.config.options = *config;
4640 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4641 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4642 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4643 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4644 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4645 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4646 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4648 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4649 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4652 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4654 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4655 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4661 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4662 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4663 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4664 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4665 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4666 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4667 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4669 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4670 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4677 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4681 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4682 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4683 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4684 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4685 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4686 // which are near the dust limit.
4687 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4688 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4689 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4690 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4691 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4693 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4694 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4696 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4699 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4700 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4703 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4704 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4707 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4708 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4712 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4717 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4719 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4720 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4721 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4722 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4723 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4724 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4726 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4728 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4736 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4737 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4741 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4742 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4743 self.update_time_counter
4746 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4747 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4750 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4751 self.config.announced_channel
4754 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4755 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4758 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4759 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4760 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4761 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4764 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4765 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4766 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4769 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4770 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4771 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4772 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4773 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4776 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4777 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4778 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4779 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4780 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4783 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4784 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4785 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4786 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4789 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4790 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4791 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4794 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4795 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4796 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4798 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4799 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4800 if self.channel_state &
4801 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4802 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4803 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4804 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4805 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4808 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4809 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4810 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4811 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4812 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4813 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4815 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4816 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4817 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4819 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4820 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4821 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4822 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4823 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4824 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4830 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4831 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4832 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4835 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4836 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4837 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4840 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4841 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4842 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4845 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4846 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4847 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4848 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4849 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4850 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4855 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4856 self.channel_update_status
4859 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4860 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4861 self.channel_update_status = status;
4864 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4866 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4867 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4868 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4872 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4873 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4874 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4877 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4881 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4882 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4883 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4885 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4886 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4887 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4889 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4890 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4893 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4894 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4895 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4896 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4897 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4898 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4899 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4900 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4901 self.channel_state);
4903 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4907 if need_commitment_update {
4908 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4909 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4910 let next_per_commitment_point =
4911 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4912 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4913 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4914 next_per_commitment_point,
4915 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4919 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4925 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4926 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4927 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4928 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4929 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4930 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4931 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4932 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4933 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4934 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4935 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4936 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4937 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4938 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4939 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4940 if self.is_outbound() {
4941 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4942 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4943 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4944 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4945 // channel and move on.
4946 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4947 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4949 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4950 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4951 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4953 if self.is_outbound() {
4954 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4955 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4956 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4957 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4958 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4959 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4963 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4964 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4965 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4966 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4967 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4971 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4972 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4973 // may have already happened for this block).
4974 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4975 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4976 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4977 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4980 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4981 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4982 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4983 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4991 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4992 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4993 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4994 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4996 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4997 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5000 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5002 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5003 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5004 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5007 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5008 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5009 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5010 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5011 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5013 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5014 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5016 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5017 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5018 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5026 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5028 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5029 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5030 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5032 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5033 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5036 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5037 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5038 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5039 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5040 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5041 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5042 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5043 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5044 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5047 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5048 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5049 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5050 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5052 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5053 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5054 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5056 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5057 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5058 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5059 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5061 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5062 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5063 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5064 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5065 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5066 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5067 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5070 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5071 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5073 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5076 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5077 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5078 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5079 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5080 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5081 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5082 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5083 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5084 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5085 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5086 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5087 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5088 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5089 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5090 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5091 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5092 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5098 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5103 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5104 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5106 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5107 if !self.is_outbound() {
5108 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5110 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5111 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5114 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5115 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5118 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5119 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5123 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5124 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5125 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5126 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5127 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5128 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5129 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5130 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5131 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5132 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5133 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5134 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5135 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5136 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5137 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5138 first_per_commitment_point,
5139 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5140 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5141 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5142 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5144 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5148 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5149 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5152 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5153 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5154 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5155 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5158 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5159 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5161 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5162 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5163 if self.is_outbound() {
5164 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5166 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5167 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5169 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5170 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5172 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5173 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5176 self.user_id = user_id;
5177 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5179 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5182 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5183 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5184 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5186 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5187 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5188 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5189 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5191 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5192 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5193 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5194 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5195 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5196 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5197 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5198 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5199 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5200 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5201 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5202 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5203 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5204 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5205 first_per_commitment_point,
5206 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5207 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5208 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5210 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5214 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5215 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5217 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5219 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5220 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5223 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5224 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5225 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5226 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5227 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5228 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5231 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5232 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5233 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5234 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5235 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5236 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5237 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5238 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5239 if !self.is_outbound() {
5240 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5242 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5243 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5245 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5246 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5247 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5248 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5251 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5252 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5254 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5257 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5263 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5265 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5267 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5268 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5269 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5271 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5272 temporary_channel_id,
5273 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5274 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5279 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5280 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5281 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5282 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5284 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5287 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5288 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5289 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5290 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5292 if !self.is_usable() {
5293 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5296 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5298 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5299 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5301 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5302 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5303 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5304 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5305 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5306 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5312 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5313 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5314 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5318 if !self.is_usable() {
5322 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5323 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5327 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5331 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5332 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5335 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5339 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5341 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5346 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5348 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5349 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5350 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5351 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5352 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5356 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5358 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5359 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5360 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5362 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5363 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5364 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5365 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5366 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5367 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5368 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5369 contents: announcement,
5372 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5376 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5377 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5378 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5379 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5380 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5382 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5384 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5385 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5386 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5387 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5389 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5390 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5391 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5392 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5395 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5396 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5397 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5398 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5401 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5404 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5405 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5406 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5407 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5410 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5412 Err(_) => return None,
5414 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5415 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5420 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5421 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5422 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5423 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5424 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5425 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5426 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5427 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5428 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5429 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5430 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5431 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5432 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5433 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5434 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5435 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5436 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5437 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5438 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5441 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5442 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5443 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5444 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5447 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5448 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5449 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5450 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5451 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5452 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5453 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5454 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5456 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5457 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5458 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5459 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5460 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5461 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5462 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5463 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5464 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5466 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5472 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5474 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5475 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5477 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5479 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5480 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5482 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5483 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5484 /// regenerate them.
5486 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5488 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5489 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5490 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5491 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5493 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5494 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5495 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5498 if amount_msat == 0 {
5499 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5502 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5503 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5506 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5507 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5508 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5509 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5510 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5511 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5512 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5516 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5517 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5518 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5519 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5521 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5522 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5526 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5527 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5528 if !self.is_outbound() {
5529 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5530 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5531 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5532 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5533 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5534 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5538 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5541 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5542 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5543 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5545 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5546 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5547 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5548 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5549 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5550 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5554 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5555 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5556 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5557 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5558 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5559 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5563 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5564 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5565 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5568 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5569 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5570 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5571 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5573 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5574 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5577 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5578 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5579 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5580 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5581 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5584 // Now update local state:
5585 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5586 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5591 onion_routing_packet,
5596 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5597 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5599 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5601 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5605 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5606 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5607 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5611 onion_routing_packet,
5613 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5618 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5619 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5620 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5621 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5622 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5623 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5624 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5626 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5627 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5629 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5630 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5632 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5633 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5635 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5636 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5637 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5638 have_updates = true;
5640 if have_updates { break; }
5642 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5643 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5644 have_updates = true;
5646 if have_updates { break; }
5649 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5651 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5653 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5654 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5655 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5656 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5657 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5659 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5660 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5661 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5663 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5664 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5668 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5669 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5670 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5671 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5672 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5673 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5674 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5677 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5678 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5679 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5680 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5681 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5682 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5685 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5687 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5688 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5689 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5690 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5691 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5692 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5694 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5697 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5698 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5701 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5702 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5703 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5704 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5705 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5706 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5707 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5708 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5711 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5712 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5715 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5716 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5717 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5718 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5719 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5720 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5721 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5723 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5725 if !self.is_outbound() {
5726 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5727 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5728 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5729 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5730 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5731 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5732 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5733 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5734 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5735 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5742 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5743 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5747 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5748 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5750 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5752 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5753 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5754 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5755 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5757 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5758 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5759 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5760 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5761 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5762 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5766 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5767 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5770 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5773 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5774 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5775 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5777 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5778 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5779 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5780 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5781 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5787 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5788 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5789 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5792 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5793 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5796 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5797 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5798 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5799 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5805 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5806 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5807 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5808 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5809 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5810 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5811 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5812 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5815 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5816 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5817 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5819 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5820 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5823 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5824 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5825 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5828 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5831 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5832 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5833 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5835 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5840 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5841 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5842 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5843 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5845 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5847 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5849 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5850 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5851 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5852 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5853 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5854 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5858 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5859 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5860 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5863 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5864 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5865 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5866 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5867 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5869 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5870 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5877 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5880 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5881 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5882 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5883 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5884 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5885 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5886 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5887 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5888 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5889 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5890 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5892 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5893 // return them to fail the payment.
5894 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5895 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5896 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5898 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5899 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5904 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5905 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5906 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5907 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5908 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5909 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5910 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5911 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5913 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5914 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5915 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5916 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5921 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5922 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5923 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5926 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&HTLCSource> {
5927 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5928 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5930 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, .. } => { Some(source) }
5934 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| &htlc.source))
5938 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5939 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5941 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5947 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5948 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5949 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5950 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5951 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5953 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5954 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5955 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5956 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5962 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5963 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5964 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5965 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5966 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5967 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5972 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5974 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5975 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5977 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5978 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5979 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5980 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5985 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5986 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5987 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5988 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5989 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5990 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5995 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5996 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5997 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6000 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6002 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6003 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6004 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6005 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6006 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6008 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6009 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6010 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6011 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6013 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6014 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6015 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6017 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6019 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6020 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6021 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6022 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6023 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6024 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6026 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6027 // deserialized from that format.
6028 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6029 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6030 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6032 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6034 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6035 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6036 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6038 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6039 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6040 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6041 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6044 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6045 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6046 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6049 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6050 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6051 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6052 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6054 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6055 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6057 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6059 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6061 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6063 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6066 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6068 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6073 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6075 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6076 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6077 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6078 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6079 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6080 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6081 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6083 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6085 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6087 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6090 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6091 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6092 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6095 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6097 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6098 preimages.push(preimage);
6100 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6101 reason.write(writer)?;
6103 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6105 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6106 preimages.push(preimage);
6108 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6109 reason.write(writer)?;
6114 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6115 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6117 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6119 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6120 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6121 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6122 source.write(writer)?;
6123 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6125 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6127 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6128 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6130 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6132 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6133 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6138 match self.resend_order {
6139 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6140 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6143 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6144 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6145 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6147 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6148 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6149 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6150 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6153 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6154 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6155 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6156 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6157 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6160 if self.is_outbound() {
6161 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6162 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6163 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6165 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6166 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6167 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6169 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6171 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6172 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6173 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6174 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6176 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6177 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6178 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6179 // consider the stale state on reload.
6182 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6183 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6184 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6186 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6187 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6188 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6190 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6191 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6193 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6194 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6195 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6197 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6198 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6200 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6203 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6204 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6205 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6207 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6210 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6211 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6213 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6214 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6215 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6217 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6219 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6221 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6224 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6226 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6227 htlc.write(writer)?;
6230 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6231 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6232 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6234 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6235 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6237 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6238 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6239 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6240 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6241 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6242 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6243 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6245 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6246 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6247 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6248 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6249 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6251 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6253 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6254 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6255 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6256 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6258 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6259 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6260 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6261 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6262 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6263 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6264 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6266 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6267 (2, chan_type, option),
6268 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6269 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6270 (5, self.config, required),
6271 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6272 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6273 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6274 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6275 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6276 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6277 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6278 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6279 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6280 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6281 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6288 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6289 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6290 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6291 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6292 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6293 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6295 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6296 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6297 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6298 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6300 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6302 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6303 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6304 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6309 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6313 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6314 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6316 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6318 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6319 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6320 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6321 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6322 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6323 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6324 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6325 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6327 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6329 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6330 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6331 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6334 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6336 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6337 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6338 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6340 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6341 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6342 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6343 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6344 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6345 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6346 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6347 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6348 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6349 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6350 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6351 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6352 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6353 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6358 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6359 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6360 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6361 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6362 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6363 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6364 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6365 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6366 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6367 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6368 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6369 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6371 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6372 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6375 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6376 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6379 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6380 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6382 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6387 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6389 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6390 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6391 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6392 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6393 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6394 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6395 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6396 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6398 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6399 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6400 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6402 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6403 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6404 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6406 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6410 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6411 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6412 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6413 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6416 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6417 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6418 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6420 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6421 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6422 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6423 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6426 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6428 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6429 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6432 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6434 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6436 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6438 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6442 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6443 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6444 // consider the stale state on reload.
6445 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6448 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6455 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6462 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6464 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6465 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6467 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6468 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6476 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6477 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6479 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6480 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6485 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6486 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6487 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6488 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6490 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6493 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6507 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6508 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6510 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6512 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6516 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6517 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6518 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6520 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6526 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6527 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6528 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6529 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6530 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6531 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6532 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6533 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6534 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6535 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6537 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6538 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6539 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6540 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6541 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6542 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6544 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6546 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6547 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6548 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6549 (2, channel_type, option),
6550 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6551 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6552 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6553 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6554 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6555 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6556 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6557 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6558 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6559 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6560 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6561 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6562 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6563 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6566 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6567 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6568 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6570 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6571 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6573 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6574 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6579 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6580 if iter.next().is_some() {
6581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6585 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6586 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6587 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6588 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6589 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6592 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6593 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6594 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6597 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6598 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6600 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6601 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6602 // separate u64 values.
6603 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6608 config: config.unwrap(),
6612 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6613 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6614 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6618 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6620 channel_value_satoshis,
6622 latest_monitor_update_id,
6625 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6628 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6629 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6632 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6633 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6634 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6638 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6639 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6640 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6641 monitor_pending_forwards,
6642 monitor_pending_failures,
6643 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6646 holding_cell_update_fee,
6647 next_holder_htlc_id,
6648 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6649 update_time_counter,
6652 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6653 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6654 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6655 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6657 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6658 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6659 closing_fee_limits: None,
6660 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6662 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6664 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6665 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6667 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6669 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6670 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6671 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6672 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6673 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6674 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6675 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6676 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6677 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6680 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6682 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6683 funding_transaction,
6685 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6686 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6687 counterparty_node_id,
6689 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6693 channel_update_status,
6694 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6699 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6700 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6701 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6703 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6705 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6706 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6707 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6709 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6711 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6712 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6714 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6722 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6723 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6724 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6725 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6726 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6728 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6729 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6730 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6731 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6732 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6733 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6734 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6735 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6736 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6737 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6738 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6739 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6740 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6741 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6742 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6743 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6744 use crate::util::test_utils;
6745 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6746 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6747 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6748 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6749 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6750 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6751 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6752 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6753 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6754 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6755 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6756 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6757 use crate::prelude::*;
6759 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6762 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6763 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6769 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6770 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6771 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6772 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6776 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6777 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6778 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6779 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6780 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6781 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6782 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6786 signer: InMemorySigner,
6788 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6789 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6791 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6792 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6793 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6794 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6795 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6796 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6797 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6798 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6801 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6803 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6804 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6807 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6810 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6811 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6812 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6815 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6816 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6817 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6821 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6822 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6823 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6824 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6826 let seed = [42; 32];
6827 let network = Network::Testnet;
6828 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6829 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6830 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6834 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6835 let config = UserConfig::default();
6836 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6837 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6838 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6840 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6841 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6845 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6846 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6848 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6849 let original_fee = 253;
6850 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6851 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6852 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6853 let seed = [42; 32];
6854 let network = Network::Testnet;
6855 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6857 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6858 let config = UserConfig::default();
6859 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6861 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6862 // same as the old fee.
6863 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6864 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6865 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6869 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6870 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6871 // dust limits are used.
6872 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6873 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6874 let seed = [42; 32];
6875 let network = Network::Testnet;
6876 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6877 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6879 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6880 // they have different dust limits.
6882 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6883 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6884 let config = UserConfig::default();
6885 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6887 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6888 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6889 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6890 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6891 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6893 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6894 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6895 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6896 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6897 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6899 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6900 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6901 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6903 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6904 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6905 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6906 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6909 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6911 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6912 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6913 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6914 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6915 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6917 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6918 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6919 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6920 payment_secret: None,
6921 payment_params: None,
6925 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6926 // the dust limit check.
6927 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6928 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6929 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6930 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6932 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6933 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6934 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6935 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6936 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6937 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6938 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6942 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6943 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6944 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6945 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6946 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6947 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6948 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6949 let seed = [42; 32];
6950 let network = Network::Testnet;
6951 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6953 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6954 let config = UserConfig::default();
6955 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6957 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6958 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6960 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6961 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6962 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6963 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6964 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6965 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6967 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6968 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6969 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6970 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6971 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6973 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6975 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6976 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6977 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6978 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6979 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6981 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6982 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6983 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6984 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6985 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6989 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6990 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6991 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6992 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6993 let seed = [42; 32];
6994 let network = Network::Testnet;
6995 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6996 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6997 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6999 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7001 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7002 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7003 let config = UserConfig::default();
7004 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7006 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7007 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7008 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7009 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7011 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7012 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7013 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7015 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7016 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7017 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7018 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7020 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7021 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7022 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7024 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7025 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7027 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7028 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7029 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7030 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7031 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7032 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7033 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7034 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7035 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7040 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7042 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7043 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7044 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7045 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7046 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7047 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7048 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7055 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7056 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7057 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7058 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7059 let seed = [42; 32];
7060 let network = Network::Testnet;
7061 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7062 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7063 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7065 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7066 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7067 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7068 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7069 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7070 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7071 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7072 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7074 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7075 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7076 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7077 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7078 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7079 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7081 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7082 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7083 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7084 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7086 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7088 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7089 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7090 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7091 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7092 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7093 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7095 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7096 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7097 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7098 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7100 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7101 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7102 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7103 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7104 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7106 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7107 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7109 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7110 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7111 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7113 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7114 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7115 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7116 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7117 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7119 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7120 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7122 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7123 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7124 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7128 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7130 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7131 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7132 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7134 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7135 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7136 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7137 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7139 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7140 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7141 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7143 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7145 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7146 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7149 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7150 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7151 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7153 let seed = [42; 32];
7154 let network = Network::Testnet;
7155 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7156 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7157 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7160 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7161 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7162 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7164 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7165 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7167 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7168 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7169 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7171 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7172 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7174 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7176 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7177 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7179 // Channel Negotiations failed
7180 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7181 assert!(result.is_err());
7186 fn channel_update() {
7187 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7188 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7189 let seed = [42; 32];
7190 let network = Network::Testnet;
7191 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7192 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7194 // Create a channel.
7195 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7196 let config = UserConfig::default();
7197 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7198 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7199 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7200 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7202 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7203 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7204 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7206 short_channel_id: 0,
7209 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7210 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7211 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7213 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7214 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7216 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7218 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7220 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7221 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7222 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7223 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7225 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7226 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7227 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7229 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7233 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7235 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7236 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7237 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7238 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7239 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7240 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7241 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7242 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7243 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7244 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7245 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7246 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7247 use crate::sync::Arc;
7249 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7250 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7251 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7252 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7254 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7256 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7257 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7258 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7259 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7260 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7261 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7263 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7264 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7269 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7270 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7271 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7273 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7274 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7275 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7276 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7277 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7278 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7280 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7282 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7283 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7284 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7285 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7286 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7287 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7289 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7290 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7291 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7292 selected_contest_delay: 144
7294 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7295 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7297 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7298 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7300 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7301 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7303 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7304 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7306 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7307 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7308 // build_commitment_transaction.
7309 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7310 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7311 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7312 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7313 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7315 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7316 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7317 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7318 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7322 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7323 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7324 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7325 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7329 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7330 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7331 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7333 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7334 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7336 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7337 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7339 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7341 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7342 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7343 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7344 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7345 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7346 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7347 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7349 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7350 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7351 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7352 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7354 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7355 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7356 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7358 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7360 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7361 commitment_tx.clone(),
7362 counterparty_signature,
7363 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7364 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7365 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7367 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7368 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7370 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7371 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7372 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7374 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7375 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7378 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7379 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7381 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7382 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7383 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7384 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7385 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7386 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7387 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7388 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7390 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7393 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7394 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7395 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7399 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7402 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7403 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7404 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7406 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7407 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7408 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7409 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7410 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7411 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7412 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7413 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7415 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7419 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7420 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7422 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7423 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7424 "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", {});
7426 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7427 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7428 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7429 "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", {});
7431 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7432 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7434 amount_msat: 1000000,
7436 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7437 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7439 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7442 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7443 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7445 amount_msat: 2000000,
7447 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7448 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7450 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7453 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7454 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7456 amount_msat: 2000000,
7458 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7459 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7460 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7462 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7465 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7466 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7468 amount_msat: 3000000,
7470 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7471 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7472 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7474 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7477 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7478 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7480 amount_msat: 4000000,
7482 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7483 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7485 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7489 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7490 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7491 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7493 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7494 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7495 "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", {
7498 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7499 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7500 "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" },
7503 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7504 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7505 "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" },
7508 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7509 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7510 "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" },
7513 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7514 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7515 "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" },
7518 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7519 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7520 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7523 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7524 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7525 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7527 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7528 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7529 "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", {
7532 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7533 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7534 "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" },
7537 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7538 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7539 "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" },
7542 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7543 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7544 "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" },
7547 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7548 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7549 "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" },
7552 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7553 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7554 "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" }
7557 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7558 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7559 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7561 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7562 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7563 "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", {
7566 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7567 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7568 "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" },
7571 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7572 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7573 "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" },
7576 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7577 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7578 "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" },
7581 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7582 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7583 "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" }
7586 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7587 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7588 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7589 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7591 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7592 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7593 "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", {
7596 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7597 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7598 "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" },
7601 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7602 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7603 "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" },
7606 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7607 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7608 "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" },
7611 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7612 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7613 "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" }
7616 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7617 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7618 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7619 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7621 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7622 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7623 "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", {
7626 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7627 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7628 "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" },
7631 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7632 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7633 "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" },
7636 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7637 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7638 "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" },
7641 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7642 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7643 "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" }
7646 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7647 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7648 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7650 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7651 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7652 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7655 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7656 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7657 "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" },
7660 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7661 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7662 "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" },
7665 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7666 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7667 "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" }
7670 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7671 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7672 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7674 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7675 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7676 "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", {
7679 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7680 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7681 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7684 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7685 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7686 "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" },
7689 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7690 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7691 "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" }
7694 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7695 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7696 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7698 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7699 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7700 "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", {
7703 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7704 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7705 "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" },
7708 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7709 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7710 "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" }
7713 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7714 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7715 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7716 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7718 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7719 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7720 "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", {
7723 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7724 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7725 "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" },
7728 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7729 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7730 "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" }
7733 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7734 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7735 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7736 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7738 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7739 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7740 "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", {
7743 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7744 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7745 "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" },
7748 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7749 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7750 "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" }
7753 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7754 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7755 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7757 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7758 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7759 "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", {
7762 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7763 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7764 "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" }
7767 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7770 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7772 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7773 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7774 "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", {
7777 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7778 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7779 "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" }
7782 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7783 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7784 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7785 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7787 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7788 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7789 "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", {
7792 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7793 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7794 "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" }
7797 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7798 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7799 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7800 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7802 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7803 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7804 "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", {});
7806 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7807 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7808 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7809 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7811 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7812 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7813 "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", {});
7815 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7816 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7817 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7818 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7820 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7821 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7822 "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", {});
7824 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7825 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7826 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7828 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7829 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7830 "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", {});
7832 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7833 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7834 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7835 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7837 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7838 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7839 "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", {});
7841 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7842 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7843 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7844 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7846 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7847 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7848 "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", {});
7850 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7851 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7852 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7853 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7854 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7855 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7857 amount_msat: 2000000,
7859 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7860 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7862 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7865 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7866 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7867 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7869 amount_msat: 5000000,
7871 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7872 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7873 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7875 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7878 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7879 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7881 amount_msat: 5000000,
7883 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7884 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7885 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7887 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7891 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7892 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7893 "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", {
7896 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7897 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7898 "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" },
7900 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7901 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7902 "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" },
7904 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7905 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7906 "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" }
7909 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7910 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7911 "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", {
7914 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7915 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7916 "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" },
7918 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7919 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7920 "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" },
7922 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7923 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7924 "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" }
7929 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7930 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7932 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7933 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7935 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7937 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7938 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7939 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7941 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7942 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7944 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7945 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7947 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7948 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7949 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7953 fn test_key_derivation() {
7954 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7955 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7957 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7958 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7960 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7961 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7963 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7964 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7966 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7967 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7969 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7970 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7972 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7973 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7975 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7976 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7980 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7981 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7982 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7983 let seed = [42; 32];
7984 let network = Network::Testnet;
7985 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7986 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7988 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7989 let config = UserConfig::default();
7990 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7991 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7993 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7994 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7996 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7997 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7998 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7999 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8000 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8001 assert!(res.is_ok());