_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::default::Default;
  43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  44 use std::ops::Deref;
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  46
  47 #[cfg(test)]
  48 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  49         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  50         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  51         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  52         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  53         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  54         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  56         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  57 }
  58
  59 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  60         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  61         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  62         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  63 }
  64
  65 enum InboundHTLCState {
  66         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  67         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  68         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  69         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  70         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  71         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  72         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  73         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  74         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  75         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  76         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  77         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  78         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  79         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  80         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  81         ///
  82         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  83         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  84         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  85         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  86         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  87         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  88         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  89         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  90         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  91         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  92         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  93         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  94         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  95         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  96         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
  97         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
  98         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
  99         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 100         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 101         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 102         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 103         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 104         Committed,
 105         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 106         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 107         /// we'll drop it.
 108         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 109         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 110         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 111         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 112         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 113         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 114         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 115         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 116 }
 117
 118 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 119         htlc_id: u64,
 120         amount_msat: u64,
 121         cltv_expiry: u32,
 122         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 123         state: InboundHTLCState,
 124 }
 125
 126 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 127         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 128         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 129         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 130         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 131         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 132         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 133         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 134         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 135         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 136         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 137         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 138         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 139         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 140         Committed,
 141         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 142         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 143         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 144         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 145         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 146         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 147         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 148         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 149         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 150         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 151         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 152         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 153         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 154         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 155         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 156 }
 157
 158 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 159         htlc_id: u64,
 160         amount_msat: u64,
 161         cltv_expiry: u32,
 162         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 163         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 164         source: HTLCSource,
 165 }
 166
 167 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 168 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 169         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 170                 // always outbound
 171                 amount_msat: u64,
 172                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 173                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 174                 source: HTLCSource,
 175                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 176         },
 177         ClaimHTLC {
 178                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 179                 htlc_id: u64,
 180         },
 181         FailHTLC {
 182                 htlc_id: u64,
 183                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 184         },
 185 }
 186
 187 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 188 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 189 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 190 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 191 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 192 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 193 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 194 enum ChannelState {
 195         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 196         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 197         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 198         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 199         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 200         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 201         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 202         FundingCreated = 4,
 203         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 204         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 205         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 206         FundingSent = 8,
 207         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 208         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 209         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 212         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 213         ChannelFunded = 64,
 214         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 215         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 216         /// dance.
 217         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 218         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 219         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 220         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 221         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 222         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 223         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 224         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 225         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 226         /// later.
 227         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 228         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 229         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 230         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 231         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 232         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 233         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 234         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 235         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 236         /// us their shutdown.
 237         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 238         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 239         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 240         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 241 }
 242 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 243 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 244
 245 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 246
 247 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 248 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 249 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 250 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 251 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 252 enum UpdateStatus {
 253         /// Status has been gossiped.
 254         Fresh,
 255         /// Status has been changed.
 256         DisabledMarked,
 257         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 258         DisabledStaged,
 259 }
 260
 261 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 262 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 263 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 264 // inbound channel.
 265 //
 266 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 267 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 268 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
 269         config: ChannelConfig,
 270
 271         user_id: u64,
 272
 273         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 274         channel_state: u32,
 275         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 276         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 277
 278         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 279
 280         #[cfg(not(test))]
 281         holder_keys: ChanSigner,
 282         #[cfg(test)]
 283         pub(super) holder_keys: ChanSigner,
 284         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 285         destination_script: Script,
 286
 287         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 288         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 289         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 290
 291         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 292         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 293         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 294         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 295         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 296         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 297
 298         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 299         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 300         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 301         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 302         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 303         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 304         /// send it first.
 305         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 306
 307         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 308         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 309         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 310         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 311         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 312
 313         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 314         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 315         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 316         //
 317         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 318         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 319         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 320         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 321         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 322         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 323         // commitment_signed.
 324         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 325         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 326         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 327         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 328         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 329         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 330         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 331         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 332         update_time_counter: u32,
 333         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 334
 335         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 336         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 337         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 338         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 339         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 340         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 341
 342         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 343
 344         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 345         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 346         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 347         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 348         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 349         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 350         /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
 351         /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
 352         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
 353         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 354
 355         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 356         #[cfg(test)]
 357         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 358         #[cfg(not(test))]
 359         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 360         #[cfg(test)]
 361         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 362         #[cfg(not(test))]
 363         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 364         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 365         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 366         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 367         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 368         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 369         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 370         #[cfg(test)]
 371         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 372         #[cfg(not(test))]
 373         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 374         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 375         minimum_depth: u32,
 376
 377         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 378
 379         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 380
 381         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 382         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 383
 384         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 385
 386         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 387
 388         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 389 }
 390
 391 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 392 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 393 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 394 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 395 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 396 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 397 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 398
 399 #[cfg(not(test))]
 400 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 401 #[cfg(test)]
 402 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 403 #[cfg(not(test))]
 404 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 405 #[cfg(test)]
 406 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 407
 408 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 409 /// it's 2^24.
 410 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 411
 412 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 413 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 414 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 415 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 416         Ignore(String),
 417         Close(String),
 418         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 419 }
 420
 421 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 422         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 423                 match self {
 424                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 425                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 426                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 427                 }
 428         }
 429 }
 430
 431 macro_rules! secp_check {
 432         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 433                 match $res {
 434                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 435                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 436                 }
 437         };
 438 }
 439
 440 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
 441         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 442         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 443                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 444         }
 445
 446         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 447         /// required by us.
 448         ///
 449         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 450         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 451                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 452                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 453         }
 454
 455         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 456                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 457         }
 458
 459         // Constructors:
 460         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
 461         where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
 462               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 463         {
 464                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 465                 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 466                 let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys().clone();
 467
 468                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 469                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 470                 }
 471                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 472                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 473                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 474                 }
 475                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 476                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 477                 }
 478                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 479                 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 480                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 481                 }
 482
 483                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 484
 485                 Ok(Channel {
 486                         user_id,
 487                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 488
 489                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 490                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 491                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 492                         channel_value_satoshis,
 493
 494                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 495
 496                         holder_keys: chan_keys,
 497                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 498                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 499
 500                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 501                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 502                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 503
 504                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 505                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 506                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 507                         pending_update_fee: None,
 508                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 509                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 510                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 511                         update_time_counter: 1,
 512
 513                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 514
 515                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 516                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 517                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 518                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 519                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 520
 521                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 522                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 523                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 524                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 525
 526                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 527
 528                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 529                         short_channel_id: None,
 530                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 531                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 532
 533                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 534                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 535                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 536                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 537                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 538                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 539                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 540                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 541                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 542
 543                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 544                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 545                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 546                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 547                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 548                                 funding_outpoint: None
 549                         },
 550                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 551
 552                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 553                         counterparty_node_id,
 554
 555                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 556
 557                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 558
 559                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 560                 })
 561         }
 562
 563         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 564                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 565         {
 566                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 567                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 568                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 569                 }
 570                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 571                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 572                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 573                 }
 574                 Ok(())
 575         }
 576
 577         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 578         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 579         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
 580                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
 581           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 582         {
 583                 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 584                 let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys().clone();
 585                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 586                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 587                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 588                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 589                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 590                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 591                 };
 592                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 593
 594                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 595                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 596                 }
 597
 598                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 599                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 600                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 601                 }
 602                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 603                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 604                 }
 605                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 606                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 607                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 608                 }
 609                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 610                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 611                 }
 612                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 613                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 614                 }
 615                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 616                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 617                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 618                 }
 619                 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 620
 621                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 622                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 623                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 624                 }
 625                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 626                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 627                 }
 628                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 629                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 630                 }
 631
 632                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 633                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 634                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 635                 }
 636                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 637                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 638                 }
 639                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 640                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 641                 }
 642                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 643                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 644                 }
 645                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 646                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 647                 }
 648                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 649                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 650                 }
 651                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 652                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 653                 }
 654
 655                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 656
 657                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 658                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 659                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 660                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 661                         }
 662                 }
 663                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 664                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 665
 666                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 667
 668                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 669                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 670                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 671                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 672                 }
 673                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 674                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 675                 }
 676                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 677                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 678                 }
 679
 680                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 681                 // for full fee payment
 682                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 683                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 684                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 685                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 686                 }
 687
 688                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 689                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 690                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 691                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 692                 }
 693
 694                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 695                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 696                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 697                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
 698                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 699                                                 Some(script.clone())
 700                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 701                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
 702                                                 None
 703                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 704                                         } else {
 705                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 706                                         }
 707                                 },
 708                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 709                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 710                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 711                                 }
 712                         }
 713                 } else { None };
 714
 715                 let chan = Channel {
 716                         user_id,
 717                         config: local_config,
 718
 719                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 720                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 721                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 722
 723                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 724
 725                         holder_keys: chan_keys,
 726                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 727                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 728
 729                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 730                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 731                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 732
 733                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 734                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 735                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 736                         pending_update_fee: None,
 737                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 738                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 739                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 740                         update_time_counter: 1,
 741
 742                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 743
 744                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 745                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 746                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 747                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 748                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 749
 750                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 751                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 752                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 753                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 754
 755                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 756
 757                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 758                         short_channel_id: None,
 759                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 760                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 761
 762                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 763                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 764                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 765                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 766                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 767                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 768                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 769                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 770                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 771                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 772
 773                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 774                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 775                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 776                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 777                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 778                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 779                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 780                                 }),
 781                                 funding_outpoint: None
 782                         },
 783                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 784
 785                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 786                         counterparty_node_id,
 787
 788                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 789
 790                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 791
 792                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 793                 };
 794
 795                 Ok(chan)
 796         }
 797
 798         // Utilities to build transactions:
 799
 800         fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
 801                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 802
 803                 let counterparty_payment_point = &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point.serialize();
 804                 if self.is_outbound() {
 805                         sha.input(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 806                         sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
 807                 } else {
 808                         sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
 809                         sha.input(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 810                 }
 811                 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 812
 813                 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
 814                 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
 815                 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
 816                 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
 817                 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
 818                 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
 819         }
 820
 821         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 822         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 823         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 824         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 825         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 826         /// an HTLC to a).
 827         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 828         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 829         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 830         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 831         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 832         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 833         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 834         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 835         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 836         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 837         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 838         #[inline]
 839         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 840                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 841                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 842                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 843
 844                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 845                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 846                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 847                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 848
 849                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 850
 851                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 852                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 853                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 854                                         offered: $offered,
 855                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 856                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 857                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 858                                         transaction_output_index: None
 859                                 }
 860                         }
 861                 }
 862
 863                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 864                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 865                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 866                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 867                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 868                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 869                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 870                                         } else {
 871                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 872                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 873                                         }
 874                                 } else {
 875                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 876                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 877                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 878                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 879                                         } else {
 880                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 881                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 882                                         }
 883                                 }
 884                         }
 885                 }
 886
 887                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 888                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 889                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 890                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 891                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 892                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 893                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 894                         };
 895
 896                         if include {
 897                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 898                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 899                         } else {
 900                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 901                                 match &htlc.state {
 902                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 903                                                 if generated_by_local {
 904                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 905                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 906                                                         }
 907                                                 }
 908                                         },
 909                                         _ => {},
 910                                 }
 911                         }
 912                 }
 913
 914                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 915                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 916                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 917                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 918                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 919                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 920                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 921                         };
 922
 923                         if include {
 924                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 925                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 926                         } else {
 927                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 928                                 match htlc.state {
 929                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 930                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 931                                         },
 932                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 933                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 934                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 935                                                 }
 936                                         },
 937                                         _ => {},
 938                                 }
 939                         }
 940                 }
 941
 942                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 943                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 944                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 945                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 946                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 947                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 948                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 949                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 950
 951                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 952                 {
 953                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 954                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 955                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 956                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 957                         } else {
 958                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 959                         };
 960                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 961                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 962                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 963                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 964                 }
 965
 966                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 967                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
 968                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
 969                 } else {
 970                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
 971                 };
 972
 973                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
 974                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
 975
 976                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
 977                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
 978                 } else {
 979                         value_to_a = 0;
 980                 }
 981
 982                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
 983                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
 984                 } else {
 985                         value_to_b = 0;
 986                 }
 987
 988                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
 989
 990                 let channel_parameters =
 991                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
 992                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
 993                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
 994                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
 995                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
 996                                                                              keys.clone(),
 997                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
 998                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
 999                                                                              &channel_parameters
1000                 );
1001                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1002                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1003                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1004                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1005
1006                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1007         }
1008
1009         #[inline]
1010         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1011                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1012                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1013         }
1014
1015         #[inline]
1016         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1017                 let mut ret =
1018                 (4 +                                           // version
1019                  1 +                                           // input count
1020                  36 +                                          // prevout
1021                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1022                  4 +                                           // sequence
1023                  1 +                                           // output count
1024                  4                                             // lock time
1025                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1026                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1027                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1028                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1029                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1030                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1031                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1032                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1033                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1034                 }
1035                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1036                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1037                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1038                 }
1039                 ret
1040         }
1041
1042         #[inline]
1043         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1044                 let txins = {
1045                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1046                         ins.push(TxIn {
1047                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1048                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1049                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1050                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1051                         });
1052                         ins
1053                 };
1054
1055                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1056                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1057                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1058
1059                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1060                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1061                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1062
1063                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1064                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1065                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1066                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1067                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1068                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1069                 }
1070
1071                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1072                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1073                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1074                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1075                         }, ()));
1076                 }
1077
1078                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1079                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1080                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1081                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1082                         }, ()));
1083                 }
1084
1085                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1086
1087                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1088                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1089                         outputs.push(out.0);
1090                 }
1091
1092                 (Transaction {
1093                         version: 2,
1094                         lock_time: 0,
1095                         input: txins,
1096                         output: outputs,
1097                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1098         }
1099
1100         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1101                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1102         }
1103
1104         #[inline]
1105         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1106         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1107         /// our counterparty!)
1108         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1109         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1110         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1111                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1112                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1113                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1114                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1115
1116                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1117         }
1118
1119         #[inline]
1120         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1121         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1122         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1123         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1124                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1125                 //may see payments to it!
1126                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1127                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1128                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1129
1130                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1131         }
1132
1133         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1134         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1135         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1136         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1137                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1138         }
1139
1140         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1141         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1142         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1143         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1144                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1145         }
1146
1147         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1148         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1149         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1150         ///
1151         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1152         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1153         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1154                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1155                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1156                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1157                 // either.
1158                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1159                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1160                 }
1161                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1162
1163                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1164
1165                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1166                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1167                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1168
1169                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1170                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1171                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1172                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1173                                 match htlc.state {
1174                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1175                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1176                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1177                                                 } else {
1178                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1179                                                 }
1180                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1181                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1182                                         },
1183                                         _ => {
1184                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1185                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1186                                         }
1187                                 }
1188                                 pending_idx = idx;
1189                                 break;
1190                         }
1191                 }
1192                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1193                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1194                 }
1195
1196                 // Now update local state:
1197                 //
1198                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1199                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1200                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1201                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1202                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1203                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1204                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1205                         }],
1206                 };
1207
1208                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1209                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1210                                 match pending_update {
1211                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1212                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1213                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1214                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1215                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1216                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1217                                                 }
1218                                         },
1219                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1220                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1221                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1222                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1223                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1224                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1225                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1226                                                 }
1227                                         },
1228                                         _ => {}
1229                                 }
1230                         }
1231                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1232                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1233                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1234                         });
1235                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1236                 }
1237
1238                 {
1239                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1240                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1241                         } else {
1242                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1243                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1244                         }
1245                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1246                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1247                 }
1248
1249                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1250                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1251                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1252                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1253                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1254         }
1255
1256         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1257                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1258                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1259                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1260                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1261                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1262                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1263                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1264                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1265                         },
1266                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1267                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1268                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1269                         },
1270                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1271                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1272                 }
1273         }
1274
1275         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1276         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1277         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1278         ///
1279         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1280         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1281         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1282                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1283                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1284                 }
1285                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1286
1287                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1288                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1289                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1290
1291                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1292                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1293                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1294                                 match htlc.state {
1295                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1296                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1297                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1298                                                 return Ok(None);
1299                                         },
1300                                         _ => {
1301                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1302                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1303                                         }
1304                                 }
1305                                 pending_idx = idx;
1306                         }
1307                 }
1308                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1309                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1310                 }
1311
1312                 // Now update local state:
1313                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1314                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1315                                 match pending_update {
1316                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1317                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1318                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1319                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1320                                                 }
1321                                         },
1322                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1323                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1324                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1325                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1326                                                 }
1327                                         },
1328                                         _ => {}
1329                                 }
1330                         }
1331                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1332                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1333                                 err_packet,
1334                         });
1335                         return Ok(None);
1336                 }
1337
1338                 {
1339                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1340                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1341                 }
1342
1343                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1344                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1345                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1346                         reason: err_packet
1347                 }))
1348         }
1349
1350         // Message handlers:
1351
1352         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1353                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1354                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1355                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1356                 }
1357                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1358                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1359                 }
1360                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1361                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1362                 }
1363                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1364                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1365                 }
1366                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1367                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1368                 }
1369                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1370                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1371                 }
1372                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1373                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1374                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1375                 }
1376                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1377                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1378                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1379                 }
1380                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1381                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1382                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1383                 }
1384                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1385                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1386                 }
1387                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1388                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1389                 }
1390
1391                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1392                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1393                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1394                 }
1395                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1396                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1397                 }
1398                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1399                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1400                 }
1401                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1402                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1403                 }
1404                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1406                 }
1407                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1409                 }
1410                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1411                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1412                 }
1413
1414                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1415                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1416                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1417                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1418                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1419                                                 Some(script.clone())
1420                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1421                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
1422                                                 None
1423                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1424                                         } else {
1425                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1426                                         }
1427                                 },
1428                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1429                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1430                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1431                                 }
1432                         }
1433                 } else { None };
1434
1435                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1436                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1437                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1438                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1439                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1440                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1441
1442                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1443                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1444                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1445                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1446                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1447                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1448                 };
1449
1450                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1451                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1452                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1453                 });
1454
1455                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1456                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1457
1458                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1459
1460                 Ok(())
1461         }
1462
1463         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1464                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1465
1466                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1467                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1468                 {
1469                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1470                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1471                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1472                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1473                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1474                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1475                 }
1476
1477                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1478                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1479
1480                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1481                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1482                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1483
1484                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1485                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1486
1487                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1488                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1489         }
1490
1491         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1492                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1493         }
1494
1495         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1496                 if self.is_outbound() {
1497                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1498                 }
1499                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1500                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1501                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1502                         // channel.
1503                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1504                 }
1505                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1506                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1507                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1508                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1509                 }
1510
1511                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1512                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1513                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1514                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1515                 self.holder_keys.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1516
1517                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1518                         Ok(res) => res,
1519                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1520                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1521                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1522                         },
1523                         Err(e) => {
1524                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1525                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1526                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1527                         }
1528                 };
1529
1530                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1531                         initial_commitment_tx,
1532                         msg.signature,
1533                         Vec::new(),
1534                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1535                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1536                 );
1537
1538                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1539
1540                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1541                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1542                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1543                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1544                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1545                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1546                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1547                                                               self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1548                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1549
1550                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1551
1552                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1553                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1554                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1555                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1556
1557                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1558                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1559                         signature
1560                 }, channel_monitor))
1561         }
1562
1563         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1564         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1565         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1566                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1567                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1568                 }
1569                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1570                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1571                 }
1572                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1573                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1574                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1575                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1576                 }
1577
1578                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1579
1580                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1581                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1582                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1583                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1584
1585                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1586
1587                 let holder_keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1588                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1589                 {
1590                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1591                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1592                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1593                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1594                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1595                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1596                         }
1597                 }
1598
1599                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1600                         initial_commitment_tx,
1601                         msg.signature,
1602                         Vec::new(),
1603                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1604                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1605                 );
1606
1607
1608                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1609                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1610                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1611                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1612                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1613                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1614                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1615                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1616                                                               self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1617                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1618
1619                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1620
1621                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1622                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1623                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1624                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1625
1626                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1627         }
1628
1629         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1630                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1631                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1632                 }
1633
1634                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1635
1636                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1637                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1638                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1639                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1640                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1641                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1642                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1643                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1644                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1645                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1646                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1647                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1648                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1649                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1650                         }
1651                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1652                         return Ok(());
1653                 } else {
1654                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1655                 }
1656
1657                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1658                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1659                 Ok(())
1660         }
1661
1662         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1663         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1664                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1665                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1666                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1667                 }
1668                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1669         }
1670
1671         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1672         /// holding cell.
1673         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1674                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1675                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1676                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1677                 }
1678
1679                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1680                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1681                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1682                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1683                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1684                         }
1685                 }
1686
1687                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1688         }
1689
1690         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1691         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1692         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1693         /// corner case properly.
1694         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1695                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1696                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1697                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1698         }
1699
1700         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1701         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1702         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1703                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1704                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1705                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1706         }
1707
1708         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction
1709         // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next
1710         // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1711         // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
1712         // HTLCs are excluded.
1713         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1714                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1715
1716                 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1717                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1718                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1719                                 continue
1720                         }
1721                         match htlc.state {
1722                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1723                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1724                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1725                                 _ => {},
1726                         }
1727                 }
1728
1729                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1730                         match htlc {
1731                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1732                                 _ => {},
1733                         }
1734                 }
1735
1736                 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1737         }
1738
1739         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction
1740         // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their
1741         // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1742         // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
1743         // are excluded.
1744         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1745                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1746
1747                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
1748                 // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
1749                 // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1750                 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1751                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1752                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis {
1753                                 continue
1754                         }
1755                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next
1756                         // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1757                         match htlc.state {
1758                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1759                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1760                                 _ => {},
1761                         }
1762                 }
1763
1764                 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1765         }
1766
1767         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1768         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1769                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1770                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1771                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1772                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1773                 }
1774                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1775                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1776                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1777                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1778                 }
1779                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1780                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1781                 }
1782                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1783                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1784                 }
1785                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1786                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1787                 }
1788                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1789                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1790                 }
1791
1792                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1793                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1794                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1795                 }
1796                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1797                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1798                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1799                 }
1800                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1801                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1802                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1803                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1804                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1805                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1806                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1807                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1808                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1809                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1810                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1811                 // transaction).
1812                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1813                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1814                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1815                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1816                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1817                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1818                         }
1819                 }
1820
1821                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1822                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1823                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1824                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1825                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1826                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1827                 }
1828
1829                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1830                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1831                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1832                         // +1 for this HTLC.
1833                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
1834                 };
1835                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1836                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1837                 };
1838
1839                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1840                         Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1841                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1842                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1843                 }
1844
1845                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1846                         // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
1847                         // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
1848                         // only on the sender's.
1849                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees,
1850                         // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1
1851                         // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of
1852                         // being sensitive to fee spikes.
1853                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1);
1854                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1855                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1856                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1857                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
1858                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
1859                         }
1860                 } else {
1861                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
1862
1863                         // +1 for this HTLC.
1864                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
1865                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1866                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
1867                         }
1868                 }
1869                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1870                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
1871                 }
1872                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1873                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
1874                 }
1875
1876                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1877                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
1878                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1879                         }
1880                 }
1881
1882                 // Now update local state:
1883                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
1884                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1885                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1886                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1887                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1888                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1889                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
1890                 });
1891                 Ok(())
1892         }
1893
1894         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1895         #[inline]
1896         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1897                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1898                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1899                                 match check_preimage {
1900                                         None => {},
1901                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
1902                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1903                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
1904                                                 }
1905                                 };
1906                                 match htlc.state {
1907                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1908                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
1909                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1910                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1911                                         },
1912                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1913                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
1914                                 }
1915                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1916                         }
1917                 }
1918                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
1919         }
1920
1921         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1922                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1923                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1924                 }
1925                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1926                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1927                 }
1928
1929                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1930                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1931         }
1932
1933         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1934                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1935                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1936                 }
1937                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1938                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1939                 }
1940
1941                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1942                 Ok(())
1943         }
1944
1945         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1946                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1947                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1948                 }
1949                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1950                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1951                 }
1952
1953                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1954                 Ok(())
1955         }
1956
1957         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
1958         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1959                                 L::Target: Logger
1960         {
1961                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1962                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
1963                 }
1964                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1965                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
1966                 }
1967                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1968                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
1969                 }
1970
1971                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1972
1973                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1974
1975                 let mut update_fee = false;
1976                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1977                         update_fee = true;
1978                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1979                 } else {
1980                         self.feerate_per_kw
1981                 };
1982
1983                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
1984                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
1985                         let commitment_txid = {
1986                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
1987                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1988                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1989
1990                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1991                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
1992                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
1993                                 }
1994                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
1995                         };
1996                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1997                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
1998                 };
1999
2000                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2001                 if update_fee {
2002                         let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2003
2004                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2005                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2006                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2007                         }
2008                 }
2009
2010                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2011                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2012                 }
2013
2014                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2015                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2016                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2017                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2018                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2019                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2020                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2021                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2022                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2023                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2024                                 }
2025                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2026                         } else {
2027                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2028                         }
2029                 }
2030
2031                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2032                         commitment_tx,
2033                         msg.signature,
2034                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2035                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2036                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2037                 );
2038
2039                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2040                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2041
2042                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2043                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2044                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2045                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2046                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2047                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2048                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2049                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2050                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2051                                         need_commitment = true;
2052                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2053                                 }
2054                         }
2055                 }
2056
2057                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2058                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2059                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2060                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2061                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2062                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2063                         }]
2064                 };
2065
2066                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2067                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2068                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2069                         } else { None };
2070                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2071                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2072                                 need_commitment = true;
2073                         }
2074                 }
2075                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2076                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2077                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2078                         } else { None } {
2079                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2080                                 need_commitment = true;
2081                         }
2082                 }
2083
2084                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2085                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2086                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2087                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2088
2089                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2090                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2091                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2092                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2093                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2094                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2095                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2096                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2097                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2098                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2099                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2100                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2101                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2102                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2103                         }
2104                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2105                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2106                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2107                 }
2108
2109                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2110                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2111                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2112                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2113                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2114                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2115                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2116                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2117                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2118                         (Some(msg), None)
2119                 } else if !need_commitment {
2120                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2121                 } else { (None, None) };
2122
2123                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2124                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2125                         per_commitment_secret,
2126                         next_per_commitment_point,
2127                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2128         }
2129
2130         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2131         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2132         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2133                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2134                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2135                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2136
2137                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2138                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2139                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2140                         };
2141
2142                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2143                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2144                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2145                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2146                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2147                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2148                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2149                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2150                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2151                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2152                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2153                                 // to rebalance channels.
2154                                 match &htlc_update {
2155                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2156                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2157                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2158                                                         Err(e) => {
2159                                                                 match e {
2160                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2161                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2162                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2163                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2164                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2165                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2166                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2167                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2168                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2169                                                                         },
2170                                                                         _ => {
2171                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2172                                                                         },
2173                                                                 }
2174                                                         }
2175                                                 }
2176                                         },
2177                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2178                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2179                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2180                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2181                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2182                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2183                                                                 }
2184                                                         },
2185                                                         Err(e) => {
2186                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2187                                                                 else {
2188                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2189                                                                 }
2190                                                         }
2191                                                 }
2192                                         },
2193                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2194                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2195                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2196                                                         Err(e) => {
2197                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2198                                                                 else {
2199                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2200                                                                 }
2201                                                         }
2202                                                 }
2203                                         },
2204                                 }
2205                         }
2206                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2207                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2208                         }
2209                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2210                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2211                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2212                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2213                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2214                                 })
2215                         } else {
2216                                 None
2217                         };
2218
2219                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2220                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2221                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2222                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2223                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2224
2225                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2226                                 update_add_htlcs,
2227                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2228                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2229                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2230                                 update_fee,
2231                                 commitment_signed,
2232                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2233                 } else {
2234                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2235                 }
2236         }
2237
2238         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2239         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2240         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2241         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2242         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2243         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2244                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2245                                         L::Target: Logger,
2246         {
2247                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2248                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2249                 }
2250                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2251                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2252                 }
2253                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2254                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2255                 }
2256
2257                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2258                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2259                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2260                         }
2261                 }
2262
2263                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2264                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2265                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2266                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2267                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2268                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2269                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2270                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2271                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2272                 }
2273
2274                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2275                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2276                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2277                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2278                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2279                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2280                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2281                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2282                         }],
2283                 };
2284
2285                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2286                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2287                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2288                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2289                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2290                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2291                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2292                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2293
2294                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2295                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2296                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2297                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2298                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2299                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2300                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2301
2302                 {
2303                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2304                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2305                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2306
2307                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2308                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2309                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2310                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2311                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2312                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2313                                         }
2314                                         false
2315                                 } else { true }
2316                         });
2317                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2318                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2319                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2320                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2321                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2322                                         } else {
2323                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2324                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2325                                         }
2326                                         false
2327                                 } else { true }
2328                         });
2329                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2330                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2331                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2332                                         true
2333                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2334                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2335                                         true
2336                                 } else { false };
2337                                 if swap {
2338                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2339                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2340
2341                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2342                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2343                                                 require_commitment = true;
2344                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2345                                                 match forward_info {
2346                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2347                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2348                                                                 match fail_msg {
2349                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2350                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2351                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2352                                                                         },
2353                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2354                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2355                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2356                                                                         },
2357                                                                 }
2358                                                         },
2359                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2360                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2361                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2362                                                         }
2363                                                 }
2364                                         }
2365                                 }
2366                         }
2367                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2368                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2369                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2370                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2371                                 }
2372                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2373                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2374                                 } else { None } {
2375                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2376                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2377                                         require_commitment = true;
2378                                 }
2379                         }
2380                 }
2381                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2382
2383                 if self.is_outbound() {
2384                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2385                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2386                         }
2387                 } else {
2388                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2389                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2390                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2391                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2392                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2393                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2394                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2395                                         require_commitment = true;
2396                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2397                                 }
2398                         }
2399                 }
2400
2401                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2402                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2403                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2404                         if require_commitment {
2405                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2406                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2407                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2408                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2409                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2410                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2411                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2412                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2413                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2414                         }
2415                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2416                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2417                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2418                 }
2419
2420                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2421                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2422                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2423                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2424                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2425                                 }
2426                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2427                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2428                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2429                                 }
2430
2431                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2432                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2433                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2434                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2435
2436                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2437                         },
2438                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2439                                 if require_commitment {
2440                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2441
2442                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2443                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2444                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2445                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2446
2447                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2448                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2449                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2450                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2451                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2452                                                 update_fee: None,
2453                                                 commitment_signed
2454                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2455                                 } else {
2456                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2457                                 }
2458                         }
2459                 }
2460
2461         }
2462
2463         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2464         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2465         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2466         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2467                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2468                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2469                 }
2470                 if !self.is_usable() {
2471                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2472                 }
2473                 if !self.is_live() {
2474                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2475                 }
2476
2477                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2478                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2479                         return None;
2480                 }
2481
2482                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2483                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2484
2485                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2486                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2487                         feerate_per_kw,
2488                 })
2489         }
2490
2491         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2492                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2493                         Some(update_fee) => {
2494                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2495                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2496                         },
2497                         None => Ok(None)
2498                 }
2499         }
2500
2501         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2502         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2503         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2504         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2505         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2506         /// completed.
2507         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2508                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2509
2510                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2511                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2512                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2513                         return outbound_drops;
2514                 }
2515                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2516                 // will be retransmitted.
2517                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2518
2519                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2520                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2521                         match htlc.state {
2522                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2523                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2524                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2525                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2526                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2527                                         false
2528                                 },
2529                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2530                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2531                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2532                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2533                                         true
2534                                 },
2535                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2536                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2537                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2538                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2539                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2540                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2541                                         true
2542                                 },
2543                         }
2544                 });
2545                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2546
2547                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2548                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2549                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2550                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2551                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2552                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2553                         }
2554                 }
2555
2556                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2557                         match htlc_update {
2558                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2559                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2560                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2561                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2562                                 // logic.
2563                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2564                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2565                                         false
2566                                 },
2567                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2568                         }
2569                 });
2570                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2571                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2572                 outbound_drops
2573         }
2574
2575         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2576         /// updates are partially paused.
2577         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2578         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2579         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2580         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2581         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2582                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2583                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2584                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2585                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2586                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2587                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2588                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2589                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2590         }
2591
2592         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2593         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2594         /// to the remote side.
2595         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2596                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2597                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2598
2599                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2600
2601                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2602                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2603                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2604                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2605                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2606                 // monitor was persisted.
2607                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2608                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2609                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2610                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2611                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2612                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2613                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2614                         })
2615                 } else { None };
2616
2617                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2618                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2619                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2620                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2621
2622                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2623                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2624                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2625                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2626                 }
2627
2628                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2629                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2630                 } else { None };
2631                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2632                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2633                 } else { None };
2634
2635                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2636                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2637                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2638                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2639                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2640                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2641                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2642                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2643                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2644         }
2645
2646         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2647                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2648         {
2649                 if self.is_outbound() {
2650                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2651                 }
2652                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2653                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2654                 }
2655                 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2656                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2657                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2658                 Ok(())
2659         }
2660
2661         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2662                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2663                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2664                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2665                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2666                         per_commitment_secret,
2667                         next_per_commitment_point,
2668                 }
2669         }
2670
2671         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2672                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2673                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2674                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2675                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2676
2677                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2678                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2679                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2680                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2681                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2682                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2683                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2684                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2685                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2686                                 });
2687                         }
2688                 }
2689
2690                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2691                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2692                                 match reason {
2693                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2694                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2695                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2696                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2697                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2698                                                 });
2699                                         },
2700                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2701                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2702                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2703                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2704                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2705                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2706                                                 });
2707                                         },
2708                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2709                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2710                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2711                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2712                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2713                                                 });
2714                                         },
2715                                 }
2716                         }
2717                 }
2718
2719                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2720                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2721                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2722                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2723                         update_fee: None,
2724                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2725                 }
2726         }
2727
2728         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2729         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2730         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2731                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2732                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2733                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2734                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2735                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2736                 }
2737
2738                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2739                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2740                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2741                 }
2742
2743                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2744                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2745                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2746                                         let expected_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2747                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2748                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2749                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2750                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2751                                         }
2752                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2753                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2754                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2755                                                 ));
2756                                         }
2757                                 },
2758                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2759                         }
2760                 }
2761
2762                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2763                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2764                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2765
2766                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2767                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2768                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2769                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2770                         })
2771                 } else { None };
2772
2773                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2774                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2775                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2776                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2777                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2778                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2779                                 }
2780                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2781                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2782                         }
2783
2784                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2785                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2786                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2787                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2788                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2789                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2790                 }
2791
2792                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2793                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2794                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2795                         None
2796                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2797                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2798                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2799                                 None
2800                         } else {
2801                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2802                         }
2803                 } else {
2804                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2805                 };
2806
2807                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2808                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2809                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2810                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2811                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2812
2813                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2814                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2815                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2816                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2817                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2818                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2819                         })
2820                 } else { None };
2821
2822                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2823                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2824                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2825                         } else {
2826                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2827                         }
2828
2829                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2830                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2831                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2832                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2833                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2834                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2835                                         }
2836                                 }
2837
2838                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2839                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2840                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2841                                 // now!
2842                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
2843                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2844                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2845                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2846                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2847                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2848                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2849                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2850                                         },
2851                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2852                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2853                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2854                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2855                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2856                                         },
2857                                 }
2858                         } else {
2859                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2860                         }
2861                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
2862                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2863                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2864                         } else {
2865                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2866                         }
2867
2868                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2869                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2870                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2871                         }
2872
2873                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2874                 } else {
2875                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2876                 }
2877         }
2878
2879         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2880                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2881         {
2882                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2883                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2884                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2885                         return None;
2886                 }
2887
2888                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2889                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2890                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2891                 }
2892                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
2893                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
2894
2895                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2896                 let sig = self.holder_keys
2897                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2898                         .ok();
2899                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
2900                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
2901
2902                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
2903                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2904                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2905                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2906                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
2907                 })
2908         }
2909
2910         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2911                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2912         {
2913                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2914                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2915                 }
2916                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2917                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2918                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2919                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2920                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
2921                 }
2922                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2923                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2924                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
2925                         }
2926                 }
2927                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2928
2929                 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2930                 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2931                 if self.is_outbound() && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2932                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2933                 }
2934
2935                 //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2936                 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2937                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2938                 }
2939
2940                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2941                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2942                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2943                         }
2944                 } else {
2945                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2946                 }
2947
2948                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2949
2950                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2951                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2952
2953                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2954                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2955                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2956                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2957                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2958                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2959                         match htlc_update {
2960                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2961                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2962                                         false
2963                                 },
2964                                 _ => true
2965                         }
2966                 });
2967                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2968                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2969                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2970
2971                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2972                         None
2973                 } else {
2974                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2975                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2976                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2977                         })
2978                 };
2979
2980                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2981                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2982
2983                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2984         }
2985
2986         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
2987                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2988                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2989                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2990
2991                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2992
2993                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
2994                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2995                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
2996                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2997                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2998                 } else {
2999                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3000                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3001                 }
3002                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3003                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3004
3005                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3006         }
3007
3008         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3009                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3010         {
3011                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3012                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3013                 }
3014                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3015                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3016                 }
3017                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3018                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3019                 }
3020                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3021                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3022                 }
3023
3024                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3025                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3026                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3027                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3028                 }
3029                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3030
3031                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3032                         Ok(_) => {},
3033                         Err(_e) => {
3034                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3035                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3036                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3037                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3038                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3039                         },
3040                 };
3041
3042                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3043                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3044                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3045                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3046                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3047                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3048                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3049                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3050                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3051                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3052                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3053                         }
3054                 }
3055
3056                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3057                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3058                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3059                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3060                                 let sig = self.holder_keys
3061                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3062                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3063                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3064                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3065                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3066                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3067                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3068                                         signature: sig,
3069                                 }), None))
3070                         }
3071                 }
3072
3073                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3074                 if self.is_outbound() {
3075                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3076                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3077                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3078                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3079                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3080                                         }
3081                                 }
3082                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3083                         }
3084                 } else {
3085                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3086                 }
3087                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3088                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3089                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3090                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3091                                 }
3092                         }
3093                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3094                 }
3095
3096                 let sig = self.holder_keys
3097                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3098                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3099                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3100                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3101                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3102
3103                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3104                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3105
3106                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3107                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3108                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3109                         signature: sig,
3110                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3111         }
3112
3113         // Public utilities:
3114
3115         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3116                 self.channel_id
3117         }
3118
3119         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3120         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3121         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3122                 self.user_id
3123         }
3124
3125         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3126         /// is_usable() returns true).
3127         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3128         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3129                 self.short_channel_id
3130         }
3131
3132         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3133         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3134         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3135                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3136         }
3137
3138         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3139                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3140         }
3141
3142         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3143                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3144         }
3145
3146         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3147                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3148         }
3149
3150         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3151                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3152         }
3153
3154         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3155         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3156                 self.counterparty_node_id
3157         }
3158
3159         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3160         #[cfg(test)]
3161         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3162                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3163         }
3164
3165         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3166         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3167                 return cmp::min(
3168                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3169                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3170                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3171                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3172
3173                         Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3174                 );
3175         }
3176
3177         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3178         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3179                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3180         }
3181
3182         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3183                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3184         }
3185
3186         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3187                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3188         }
3189
3190         #[cfg(test)]
3191         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3192                 self.feerate_per_kw
3193         }
3194
3195         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3196                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3197         }
3198
3199         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3200                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3201         }
3202
3203         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3204                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3205         }
3206
3207         #[cfg(test)]
3208         pub fn get_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3209                 &self.holder_keys
3210         }
3211
3212         #[cfg(test)]
3213         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3214                 ChannelValueStat {
3215                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3216                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3217                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3218                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3219                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3220                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3221                                 let mut res = 0;
3222                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3223                                         match h {
3224                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3225                                                         res += amount_msat;
3226                                                 }
3227                                                 _ => {}
3228                                         }
3229                                 }
3230                                 res
3231                         },
3232                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3233                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3234                 }
3235         }
3236
3237         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3238         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3239                 self.update_time_counter
3240         }
3241
3242         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3243                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3244         }
3245
3246         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3247                 self.config.announced_channel
3248         }
3249
3250         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3251                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3252         }
3253
3254         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3255         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3256         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3257                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3258         {
3259                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3260                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3261
3262                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3263                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3264
3265                 if self.is_outbound() {
3266                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3267                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3268                 }
3269
3270                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3271                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3272
3273                 res as u32
3274         }
3275
3276         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3277         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3278                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3279         }
3280
3281         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3282         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3283         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3284                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3285                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3286         }
3287
3288         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3289         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3290         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3291         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3292                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3293         }
3294
3295         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3296         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3297         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3298                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3299         }
3300
3301         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3302         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3303                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3304         }
3305
3306         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3307         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3308         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3309         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3310                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3311                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3312                         true
3313                 } else { false }
3314         }
3315
3316         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3317                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3318         }
3319
3320         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3321                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3322         }
3323
3324         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3325                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3326         }
3327
3328         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3329                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3330         }
3331
3332         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3333                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3334         }
3335
3336         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3337         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3338         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3339         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3340         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3341         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3342         ///
3343         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3344         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3345         /// post-shutdown.
3346         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3347         ///
3348         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3349         /// back.
3350         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3351                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3352                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3353                         match htlc_update {
3354                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3355                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3356                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3357                                                 false
3358                                         } else { true }
3359                                 },
3360                                 _ => true
3361                         }
3362                 });
3363                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3364                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3365                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3366                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3367                         }
3368                 }
3369                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3370                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3371                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3372                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3373                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3374                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3375                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3376                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3377                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3378                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3379                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3380                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3381                                                         // channel and move on.
3382                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3383                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3384                                                 }
3385                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3386                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3387                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3388                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3389                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3390                                                 });
3391                                         } else {
3392                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3393                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3394                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3395                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3396                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3397                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3398                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3399                                                                 }
3400                                                         }
3401                                                 }
3402                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3403                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3404                                                 }
3405                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3406                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3407                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3408                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3409                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3410                                         }
3411                                 }
3412                         }
3413                 }
3414                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3415                         self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3416                         self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3417                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3418                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3419                                         let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3420                                                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3421                                                 true
3422                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3423                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3424                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3425                                                 true
3426                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3427                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3428                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3429                                                 false
3430                                         } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3431                                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3432                                         } else {
3433                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3434                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3435                                                 false
3436                                         };
3437                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3438
3439                                         //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3440                                         //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3441                                         //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3442                                         //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3443                                         if need_commitment_update {
3444                                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3445                                                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3446                                                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3447                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3448                                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3449                                                         }), timed_out_htlcs));
3450                                                 } else {
3451                                                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3452                                                         return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3453                                                 }
3454                                         }
3455                                 }
3456                         }
3457                 }
3458                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3459         }
3460
3461         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3462         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3463         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3464         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3465                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3466                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3467                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3468                                 return true;
3469                         }
3470                 }
3471                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3472                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3473                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3474                 }
3475                 false
3476         }
3477
3478         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3479         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3480
3481         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3482                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3483                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3484                 }
3485                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3486                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3487                 }
3488
3489                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3490                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3491                 }
3492
3493                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3494                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3495
3496                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3497                         chain_hash,
3498                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3499                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3500                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3501                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3502                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3503                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3504                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3505                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3506                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3507                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3508                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3509                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3510                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3511                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3512                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3513                         first_per_commitment_point,
3514                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3515                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3516                 }
3517         }
3518
3519         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3520                 if self.is_outbound() {
3521                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3522                 }
3523                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3524                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3525                 }
3526                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3527                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3528                 }
3529
3530                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3531                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3532
3533                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3534                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3535                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3536                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3537                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3538                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3539                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3540                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3541                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3542                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3543                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3544                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3545                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3546                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3547                         first_per_commitment_point,
3548                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3549                 }
3550         }
3551
3552         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3553         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3554                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3555                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3556                 Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3557                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3558         }
3559
3560         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3561         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3562         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3563         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3564         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3565         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3566         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3567         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3568                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3569                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3570                 }
3571                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3572                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3573                 }
3574                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3575                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3576                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3577                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3578                 }
3579
3580                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3581                 self.holder_keys.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3582
3583                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3584                         Ok(res) => res,
3585                         Err(e) => {
3586                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3587                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3588                                 return Err(e);
3589                         }
3590                 };
3591
3592                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3593
3594                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3595
3596                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3597                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3598
3599                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3600                         temporary_channel_id,
3601                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3602                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3603                         signature
3604                 })
3605         }
3606
3607         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3608         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3609         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3610         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3611         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3612         /// closing).
3613         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3614         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3615         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3616                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3617                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3618                 }
3619                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3620                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3621                 }
3622                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3623                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3624                 }
3625
3626                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3627
3628                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3629                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3630                         chain_hash,
3631                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3632                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3633                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3634                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3635                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3636                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3637                 };
3638
3639                 let sig = self.holder_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3640                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3641
3642                 Ok((msg, sig))
3643         }
3644
3645         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3646         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3647         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3648                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3649                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3650                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3651                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3652                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3653                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3654                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3655                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3656                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3657                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3658                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3659                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3660                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3661                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3662                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3663                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3664                         })
3665                 } else {
3666                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3667                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3668                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3669                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3670                         })
3671                 };
3672                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3673                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3674                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3675                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3676                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3677                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3678                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3679                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3680
3681                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3682                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3683                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3684                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3685                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3686                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3687                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3688                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3689                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3690                         // overflow here.
3691                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3692                         data_loss_protect,
3693                 }
3694         }
3695
3696
3697         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3698
3699         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3700         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3701         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3702         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3703         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3704         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3705         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3706         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3707                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3708                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3709                 }
3710                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3711                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3712                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3713                 }
3714
3715                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3716                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3717                 }
3718
3719                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3720                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3721                 }
3722
3723                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3724                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3725                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3726                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3727                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3728                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3729                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3730                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3731                 }
3732
3733                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3734                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3735                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3736                 }
3737                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3738                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3739                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3740                 }
3741
3742                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3743                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3744
3745                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3746                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3747                         // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC.
3748                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
3749                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3750                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3751                         }
3752                 }
3753
3754                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3755                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3756                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3757                 }
3758
3759                 // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
3760                 // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
3761                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3762                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
3763                 } else { 0 };
3764                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3765                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3766                 }
3767
3768                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3769                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3770                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3771                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3772                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3773                 }
3774
3775                 // Now update local state:
3776                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3777                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3778                                 amount_msat,
3779                                 payment_hash,
3780                                 cltv_expiry,
3781                                 source,
3782                                 onion_routing_packet,
3783                         });
3784                         return Ok(None);
3785                 }
3786
3787                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3788                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3789                         amount_msat,
3790                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3791                         cltv_expiry,
3792                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3793                         source,
3794                 });
3795
3796                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3797                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3798                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3799                         amount_msat,
3800                         payment_hash,
3801                         cltv_expiry,
3802                         onion_routing_packet,
3803                 };
3804                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3805
3806                 Ok(Some(res))
3807         }
3808
3809         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3810         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3811         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3812         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3813         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3814                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3815                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3816                 }
3817                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3818                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3819                 }
3820                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3821                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3822                 }
3823                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3824                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3825                 }
3826                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3827                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3828                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3829                                 have_updates = true;
3830                         }
3831                         if have_updates { break; }
3832                 }
3833                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3834                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3835                                 have_updates = true;
3836                         }
3837                         if have_updates { break; }
3838                 }
3839                 if !have_updates {
3840                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3841                 }
3842                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3843         }
3844         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3845         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3846                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3847                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3848                 // is acceptable.
3849                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3850                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3851                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3852                         } else { None };
3853                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
3854                                 htlc.state = state;
3855                         }
3856                 }
3857                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3858                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3859                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
3860                         } else { None } {
3861                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3862                         }
3863                 }
3864                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3865
3866                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
3867                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3868                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3869                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3870                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3871                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3872                         },
3873                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
3874                 };
3875
3876                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3877                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3878                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3879                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
3880                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
3881                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3882                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
3883                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3884                         }]
3885                 };
3886                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3887                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3888         }
3889
3890         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3891         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3892         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3893                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3894                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3895                         if self.is_outbound() {
3896                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3897                         }
3898                 }
3899
3900                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3901                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
3902                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
3903                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3904
3905                 {
3906                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
3907                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3908                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
3909                         }
3910
3911                         let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
3912                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
3913                         signature = res.0;
3914                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
3915
3916                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3917                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
3918                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3919                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3920
3921                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3922                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3923                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
3924                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
3925                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
3926                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3927                         }
3928                 }
3929
3930                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3931                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3932                         signature,
3933                         htlc_signatures,
3934                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
3935         }
3936
3937         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3938         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3939         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3940         /// more info.
3941         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3942                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3943                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3944                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3945                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3946                         },
3947                         None => Ok(None)
3948                 }
3949         }
3950
3951         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3952         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3953         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3954                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3955                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3956                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
3957                         }
3958                 }
3959                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3960                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3961                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
3962                         }
3963                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3964                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
3965                         }
3966                 }
3967                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3968                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3969                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
3970                 }
3971
3972                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3973
3974                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3975                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3976                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3977                 } else {
3978                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3979                 }
3980                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3981
3982                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3983                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3984                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3985                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3986                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3987                         match htlc_update {
3988                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3989                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3990                                         false
3991                                 },
3992                                 _ => true
3993                         }
3994                 });
3995
3996                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3997                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3998                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
3999                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4000         }
4001
4002         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4003         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4004         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4005         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4006         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4007         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4008                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4009
4010                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4011                 // return them to fail the payment.
4012                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4013                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4014                         match htlc_update {
4015                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4016                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4017                                 },
4018                                 _ => {}
4019                         }
4020                 }
4021                 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4022                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4023                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4024                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4025                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4026                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4027                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4028                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4029                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4030                                 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4031                         } else { None }
4032                 } else { None };
4033
4034                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4035                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4036                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4037                 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4038                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4039                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4040                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4041         }
4042 }
4043
4044 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4045 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4046
4047 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4048         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4049                 match self {
4050                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4051                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4052                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4053                         },
4054                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4055                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4056                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4057                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4058                         },
4059                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4060                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4061                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4062                         },
4063                 }
4064                 Ok(())
4065         }
4066 }
4067
4068 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4069         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4070                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4071                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4072                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4073                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4074                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4075                 })
4076         }
4077 }
4078
4079 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4080         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4081                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4082                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4083
4084                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4085                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4086
4087                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4088                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4089
4090                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4091                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4092                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4093
4094                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4095
4096                 self.holder_keys.write(writer)?;
4097                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4098                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4099
4100                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4101                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4102                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4103
4104                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4105                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4106                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4107                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4108                         }
4109                 }
4110                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4111                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4112                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4113                                 continue; // Drop
4114                         }
4115                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4116                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4117                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4118                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4119                         match &htlc.state {
4120                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4121                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4122                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4123                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4124                                 },
4125                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4126                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4127                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4128                                 },
4129                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4130                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4131                                 },
4132                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4133                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4134                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4135                                 },
4136                         }
4137                 }
4138
4139                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4140                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4141                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4142                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4143                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4144                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4145                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4146                         match &htlc.state {
4147                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4148                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4149                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4150                                 },
4151                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4152                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4153                                 },
4154                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4155                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4156                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4157                                 },
4158                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4159                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4160                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4161                                 },
4162                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4163                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4164                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4165                                 },
4166                         }
4167                 }
4168
4169                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4170                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4171                         match update {
4172                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4173                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4174                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4175                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4176                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4177                                         source.write(writer)?;
4178                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4179                                 },
4180                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4181                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4182                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4183                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4184                                 },
4185                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4186                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4187                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4188                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4189                                 }
4190                         }
4191                 }
4192
4193                 match self.resend_order {
4194                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4195                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4196                 }
4197
4198                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4199                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4200                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4201
4202                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4203                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4204                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4205                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4206                 }
4207
4208                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4209                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4210                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4211                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4212                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4213                 }
4214
4215                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4216                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4217
4218                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4219                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4220                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4221                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4222
4223                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4224                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4225                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4226                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4227                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4228                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4229                         },
4230                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4231                 }
4232
4233                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4234                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4235
4236                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4237                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4238
4239                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4240                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4241                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4242                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4243                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4244                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4245                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4246                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4247
4248                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4249                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4250
4251                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4252                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4253
4254                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4255
4256                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4257                 Ok(())
4258         }
4259 }
4260
4261 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4262         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4263                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4264                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4265                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4266                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4267                 }
4268
4269                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4270                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4271
4272                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4273                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4274                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4275
4276                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4277
4278                 let holder_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4279                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4280                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4281
4282                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4283                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4284                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4285
4286                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4287                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4288                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4289                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4290                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4291                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4292                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4293                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4294                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4295                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4296                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4297                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4298                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4299                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4300                                 },
4301                         });
4302                 }
4303
4304                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4305                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4306                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4307                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4308                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4309                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4310                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4311                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4312                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4313                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4314                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4315                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4316                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4317                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4318                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4319                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4320                                 },
4321                         });
4322                 }
4323
4324                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4325                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4326                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4327                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4328                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4329                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4330                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4331                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4332                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4333                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4334                                 },
4335                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4336                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4337                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4338                                 },
4339                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4340                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4341                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4342                                 },
4343                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4344                         });
4345                 }
4346
4347                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4348                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4349                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4350                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4351                 };
4352
4353                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4354                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4355                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4356
4357                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4358                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4359                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4360                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4361                 }
4362
4363                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4364                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4365                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4366                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4367                 }
4368
4369                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4370                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4371
4372                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4373                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4374                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4375                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4376
4377                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4378                         0 => None,
4379                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4380                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4381                 };
4382
4383                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4384                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4385
4386                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4387                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4388
4389                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4390                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4391                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4392                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4394                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4396                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4397
4398                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4399                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4400
4401                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4402                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4403
4404                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4405                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4406
4407                 Ok(Channel {
4408                         user_id,
4409
4410                         config,
4411                         channel_id,
4412                         channel_state,
4413                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4414                         channel_value_satoshis,
4415
4416                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4417
4418                         holder_keys,
4419                         shutdown_pubkey,
4420                         destination_script,
4421
4422                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4423                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4424                         value_to_self_msat,
4425
4426                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4427                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4428                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4429
4430                         resend_order,
4431
4432                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4433                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4434                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4435                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4436                         monitor_pending_failures,
4437
4438                         pending_update_fee,
4439                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4440                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4441                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4442                         update_time_counter,
4443                         feerate_per_kw,
4444
4445                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4446                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4447                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4448                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4449
4450                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4451
4452                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4453                         short_channel_id,
4454                         last_block_connected,
4455                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4456
4457                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4458                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4459                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4460                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4461                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4462                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4463                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4464                         minimum_depth,
4465
4466                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4467                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4468
4469                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4470                         counterparty_node_id,
4471
4472                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4473
4474                         commitment_secrets,
4475
4476                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4477                 })
4478         }
4479 }
4480
4481 #[cfg(test)]
4482 mod tests {
4483         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4484         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4485         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4486         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4487         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4488         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4489         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4490         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4491         use hex;
4492         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4493         use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4494         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4495         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4496         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
4497         use ln::chan_utils;
4498         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4499         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4500         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4501         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4502         use util::config::UserConfig;
4503         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4504         use util::test_utils;
4505         use util::logger::Logger;
4506         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4507         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4508         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4509         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4510         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4511         use std::sync::Arc;
4512
4513         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4514                 fee_est: u32
4515         }
4516         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4517                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4518                         self.fee_est
4519                 }
4520         }
4521
4522         #[test]
4523         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4524                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4525                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4526         }
4527
4528         struct Keys {
4529                 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4530         }
4531         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4532                 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4533
4534                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4535                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4536                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4537                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4538                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4539                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4540                 }
4541
4542                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4543                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4544                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4545                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4546                 }
4547
4548                 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4549                         self.chan_keys.clone()
4550                 }
4551                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4552         }
4553
4554         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4555                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4556         }
4557
4558         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4559         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4560         #[test]
4561         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4562                 let original_fee = 253;
4563                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4564                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4565                 let seed = [42; 32];
4566                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4567                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4568
4569                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4570                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4571                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4572
4573                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4574                 // same as the old fee.
4575                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4576                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4577                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4578         }
4579
4580         #[test]
4581         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4582                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4583                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4584                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4585                 let seed = [42; 32];
4586                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4587                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4588
4589                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4590
4591                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4592                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4593                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4594                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4595
4596                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4597                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4598                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4599                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4600
4601                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4602                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4603                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4604
4605                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4606                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4607                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4608                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4609                 }]};
4610                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4611                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4612                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4613
4614                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4615                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4616
4617                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4618                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4619                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4620                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4621                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4622                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4623                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4624                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4625                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4626                         },
4627                         _ => panic!()
4628                 }
4629
4630                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4631                 // is sane.
4632                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4633                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4634                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4635                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4636                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4637                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4638                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4639                         },
4640                         _ => panic!()
4641                 }
4642         }
4643
4644         #[test]
4645         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4646                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4647                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4648                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4649                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4650
4651                 let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4652                         &secp_ctx,
4653                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4654                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4655                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4656                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4657                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4658
4659                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4660                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4661                         10_000_000,
4662                         (0, 0)
4663                 );
4664
4665                 assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4666                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4667                 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
4668
4669                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4670                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4671                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4672                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4673                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4674
4675                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
4676
4677                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4678                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4679                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4680                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4681                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4682                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4683                 };
4684                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
4685                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4686                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
4687                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
4688                         });
4689                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
4690                 chan_keys.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
4691
4692                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
4693                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4694
4695                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4696                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4697
4698                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4699                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4700
4701                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4702                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4703                 // build_commitment_transaction.
4704                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
4705                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4706                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4707                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
4708                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4709
4710                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4711                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
4712                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
4713                         } ) => { {
4714                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
4715                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
4716
4717                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4718                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4719                                                 .collect();
4720                                         (res.0, htlcs)
4721                                 };
4722                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
4723                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4724                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4725                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4726                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
4727                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4728
4729                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
4730                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4731                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
4732                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4733                                 $({
4734                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4735                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
4736                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
4737                                 })*
4738                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
4739
4740                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4741                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
4742                                         counterparty_signature,
4743                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
4744                                         &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4745                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4746                                 );
4747                                 let holder_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
4748                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
4749
4750                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4751                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
4752                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
4753
4754                                 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
4755
4756                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
4757                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
4758
4759                                 $({
4760                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4761
4762                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
4763                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4764                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4765                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
4766                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
4767
4768                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4769                                         if !htlc.offered {
4770                                                 for i in 0..5 {
4771                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4772                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4773                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4774                                                         }
4775                                                 }
4776
4777                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4778                                         }
4779
4780                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
4781                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
4782
4783                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4784                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
4785                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
4786                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
4787                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
4788                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
4789                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
4790                                 })*
4791                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
4792                         } }
4793                 }
4794
4795                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4796                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4797
4798                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
4799                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
4800                                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
4801
4802                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4803                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4804                                 htlc_id: 0,
4805                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
4806                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
4807                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4808                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4809                         };
4810                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4811                         out
4812                 });
4813                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4814                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4815                                 htlc_id: 1,
4816                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
4817                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
4818                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4819                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4820                         };
4821                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4822                         out
4823                 });
4824                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4825                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4826                                 htlc_id: 2,
4827                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
4828                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
4829                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4830                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4831                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4832                         };
4833                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4834                         out
4835                 });
4836                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4837                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4838                                 htlc_id: 3,
4839                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
4840                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
4841                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4842                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4843                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4844                         };
4845                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4846                         out
4847                 });
4848                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4849                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4850                                 htlc_id: 4,
4851                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
4852                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
4853                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4854                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4855                         };
4856                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4857                         out
4858                 });
4859
4860                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4861                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4862                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4863
4864                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
4865                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
4866                                  "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", {
4867
4868                                   { 0,
4869                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
4870                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
4871                                   "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" },
4872
4873                                   { 1,
4874                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
4875                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
4876                                   "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" },
4877
4878                                   { 2,
4879                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
4880                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
4881                                   "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" },
4882
4883                                   { 3,
4884                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
4885                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
4886                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
4887
4888                                   { 4,
4889                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
4890                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
4891                                   "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" }
4892                 } );
4893
4894                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4895                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4896                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4897
4898                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
4899                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
4900                                  "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", {
4901
4902                                   { 0,
4903                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
4904                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
4905                                   "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" },
4906
4907                                   { 1,
4908                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
4909                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
4910                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
4911
4912                                   { 2,
4913                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
4914                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
4915                                   "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" },
4916
4917                                   { 3,
4918                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
4919                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
4920                                   "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" },
4921
4922                                   { 4,
4923                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
4924                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
4925                                   "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" }
4926                 } );
4927
4928                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4929                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4930                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4931
4932                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
4933                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
4934                                  "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", {
4935
4936                                   { 0,
4937                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
4938                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
4939                                   "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" },
4940
4941                                   { 1,
4942                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
4943                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
4944                                   "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" },
4945
4946                                   { 2,
4947                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
4948                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
4949                                   "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" },
4950
4951                                   { 3,
4952                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
4953                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
4954                                   "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" }
4955                 } );
4956
4957                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4958                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4959                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4960
4961                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
4962                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
4963                                  "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", {
4964
4965                                   { 0,
4966                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
4967                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
4968                                   "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" },
4969
4970                                   { 1,
4971                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
4972                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
4973                                   "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" },
4974
4975                                   { 2,
4976                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
4977                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
4978                                   "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" },
4979
4980                                   { 3,
4981                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
4982                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
4983                                   "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
4984                 } );
4985
4986                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4987                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4988                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4989
4990                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
4991                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
4992                                  "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", {
4993
4994                                   { 0,
4995                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
4996                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
4997                                   "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" },
4998
4999                                   { 1,
5000                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5001                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5002                                   "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" },
5003
5004                                   { 2,
5005                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5006                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5007                                   "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" }
5008                 } );
5009
5010                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5011                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5012                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5013
5014                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5015                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5016                                  "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", {
5017
5018                                   { 0,
5019                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5020                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5021                                   "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" },
5022
5023                                   { 1,
5024                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5025                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5026                                   "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" },
5027
5028                                   { 2,
5029                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5030                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5031                                   "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" }
5032                 } );
5033
5034                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5035                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5036                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5037
5038                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5039                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5040                                  "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", {
5041
5042                                   { 0,
5043                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5044                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5045                                   "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" },
5046
5047                                   { 1,
5048                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5049                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5050                                   "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" }
5051                 } );
5052
5053                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5054                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5055                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5056
5057                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5058                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5059                                  "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", {
5060
5061                                   { 0,
5062                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5063                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5064                                   "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" },
5065
5066                                   { 1,
5067                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5068                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5069                                   "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" }
5070                 } );
5071
5072                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5073                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5074                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5075
5076                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5077                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5078                                  "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", {
5079
5080                                   { 0,
5081                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5082                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5083                                   "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" }
5084                 } );
5085
5086                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5087                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5088                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5089
5090                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5091                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5092                                  "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", {
5093
5094                                   { 0,
5095                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5096                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5097                                   "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" }
5098                 } );
5099
5100                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5101                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5102                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5103
5104                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5105                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5106                                  "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", {});
5107
5108                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5109                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5110                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5111
5112                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5113                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5114                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5115
5116                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5117                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5118                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5119
5120                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5121                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5122                                  "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", {});
5123
5124                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5125                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5126                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5127
5128                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5129                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5130                                  "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", {});
5131         }
5132
5133         #[test]
5134         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5135                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5136
5137                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5138                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5139                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5140                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5141
5142                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5143                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5144                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5145
5146                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5147                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5148
5149                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5150                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5151
5152                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5153                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5154                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5155         }
5156
5157         #[test]
5158         fn test_key_derivation() {
5159                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5160                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5161
5162                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5163                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5164
5165                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5166                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5167
5168                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5169                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5170
5171                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5172                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5173
5174                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5175                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5176
5177                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5178                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5179
5180                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5181                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5182         }
5183 }