1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
502 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
505 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
506 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
508 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
509 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
510 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
512 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
513 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
514 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
515 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
517 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
518 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
520 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
522 holder_signer: Signer,
523 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
524 destination_script: Script,
526 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
527 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
528 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
530 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
532 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
533 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
534 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
535 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
537 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
538 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
539 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
540 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
541 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
542 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
544 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
546 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
547 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
548 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
550 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
551 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
552 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
553 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
554 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
555 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
556 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
558 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
560 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
561 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
562 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
563 // HTLCs with similar state.
564 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
565 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
566 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
567 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
568 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
569 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
570 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
571 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
575 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
576 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
577 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
579 update_time_counter: u32,
581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
582 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
586 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
588 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
589 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
591 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
592 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
593 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
594 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
596 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
597 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
599 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
603 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
604 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
605 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
606 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
607 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
608 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
610 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
611 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
612 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
613 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
614 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
616 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
617 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
618 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
619 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
620 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
621 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
622 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
623 channel_creation_height: u32,
625 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
630 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
635 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
643 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
646 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
650 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
653 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
657 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
659 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
661 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
662 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
666 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
673 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
674 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
675 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
677 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
678 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
679 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
681 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
682 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
683 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
685 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
686 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
687 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
688 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
692 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
694 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
695 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
696 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
697 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
698 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
700 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
701 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
704 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
705 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
706 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
707 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
708 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
709 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
710 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
712 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
713 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
715 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
716 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
717 // the channel's funding UTXO.
719 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
720 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
721 // associated channel mapping.
723 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
724 // to store all of them.
725 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
727 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
728 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
729 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
730 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
731 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
733 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
734 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
736 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
737 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
739 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
740 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
741 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
743 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
744 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
745 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
746 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
747 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
751 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
753 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
754 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
755 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
759 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
761 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
764 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
768 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
770 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
772 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
774 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
775 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
776 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
777 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
778 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
780 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
781 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
783 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
785 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
786 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
788 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
789 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
790 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
791 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
792 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
793 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
795 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
796 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
798 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
799 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
800 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
801 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
802 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
804 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
805 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
807 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
808 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
810 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
811 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
812 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
813 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
819 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
820 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
822 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
823 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
824 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
829 macro_rules! secp_check {
830 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
833 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
838 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
839 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
840 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
843 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
846 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
847 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
849 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
852 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
854 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
857 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
858 /// required by us according to the configured or default
859 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
861 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
863 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
864 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
865 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
866 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
870 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
871 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
872 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
873 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
874 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
875 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
876 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
879 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
880 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
883 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
884 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
885 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
886 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
887 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
888 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
889 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
890 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
891 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
892 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
895 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
896 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
897 // `only_static_remotekey`.
899 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
900 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
901 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
902 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
909 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
910 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
911 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
912 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
913 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
914 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
915 // We've exhausted our options
918 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
919 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
922 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
923 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
924 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
925 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
927 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
929 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
930 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
931 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
932 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
934 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
936 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
940 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
941 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
942 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
943 outbound_scid_alias: u64
944 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
945 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
946 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
949 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
950 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
951 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
952 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
954 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
957 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
960 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
961 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
964 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
967 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
968 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
969 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
970 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
974 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
975 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
977 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
979 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
980 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
981 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
985 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
986 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
988 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
989 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
990 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
991 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
995 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
996 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
997 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1001 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1002 Ok(script) => script,
1003 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1006 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1011 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1012 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1013 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1014 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1019 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1021 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1022 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1023 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1024 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1026 channel_value_satoshis,
1028 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1031 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1034 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1035 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1038 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1039 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1040 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1041 pending_update_fee: None,
1042 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1043 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1044 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1045 update_time_counter: 1,
1047 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1049 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1050 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1051 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1052 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1053 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1054 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1056 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1057 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1058 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1059 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1061 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1062 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1063 closing_fee_limits: None,
1064 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1066 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1068 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1069 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1070 short_channel_id: None,
1071 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1073 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1074 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1075 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1076 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1077 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1078 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1079 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1080 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1081 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1082 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1083 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1084 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1086 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1088 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1089 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1090 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1091 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1092 counterparty_parameters: None,
1093 funding_outpoint: None,
1094 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1095 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1097 funding_transaction: None,
1099 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1100 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1101 counterparty_node_id,
1103 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1105 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1107 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1108 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1110 announcement_sigs: None,
1112 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1113 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1114 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1115 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1117 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1119 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1120 outbound_scid_alias,
1122 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1123 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1125 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1126 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1131 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1135 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1136 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1137 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1139 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1140 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1141 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1142 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1143 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1144 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1145 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1148 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1149 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1150 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1151 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1152 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1153 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1154 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1155 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1157 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1158 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1167 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1168 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1169 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1170 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1171 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1172 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1173 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1174 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1175 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1176 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1177 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1180 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1182 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1183 // support this channel type.
1184 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1185 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1189 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1190 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1191 // `static_remote_key`.
1192 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1195 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1196 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1199 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1202 channel_type.clone()
1204 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1205 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1210 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1212 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1213 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1214 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1215 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1216 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1217 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1218 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1219 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1220 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1223 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1227 // Check sanity of message fields:
1228 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1231 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1234 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1237 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1238 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1241 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1244 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1247 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1249 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1250 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1253 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1260 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1261 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1264 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1267 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1270 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1273 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1276 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1283 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1285 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1286 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1291 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1292 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1293 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1294 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1297 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1300 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1301 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1302 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1304 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1308 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1309 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1310 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1311 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1312 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1316 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1317 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1318 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1319 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1323 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1324 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1325 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1326 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1327 if script.len() == 0 {
1330 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1333 Some(script.clone())
1336 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1337 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1343 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1344 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1345 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1346 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1350 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1351 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1356 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1357 Ok(script) => script,
1358 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1361 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1364 let chan = Channel {
1367 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1368 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1370 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1375 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1377 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1378 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1379 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1380 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1383 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1386 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1389 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1390 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1391 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1393 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1394 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1395 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1396 pending_update_fee: None,
1397 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1398 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1399 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1400 update_time_counter: 1,
1402 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1404 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1405 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1406 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1407 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1408 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1409 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1411 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1412 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1413 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1414 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1416 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1417 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1418 closing_fee_limits: None,
1419 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1421 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1423 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1424 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1425 short_channel_id: None,
1426 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1428 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1429 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1430 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1431 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1432 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1433 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1434 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1435 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1436 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1437 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1438 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1439 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1440 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1442 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1444 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1445 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1446 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1447 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1448 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1449 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1450 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1452 funding_outpoint: None,
1453 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1454 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1456 funding_transaction: None,
1458 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1459 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1460 counterparty_node_id,
1462 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1464 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1466 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1467 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1469 announcement_sigs: None,
1471 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1472 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1473 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1474 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1476 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1478 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1479 outbound_scid_alias,
1481 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1482 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1484 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1485 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1490 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1496 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1497 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1498 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1499 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1500 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1502 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1503 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1504 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1505 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1506 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1507 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1508 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1510 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1511 where L::Target: Logger
1513 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1514 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1515 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1517 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1518 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1519 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1520 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1522 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1523 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1524 if match update_state {
1525 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1526 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1527 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1528 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1529 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1531 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1535 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1536 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1537 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1538 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1540 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1541 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1542 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1544 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1545 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1546 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1547 transaction_output_index: None
1552 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1553 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1554 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1555 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1556 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1559 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1561 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1562 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1563 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1565 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1566 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1569 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1570 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1573 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1575 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1576 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1577 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1580 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1586 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1588 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1589 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1590 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1591 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1592 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1596 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1597 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1599 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1601 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1602 if generated_by_local {
1603 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1604 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1613 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1615 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1616 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1617 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1618 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1619 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1620 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1621 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1624 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1625 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1626 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1627 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1631 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1632 preimages.push(preimage);
1636 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1637 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1639 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1642 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1644 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1645 if !generated_by_local {
1646 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1654 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1655 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1656 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1657 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1658 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1659 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1660 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1661 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1663 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1665 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1666 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1667 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1668 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1670 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1672 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1673 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1674 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1675 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1678 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1679 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1680 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1681 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1683 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1686 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1687 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1688 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1689 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1691 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1694 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1695 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1700 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1701 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1706 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1708 let channel_parameters =
1709 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1710 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1711 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1714 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1719 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1722 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1723 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1724 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1725 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1727 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1728 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1729 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1737 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1738 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1744 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1745 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1746 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1747 // outside of those situations will fail.
1748 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1752 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1757 1 + // script length (0)
1761 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1762 2 + // witness marker and flag
1763 1 + // witness element count
1764 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1765 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1766 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1767 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1768 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1769 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1771 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1772 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1773 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1779 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1780 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1781 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1782 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1784 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1785 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1786 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1788 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1789 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1790 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1791 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1792 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1793 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1796 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1797 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1800 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1801 value_to_holder = 0;
1804 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1805 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1806 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1807 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1809 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1810 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1813 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1814 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1818 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1819 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1820 /// our counterparty!)
1821 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1822 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1823 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1824 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1825 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1826 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1827 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1829 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1833 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1834 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1835 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1836 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1837 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1838 //may see payments to it!
1839 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1840 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1841 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1843 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1846 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1847 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1848 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1849 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1850 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1853 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1856 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1857 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1859 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1861 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1862 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1863 where L::Target: Logger {
1864 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1865 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1866 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1867 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1868 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1869 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1870 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1871 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1875 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1876 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1877 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1878 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1880 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1881 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1883 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1885 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1887 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1888 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1889 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1891 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1892 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1893 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1894 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1895 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1897 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1898 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1899 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1901 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1902 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1904 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1907 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1908 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1912 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1916 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1918 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1919 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1920 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 // Now update local state:
1926 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1927 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1928 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1929 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1930 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1931 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1932 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1936 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1937 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1938 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1939 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1940 // do not not get into this branch.
1941 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1942 match pending_update {
1943 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1944 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1945 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1946 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1947 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1948 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1949 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1952 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1953 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1954 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1955 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1956 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1957 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1958 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1964 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1965 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1966 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1968 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1969 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1970 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1972 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1973 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1976 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1977 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1979 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1980 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1982 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1983 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1986 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1989 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1990 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1991 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1992 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1997 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1998 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1999 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
2000 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2001 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2002 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2003 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2004 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2005 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2006 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
2007 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2008 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
2012 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
2013 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2014 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
2015 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2016 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
2020 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2024 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2025 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2026 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2027 /// before we fail backwards.
2029 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2030 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2031 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2032 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2033 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2034 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2035 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2038 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2039 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2040 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2041 /// before we fail backwards.
2043 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2044 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2045 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2046 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2047 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2048 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2049 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2051 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2053 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2054 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2055 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2057 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2058 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2059 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2061 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2062 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2063 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2065 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2070 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2077 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2078 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2079 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2080 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2081 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2085 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2086 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2087 force_holding_cell = true;
2090 // Now update local state:
2091 if force_holding_cell {
2092 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2093 match pending_update {
2094 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2095 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2097 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2101 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2102 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2103 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2104 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2110 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2111 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2112 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2118 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2120 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2121 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2124 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2125 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2126 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2131 // Message handlers:
2133 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2134 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2136 // Check sanity of message fields:
2137 if !self.is_outbound() {
2138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2140 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2143 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2146 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2149 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2152 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2154 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2156 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2157 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2160 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2161 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2164 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2167 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2171 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2172 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2175 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2178 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2181 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2184 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2187 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2190 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2194 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2195 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2198 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2199 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2201 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2202 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2205 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2208 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2209 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2210 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2211 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2212 if script.len() == 0 {
2215 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2218 Some(script.clone())
2221 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2222 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2228 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2229 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2230 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2231 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2232 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2234 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2235 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2237 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2240 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2241 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2242 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2243 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2244 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2245 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2248 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2249 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2250 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2253 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2254 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2256 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2257 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2262 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2263 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2265 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2266 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2268 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2269 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2270 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2271 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2272 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2273 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2274 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2275 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2276 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2279 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2280 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2282 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2283 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2284 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2285 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2287 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2288 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2290 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2291 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2294 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2295 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2298 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2299 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2300 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2302 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2305 if self.is_outbound() {
2306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2308 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2309 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2310 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2314 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2317 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2318 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2319 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2320 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2323 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2324 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2325 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2326 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2327 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2329 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2331 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2332 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2336 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2337 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2338 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2342 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2343 initial_commitment_tx,
2346 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2347 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2350 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2351 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2353 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2355 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2356 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2357 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2358 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2359 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2360 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2361 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2362 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2363 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2364 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2365 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2367 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2369 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2371 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2372 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2373 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2374 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2376 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2378 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2379 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2381 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2382 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2385 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2386 }, channel_monitor))
2389 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2390 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2391 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2392 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2393 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2395 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2398 if !self.is_outbound() {
2399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2401 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2404 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2405 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2406 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2407 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2410 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2412 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2413 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2414 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2415 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2417 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2418 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2420 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2421 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2423 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2424 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2425 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2426 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2427 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2432 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2433 initial_commitment_tx,
2436 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2437 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2440 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2441 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2444 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2445 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2446 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2447 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2448 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2449 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2450 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2451 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2452 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2453 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2454 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2455 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2457 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2459 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2461 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2462 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2463 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2464 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2466 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2468 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2469 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2473 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2474 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2476 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2477 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2478 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2479 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2481 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2484 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2485 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2486 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2489 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2490 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2491 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2492 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2493 // when routing outbound payments.
2494 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2498 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2500 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2501 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2502 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2503 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2504 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2505 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2506 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2507 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2508 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2510 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2511 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2512 let expected_point =
2513 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2514 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2516 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2517 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2518 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2519 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2520 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2521 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2523 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2524 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2525 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2526 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2527 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2529 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2530 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2537 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2538 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2540 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2542 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2545 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2546 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2547 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2548 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2554 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2555 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2556 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2557 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2558 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2559 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2560 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2561 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2562 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2565 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2568 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2569 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2570 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2572 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2573 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2574 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2575 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2576 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2577 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2579 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2580 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2586 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2587 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2588 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2589 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2590 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2591 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2592 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2593 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2594 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2597 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2600 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2601 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2602 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2604 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2605 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2606 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2607 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2608 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2609 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2611 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2612 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2616 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2617 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2618 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2619 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2620 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2621 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2624 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2627 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2634 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2635 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2636 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2637 /// corner case properly.
2638 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2639 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2640 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2642 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2643 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2644 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2645 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2648 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2650 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2651 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2652 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2655 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2656 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2657 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2658 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2660 outbound_capacity_msat,
2661 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2662 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2663 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2669 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2670 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2673 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2674 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2675 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2676 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2677 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2678 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2681 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2682 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2684 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2685 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2688 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2689 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2690 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2692 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2693 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2695 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2698 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2699 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2701 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2702 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2704 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2705 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2707 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2708 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2712 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2713 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2719 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2720 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2721 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2724 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2725 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2726 included_htlcs += 1;
2729 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2730 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2734 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2735 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2736 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2737 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2738 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2739 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2744 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2746 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2747 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2752 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2753 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2757 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2758 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2762 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2763 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2765 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2766 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2767 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2769 total_pending_htlcs,
2770 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2771 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2772 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2774 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2775 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2776 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2778 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2780 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2785 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2786 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2787 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2789 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2790 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2792 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2795 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2796 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2798 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2799 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2801 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2802 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2804 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2805 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2809 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2810 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2816 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2817 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2818 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2819 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2820 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2824 included_htlcs += 1;
2827 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2828 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2831 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2832 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2834 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2835 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2836 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2841 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2842 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2843 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2846 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2847 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2849 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2850 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2852 total_pending_htlcs,
2853 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2854 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2857 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2858 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2859 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2861 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2863 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2868 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2869 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2870 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2871 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2872 if local_sent_shutdown {
2873 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2875 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2876 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2877 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2880 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2883 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2886 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2889 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2893 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2894 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2895 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2896 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2898 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2901 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2902 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2903 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2904 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2905 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2906 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2907 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2908 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2909 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2910 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2911 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2913 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2914 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2915 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2916 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2917 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2918 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2922 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2925 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2926 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2927 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2929 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2930 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2931 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2932 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2933 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2934 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2935 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2939 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2940 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2941 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2942 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2943 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2944 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2945 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2949 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2950 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2951 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2952 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2953 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2957 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2958 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2959 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2960 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2961 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2963 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2967 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2971 if !self.is_outbound() {
2972 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2973 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2974 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2975 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2976 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2977 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2978 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2979 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2980 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2981 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2982 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2983 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2984 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2985 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2986 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2989 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2990 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2991 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2992 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2996 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2999 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3003 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3004 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3005 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3009 // Now update local state:
3010 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3011 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3012 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3013 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3014 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3015 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3016 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3021 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3023 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3024 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3025 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3026 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3027 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3028 None => fail_reason.into(),
3029 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3030 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3031 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3034 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3038 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3040 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3041 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3043 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3049 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3052 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3053 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3056 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3060 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3063 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3064 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3067 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3071 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3075 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3076 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3079 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3083 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3087 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3088 where L::Target: Logger
3090 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3093 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3096 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3100 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3102 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3104 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3105 let commitment_txid = {
3106 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3107 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3108 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3110 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3111 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3112 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3113 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3114 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3119 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3121 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3122 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3123 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3124 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3127 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3128 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3129 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3135 if self.is_outbound() {
3136 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3137 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3138 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3139 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3140 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3141 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3142 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3143 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3144 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3145 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3151 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3155 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3156 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3157 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3158 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3159 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3160 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3161 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3162 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3163 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3164 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3165 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3166 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3167 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3170 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3171 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3172 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3173 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3174 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3175 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3176 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3178 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3179 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3180 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3181 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3182 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3183 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3184 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3187 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3188 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3191 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3193 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3194 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3195 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3198 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3201 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3202 commitment_stats.tx,
3204 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3205 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3206 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3209 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3210 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3212 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3213 let mut need_commitment = false;
3214 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3215 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3216 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3217 need_commitment = true;
3221 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3222 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3223 Some(forward_info.clone())
3225 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3226 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3227 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3228 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3229 need_commitment = true;
3232 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3233 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3234 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3235 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3236 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3237 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3238 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3239 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3240 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3241 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3242 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3243 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3244 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3245 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3247 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3249 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3250 need_commitment = true;
3254 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3255 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3256 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3257 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3258 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3259 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3261 nondust_htlc_sources,
3265 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3266 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3267 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3268 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3270 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3271 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3272 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3273 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3274 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3275 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3276 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3277 // includes the right HTLCs.
3278 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3279 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3280 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3281 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3282 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3283 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3285 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3286 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3287 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3288 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3291 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3292 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3293 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3294 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3295 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3296 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3297 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3298 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3299 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3303 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3304 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3305 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3306 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3307 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3310 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3311 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3312 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3313 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3314 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3315 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3316 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3317 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3320 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3321 /// for our counterparty.
3322 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3323 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3324 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3325 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3326 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3328 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3329 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3330 updates: Vec::new(),
3333 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3334 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3335 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3336 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3337 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3338 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3339 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3340 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3341 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3342 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3343 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3344 // to rebalance channels.
3345 match &htlc_update {
3346 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3347 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3348 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3351 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3352 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3353 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3354 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3355 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3356 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3357 // into the holding cell without ever being
3358 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3359 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3360 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3363 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3370 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3371 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3372 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3373 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3374 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3375 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3376 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3377 (msg, monitor_update)
3378 } else { unreachable!() };
3379 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3380 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3383 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3384 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3385 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3386 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3387 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3388 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3389 // for a full revocation before failing.
3390 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3393 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3395 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3402 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3403 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3405 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3406 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3411 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3412 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3413 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3414 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3415 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3417 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3418 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3419 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3421 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3422 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3423 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3429 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3430 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3431 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3432 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3433 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3434 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3435 where L::Target: Logger,
3437 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3440 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3443 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3447 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3449 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3450 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3455 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3456 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3457 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3458 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3459 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3460 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3461 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3462 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3466 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3468 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3469 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3472 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3473 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3475 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3477 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3478 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3479 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3480 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3481 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3482 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3483 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3484 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3488 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3489 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3490 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3491 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3492 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3493 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3494 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3495 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3497 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3498 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3501 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3502 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3503 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3504 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3505 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3506 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3507 let mut require_commitment = false;
3508 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3511 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3512 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3513 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3515 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3516 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3517 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3518 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3519 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3520 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3525 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3526 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3527 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3528 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3529 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3531 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3532 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3533 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3538 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3539 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3541 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3545 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3546 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3548 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3549 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3550 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3551 require_commitment = true;
3552 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3553 match forward_info {
3554 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3555 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3556 require_commitment = true;
3558 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3559 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3560 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3562 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3563 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3564 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3568 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3569 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3570 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3571 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3577 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3578 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3579 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3580 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3582 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3583 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3584 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3585 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3586 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3587 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3588 require_commitment = true;
3592 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3594 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3595 match update_state {
3596 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3597 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3598 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3599 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3600 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3602 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3603 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3604 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3605 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3606 require_commitment = true;
3607 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3608 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3613 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3614 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3615 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3616 if require_commitment {
3617 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3618 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3619 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3620 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3621 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3622 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3623 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3624 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3625 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3627 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3628 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3629 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3630 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3631 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3632 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3635 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3636 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3637 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3638 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3639 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3640 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3641 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3643 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3644 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3645 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3647 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3648 if require_commitment {
3649 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3651 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3652 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3653 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3654 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3656 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3657 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3658 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3659 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3660 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3662 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3663 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3664 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3665 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3671 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3672 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3673 /// commitment update.
3674 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3675 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3676 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3679 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3680 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3681 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3682 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3684 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3685 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3686 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3687 if !self.is_outbound() {
3688 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3690 if !self.is_usable() {
3691 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3693 if !self.is_live() {
3694 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3697 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3698 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3699 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3700 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3701 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3702 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3703 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3704 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3705 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3706 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3710 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3711 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3712 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3713 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3714 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3717 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3718 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3722 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3723 force_holding_cell = true;
3726 if force_holding_cell {
3727 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3731 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3732 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3734 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3735 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3740 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3741 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3743 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3745 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3746 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3747 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3748 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3752 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3753 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3754 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3758 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3759 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3762 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3763 // will be retransmitted.
3764 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3765 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3766 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3768 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3769 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3771 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3772 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3773 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3774 // this HTLC accordingly
3775 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3778 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3779 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3780 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3781 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3784 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3785 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3786 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3787 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3788 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3789 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3794 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3796 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3797 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3798 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3799 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3803 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3804 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3805 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3806 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3807 // the update upon reconnection.
3808 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3812 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3813 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3816 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3817 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3818 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3819 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3820 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3821 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3822 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3824 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3825 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3826 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3827 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3828 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3829 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3830 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3832 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3833 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3834 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3835 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3836 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3837 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3838 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3841 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3842 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3843 /// to the remote side.
3844 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3845 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3846 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3847 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3850 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3852 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3853 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3854 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3856 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3857 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3858 // first received the funding_signed.
3859 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3860 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3861 self.funding_transaction.take()
3863 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3864 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3865 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3866 funding_broadcastable = None;
3869 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3870 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3871 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3872 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3873 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3874 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3875 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3876 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3877 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3878 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3879 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3880 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3881 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3882 next_per_commitment_point,
3883 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3887 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3889 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3890 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3891 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3892 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3893 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3894 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3896 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3897 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3898 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3899 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3900 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3901 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3905 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3906 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3908 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3909 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3912 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3913 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3914 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3915 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3916 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3917 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3918 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3919 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3920 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3924 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3925 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3927 if self.is_outbound() {
3928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3930 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3933 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3934 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3936 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3937 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3938 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3939 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3940 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3941 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3942 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3943 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3944 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3945 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3946 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3947 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3948 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3950 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3952 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3958 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3959 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3960 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3961 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3962 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3963 per_commitment_secret,
3964 next_per_commitment_point,
3966 next_local_nonce: None,
3970 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3971 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3972 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3973 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3974 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3976 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3977 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3978 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3979 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3980 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3981 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3982 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3983 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3984 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3989 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3990 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3992 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3993 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3994 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3995 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3996 reason: err_packet.clone()
3999 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4000 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4001 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4002 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4003 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4004 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4007 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4008 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4009 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4010 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4011 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4018 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4019 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4020 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4021 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4025 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4026 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4027 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4028 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4029 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4030 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4034 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4035 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4037 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4038 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4039 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4040 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4041 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4042 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4043 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4044 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4047 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4049 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4050 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4051 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4052 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4056 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4057 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4061 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4062 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4063 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4064 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4065 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4066 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4067 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4070 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4071 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4072 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4073 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4074 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4077 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4078 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4079 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4080 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4081 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4082 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4083 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4084 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4087 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4091 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4092 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4093 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4094 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4096 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4100 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4101 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4102 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4104 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4105 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4106 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4107 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4108 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4112 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4114 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4115 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4116 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4117 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4118 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4121 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4122 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4123 channel_ready: None,
4124 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4125 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4126 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4130 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4131 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4132 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4133 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4134 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4135 next_per_commitment_point,
4136 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4138 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4139 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4140 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4144 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4145 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4146 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4148 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4149 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4150 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4153 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4159 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4160 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4161 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4162 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4163 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4165 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4166 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4167 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4168 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4169 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4170 next_per_commitment_point,
4171 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4175 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4176 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4177 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4179 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4182 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4183 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4184 raa: required_revoke,
4185 commitment_update: None,
4186 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4188 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4189 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4190 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4192 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4195 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4196 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4197 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4198 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4199 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4200 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4203 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4204 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4205 raa: required_revoke,
4206 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4207 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4211 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4215 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4216 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4217 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4218 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4220 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4222 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4224 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4225 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4226 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4227 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4228 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4229 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4231 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4232 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4233 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4234 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4235 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4237 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4238 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4239 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4240 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4243 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4244 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4245 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4246 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4247 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4248 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4249 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4250 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4251 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4252 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4253 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4254 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4255 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4256 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4257 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4259 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4262 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4263 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4266 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4267 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4268 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4269 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4270 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4271 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4272 self.channel_state &
4273 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4274 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4275 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4276 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4279 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4280 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4281 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4282 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4283 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4284 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4287 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4293 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4294 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4295 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4296 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4298 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4299 return Ok((None, None));
4302 if !self.is_outbound() {
4303 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4304 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4306 return Ok((None, None));
4309 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4311 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4312 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4313 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4314 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4316 let sig = self.holder_signer
4317 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4318 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4320 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4321 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4322 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4323 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4325 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4326 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4327 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4332 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4333 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4334 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4335 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4337 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4340 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4341 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4342 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4343 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4346 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4347 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4351 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4353 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4354 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4357 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4358 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4362 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4365 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4366 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4367 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4368 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4370 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4373 assert!(send_shutdown);
4374 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4375 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4376 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4378 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4381 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4386 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4388 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4389 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4391 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4392 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4393 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4394 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4395 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4396 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4399 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4400 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4401 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4403 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4404 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4406 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4410 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4411 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4412 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4413 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4414 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4415 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4417 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4418 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4425 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4426 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4428 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4431 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4432 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4434 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4436 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4437 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4438 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4439 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4440 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4441 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4442 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4443 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4444 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4446 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4447 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4450 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4454 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4455 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4456 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4457 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4459 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4462 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4465 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4468 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4469 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4472 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4476 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4477 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4478 return Ok((None, None));
4481 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4482 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4483 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4486 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4488 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4491 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4492 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4493 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4494 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4495 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4499 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4500 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4501 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4505 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4506 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4507 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4508 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4509 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4510 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4511 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4515 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4517 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4518 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4519 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4520 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4522 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4525 let sig = self.holder_signer
4526 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4527 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4529 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4530 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4531 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4532 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4536 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4537 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4538 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4539 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4541 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4542 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4543 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4549 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4550 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4551 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4553 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4554 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4556 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4557 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4560 if !self.is_outbound() {
4561 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4562 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4563 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4564 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4566 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4568 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4570 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4571 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4574 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4575 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4576 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4577 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4578 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4579 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4580 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4581 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4586 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4587 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4588 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4589 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4591 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4595 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4596 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4597 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4598 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4600 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4606 // Public utilities:
4608 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4612 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4614 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4615 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4616 self.temporary_channel_id
4619 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4623 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4624 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4625 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4629 /// Gets the channel's type
4630 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4634 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4635 /// is_usable() returns true).
4636 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4637 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4638 self.short_channel_id
4641 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4642 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4643 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4647 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4648 self.outbound_scid_alias
4650 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4651 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4652 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4653 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4654 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4657 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4658 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4659 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4660 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4663 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4664 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4665 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4668 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4669 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4670 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4671 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4675 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4678 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4679 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4682 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4683 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4686 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4687 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4688 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4691 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4692 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4695 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4696 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4697 self.counterparty_node_id
4700 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4701 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4702 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4705 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4706 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4707 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4710 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4711 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4713 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4714 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4715 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4716 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4718 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4722 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4723 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4724 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4727 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4728 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4729 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4732 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4733 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4734 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4736 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4737 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4742 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4743 self.channel_value_satoshis
4746 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4747 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4750 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4751 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4754 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4755 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4758 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4759 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4760 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4763 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4764 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4765 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4768 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4769 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4770 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4773 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4774 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4775 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4778 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4779 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4780 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4783 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4784 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4785 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4788 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4789 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4790 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4791 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4792 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4795 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4797 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4798 self.prev_config = None;
4802 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4803 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4807 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4808 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4809 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4810 let did_channel_update =
4811 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4812 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4813 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4814 if did_channel_update {
4815 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4816 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4817 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4818 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4820 self.config.options = *config;
4824 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4825 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4826 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4827 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4828 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4829 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4830 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4832 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4833 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4836 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4838 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4839 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4845 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4846 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4847 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4848 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4849 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4850 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4851 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4853 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4854 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4861 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4865 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4866 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4867 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4868 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4869 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4870 // which are near the dust limit.
4871 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4872 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4873 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4874 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4875 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4877 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4878 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4880 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4883 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4884 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4887 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4888 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4891 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4892 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4896 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4901 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4903 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4904 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4905 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4906 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4907 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4908 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4910 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4912 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4920 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4921 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4925 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4926 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4927 self.update_time_counter
4930 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4931 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4934 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4935 self.config.announced_channel
4938 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4939 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4942 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4944 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4945 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4948 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4949 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4950 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4953 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4954 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4955 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4956 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4957 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4960 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4961 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4963 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4964 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4967 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4968 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4969 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4970 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4973 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4974 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4977 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4978 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4979 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4982 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4983 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4984 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4986 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4987 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4988 if self.channel_state &
4989 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4990 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4991 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4992 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4993 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4996 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4997 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4998 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4999 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5000 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5001 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5003 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5004 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5005 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5007 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5008 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5009 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5010 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5011 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5012 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5018 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5019 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5020 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5023 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5024 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5025 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5028 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5029 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5030 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5033 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5034 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5035 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5036 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5037 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5038 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5043 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5044 self.channel_update_status
5047 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5048 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5049 self.channel_update_status = status;
5052 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5054 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5055 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5056 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5060 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5061 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5062 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5065 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5069 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5070 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5071 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5073 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5074 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5075 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5077 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5078 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5082 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5083 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5084 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5085 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5086 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5087 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5088 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5089 self.channel_state);
5091 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5095 if need_commitment_update {
5096 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5097 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5098 let next_per_commitment_point =
5099 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5100 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5101 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5102 next_per_commitment_point,
5103 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5107 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5113 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5114 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5115 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5116 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5117 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5118 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5119 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5121 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5124 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5125 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5126 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5127 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5128 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5129 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5130 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5131 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5132 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5133 if self.is_outbound() {
5134 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5135 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5136 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5137 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5138 // channel and move on.
5139 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5140 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5142 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5143 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5144 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5146 if self.is_outbound() {
5147 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5148 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5149 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5150 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5151 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5152 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5156 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5157 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5158 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5159 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5160 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5164 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5165 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5166 // may have already happened for this block).
5167 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5168 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5169 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5170 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5173 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5174 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5175 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5176 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5184 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5185 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5186 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5187 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5189 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5190 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5193 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5195 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5196 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5197 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5198 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5200 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5203 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5206 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5207 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5208 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5209 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5211 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5214 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5215 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5216 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5218 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5219 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5222 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5223 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5231 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5233 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5234 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5235 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5237 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5238 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5241 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5242 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5243 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5244 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5245 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5246 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5247 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5248 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5249 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5252 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5253 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5254 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5255 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5257 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5258 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5259 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5261 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5262 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5263 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5264 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5266 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5267 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5268 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5269 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5270 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5271 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5272 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5275 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5276 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5278 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5281 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5282 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5283 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5284 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5285 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5286 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5287 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5288 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5289 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5290 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5291 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5292 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5293 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5294 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5295 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5296 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5297 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5303 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5308 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5309 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5311 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5312 if !self.is_outbound() {
5313 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5315 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5316 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5319 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5320 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5323 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5324 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5328 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5329 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5330 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5331 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5332 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5333 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5334 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5335 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5336 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5337 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5338 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5339 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5340 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5341 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5342 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5343 first_per_commitment_point,
5344 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5345 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5346 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5347 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5349 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5353 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5354 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5357 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5358 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5359 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5360 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5363 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5364 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5366 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5367 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5368 if self.is_outbound() {
5369 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5371 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5372 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5374 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5375 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5377 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5378 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5381 self.user_id = user_id;
5382 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5384 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5387 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5388 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5389 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5391 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5392 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5393 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5394 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5396 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5397 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5398 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5399 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5400 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5401 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5402 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5403 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5404 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5405 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5406 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5407 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5408 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5409 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5410 first_per_commitment_point,
5411 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5412 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5413 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5415 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5417 next_local_nonce: None,
5421 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5422 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5424 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5426 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5427 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5430 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5431 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5432 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5433 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5434 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5435 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5438 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5439 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5440 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5441 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5442 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5443 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5444 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5445 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5446 if !self.is_outbound() {
5447 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5449 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5450 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5452 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5453 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5454 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5455 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5458 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5459 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5461 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5464 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5465 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5470 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5472 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5474 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5475 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5476 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5478 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5479 temporary_channel_id,
5480 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5481 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5484 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5486 next_local_nonce: None,
5490 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5491 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5492 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5493 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5495 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5498 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5499 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5500 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5501 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5502 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5503 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5505 if !self.is_usable() {
5506 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5509 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5510 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5511 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5512 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5514 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5515 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5517 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5518 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5519 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5520 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5521 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5522 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5528 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5529 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5530 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5531 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5533 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5536 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5540 if !self.is_usable() {
5544 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5545 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5549 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5553 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5554 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5557 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5561 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5563 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5568 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5570 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5575 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5577 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5578 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5579 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5580 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5581 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5585 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5587 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5588 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5589 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5590 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5591 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5592 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5593 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5595 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5596 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5597 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5598 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5599 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5600 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5601 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5602 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5603 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5604 contents: announcement,
5607 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5611 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5612 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5613 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5614 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5615 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5616 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5617 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5618 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5620 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5622 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5624 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5625 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5627 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5628 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5629 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5630 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5633 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5634 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5635 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5636 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5639 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5642 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5643 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5644 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5645 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5646 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5647 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5650 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5652 Err(_) => return None,
5654 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5655 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5660 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5661 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5662 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5663 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5664 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5665 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5666 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5667 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5668 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5669 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5670 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5671 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5672 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5673 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5674 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5675 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5676 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5677 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5678 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5681 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5682 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5683 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5684 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5687 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5688 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5689 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5690 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5691 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5692 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5693 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5694 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5696 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5697 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5698 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5699 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5700 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5701 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5702 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5703 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5704 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5706 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5712 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5714 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5715 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5716 /// commitment update.
5718 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5719 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5720 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5721 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5723 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5724 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5726 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5727 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5732 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5733 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5735 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5737 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5738 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5740 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5741 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5742 /// regenerate them.
5744 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5745 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5747 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5748 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5749 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5750 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5751 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5752 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5754 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5755 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5759 if amount_msat == 0 {
5760 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5763 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5764 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5767 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5768 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5769 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5770 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5771 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5772 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5773 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5774 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5777 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5778 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5779 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5780 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5782 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5783 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5784 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5787 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5788 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5789 if !self.is_outbound() {
5790 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5791 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5792 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5793 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5794 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5795 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5799 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5802 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5803 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5804 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5806 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5807 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5808 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5809 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5811 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5815 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5816 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5817 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5818 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5819 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5820 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5824 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5825 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5826 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5829 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5830 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5831 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5832 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5834 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5838 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5839 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5840 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5841 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5845 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5846 force_holding_cell = true;
5849 // Now update local state:
5850 if force_holding_cell {
5851 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5856 onion_routing_packet,
5861 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5862 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5864 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5866 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5870 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5871 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5872 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5876 onion_routing_packet,
5878 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5883 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5884 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5885 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5886 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5888 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5889 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5890 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5892 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5893 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5897 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5898 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5899 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5900 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5901 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5902 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5903 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5906 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5907 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5908 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5909 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5910 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5911 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5914 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5916 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5917 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5918 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5920 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5921 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5924 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5925 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5928 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5929 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5930 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5931 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5934 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5938 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5939 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5940 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5941 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5945 if !self.is_outbound() {
5946 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5947 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5948 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5949 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5950 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5951 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5952 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5953 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5954 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5955 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5961 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5964 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5965 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5966 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5967 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5968 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5969 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5971 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5972 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5973 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5974 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5977 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5978 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5982 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5983 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5985 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5987 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5988 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5989 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5990 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5992 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5993 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5994 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5995 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5996 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5997 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6001 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6002 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6006 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6007 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6010 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6011 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6013 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6014 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6015 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6016 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6017 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6020 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6021 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6022 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6023 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
6029 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6030 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6031 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6034 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6035 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6038 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6039 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6040 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6041 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6047 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6048 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6050 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6051 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6052 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6053 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
6054 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6055 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6056 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6057 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6058 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6061 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6062 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6063 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6065 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6066 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6069 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6070 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6071 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6074 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6075 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6076 let mut chan_closed = false;
6077 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6081 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6083 None if !chan_closed => {
6084 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6085 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6086 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned() }),
6088 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6089 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6091 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6097 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6098 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6099 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6100 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6102 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6104 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6106 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6107 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6108 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6109 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6110 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6111 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6114 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6115 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6116 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6118 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6119 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6120 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6123 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6124 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6125 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6126 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6127 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6129 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6130 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6137 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6138 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6140 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6143 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6144 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6145 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6146 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6147 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6148 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6149 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6150 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6151 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6152 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6153 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6155 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6156 // return them to fail the payment.
6157 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6158 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6159 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6161 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6162 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6167 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6168 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6169 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6170 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6171 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6172 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6173 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6174 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6175 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6176 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6177 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6178 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6179 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6184 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6185 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6186 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6189 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6190 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6191 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6193 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6194 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6198 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6202 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6203 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6205 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6211 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6212 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6213 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6214 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6215 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6217 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6218 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6219 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6220 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6226 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6227 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6228 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6229 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6230 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6231 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6236 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6237 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6238 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6239 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6241 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6242 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6243 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6244 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6249 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6250 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6251 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6252 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6253 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6254 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6259 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6260 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6261 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6264 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6266 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6267 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6268 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6269 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6270 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6272 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6273 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6274 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6275 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6277 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6278 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6279 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6281 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6283 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6284 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6285 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6286 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6287 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6288 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6290 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6291 // deserialized from that format.
6292 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6293 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6294 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6296 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6298 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6299 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6300 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6302 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6303 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6304 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6305 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6308 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6309 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6310 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6313 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6314 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6315 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6316 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6318 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6319 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6321 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6323 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6325 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6327 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6330 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6332 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6337 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6339 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6340 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6341 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6342 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6343 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6344 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6345 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6347 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6349 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6351 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6354 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6355 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6356 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6359 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6361 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6362 preimages.push(preimage);
6364 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6365 reason.write(writer)?;
6367 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6369 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6370 preimages.push(preimage);
6372 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6373 reason.write(writer)?;
6378 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6379 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6381 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6383 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6384 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6385 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6386 source.write(writer)?;
6387 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6391 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6392 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6394 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6396 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6397 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6402 match self.resend_order {
6403 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6404 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6407 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6408 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6409 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6411 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6412 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6413 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6414 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6417 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6418 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6419 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6420 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6421 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6424 if self.is_outbound() {
6425 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6426 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6427 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6429 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6430 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6431 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6433 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6435 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6436 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6437 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6438 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6440 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6441 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6442 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6443 // consider the stale state on reload.
6446 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6447 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6448 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6450 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6451 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6452 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6454 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6455 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6457 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6458 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6459 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6461 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6462 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6464 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6467 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6468 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6469 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6471 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6474 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6475 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6477 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6478 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6479 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6481 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6483 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6485 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6487 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6488 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6489 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6490 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6491 htlc.write(writer)?;
6494 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6495 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6496 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6498 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6499 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6501 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6502 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6503 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6504 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6505 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6506 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6507 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6509 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6510 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6511 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6512 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6513 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6515 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6516 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6518 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6519 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6520 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6521 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6523 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6525 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6526 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6527 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6528 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6529 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6530 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6531 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6533 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6534 (2, chan_type, option),
6535 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6536 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6537 (5, self.config, required),
6538 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6539 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6540 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6541 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6542 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6543 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6544 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6545 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6546 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6547 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6548 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6549 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6550 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6551 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6552 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6559 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6560 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6562 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6563 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6565 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6566 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6567 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6569 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6570 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6571 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6572 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6574 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6576 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6577 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6578 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6579 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6580 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6582 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6583 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6590 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6592 let mut keys_data = None;
6594 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6595 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6596 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6598 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6599 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6600 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6601 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6602 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6603 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6607 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6608 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6609 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6612 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6621 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6622 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6623 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6624 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6625 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6626 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6627 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6628 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6629 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6630 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6631 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6632 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6637 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6638 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6639 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6640 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6641 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6642 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6643 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6644 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6645 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6646 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6647 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6648 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6650 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6654 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6658 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6661 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6666 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6668 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6669 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6670 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6671 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6672 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6673 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6674 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6675 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6677 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6678 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6679 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6681 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6682 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6683 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6685 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6689 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6690 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6691 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6692 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6695 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6697 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6699 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6700 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6701 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6702 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6705 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6707 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6708 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6711 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6713 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6715 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6716 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6720 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6721 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6722 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6723 // consider the stale state on reload.
6724 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6727 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6728 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6729 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6731 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6734 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6735 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6743 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6744 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6746 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6747 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6750 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6755 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6756 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6758 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6759 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6762 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6764 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6765 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6766 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6767 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6769 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6772 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6777 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6780 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6781 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6783 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6785 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6786 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6787 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6789 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6791 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6795 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6796 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6797 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6799 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6805 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6806 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6807 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6808 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6809 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6810 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6811 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6812 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6813 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6814 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6816 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6817 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6818 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6819 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6820 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6821 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6822 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6824 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6825 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6826 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6827 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6829 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6830 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6831 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6832 (2, channel_type, option),
6833 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6834 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6835 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6836 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6837 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6838 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6839 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6840 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6841 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6842 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6843 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6844 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6845 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6846 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6847 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6848 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6849 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6850 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6853 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6854 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6855 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6856 // required channel parameters.
6857 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6858 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6859 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6861 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6863 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6864 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6865 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6866 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6869 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6870 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6871 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6873 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6874 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6876 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6877 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6882 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6883 if iter.next().is_some() {
6884 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6888 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6889 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6890 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6891 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6892 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6895 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6896 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6898 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6899 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6900 // separate u64 values.
6901 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6903 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
6908 config: config.unwrap(),
6912 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6913 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6914 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6917 temporary_channel_id,
6919 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6921 channel_value_satoshis,
6923 latest_monitor_update_id,
6926 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6929 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6930 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6933 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6934 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6935 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6936 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6940 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6941 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6942 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6943 monitor_pending_forwards,
6944 monitor_pending_failures,
6945 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6948 holding_cell_update_fee,
6949 next_holder_htlc_id,
6950 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6951 update_time_counter,
6954 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6955 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6956 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6957 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6959 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6960 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6961 closing_fee_limits: None,
6962 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6964 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6966 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6967 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6969 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6971 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6972 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6973 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6974 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6975 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6976 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6977 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6978 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6979 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6982 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6984 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6985 funding_transaction,
6987 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6988 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6989 counterparty_node_id,
6991 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6995 channel_update_status,
6996 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7000 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7001 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7002 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7003 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7005 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7007 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7008 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7009 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7011 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7012 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7014 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7015 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7017 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7020 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7028 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7029 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7030 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7031 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7032 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7034 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7035 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7037 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7038 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7039 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7040 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7041 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7042 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7043 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7044 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7045 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7046 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7047 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7048 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7049 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7050 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7051 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7052 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7053 use crate::util::test_utils;
7054 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7055 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7056 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7057 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7058 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7059 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7060 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7061 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7062 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7063 use crate::prelude::*;
7065 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7068 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7069 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7075 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7076 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7077 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7078 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7082 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7083 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7084 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7085 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7086 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7087 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7088 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7092 signer: InMemorySigner,
7095 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7096 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7099 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7100 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7102 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7103 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7106 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7110 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7112 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7113 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7114 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7115 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7116 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7119 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7120 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7121 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7122 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7126 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7127 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7128 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7132 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7133 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7134 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7135 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7137 let seed = [42; 32];
7138 let network = Network::Testnet;
7139 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7140 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7141 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7144 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7145 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7146 let config = UserConfig::default();
7147 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7148 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7149 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7151 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7152 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7156 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7157 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7159 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7160 let original_fee = 253;
7161 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7162 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7163 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7164 let seed = [42; 32];
7165 let network = Network::Testnet;
7166 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7168 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7169 let config = UserConfig::default();
7170 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7172 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7173 // same as the old fee.
7174 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7175 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7176 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7180 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7181 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7182 // dust limits are used.
7183 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7184 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7185 let seed = [42; 32];
7186 let network = Network::Testnet;
7187 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7188 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7190 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7191 // they have different dust limits.
7193 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7194 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7195 let config = UserConfig::default();
7196 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7198 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7199 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7200 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7201 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7202 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7204 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7205 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7206 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7207 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7208 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7210 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7211 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7212 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7214 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7215 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7216 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7217 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7220 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7222 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7223 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7224 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7225 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7226 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7227 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7228 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7229 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7230 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7234 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7235 // the dust limit check.
7236 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7237 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7238 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7239 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7241 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7242 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7243 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7244 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7245 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7246 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7247 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7251 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7252 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7253 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7254 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7255 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7256 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7257 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 let seed = [42; 32];
7259 let network = Network::Testnet;
7260 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7262 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7263 let config = UserConfig::default();
7264 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7266 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7267 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7269 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7270 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7271 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7272 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7273 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7274 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7276 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7277 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7278 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7279 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7280 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7282 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7284 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7285 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7286 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7287 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7288 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7290 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7291 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7292 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7293 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7294 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7298 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7299 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7300 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7301 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7302 let seed = [42; 32];
7303 let network = Network::Testnet;
7304 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7305 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7306 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7308 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7310 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7311 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7312 let config = UserConfig::default();
7313 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7315 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7316 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7317 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7318 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7320 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7321 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7322 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7324 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7325 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7326 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7327 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7329 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7330 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7331 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7333 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7334 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7336 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7337 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7338 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7339 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7340 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7341 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7342 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7343 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7344 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7349 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7351 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7352 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7353 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7354 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7355 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7356 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7357 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7364 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7365 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7366 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7368 let seed = [42; 32];
7369 let network = Network::Testnet;
7370 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7371 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7372 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7374 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7375 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7376 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7377 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7378 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7379 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7380 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7381 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7383 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7384 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7385 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7386 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7387 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7388 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7390 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7391 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7392 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7393 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7395 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7397 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7398 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7399 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7400 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7401 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7402 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7404 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7405 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7406 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7407 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7409 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7410 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7411 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7412 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7413 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7415 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7416 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7418 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7419 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7420 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7422 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7423 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7424 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7425 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7426 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7428 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7429 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7431 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7432 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7433 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7437 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7439 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7440 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7441 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7443 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7444 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7445 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7446 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7448 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7449 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7450 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7452 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7454 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7455 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7458 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7459 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7460 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7461 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7462 let seed = [42; 32];
7463 let network = Network::Testnet;
7464 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7465 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7466 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7469 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7470 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7471 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7473 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7474 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7476 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7477 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7478 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7480 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7481 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7483 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7485 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7486 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7488 // Channel Negotiations failed
7489 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7490 assert!(result.is_err());
7495 fn channel_update() {
7496 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7498 let seed = [42; 32];
7499 let network = Network::Testnet;
7500 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7501 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7503 // Create a channel.
7504 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7505 let config = UserConfig::default();
7506 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7507 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7508 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7509 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7511 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7512 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7513 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7515 short_channel_id: 0,
7518 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7519 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7520 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7522 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7523 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7525 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7527 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7529 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7530 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7531 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7532 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7534 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7535 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7536 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7538 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7542 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7544 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7545 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7546 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7547 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7548 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7549 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7550 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7551 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7552 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7553 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7554 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7555 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7556 use crate::sync::Arc;
7558 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7559 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7560 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7563 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7565 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7566 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7567 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7568 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7569 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7571 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7572 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7578 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7579 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7580 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7582 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7583 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7584 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7585 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7586 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7587 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7589 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7591 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7592 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7593 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7594 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7595 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7596 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7598 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7599 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7600 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7601 selected_contest_delay: 144
7603 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7604 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7606 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7607 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7609 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7610 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7612 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7613 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7615 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7616 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7617 // build_commitment_transaction.
7618 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7619 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7620 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7621 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7622 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7624 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7625 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7626 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7627 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7631 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7632 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7633 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7634 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7638 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7639 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7640 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7642 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7643 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7645 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7646 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7648 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7650 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7651 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7652 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7653 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7654 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7655 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7656 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7658 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7659 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7660 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7661 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7663 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7664 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7665 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7667 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7669 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7670 commitment_tx.clone(),
7671 counterparty_signature,
7672 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7673 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7674 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7676 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7677 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7679 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7680 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7681 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7683 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7684 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7687 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7688 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7690 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7691 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7692 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7693 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7694 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7695 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7696 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7697 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7699 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7702 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7703 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7704 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7708 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7711 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7712 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7713 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7715 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7716 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7717 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7718 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7719 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7720 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7721 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7722 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7724 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7728 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7729 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7730 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7731 "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", {});
7733 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7734 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7736 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7737 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7738 "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", {});
7740 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7741 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7742 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7743 "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", {});
7745 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7746 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7748 amount_msat: 1000000,
7750 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7751 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7753 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7756 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7757 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7759 amount_msat: 2000000,
7761 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7762 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7764 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7767 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7768 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7770 amount_msat: 2000000,
7772 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7773 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7774 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7776 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7779 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7780 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7782 amount_msat: 3000000,
7784 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7785 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7786 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7788 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7791 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7792 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7794 amount_msat: 4000000,
7796 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7797 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7799 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7803 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7804 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7805 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7807 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7808 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7809 "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", {
7812 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7813 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7814 "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" },
7817 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7818 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7819 "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" },
7822 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7823 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7824 "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" },
7827 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7828 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7829 "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" },
7832 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7833 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7834 "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" }
7837 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7838 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7839 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7841 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7842 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7843 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7846 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7847 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7848 "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" },
7851 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7852 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7853 "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" },
7856 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7857 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7858 "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" },
7861 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7862 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7863 "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" },
7866 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7867 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7868 "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" }
7871 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7872 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7873 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7875 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7876 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7877 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7880 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7881 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7882 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7885 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7886 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7887 "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" },
7890 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7891 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7892 "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" },
7895 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7896 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7897 "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" }
7900 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7901 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7902 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7903 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7905 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7906 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7907 "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", {
7910 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7911 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7912 "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" },
7915 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7916 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7917 "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" },
7920 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7921 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7922 "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" },
7925 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7926 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7927 "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" }
7930 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7931 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7932 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7933 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7935 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7936 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7937 "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", {
7940 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7941 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7942 "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" },
7945 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7946 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7947 "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" },
7950 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7951 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7952 "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" },
7955 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7956 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7957 "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" }
7960 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7961 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7962 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7964 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7965 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7966 "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", {
7969 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7970 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7971 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7974 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7975 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7976 "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" },
7979 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7980 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7981 "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" }
7984 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7985 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7986 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7988 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7989 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7990 "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", {
7993 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7994 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7995 "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" },
7998 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7999 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8000 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8003 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8004 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8005 "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" }
8008 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8009 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8010 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8012 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8013 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8014 "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", {
8017 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8018 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8019 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8022 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8023 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8024 "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" }
8027 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8028 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8029 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8030 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8032 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8033 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8034 "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", {
8037 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8038 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8039 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8042 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8043 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8044 "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" }
8047 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8048 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8049 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8050 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8052 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8053 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8054 "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", {
8057 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8058 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8059 "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" },
8062 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8063 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8064 "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" }
8067 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8068 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8069 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8071 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8072 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8073 "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", {
8076 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8077 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8078 "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" }
8081 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8082 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8083 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8084 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8086 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8087 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8088 "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", {
8091 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8092 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8093 "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" }
8096 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8097 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8098 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8099 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8101 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8102 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8103 "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", {
8106 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8107 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8108 "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" }
8111 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8112 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8113 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8114 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8116 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8117 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8118 "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", {});
8120 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8121 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8122 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8123 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8125 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8126 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8127 "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", {});
8129 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8130 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8131 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8132 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8134 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8135 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8136 "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", {});
8138 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8139 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8140 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8142 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8143 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8144 "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", {});
8146 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8147 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8148 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8149 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8151 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8152 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8153 "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", {});
8155 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8156 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8157 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8158 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8160 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8161 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8162 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8164 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8165 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8166 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8167 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8168 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8169 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8171 amount_msat: 2000000,
8173 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8174 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8176 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8179 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8180 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8181 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8183 amount_msat: 5000001,
8185 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8186 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8187 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8189 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8192 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8193 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8195 amount_msat: 5000000,
8197 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8198 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8199 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8201 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8205 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8206 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8207 "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", {
8210 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8211 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8212 "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" },
8214 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8215 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8216 "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" },
8218 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8219 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8220 "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" }
8223 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8224 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8225 "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", {
8228 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8229 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8230 "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" },
8232 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8233 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8234 "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" },
8236 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8237 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8238 "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" }
8243 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8244 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8246 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8247 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8248 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8249 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8251 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8252 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8253 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8255 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8256 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8258 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8259 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8261 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8262 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8263 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8267 fn test_key_derivation() {
8268 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8269 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8271 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8272 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8274 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8275 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8277 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8278 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8280 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8281 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8283 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8284 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8286 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8287 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8289 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8290 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8294 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8295 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8296 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8297 let seed = [42; 32];
8298 let network = Network::Testnet;
8299 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8300 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8302 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8303 let config = UserConfig::default();
8304 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8305 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8307 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8308 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8310 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8311 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8312 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8313 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8314 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8315 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8316 assert!(res.is_ok());
8321 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8322 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8323 // resulting `channel_type`.
8324 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8325 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8326 let network = Network::Testnet;
8327 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8328 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8330 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8331 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8333 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8334 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8336 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8337 // need to signal it.
8338 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8339 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8340 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8343 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8345 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8346 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8347 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8349 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8350 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8351 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8354 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8355 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8356 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8357 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8358 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8361 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8362 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8367 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8368 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8369 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8370 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8371 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8372 let network = Network::Testnet;
8373 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8374 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8376 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8377 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8379 let config = UserConfig::default();
8381 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8382 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8383 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8384 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8385 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8387 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8388 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8389 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8392 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8393 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8394 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8396 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8397 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8398 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8399 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8400 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8401 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8403 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8408 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8409 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8411 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8412 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8413 let network = Network::Testnet;
8414 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8415 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8417 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8418 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8420 let config = UserConfig::default();
8422 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8423 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8424 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8425 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8426 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8427 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8428 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8429 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8431 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8432 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8433 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8434 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8435 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8436 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8439 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8440 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8442 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8443 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8444 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8445 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8447 assert!(res.is_err());
8449 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8450 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8451 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8453 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8454 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8455 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8458 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8460 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8461 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8462 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8463 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8466 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8467 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8469 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8470 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8472 assert!(res.is_err());