1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
309 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
310 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
312 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
316 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
318 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
322 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
323 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
324 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
325 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
326 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
328 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
329 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
331 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
333 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
334 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
336 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
337 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
338 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
339 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
340 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
341 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
343 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
344 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
346 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
347 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
348 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
349 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
350 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
352 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
353 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
355 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
356 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
358 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
359 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
360 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
361 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
367 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
368 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
370 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
371 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
377 macro_rules! secp_check {
378 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
381 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
386 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
387 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
388 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
389 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
390 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
392 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
393 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
395 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
397 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
399 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
403 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
405 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
406 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
407 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
409 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
410 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
412 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
413 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
414 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
415 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
416 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
418 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
419 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
423 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
429 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
432 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
433 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
434 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
435 holding_cell_msat: u64,
436 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
439 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
440 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
441 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
442 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
443 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
444 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
445 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
446 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
447 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
448 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
451 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
452 struct HTLCCandidate {
454 origin: HTLCInitiator,
458 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
466 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
468 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
470 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
471 htlc_value_msat: u64,
472 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
477 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
478 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
479 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
480 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
481 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
483 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
484 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
485 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
486 htlc_value_msat: u64,
488 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
489 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
493 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
494 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
495 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
496 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
497 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
498 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
499 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
500 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
501 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
502 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
503 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
506 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
507 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
508 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
509 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
510 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
511 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
512 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
513 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
516 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
517 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
518 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
519 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
522 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
523 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
524 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
525 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
526 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
527 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
528 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
529 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
530 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
531 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
532 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
533 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
534 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
535 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
536 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
538 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
539 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
540 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
541 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
543 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
544 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
545 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
546 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
548 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
549 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
550 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
551 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
552 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
554 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
555 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
556 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
557 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
559 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
560 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
561 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
563 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
564 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
565 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
566 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
567 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
569 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
570 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
573 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
574 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
576 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
577 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
578 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
579 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
580 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
582 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
586 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
587 (0, update, required),
588 (2, blocked, required),
591 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
592 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
593 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
595 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
596 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
597 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
598 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
600 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
604 channel_id: [u8; 32],
605 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
608 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
609 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
611 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
612 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
613 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
615 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
616 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
617 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
618 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
620 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
621 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
623 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
625 holder_signer: Signer,
626 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
627 destination_script: Script,
629 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
630 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
631 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
633 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
634 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
635 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
636 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
637 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
638 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
640 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
641 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
642 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
643 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
644 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
645 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
647 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
649 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
650 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
651 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
653 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
654 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
655 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
656 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
657 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
658 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
659 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
661 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
663 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
664 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
665 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
666 // HTLCs with similar state.
667 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
668 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
669 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
670 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
671 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
672 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
673 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
674 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
675 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
678 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
679 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
680 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
682 update_time_counter: u32,
684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
685 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
686 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
687 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
688 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
689 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
691 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
692 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
694 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
695 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
696 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
697 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
699 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
700 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
702 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
704 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
706 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
707 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
708 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
709 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
710 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
711 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
713 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
714 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
715 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
716 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
717 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
719 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
720 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
721 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
722 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
723 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
724 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
725 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
726 channel_creation_height: u32,
728 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
731 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
733 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
736 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
738 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
743 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
745 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
746 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
749 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
751 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
753 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
754 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
756 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
758 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
759 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
760 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
762 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
764 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
765 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
767 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
768 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
769 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
771 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
773 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
775 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
776 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
777 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
778 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
780 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
781 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
782 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
784 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
785 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
786 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
788 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
789 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
790 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
791 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
792 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
793 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
794 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
795 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
797 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
798 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
799 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
800 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
801 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
803 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
804 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
806 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
807 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
808 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
809 /// unblock the state machine.
811 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
812 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
813 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
815 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
816 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
817 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
819 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
820 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
821 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
822 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
823 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
824 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
825 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
826 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
828 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
829 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
831 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
832 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
833 // the channel's funding UTXO.
835 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
836 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
837 // associated channel mapping.
839 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
840 // to store all of them.
841 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
843 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
844 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
845 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
846 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
847 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
849 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
850 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
852 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
853 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
855 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
856 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
857 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
859 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
860 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
861 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
862 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
863 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
866 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
867 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
868 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
907 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
908 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
909 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
910 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
915 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
919 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
921 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
922 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
923 self.temporary_channel_id
926 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
930 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
931 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
932 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
936 /// Gets the channel's type
937 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
941 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
942 /// is_usable() returns true).
943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
944 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
945 self.short_channel_id
948 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
949 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
950 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
955 self.outbound_scid_alias
958 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
959 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
960 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
961 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
962 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
965 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
966 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
967 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
968 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
971 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
972 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
973 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
976 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
977 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
979 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
983 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
986 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
987 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
990 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
991 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
994 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
996 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
999 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1000 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1003 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1005 self.counterparty_node_id
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1010 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1014 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1015 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1021 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1022 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1023 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1024 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1026 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1032 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1037 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1040 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1041 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1042 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1044 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1045 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1050 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1051 self.channel_value_satoshis
1054 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1055 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1058 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1059 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1062 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1063 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1066 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1067 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1068 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1071 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1072 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1073 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1076 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1077 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1078 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1081 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1083 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1086 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1088 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1096 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1097 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1098 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1099 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1100 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1103 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1105 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1106 self.prev_config = None;
1110 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1111 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1115 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1116 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1117 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1118 let did_channel_update =
1119 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1120 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1121 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1122 if did_channel_update {
1123 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1124 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1125 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1126 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1128 self.config.options = *config;
1132 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1133 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1137 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1138 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1139 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1140 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1141 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1143 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1144 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1145 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1146 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1147 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1148 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1149 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1151 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1152 where L::Target: Logger
1154 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1155 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1156 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1158 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1159 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1160 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1161 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1163 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1164 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1165 if match update_state {
1166 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1167 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1168 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1169 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1170 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1172 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1176 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1177 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1178 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1179 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1181 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1182 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1183 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1185 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1186 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1187 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1188 transaction_output_index: None
1193 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1194 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1195 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1196 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1197 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1200 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1202 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1203 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1204 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1206 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1207 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1210 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1211 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1214 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1216 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1217 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1218 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1221 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1227 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1228 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1229 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1230 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1232 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1233 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1237 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1238 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1240 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1242 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1243 if generated_by_local {
1244 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1245 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1254 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1256 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1257 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1258 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1259 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1261 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1265 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1272 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1273 preimages.push(preimage);
1277 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1278 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1280 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1282 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1283 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1285 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1286 if !generated_by_local {
1287 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1296 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1297 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1298 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1299 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1300 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1301 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1302 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1304 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1306 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1307 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1308 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1309 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1311 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1313 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1314 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1315 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1316 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1319 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1320 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1321 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1322 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1324 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1327 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1328 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1329 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1330 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1332 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1335 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1341 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1347 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1349 let channel_parameters =
1350 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1351 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1352 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1355 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1360 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1363 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1364 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1365 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1366 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1368 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1369 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1370 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1378 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1379 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1385 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1386 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1387 /// our counterparty!)
1388 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1389 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1390 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1391 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1392 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1393 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1394 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1396 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1400 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1401 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1402 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1403 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1404 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1405 //may see payments to it!
1406 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1407 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1408 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1410 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1413 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1414 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1415 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1416 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1417 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1420 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1421 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1424 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1428 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1429 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1430 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1431 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1432 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1433 // which are near the dust limit.
1434 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1435 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1436 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1437 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1438 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1440 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1441 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1443 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1446 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1447 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1448 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1451 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1452 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1454 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1455 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1456 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1457 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1458 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1459 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1460 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1463 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1466 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1467 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1468 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1470 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1471 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1472 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1473 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1474 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1475 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1477 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1478 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1484 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1485 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1487 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1488 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1489 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1490 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1491 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1492 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1493 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1496 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1499 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1500 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1501 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1503 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1504 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1505 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1506 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1507 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1508 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1510 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1511 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1516 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1517 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1518 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1519 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1520 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1523 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1526 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1533 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1534 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1535 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1536 /// corner case properly.
1537 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1538 let context = &self;
1539 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1540 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1541 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1543 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1544 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1545 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1546 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1549 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1551 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1552 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1554 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1556 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1558 if context.is_outbound() {
1559 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1560 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1562 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1563 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1565 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1566 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1567 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1568 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1571 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1572 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1573 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1574 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1576 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1577 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1578 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1579 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1580 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1581 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1582 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1583 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1584 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1585 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1587 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1590 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1591 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1592 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1593 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1594 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1597 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1598 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1600 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1601 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1602 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1604 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1605 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1606 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1607 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1611 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1613 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1614 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1615 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1616 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1617 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1618 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1620 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1621 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1623 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1624 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1625 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1627 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1628 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1629 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1630 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1631 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1634 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1635 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1636 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1637 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1638 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1639 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1642 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1643 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1644 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1646 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1650 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1651 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1653 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1654 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1658 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1659 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1660 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1661 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1663 outbound_capacity_msat,
1664 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1665 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1670 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1671 let context = &self;
1672 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1675 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1676 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1678 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1679 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1681 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1682 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1684 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1685 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1686 let context = &self;
1687 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1689 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1692 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1693 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1695 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1696 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1698 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1699 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1701 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1702 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1706 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1707 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1713 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1714 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1718 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1719 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1720 included_htlcs += 1;
1723 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1724 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1728 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1729 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1730 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1731 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1732 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1733 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1738 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1741 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1746 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1747 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1751 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1752 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1753 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1756 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1757 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1759 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1760 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1761 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1763 total_pending_htlcs,
1764 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1765 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1766 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1768 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1769 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1770 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1772 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1774 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1779 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1780 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1782 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1783 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1785 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1786 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1788 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1789 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1790 let context = &self;
1791 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1793 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1796 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1797 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1799 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1800 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1802 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1803 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1805 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1806 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1810 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1811 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1817 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1818 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1819 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1820 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1821 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1822 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1825 included_htlcs += 1;
1828 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1829 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1832 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1833 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1835 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1836 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1837 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1842 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1843 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1844 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1847 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1848 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1850 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1851 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1853 total_pending_htlcs,
1854 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1856 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1858 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1859 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1862 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1864 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1869 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1870 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1871 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1872 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1878 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1879 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1880 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1881 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1882 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1883 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1884 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1885 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1886 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1887 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1888 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1890 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1891 // return them to fail the payment.
1892 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1893 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1894 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1896 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1897 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1902 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1903 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1904 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1905 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1906 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1907 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1908 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1909 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1910 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1911 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1912 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1913 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1914 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1919 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1920 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1921 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1925 // Internal utility functions for channels
1927 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1928 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1929 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1931 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1933 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1934 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1935 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1937 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1940 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1942 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1945 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1946 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1947 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1949 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1951 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1952 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1953 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1954 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1955 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1958 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1959 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1960 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1961 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1962 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1963 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1964 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1967 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1968 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1970 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1971 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1974 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1975 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1976 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1977 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1978 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1979 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1982 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1983 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1984 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1987 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1988 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1989 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1990 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1994 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1996 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
1997 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1998 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2002 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2003 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
2004 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
2005 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
2006 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
2007 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
2008 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2009 // We've exhausted our options
2012 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
2013 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
2016 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
2017 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
2018 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
2019 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
2021 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2022 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2023 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
2024 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
2025 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
2026 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
2028 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
2030 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
2035 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2036 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2037 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2039 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2040 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2041 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2042 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2043 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2044 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2045 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2048 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2049 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2050 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2051 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2052 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2053 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2054 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2055 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2057 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2058 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2068 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2069 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2070 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2071 // outside of those situations will fail.
2072 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2076 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2081 1 + // script length (0)
2085 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2086 2 + // witness marker and flag
2087 1 + // witness element count
2088 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2089 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2090 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2091 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2092 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2093 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2095 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2096 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2097 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2103 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2104 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2105 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2106 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2108 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2109 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2110 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2112 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2113 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2114 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2115 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2116 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2117 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2120 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2121 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2124 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2125 value_to_holder = 0;
2128 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2129 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2130 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2131 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2133 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2134 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2137 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2138 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2141 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2144 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2145 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2147 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2149 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2150 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2151 where L::Target: Logger {
2152 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2153 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2154 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2155 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2156 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2157 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2158 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2159 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2163 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2164 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2165 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2166 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2168 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2169 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2171 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2173 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2175 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2176 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2177 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2179 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2180 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2181 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2182 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2183 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2185 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2186 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2187 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2189 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2190 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2192 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2195 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2196 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2200 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2204 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2205 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2207 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2208 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2209 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2212 // Now update local state:
2214 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2215 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2216 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2217 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2218 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2219 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2220 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2224 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2225 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2226 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2227 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2228 // do not not get into this branch.
2229 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2230 match pending_update {
2231 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2232 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2233 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2234 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2235 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2236 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2237 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2240 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2241 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2242 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2243 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2244 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2245 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2246 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2252 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2253 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2254 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2256 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2257 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2258 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2261 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2264 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2265 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2267 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2268 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2270 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2271 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2274 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2277 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2278 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2279 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2280 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2285 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2286 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2287 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2288 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2289 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2290 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2291 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2292 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2293 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2294 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2295 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2296 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2297 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2298 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2299 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2300 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2301 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2303 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2305 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2306 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2307 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2308 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2309 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2310 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2311 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2313 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2314 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2317 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2318 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2319 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2320 update, blocked: true,
2325 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2326 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2327 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2328 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2332 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2336 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2337 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2338 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2339 /// before we fail backwards.
2341 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2342 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2343 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2344 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2345 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2346 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2347 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2350 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2351 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2352 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2353 /// before we fail backwards.
2355 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2356 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2357 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2358 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2359 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2360 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2361 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2363 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2365 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2366 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2367 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2369 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2370 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2371 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2373 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2374 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2375 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2377 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2382 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2383 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2389 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2391 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2392 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2393 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2397 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2398 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2399 force_holding_cell = true;
2402 // Now update local state:
2403 if force_holding_cell {
2404 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2405 match pending_update {
2406 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2407 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2408 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2409 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2413 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2414 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2415 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2416 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2422 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2423 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2424 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2430 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2432 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2433 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2436 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2437 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2438 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2443 // Message handlers:
2445 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2446 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2448 // Check sanity of message fields:
2449 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2450 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2452 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2455 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2456 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2458 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
2459 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
2461 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2462 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2464 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2466 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2468 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2469 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2472 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2473 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2476 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2479 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2483 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2484 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2485 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2487 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2488 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2490 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2491 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2493 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2496 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2497 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2499 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2502 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2506 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2507 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
2508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2510 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2511 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2513 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2514 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2517 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
2520 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2521 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2522 &Some(ref script) => {
2523 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2524 if script.len() == 0 {
2527 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2530 Some(script.clone())
2533 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2540 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2541 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2542 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2543 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2544 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2546 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2547 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2549 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2552 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2553 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2554 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2555 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2556 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2557 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2560 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2561 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2562 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2565 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2566 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2568 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2569 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2574 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2575 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2577 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2578 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2580 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2581 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2582 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2583 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2584 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2585 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2586 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2587 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2588 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2591 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2592 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2594 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2595 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2596 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2597 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2599 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
2600 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2602 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2603 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2606 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2607 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2608 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2610 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2613 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2616 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2617 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2618 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2622 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2625 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2626 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2627 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2628 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2631 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2632 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2633 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2634 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2635 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2637 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2639 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2640 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2644 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2645 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2646 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2650 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2651 initial_commitment_tx,
2654 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2655 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2658 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2659 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2661 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2663 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2664 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2665 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2666 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2667 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2668 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2669 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2670 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2671 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2672 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2673 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2675 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2677 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2679 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2680 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2681 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2682 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2684 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2686 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2687 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2689 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2690 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
2693 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2694 }, channel_monitor))
2697 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2698 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2699 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2700 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2701 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2703 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2706 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2709 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2712 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2713 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2714 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2715 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2718 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2720 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2721 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2722 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2723 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2725 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2726 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2728 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2729 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2731 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2732 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2733 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2734 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2735 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2736 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2740 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2741 initial_commitment_tx,
2744 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2745 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2748 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2749 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2752 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2753 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2754 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2755 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2756 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2757 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2758 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2759 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2760 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2761 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2762 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2763 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2765 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2767 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2769 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2770 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2771 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2772 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2774 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2776 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2777 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2781 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2782 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2784 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2785 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2786 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2787 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2789 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2792 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2793 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2797 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2798 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2799 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2800 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2801 // when routing outbound payments.
2802 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2806 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2808 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2809 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2810 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2811 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2812 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2813 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2814 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2815 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2816 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2818 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2819 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2820 let expected_point =
2821 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2822 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2824 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2825 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2826 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2827 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2828 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2829 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2831 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2832 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2833 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2834 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2835 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2837 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2845 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2846 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2848 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2850 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2853 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2854 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2855 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2856 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2857 if local_sent_shutdown {
2858 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2860 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2861 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2862 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2865 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2868 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2871 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2874 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2875 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2878 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2879 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2880 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2883 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2886 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2887 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2888 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2889 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2890 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2891 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2892 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2893 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2894 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2895 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2896 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2898 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2899 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2900 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2901 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2902 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2903 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2907 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2910 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2911 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2912 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2914 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2915 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2916 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2917 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2918 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2919 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2920 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2924 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2925 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2926 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2927 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2928 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2929 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2930 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2934 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2935 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2936 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2937 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2938 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2942 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2943 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2944 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2945 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2946 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2948 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2952 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2956 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2957 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2958 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2959 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2960 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2961 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2962 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2963 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2964 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2965 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2966 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2967 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2968 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2969 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2970 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2971 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2974 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2975 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2976 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2977 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2981 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2984 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2988 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2989 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2990 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2994 // Now update local state:
2995 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2996 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2997 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2998 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2999 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3000 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3001 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3006 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3008 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3009 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3010 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3011 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3012 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3013 None => fail_reason.into(),
3014 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3015 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3016 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3019 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3023 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3025 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3026 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3028 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3034 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3037 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3038 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3041 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3045 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3048 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3049 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3052 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3056 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3060 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3061 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3064 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3068 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3072 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3073 where L::Target: Logger
3075 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3078 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3081 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3085 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3087 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3089 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3090 let commitment_txid = {
3091 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3092 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3093 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3095 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3096 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3097 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3098 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3099 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3104 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3106 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3107 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3108 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3109 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3112 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3113 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3114 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3118 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3120 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3121 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3122 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3123 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3124 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3125 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3126 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3127 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3128 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3129 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3130 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3136 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3140 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3141 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3142 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3143 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3144 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3145 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3146 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3147 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3148 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3149 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3150 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3151 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3152 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3155 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3156 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3157 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3158 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3159 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3160 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
3161 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3163 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3164 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3165 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3166 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3167 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3168 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3169 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3172 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3173 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3176 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3178 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3179 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3180 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3183 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3186 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3187 commitment_stats.tx,
3189 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3190 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3191 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3194 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3195 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3197 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3198 let mut need_commitment = false;
3199 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3200 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3201 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3202 need_commitment = true;
3206 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3207 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3208 Some(forward_info.clone())
3210 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3211 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3212 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3213 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3214 need_commitment = true;
3217 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3218 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3219 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3220 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3221 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3222 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3223 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3224 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3225 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3226 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3227 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3228 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3229 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3230 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3232 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3234 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3235 need_commitment = true;
3239 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3240 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3241 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3242 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3243 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3244 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3246 nondust_htlc_sources,
3250 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3251 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3252 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3253 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3255 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3256 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3257 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3258 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3259 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3260 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3261 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3262 // includes the right HTLCs.
3263 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3264 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3265 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3266 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3267 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3268 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3270 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3271 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3272 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3275 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3276 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3277 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3278 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3279 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3280 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3281 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3282 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3283 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3287 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3288 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3289 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3290 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3293 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3294 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3295 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3296 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3297 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3298 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3299 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3300 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3303 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3304 /// for our counterparty.
3305 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3306 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3307 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3308 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3309 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3311 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3312 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3313 updates: Vec::new(),
3316 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3317 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3318 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3319 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3320 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3321 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3322 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3323 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3324 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3325 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3326 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3327 // to rebalance channels.
3328 match &htlc_update {
3329 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3330 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3331 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3334 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3335 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3336 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3337 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3338 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3339 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3340 // into the holding cell without ever being
3341 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3342 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3343 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3346 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3352 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3353 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3354 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3355 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3356 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3357 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3358 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3359 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3360 (msg, monitor_update)
3361 } else { unreachable!() };
3362 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3363 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3365 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3366 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3367 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3368 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3369 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3370 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3371 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3372 // for a full revocation before failing.
3373 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3376 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3378 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3385 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3386 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3388 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3389 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3394 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3395 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3396 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3397 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3398 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3400 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3401 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3402 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3404 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3405 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3411 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3412 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3413 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3414 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3415 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3416 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3417 where L::Target: Logger,
3419 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3422 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3425 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3429 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3431 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3432 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3437 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3438 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3439 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3440 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3441 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3442 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3443 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3444 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3448 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3450 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3451 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3454 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3455 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3457 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3459 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3460 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3461 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3462 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3463 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3464 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3465 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3466 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3470 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3471 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3472 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3473 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3474 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3475 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3476 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3477 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3478 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3480 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3481 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3484 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3485 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3486 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3487 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3488 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3489 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3490 let mut require_commitment = false;
3491 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3494 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3495 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3496 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3498 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3499 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3500 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3501 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3502 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3503 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3508 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3509 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3510 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3511 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3512 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3514 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3515 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3516 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3521 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3522 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3524 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3528 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3529 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3531 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3532 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3533 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3534 require_commitment = true;
3535 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3536 match forward_info {
3537 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3538 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3539 require_commitment = true;
3541 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3542 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3543 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3545 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3546 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3547 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3551 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3552 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3553 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3554 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3560 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3561 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3562 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3563 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3565 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3566 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3567 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3568 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3569 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3570 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3571 require_commitment = true;
3575 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3577 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3578 match update_state {
3579 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3580 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3581 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3582 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3583 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3585 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3586 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3587 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3588 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3589 require_commitment = true;
3590 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3591 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3596 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3597 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3598 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3599 if require_commitment {
3600 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3601 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3602 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3603 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3604 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3605 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3606 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3607 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3608 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3611 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3613 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3614 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3617 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3618 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3619 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3620 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3621 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3622 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3623 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3625 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3626 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3628 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3629 if require_commitment {
3630 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3632 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3633 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3634 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3635 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3637 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3638 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3639 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3640 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3642 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3643 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3644 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3650 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3651 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3652 /// commitment update.
3653 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3654 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3655 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3658 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3659 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3660 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3661 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3663 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3664 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3665 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3666 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3667 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3669 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3670 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3672 if !self.context.is_live() {
3673 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3676 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3677 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3678 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3679 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3680 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3681 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3682 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3683 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3684 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3685 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3689 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3690 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3691 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3692 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3693 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3696 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3697 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3701 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3702 force_holding_cell = true;
3705 if force_holding_cell {
3706 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3710 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3711 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3713 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3714 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3719 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3720 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3722 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3724 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3725 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3726 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3727 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3731 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3732 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3733 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3737 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3738 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3741 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3742 // will be retransmitted.
3743 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3744 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3745 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3747 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3748 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3750 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3751 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3752 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3753 // this HTLC accordingly
3754 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3757 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3758 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3759 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3760 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3763 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3764 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3765 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3766 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3767 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3768 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3773 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3775 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3776 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3777 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3778 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3782 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3783 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3784 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3785 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3786 // the update upon reconnection.
3787 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3791 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3793 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3794 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3797 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3798 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3799 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3800 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3801 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3802 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3803 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3805 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3806 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3807 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3808 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3809 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3810 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3811 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3813 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3814 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3815 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3816 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3817 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3818 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3819 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3822 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3823 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3824 /// to the remote side.
3825 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3826 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3827 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3828 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3831 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3833 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3834 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3835 let mut found_blocked = false;
3836 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3837 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3838 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3842 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3843 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3844 // first received the funding_signed.
3845 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3846 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3847 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3849 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3850 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3851 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3852 funding_broadcastable = None;
3855 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3856 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3857 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3858 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3859 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3860 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3861 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3862 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3863 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3864 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3865 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3866 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3867 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3868 next_per_commitment_point,
3869 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3873 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3875 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3876 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3877 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3878 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3879 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3880 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3882 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3883 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3884 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3885 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3886 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3887 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3891 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3892 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3894 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3895 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3896 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3899 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3900 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3901 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3902 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3903 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3904 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3905 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3906 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3907 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3911 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3912 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3914 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3917 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3920 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3921 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3923 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3924 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3925 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3926 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3927 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3928 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3929 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3930 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3931 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3932 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3933 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3935 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3937 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3939 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3945 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3946 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3947 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3948 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3950 per_commitment_secret,
3951 next_per_commitment_point,
3953 next_local_nonce: None,
3957 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3958 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3959 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3960 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3961 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3963 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3964 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3965 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3966 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3967 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3968 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3969 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3970 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3971 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3976 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3977 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3979 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3980 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3981 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3982 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3983 reason: err_packet.clone()
3986 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3987 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3988 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3989 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3990 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3991 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3994 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3995 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3996 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3997 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3998 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4005 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4006 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4007 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4008 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4012 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4013 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4014 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4015 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4016 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4017 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4021 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4022 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4024 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4025 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4026 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4027 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4028 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4029 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4030 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4031 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4034 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4036 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4037 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4038 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4039 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4043 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4044 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4048 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4049 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4050 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4051 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4052 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4055 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4056 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4057 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4058 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4059 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4062 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4063 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4064 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4065 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4066 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4067 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4068 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4069 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4073 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4074 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4075 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4076 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4078 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4082 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4083 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4084 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4085 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4087 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4088 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4089 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4090 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4091 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4095 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4097 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4098 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4099 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4100 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4101 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4104 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4105 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4106 channel_ready: None,
4107 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4108 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4109 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4113 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4114 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4115 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4116 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4117 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4118 next_per_commitment_point,
4119 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4121 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4122 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4123 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4127 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4128 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4129 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4131 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4132 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4133 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4136 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4142 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4143 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4144 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4145 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4146 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4147 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4148 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4150 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4152 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4153 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4154 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4155 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4156 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4157 next_per_commitment_point,
4158 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4162 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4163 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4164 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4166 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4169 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4170 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4171 raa: required_revoke,
4172 commitment_update: None,
4173 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4175 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4176 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4177 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4179 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4182 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4183 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4184 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4185 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4186 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4187 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4190 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4191 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4192 raa: required_revoke,
4193 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4194 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4198 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4202 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4203 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4204 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4205 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4207 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4209 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4211 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4212 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4213 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4214 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4215 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4216 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4218 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4219 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4220 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4221 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4222 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4224 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4225 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4226 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4227 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4230 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4231 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4232 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4233 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4234 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4235 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4236 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4237 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4238 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4239 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4240 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4241 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4242 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4243 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4244 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4246 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4249 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4250 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4253 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4254 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4255 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4256 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4257 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4258 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4259 self.context.channel_state &
4260 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4261 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4262 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4263 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4266 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4267 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4268 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4269 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4270 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4271 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4274 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4280 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4281 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4282 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4283 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4285 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4286 return Ok((None, None));
4289 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4290 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4291 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4293 return Ok((None, None));
4296 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4298 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4299 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4300 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4301 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4303 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4304 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4305 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4307 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4308 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4309 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4310 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4312 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4313 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4314 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4319 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4320 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4322 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4323 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4326 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4327 /// within our expected timeframe.
4329 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4330 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4331 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4334 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4337 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4338 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4341 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4342 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4343 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4344 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4346 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4349 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4350 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4351 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4352 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4355 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4356 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4360 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4362 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4366 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4367 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4371 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4374 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4375 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4376 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4377 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4379 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4382 assert!(send_shutdown);
4383 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4384 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4385 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4387 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4390 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4395 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4397 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4398 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4400 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4401 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4402 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4403 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4404 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4405 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4408 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4409 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4410 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4413 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4414 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4415 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4416 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4420 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4421 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4422 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4423 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4424 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4425 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4427 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4428 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4435 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4436 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4438 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4441 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4442 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4444 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4446 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4447 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4448 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4449 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4450 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4451 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4452 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4453 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4454 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4456 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4457 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4460 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4464 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4465 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4466 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4467 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4469 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4472 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4475 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4478 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4482 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4486 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4487 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4488 return Ok((None, None));
4491 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4492 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4493 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4496 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4498 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4501 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4502 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4503 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4504 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4505 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4509 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4510 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4511 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4515 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4516 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4517 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4518 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4519 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4520 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4521 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4525 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4527 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4528 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4529 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4530 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4532 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4535 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4536 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4537 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4539 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4541 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4542 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4546 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4547 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4548 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4549 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4551 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4552 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4553 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4559 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4560 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4561 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4563 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4564 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4566 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4570 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4571 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4572 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4573 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4574 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4576 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4578 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4580 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4581 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4584 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4585 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4586 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4587 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4588 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4589 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4590 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4591 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4596 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4597 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4598 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4599 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4605 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4606 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4607 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4608 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4610 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4616 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4617 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4618 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4619 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4620 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4621 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4622 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4624 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4625 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4628 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4630 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4631 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4637 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4638 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4639 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4640 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4641 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4642 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4643 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4645 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4646 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4653 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4654 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4657 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4658 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4661 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4662 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4666 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4667 &self.context.holder_signer
4671 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4673 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4674 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4675 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4676 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4677 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4678 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4680 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4682 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4690 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4691 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4695 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4696 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4697 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4698 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4701 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4702 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4703 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4706 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4707 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4708 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4709 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4710 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4711 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4712 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4713 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4719 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4720 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4721 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4722 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4723 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4724 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4729 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4730 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4732 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4733 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4734 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4735 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4738 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4739 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4742 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4743 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4744 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4745 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4751 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4752 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4755 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4756 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4757 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4758 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4761 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4762 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4763 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4765 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4766 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4767 if self.context.channel_state &
4768 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4769 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4770 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4771 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4772 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4775 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4776 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4777 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4778 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4779 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4780 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4782 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4783 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4784 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4786 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4787 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4788 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4789 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4790 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4791 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4797 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4798 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4799 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4802 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4803 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4804 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4807 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4808 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4809 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4812 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4813 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4814 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4815 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4816 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4817 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4822 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4823 self.context.channel_update_status
4826 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4827 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4828 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4831 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4833 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4834 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4835 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4839 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4840 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4841 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4844 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4848 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4849 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4850 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4852 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4853 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4854 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4856 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4857 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4860 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4861 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4862 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4863 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4864 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4865 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4866 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4867 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4868 self.context.channel_state);
4870 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4874 if need_commitment_update {
4875 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4876 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4877 let next_per_commitment_point =
4878 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4879 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4880 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4881 next_per_commitment_point,
4882 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4886 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4892 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4893 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4894 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4895 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4896 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4897 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4898 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4903 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4904 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4905 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4906 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4907 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4908 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4909 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4910 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4911 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4912 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4913 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4914 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4915 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4916 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4917 // channel and move on.
4918 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4919 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4921 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4922 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4923 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4925 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4926 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4927 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4928 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4929 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4930 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4931 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4935 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4936 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4937 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4938 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4939 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4943 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4944 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4945 // may have already happened for this block).
4946 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4947 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4948 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4949 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4952 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4953 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4954 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4955 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4963 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4964 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4965 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4966 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4968 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4969 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4972 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4974 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4975 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4976 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4977 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4979 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4982 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4985 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4986 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4987 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4988 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4990 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4993 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4994 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4995 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4997 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4998 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5000 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5001 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5002 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5010 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5012 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5013 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5014 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5016 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5017 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5020 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5021 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5022 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5023 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5024 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5025 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5026 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5027 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5028 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5031 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5032 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5033 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5034 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5036 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5037 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5038 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5040 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5041 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5042 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5043 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5045 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5046 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5047 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5048 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5049 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5050 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5051 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5054 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5055 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5057 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5060 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5061 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5062 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5063 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5064 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5065 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5066 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5067 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5068 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5069 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5070 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5071 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5072 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5073 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5074 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5075 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5076 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5082 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5087 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5088 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5090 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5091 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5092 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5094 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5095 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5098 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5099 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5102 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5103 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5107 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5108 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5109 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5110 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5111 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5112 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5113 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5114 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5115 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5116 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5117 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5118 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5119 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5120 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5121 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5122 first_per_commitment_point,
5123 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5124 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5125 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5126 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5128 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5132 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5133 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
5136 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5137 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5138 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5139 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5142 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5143 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5145 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5146 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5147 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5148 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5150 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5151 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5153 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5154 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5156 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5157 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5160 self.context.user_id = user_id;
5161 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5163 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5166 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5167 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5168 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5170 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5171 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5172 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5173 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5175 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5176 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5177 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5178 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5179 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5180 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5181 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5182 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5183 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5184 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5185 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5186 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5187 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5188 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5189 first_per_commitment_point,
5190 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5191 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5192 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5194 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5196 next_local_nonce: None,
5200 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5201 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5203 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5205 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5206 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5209 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5210 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5211 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5212 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5213 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5214 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5217 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5218 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5219 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5220 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5221 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5222 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5223 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5224 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5225 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5226 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5228 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5229 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5231 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5232 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5233 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5234 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5237 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5238 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5240 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5243 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5244 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5249 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5251 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5253 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5254 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5255 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5257 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5258 temporary_channel_id,
5259 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5260 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5263 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5265 next_local_nonce: None,
5269 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5270 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5271 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5272 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5274 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5277 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5278 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5279 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5280 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5281 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5282 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5284 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5285 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5288 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5289 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5290 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5291 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5293 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5294 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5296 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5297 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5298 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5299 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5300 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5301 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5307 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5308 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5309 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5310 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5312 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5315 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5319 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5323 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5324 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5328 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5332 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5333 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5336 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5340 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5342 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5347 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5349 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5354 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5356 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5357 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5358 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5359 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5360 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5364 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5366 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5367 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5368 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5369 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5370 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5371 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5372 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5374 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5375 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5376 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5377 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5378 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5379 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5380 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5381 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5382 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5383 contents: announcement,
5386 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5390 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5391 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5392 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5393 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5394 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5395 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5396 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5397 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5399 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5401 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5403 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5404 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5406 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5408 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5409 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5412 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5413 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5414 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5415 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5418 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5421 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5422 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5423 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5424 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5425 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5426 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5429 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5431 Err(_) => return None,
5433 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5434 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5439 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5440 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5441 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5442 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5443 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5444 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5445 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5446 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5447 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5448 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5449 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5450 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5451 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5452 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5453 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5454 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5457 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5460 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5461 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5462 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5463 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5464 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5465 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5466 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5467 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5468 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5470 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5471 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5472 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5473 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5474 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5475 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5476 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5477 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5478 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5480 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5481 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5482 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5483 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5484 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5485 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5486 next_funding_txid: None,
5491 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5493 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5494 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5495 /// commitment update.
5497 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5498 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5499 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5500 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5502 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5503 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5505 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5506 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5511 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5512 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5514 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5516 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5517 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5519 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5520 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5521 /// regenerate them.
5523 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5524 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5526 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5527 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5528 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5529 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5530 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5533 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5534 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5535 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5538 if amount_msat == 0 {
5539 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5542 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5543 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5544 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5545 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5548 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5549 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5550 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5553 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5554 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5555 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5556 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5557 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5558 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5559 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5560 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5563 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5564 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5565 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5566 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5567 else { "to peer" });
5569 if need_holding_cell {
5570 force_holding_cell = true;
5573 // Now update local state:
5574 if force_holding_cell {
5575 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5580 onion_routing_packet,
5585 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5586 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5588 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5590 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5594 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5595 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5596 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5600 onion_routing_packet,
5602 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5607 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5608 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5609 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5610 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5612 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5613 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5614 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5616 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5617 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5621 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5622 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5623 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5624 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5625 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5626 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5627 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5630 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5631 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5632 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5633 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5634 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5635 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5638 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5640 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5641 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5642 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5644 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5645 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5648 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5649 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5650 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5651 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5652 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5653 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5654 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5655 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5658 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5662 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5663 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5664 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5665 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5667 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5669 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5670 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5671 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5672 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5673 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5674 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5675 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5676 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5677 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5678 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5679 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5685 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5688 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5689 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5690 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5691 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5693 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5695 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5696 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5697 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5698 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5701 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5702 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5706 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5707 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5709 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5711 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5712 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5713 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5714 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5716 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5717 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5718 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5719 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5720 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5721 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5725 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5726 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5730 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5731 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5734 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5735 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5737 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5738 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5739 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5740 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5741 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5744 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5745 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5746 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5752 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5753 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5756 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5757 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5758 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5759 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5765 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5766 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5768 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5769 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5770 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5771 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5772 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5773 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5774 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5775 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5776 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5779 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5780 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5781 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5783 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5784 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5787 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5790 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5791 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5792 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5795 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5796 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5797 let mut chan_closed = false;
5798 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5802 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5804 None if !chan_closed => {
5805 // use override shutdown script if provided
5806 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5807 Some(script) => script,
5809 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5810 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5811 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5812 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5816 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5817 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5819 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5825 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5826 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5827 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5828 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5830 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5832 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5834 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5835 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5836 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5837 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5838 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5839 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5842 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5843 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5844 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5847 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5848 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5849 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5852 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5853 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5854 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5855 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5856 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5858 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5859 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5866 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5867 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5869 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5872 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5873 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5874 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5876 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5877 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5881 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5885 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5886 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5887 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5890 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5891 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5892 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5893 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5894 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5895 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5896 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5897 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5898 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5899 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5900 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5903 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5904 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5905 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5907 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5908 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5909 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5910 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5917 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5918 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5919 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5920 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5921 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5922 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5923 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5926 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5927 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5928 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5929 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5931 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5934 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5935 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5937 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5938 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5941 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5944 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5945 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5946 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5947 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5951 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5952 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5954 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5956 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5957 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5958 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5962 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5963 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5965 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5966 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5967 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5968 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5972 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5973 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5974 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5978 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5979 Ok(script) => script,
5980 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5983 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5986 context: ChannelContext {
5989 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5990 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5991 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5992 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5997 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5999 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6000 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6001 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
6002 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6004 channel_value_satoshis,
6006 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6009 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6012 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6013 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6016 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6017 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6018 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6019 pending_update_fee: None,
6020 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6021 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6022 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6023 update_time_counter: 1,
6025 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6027 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6028 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6029 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6030 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6031 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6032 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6034 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6035 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6036 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6037 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6039 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6040 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6041 closing_fee_limits: None,
6042 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6044 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6046 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6047 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6048 short_channel_id: None,
6049 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6051 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
6052 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6053 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6054 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6055 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6056 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6057 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6058 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6059 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6060 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6061 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6062 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6064 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6066 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6067 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6068 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6069 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6070 counterparty_parameters: None,
6071 funding_outpoint: None,
6072 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
6073 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6075 funding_transaction: None,
6077 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6078 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6079 counterparty_node_id,
6081 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6083 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6085 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6086 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6088 announcement_sigs: None,
6090 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6091 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6093 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6095 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6096 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6098 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6099 outbound_scid_alias,
6101 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6102 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6104 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6105 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6110 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6116 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6117 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6118 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6121 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6122 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6123 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6124 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6125 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6126 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6127 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6128 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
6129 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6130 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6131 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6132 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6135 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6137 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6138 // support this channel type.
6139 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6140 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6144 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6145 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6146 // `static_remote_key`.
6147 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6150 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6151 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6154 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6157 channel_type.clone()
6159 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6160 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6165 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6167 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6168 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6169 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6170 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6171 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6172 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6173 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6174 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6175 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6178 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6182 // Check sanity of message fields:
6183 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6186 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6189 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6192 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6193 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6196 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6199 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6202 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6204 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6205 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6211 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6215 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6216 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6219 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6222 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6225 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6228 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6231 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6234 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6238 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6240 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6241 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6246 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6247 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6248 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6249 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6252 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6255 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6256 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6257 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6259 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6263 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6264 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6265 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6266 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6267 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6271 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6272 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6273 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6274 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6278 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6279 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6280 &Some(ref script) => {
6281 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6282 if script.len() == 0 {
6285 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6288 Some(script.clone())
6291 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6298 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6299 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6300 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6301 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6305 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6306 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6311 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6312 Ok(script) => script,
6313 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6316 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6317 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6319 let chan = Channel {
6320 context: ChannelContext {
6323 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6324 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6326 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6331 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6333 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6334 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6335 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6336 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6339 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6342 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6345 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6346 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6347 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6349 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6350 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6351 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6352 pending_update_fee: None,
6353 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6354 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6355 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6356 update_time_counter: 1,
6358 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6360 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6361 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6362 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6363 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6364 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6365 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6367 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6368 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6369 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6370 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6372 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6373 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6374 closing_fee_limits: None,
6375 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6377 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6379 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6380 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6381 short_channel_id: None,
6382 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6384 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6385 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6386 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6387 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6388 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6389 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6390 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6391 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6392 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6393 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6394 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6395 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6396 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6398 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6400 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6401 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6402 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6403 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6404 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6405 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6406 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6408 funding_outpoint: None,
6409 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6410 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6412 funding_transaction: None,
6414 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6415 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6416 counterparty_node_id,
6418 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6420 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6422 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6423 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6425 announcement_sigs: None,
6427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6432 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6433 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6435 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6436 outbound_scid_alias,
6438 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6439 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6441 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6442 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6447 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6455 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6456 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6458 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6464 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6465 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6466 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6467 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6468 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6470 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6471 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6472 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6473 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6479 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6480 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6481 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6482 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6483 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6489 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6490 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6491 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6492 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6494 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6495 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6496 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6497 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6502 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6503 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6504 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6505 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6506 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6507 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6512 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6514 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6517 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6519 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6520 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6521 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6522 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6523 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6525 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6526 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6527 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6528 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6530 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6531 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6532 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6536 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6537 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6538 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6539 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6540 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6541 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6543 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6544 // deserialized from that format.
6545 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6546 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6547 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6549 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6551 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6552 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6553 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6555 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6556 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6557 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6558 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6561 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6562 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6563 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6566 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6567 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6568 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6569 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6571 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6572 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6574 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6576 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6578 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6580 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6583 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6585 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6590 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6592 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6593 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6594 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6595 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6596 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6597 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6598 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6600 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6602 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6604 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6607 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6608 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6609 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6612 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6614 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6615 preimages.push(preimage);
6617 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6618 reason.write(writer)?;
6620 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6622 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6623 preimages.push(preimage);
6625 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6626 reason.write(writer)?;
6631 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6632 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6634 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6636 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6637 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6638 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6639 source.write(writer)?;
6640 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6644 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6645 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6647 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6649 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6650 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6655 match self.context.resend_order {
6656 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6657 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6660 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6661 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6662 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6664 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6665 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6666 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6667 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6670 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6671 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6672 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6673 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6674 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6677 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6678 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6679 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6680 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6682 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6683 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6684 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6686 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6688 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6689 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6691 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6693 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6694 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6695 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6696 // consider the stale state on reload.
6699 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6700 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6701 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6703 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6704 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6707 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6708 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6711 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6714 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6715 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6717 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6720 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6721 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6722 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6724 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6727 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6730 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6731 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6732 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6734 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6736 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6741 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6743 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6744 htlc.write(writer)?;
6747 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6748 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6749 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6751 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6752 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6754 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6755 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6756 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6757 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6758 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6759 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6760 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6762 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6763 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6764 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6765 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6766 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6768 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6769 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6771 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6772 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6773 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6774 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6776 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6778 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6779 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6780 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6781 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6782 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6783 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6784 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6786 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6787 (2, chan_type, option),
6788 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6789 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6790 (5, self.context.config, required),
6791 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6792 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6793 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6794 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6795 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6796 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6797 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6798 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6799 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6800 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6801 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6802 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6803 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6804 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6805 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6806 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6813 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6814 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6817 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6819 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6820 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6821 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6823 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6824 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6825 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6826 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6830 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6831 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6837 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6842 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let mut keys_data = None;
6848 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6849 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6850 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6852 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6853 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6854 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6855 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6856 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6857 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6861 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6862 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6863 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6866 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6875 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6876 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6877 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6879 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6880 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6881 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6882 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6883 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6884 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6885 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6886 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6891 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6893 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6894 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6895 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6896 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6898 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6899 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6900 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6901 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6902 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6904 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6908 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6912 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6915 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6920 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6922 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6923 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6924 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6925 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6929 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6932 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6933 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6935 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6936 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6937 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6939 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6943 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6944 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6945 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6946 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6949 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6953 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6954 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6955 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6956 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6959 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6961 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6962 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6965 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6975 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6976 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6977 // consider the stale state on reload.
6978 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6981 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6988 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6997 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6998 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7000 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7001 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7009 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7010 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7012 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7013 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7018 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7019 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7020 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7021 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7023 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7026 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7040 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7041 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7043 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7045 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7049 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7050 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7051 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7053 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7059 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7060 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7061 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7062 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7063 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7064 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7065 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7066 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7067 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7068 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7070 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7071 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7072 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7073 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7074 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7075 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7076 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7078 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7079 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7080 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7081 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7083 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7085 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7086 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7087 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7088 (2, channel_type, option),
7089 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7090 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7091 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7092 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7093 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7094 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7095 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7096 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7097 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7098 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7099 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7100 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7101 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7102 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7103 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7104 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7105 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7106 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7107 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7110 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7111 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7112 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7113 // required channel parameters.
7114 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7115 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7116 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7118 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7120 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7121 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7122 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7123 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7126 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7127 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7128 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7130 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7131 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7133 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7139 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7140 if iter.next().is_some() {
7141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7145 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7146 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7147 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7148 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7149 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7152 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7153 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7155 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7156 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7157 // separate u64 values.
7158 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7160 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7163 context: ChannelContext {
7166 config: config.unwrap(),
7170 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7171 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7172 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7175 temporary_channel_id,
7177 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7179 channel_value_satoshis,
7181 latest_monitor_update_id,
7184 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7187 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7188 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7191 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7192 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7193 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7194 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7198 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7199 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7200 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7201 monitor_pending_forwards,
7202 monitor_pending_failures,
7203 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7206 holding_cell_update_fee,
7207 next_holder_htlc_id,
7208 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7209 update_time_counter,
7212 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7213 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7214 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7215 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7217 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7218 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7219 closing_fee_limits: None,
7220 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7222 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7224 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7225 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7227 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7229 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7230 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7231 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7232 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7233 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7234 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7235 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7236 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7237 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7240 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7242 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7243 funding_transaction,
7245 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7246 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7247 counterparty_node_id,
7249 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7253 channel_update_status,
7254 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7258 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7259 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7261 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7263 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7264 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7266 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7267 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7268 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7270 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7271 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7274 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7276 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7279 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7288 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7289 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7290 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7291 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7292 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7294 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7295 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7297 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7298 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7299 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7300 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7301 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7302 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7303 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7304 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7305 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7306 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7307 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7308 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7309 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7310 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7311 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7312 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7313 use crate::util::test_utils;
7314 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7315 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7316 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7317 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7318 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7319 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7320 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7321 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7322 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7323 use crate::prelude::*;
7325 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7328 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7329 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7335 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7336 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7337 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7338 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7342 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7343 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7344 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7345 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7346 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7347 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7348 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7352 signer: InMemorySigner,
7355 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7356 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7359 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7360 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7362 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7363 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7366 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7370 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7372 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7373 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7374 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7375 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7376 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7379 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7380 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7381 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7382 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7386 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7387 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7388 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7392 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7393 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7394 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7395 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7397 let seed = [42; 32];
7398 let network = Network::Testnet;
7399 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7400 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7401 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7405 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7406 let config = UserConfig::default();
7407 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7408 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7409 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7411 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7412 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7416 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7417 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7419 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7420 let original_fee = 253;
7421 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7422 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7424 let seed = [42; 32];
7425 let network = Network::Testnet;
7426 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7428 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7429 let config = UserConfig::default();
7430 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7432 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7433 // same as the old fee.
7434 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7435 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7436 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7440 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7441 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7442 // dust limits are used.
7443 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7445 let seed = [42; 32];
7446 let network = Network::Testnet;
7447 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7448 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7450 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7451 // they have different dust limits.
7453 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7454 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7455 let config = UserConfig::default();
7456 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7458 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7459 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7460 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7461 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7462 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7464 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7465 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7466 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7467 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7468 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7470 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7471 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7472 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7474 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7475 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7476 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7477 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7480 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7482 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7483 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7484 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7485 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7486 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7487 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7488 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7489 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7490 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7494 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7495 // the dust limit check.
7496 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7497 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7498 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7499 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7501 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7502 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7503 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7504 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7505 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7506 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7507 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7511 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7512 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7513 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7514 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7515 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7516 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7517 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7518 let seed = [42; 32];
7519 let network = Network::Testnet;
7520 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7522 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7523 let config = UserConfig::default();
7524 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7526 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7527 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7529 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7530 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7531 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7532 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7533 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7534 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7536 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7537 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7538 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7539 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7540 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7542 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7544 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7545 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7546 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7547 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7548 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7550 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7551 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7552 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7553 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7554 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7558 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7559 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7560 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7562 let seed = [42; 32];
7563 let network = Network::Testnet;
7564 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7565 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7566 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7568 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7570 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7571 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7572 let config = UserConfig::default();
7573 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7575 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7576 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7577 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7578 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7580 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7581 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7582 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7584 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7585 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7586 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7587 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7589 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7590 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7591 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7593 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7594 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7596 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7597 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7598 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7599 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7600 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7601 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7602 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7604 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7606 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7607 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7608 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7609 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7610 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7614 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7615 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7616 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7618 let seed = [42; 32];
7619 let network = Network::Testnet;
7620 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7621 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7622 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7624 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7625 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7626 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7627 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7628 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7629 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7630 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7631 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7633 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7634 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7635 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7636 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7637 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7638 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7640 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7641 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7642 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7643 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7645 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7647 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7648 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7649 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7650 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7651 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7652 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7654 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7655 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7656 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7657 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7659 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7660 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7661 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7662 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7663 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7665 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7666 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7668 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7669 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7670 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7672 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7673 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7674 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7675 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7676 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7678 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7679 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7681 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7682 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7683 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7687 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7689 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7690 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7691 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7693 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7694 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7695 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7696 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7698 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7699 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7700 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7702 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7704 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7705 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7708 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7709 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7710 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7712 let seed = [42; 32];
7713 let network = Network::Testnet;
7714 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7715 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7716 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7719 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7720 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7721 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7723 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7724 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7726 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7727 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7728 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7730 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7731 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7733 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7735 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7736 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7738 // Channel Negotiations failed
7739 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7740 assert!(result.is_err());
7745 fn channel_update() {
7746 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7747 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7748 let seed = [42; 32];
7749 let network = Network::Testnet;
7750 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7751 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7753 // Create a channel.
7754 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7755 let config = UserConfig::default();
7756 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7757 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7758 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7759 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7761 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7762 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7763 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7765 short_channel_id: 0,
7768 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7769 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7770 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7772 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7773 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7775 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7777 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7779 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7780 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7781 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7782 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7784 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7785 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7786 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7788 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7792 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7794 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7795 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7796 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7797 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7798 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7799 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7800 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7801 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7802 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7803 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7804 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7805 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7806 use crate::sync::Arc;
7808 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7809 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7810 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7811 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7813 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7815 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7816 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7817 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7818 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7819 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7821 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7822 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7828 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7829 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7830 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7832 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7833 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7834 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7835 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7836 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7837 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7839 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7841 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7842 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7843 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7844 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7845 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7846 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7848 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7849 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7850 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7851 selected_contest_delay: 144
7853 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7854 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7856 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7857 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7859 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7860 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7862 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7863 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7865 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7866 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7867 // build_commitment_transaction.
7868 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7869 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7870 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7871 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7872 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7874 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7875 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7876 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7877 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7881 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7882 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7883 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7884 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7888 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7889 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7890 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7892 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7893 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7895 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7896 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7898 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7900 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7901 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7902 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7903 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7904 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7905 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7906 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7908 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7909 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7910 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7911 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7913 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7914 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7915 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7917 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7919 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7920 commitment_tx.clone(),
7921 counterparty_signature,
7922 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7923 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7924 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7926 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7927 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7929 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7930 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7931 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7933 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7934 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7937 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7938 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7940 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7941 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7942 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7943 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7944 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7945 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7946 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7947 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7949 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7952 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7953 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7954 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7958 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7961 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7962 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7963 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7965 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7966 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7967 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7968 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7969 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7970 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7971 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7972 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7974 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7978 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7979 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7980 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7981 "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", {});
7983 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7984 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7986 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7987 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7988 "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", {});
7990 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7991 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7992 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7993 "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", {});
7995 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7996 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7998 amount_msat: 1000000,
8000 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8001 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8003 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8006 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8007 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8009 amount_msat: 2000000,
8011 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8012 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8014 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8017 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8018 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8020 amount_msat: 2000000,
8022 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8023 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8024 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8026 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8029 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8030 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8032 amount_msat: 3000000,
8034 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8035 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8036 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8038 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8041 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8042 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8044 amount_msat: 4000000,
8046 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8047 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8049 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8053 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8054 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8055 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8057 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8058 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8059 "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", {
8062 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8063 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8064 "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" },
8067 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8068 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8069 "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" },
8072 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8073 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8074 "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" },
8077 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8078 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8079 "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" },
8082 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8083 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8084 "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" }
8087 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8088 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8089 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8091 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8092 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8093 "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", {
8096 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8097 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8098 "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" },
8101 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8102 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8103 "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" },
8106 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8107 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8108 "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" },
8111 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8112 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8113 "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" },
8116 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8117 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8118 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8121 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8122 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8123 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8125 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8126 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8127 "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", {
8130 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8131 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8132 "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" },
8135 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8136 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8137 "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" },
8140 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8141 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8142 "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" },
8145 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8146 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8147 "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" }
8150 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8151 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8152 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8153 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8155 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8156 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8157 "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", {
8160 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8161 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8162 "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" },
8165 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8166 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8167 "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" },
8170 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8171 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8172 "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" },
8175 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8176 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8177 "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" }
8180 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8181 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8182 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8183 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8185 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8186 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8187 "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", {
8190 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8191 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8192 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8195 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8196 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8197 "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" },
8200 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8201 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8202 "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" },
8205 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8206 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8207 "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" }
8210 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8211 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8212 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8214 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8215 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8216 "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", {
8219 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8220 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8221 "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" },
8224 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8225 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8226 "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" },
8229 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8230 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8231 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8234 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8235 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8236 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8238 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8239 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8240 "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", {
8243 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8244 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8245 "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" },
8248 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8249 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8250 "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" },
8253 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8254 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8255 "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" }
8258 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8259 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8260 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8262 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8263 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8264 "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", {
8267 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8268 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8269 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8272 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8273 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8274 "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" }
8277 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8278 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8279 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8280 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8282 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8283 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8284 "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", {
8287 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8288 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8289 "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" },
8292 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8293 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8294 "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" }
8297 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8298 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8299 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8300 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8302 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8303 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8304 "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", {
8307 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8308 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8309 "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" },
8312 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8313 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8314 "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" }
8317 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8318 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8319 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8321 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8322 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8323 "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", {
8326 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8327 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8328 "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" }
8331 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8332 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8333 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8334 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8336 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8337 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8338 "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", {
8341 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8342 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8343 "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" }
8346 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8347 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8348 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8349 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8351 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8352 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8353 "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", {
8356 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8357 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8358 "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" }
8361 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8362 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8363 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8364 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8366 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8367 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8368 "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", {});
8370 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8371 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8372 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8373 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8375 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8376 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8377 "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", {});
8379 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8380 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8381 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8382 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8384 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8385 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8386 "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", {});
8388 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8389 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8390 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8392 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8393 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8394 "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", {});
8396 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8399 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8401 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8402 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8403 "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", {});
8405 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8406 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8407 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8408 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8410 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8411 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8412 "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", {});
8414 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8415 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8416 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8417 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8418 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8419 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8421 amount_msat: 2000000,
8423 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8424 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8426 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8429 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8430 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8431 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8433 amount_msat: 5000001,
8435 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8436 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8437 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8439 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8442 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8443 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8445 amount_msat: 5000000,
8447 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8448 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8449 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8451 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8455 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8456 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8457 "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", {
8460 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8461 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8462 "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" },
8464 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8465 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8466 "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" },
8468 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8469 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8470 "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" }
8473 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8474 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8475 "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", {
8478 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8479 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8480 "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" },
8482 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8483 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8484 "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" },
8486 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8487 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8488 "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" }
8493 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8494 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8496 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8497 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8498 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8499 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8501 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8502 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8503 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8505 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8506 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8508 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8509 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8511 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8512 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8513 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8517 fn test_key_derivation() {
8518 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8519 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8521 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8522 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8524 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8525 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8527 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8528 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8530 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8531 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8533 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8534 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8536 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8537 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8539 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8540 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8544 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8545 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8547 let seed = [42; 32];
8548 let network = Network::Testnet;
8549 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8550 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8552 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8553 let config = UserConfig::default();
8554 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8555 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8557 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8558 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8560 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8561 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8562 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8563 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8564 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8565 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8566 assert!(res.is_ok());
8571 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8572 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8573 // resulting `channel_type`.
8574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8575 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8576 let network = Network::Testnet;
8577 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8578 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8580 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8581 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8583 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8584 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8586 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8587 // need to signal it.
8588 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8589 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8590 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8593 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8595 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8596 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8597 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8599 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8600 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8601 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8604 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8605 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8606 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8607 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8608 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8611 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8612 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8617 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8618 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8619 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8620 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8621 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8622 let network = Network::Testnet;
8623 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8624 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8626 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8627 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8629 let config = UserConfig::default();
8631 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8632 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8633 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8634 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8635 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8637 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8638 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8639 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8642 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8643 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8644 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8646 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8647 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8648 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8649 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8650 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8651 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8653 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8658 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8659 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8661 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8662 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8663 let network = Network::Testnet;
8664 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8665 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8667 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8668 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8670 let config = UserConfig::default();
8672 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8673 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8674 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8675 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8676 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8677 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8678 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8679 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8681 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8682 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8683 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8684 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8685 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8686 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8689 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8690 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8692 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8693 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8694 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8695 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8697 assert!(res.is_err());
8699 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8700 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8701 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8703 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8704 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8705 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8708 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8710 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8711 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8712 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8713 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8716 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8717 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8719 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8720 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8722 assert!(res.is_err());