1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
196 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
199 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
203 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
208 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
217 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
222 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
227 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
228 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
247 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
248 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
249 /// move on to ChannelReady.
250 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
251 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
252 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
255 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
256 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
257 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
258 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
259 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
260 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
263 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
264 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
267 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
268 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
274 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
277 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
278 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
279 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
280 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
281 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
282 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
283 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
284 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
287 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
288 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
289 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
290 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
291 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
292 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
293 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
294 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
295 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
296 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
297 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
300 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
305 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
306 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
307 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
308 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
311 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
321 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
324 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
325 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
328 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
331 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
332 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
333 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
334 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
337 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
341 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
347 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
350 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
351 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 holding_cell_msat: u64,
354 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
357 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
358 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
359 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
360 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
361 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
362 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
363 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
364 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
369 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
370 struct HTLCCandidate {
372 origin: HTLCInitiator,
376 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
384 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
389 htlc_value_msat: u64,
390 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
395 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
396 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
397 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
398 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
399 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
402 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
403 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
404 htlc_value_msat: u64,
405 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
406 /// in the holding cell).
407 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
416 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
419 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
420 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
421 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
422 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
425 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
426 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
427 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
428 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
429 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
430 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
431 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
432 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
433 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
434 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
435 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
438 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
439 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
440 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
441 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
442 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
443 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
740 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
741 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
743 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
744 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
745 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
748 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
749 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
750 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
751 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
754 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
755 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
757 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
758 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
759 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
763 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
765 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
766 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
767 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
768 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
772 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
774 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
776 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
778 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
779 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
780 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
781 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
782 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
784 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
785 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
787 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
789 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
790 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
792 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
793 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
794 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
795 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
796 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
797 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
799 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
800 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
802 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
803 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
804 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
805 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
806 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
808 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
809 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
811 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
812 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
814 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
815 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
816 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
817 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
823 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
824 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
826 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
827 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
828 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
833 macro_rules! secp_check {
834 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
837 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
842 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
843 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
844 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
847 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
849 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
850 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
851 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
853 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
856 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
858 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
861 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
862 /// required by us according to the configured or default
863 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
865 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
867 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
868 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
869 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
870 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
871 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
874 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
875 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
876 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
877 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
878 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
879 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
880 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
883 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
884 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
887 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
888 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
889 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
890 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
891 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
892 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
893 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
894 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
895 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
896 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
899 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
900 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
901 // `only_static_remotekey`.
903 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
904 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
905 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
906 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
913 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
914 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
915 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
916 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
917 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
918 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
919 // We've exhausted our options
922 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
923 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
926 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
927 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
928 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
929 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
931 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
932 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
933 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
934 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
935 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
936 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
938 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
940 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
944 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
945 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
946 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
947 outbound_scid_alias: u64
948 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
949 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
950 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
953 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
954 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
955 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
956 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
958 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
961 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
964 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
965 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
968 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
969 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
971 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
972 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
973 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
974 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
978 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
979 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
981 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
983 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
984 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
985 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
989 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
990 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
992 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
993 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
996 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
997 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
998 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1005 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1006 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1007 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1008 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1013 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1015 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1016 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1017 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1019 channel_value_satoshis,
1021 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1024 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1025 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1027 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1028 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1031 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1033 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1034 pending_update_fee: None,
1035 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1036 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1037 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1038 update_time_counter: 1,
1040 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1042 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1043 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1044 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1045 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1046 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1047 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1049 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1050 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1051 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1052 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1054 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1055 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1056 closing_fee_limits: None,
1057 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1059 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1061 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1062 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1063 short_channel_id: None,
1064 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1066 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1067 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1068 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1069 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1070 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1071 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1072 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1073 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1074 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1075 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1076 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1078 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1080 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1081 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1082 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1083 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1084 counterparty_parameters: None,
1085 funding_outpoint: None,
1086 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1087 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1089 funding_transaction: None,
1091 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1092 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1093 counterparty_node_id,
1095 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1097 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1099 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1100 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1102 announcement_sigs: None,
1104 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1105 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1106 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1107 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1109 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1111 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1112 outbound_scid_alias,
1114 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1116 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1117 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1122 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1126 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1127 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1128 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1130 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1131 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1132 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1133 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1134 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1135 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1136 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1139 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1140 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1141 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1142 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1143 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1144 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1145 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1146 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1148 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1149 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1158 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1159 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1160 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1161 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1162 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1163 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1164 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1165 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1166 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1167 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1171 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1173 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1174 // support this channel type.
1175 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1176 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1180 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1181 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1182 // `static_remote_key`.
1183 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1186 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1187 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1190 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1193 channel_type.clone()
1195 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1196 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1201 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1203 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1204 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1205 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1206 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1207 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1208 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1209 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1210 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1211 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1214 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1218 // Check sanity of message fields:
1219 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1222 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1225 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1228 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1229 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1235 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1238 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1240 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1241 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1244 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1247 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1251 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1252 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1258 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1261 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1264 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1267 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1270 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1274 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1276 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1277 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1282 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1283 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1285 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1288 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1291 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1293 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1295 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1299 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1300 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1301 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1302 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1303 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1307 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1308 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1309 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1310 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1314 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1315 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1316 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1317 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1318 if script.len() == 0 {
1321 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1324 Some(script.clone())
1327 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1328 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1334 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1335 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1338 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1339 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1344 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1345 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1347 let chan = Channel {
1350 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1351 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1353 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1358 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1360 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1361 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1362 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1365 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1368 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1369 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1371 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1372 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1373 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1375 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1376 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1377 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1378 pending_update_fee: None,
1379 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1380 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1381 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1382 update_time_counter: 1,
1384 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1386 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1387 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1388 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1389 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1390 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1391 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1393 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1394 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1395 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1396 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1398 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1399 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1400 closing_fee_limits: None,
1401 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1403 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1405 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1406 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1407 short_channel_id: None,
1408 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1410 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1411 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1412 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1413 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1414 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1415 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1416 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1417 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1418 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1419 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1420 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1421 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1423 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1425 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1426 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1427 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1428 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1429 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1430 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1431 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1433 funding_outpoint: None,
1434 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1435 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1437 funding_transaction: None,
1439 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1440 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1441 counterparty_node_id,
1443 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1445 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1447 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1448 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1450 announcement_sigs: None,
1452 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1453 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1457 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1459 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1460 outbound_scid_alias,
1462 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1464 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1465 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1470 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1476 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1477 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1478 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1479 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1480 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1482 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1483 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1484 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1485 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1486 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1487 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1488 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1490 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1491 where L::Target: Logger
1493 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1494 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1495 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1497 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1498 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1499 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1500 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1502 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1503 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1504 if match update_state {
1505 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1506 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1507 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1508 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1509 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1511 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1515 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1516 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1517 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1518 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1520 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1521 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1522 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1524 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1525 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1526 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1527 transaction_output_index: None
1532 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1533 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1534 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1535 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1536 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1539 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1541 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1542 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1543 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1545 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1546 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1549 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1550 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1553 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1555 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1556 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1557 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1559 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1560 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1566 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1567 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1568 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1569 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1570 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1571 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1572 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1576 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1577 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1581 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1582 if generated_by_local {
1583 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1584 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1593 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1595 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1596 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1597 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1598 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1599 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1600 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1601 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1604 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1605 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1606 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1607 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1611 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1612 preimages.push(preimage);
1616 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1617 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1621 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1622 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1624 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1625 if !generated_by_local {
1626 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1634 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1635 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1636 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1637 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1638 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1639 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1640 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1641 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1643 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1645 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1646 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1647 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1648 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1650 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1652 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1653 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1654 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1655 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1658 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1659 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1660 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1661 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1663 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1666 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1667 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1668 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1669 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1671 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1674 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1675 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1680 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1681 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1686 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1688 let channel_parameters =
1689 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1690 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1691 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1694 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1699 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1702 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1703 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1704 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1705 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1707 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1708 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1709 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1717 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1718 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1724 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1725 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1726 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1727 // outside of those situations will fail.
1728 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1732 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1737 1 + // script length (0)
1741 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1742 2 + // witness marker and flag
1743 1 + // witness element count
1744 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1745 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1746 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1747 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1748 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1749 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1751 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1752 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1753 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1759 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1760 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1761 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1762 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1764 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1765 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1766 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1768 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1769 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1770 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1771 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1772 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1773 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1776 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1777 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1780 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1781 value_to_holder = 0;
1784 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1785 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1786 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1787 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1789 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1790 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1793 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1794 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1798 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1799 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1800 /// our counterparty!)
1801 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1802 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1803 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1804 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1805 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1806 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1807 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1809 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1813 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1814 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1815 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1816 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1817 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1818 //may see payments to it!
1819 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1820 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1821 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1823 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1826 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1827 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1828 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1829 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1830 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1833 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1836 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1837 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1839 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1841 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1842 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1843 where L::Target: Logger {
1844 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1845 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1846 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1847 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1848 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1849 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1850 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1851 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1855 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1856 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1857 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1858 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1860 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1861 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1863 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1865 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1867 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1868 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1869 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1871 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1872 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1873 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1874 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1875 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1877 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1878 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1879 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1881 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1882 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1884 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1887 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1888 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1892 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1896 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1898 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1899 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1900 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1901 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1904 // Now update local state:
1906 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1907 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1908 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1909 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1910 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1911 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1912 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1916 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1917 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1918 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1919 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1920 // do not not get into this branch.
1921 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1922 match pending_update {
1923 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1924 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1925 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1926 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1927 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1928 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1929 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1932 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1933 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1934 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1935 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1936 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1937 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1938 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1944 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1945 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1946 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1948 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1949 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1950 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1952 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1953 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1956 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1957 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1959 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1960 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1962 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1963 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1966 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1969 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1970 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1971 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1972 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1977 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1978 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1979 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1980 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1981 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1984 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1985 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1986 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1987 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1988 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1990 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1991 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1999 /// before we fail backwards.
2001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2010 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2011 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2012 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2013 /// before we fail backwards.
2015 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2016 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2017 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2018 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2019 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2020 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2021 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2023 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2025 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2026 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2027 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2029 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2030 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2031 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2033 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2034 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2035 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2049 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2052 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2053 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2057 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2058 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2059 force_holding_cell = true;
2062 // Now update local state:
2063 if force_holding_cell {
2064 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2065 match pending_update {
2066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2067 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2069 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2074 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2075 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2082 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2083 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2084 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2090 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2092 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2096 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2098 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2103 // Message handlers:
2105 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2106 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2108 // Check sanity of message fields:
2109 if !self.is_outbound() {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2112 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2126 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2128 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2129 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2132 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2133 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2136 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2139 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2143 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2144 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2147 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2153 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2156 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2159 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2162 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2166 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2167 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2170 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2171 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2173 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2174 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2177 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2180 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2181 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2182 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2184 if script.len() == 0 {
2187 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2190 Some(script.clone())
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2194 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2200 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2202 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2203 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2204 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2206 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2207 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2209 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2212 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2213 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2214 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2215 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2216 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2217 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2220 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2225 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2226 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2228 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2229 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2234 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2235 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2237 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2238 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2240 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2241 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2242 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2243 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2245 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2247 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2248 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2251 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2252 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2254 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2255 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2259 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2262 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2263 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2266 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2267 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2270 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2271 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2272 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2277 if self.is_outbound() {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2280 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2281 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2282 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2286 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2289 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2290 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2291 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2295 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2297 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2298 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2299 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2301 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2303 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2308 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2309 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2310 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2314 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2315 initial_commitment_tx,
2318 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2319 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2322 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2325 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2327 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2328 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2329 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2330 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2331 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2332 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2344 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2345 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2351 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2353 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2356 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2357 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2358 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2359 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2360 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2362 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2365 if !self.is_outbound() {
2366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2368 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2371 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2372 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2373 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2374 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2377 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2379 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2380 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2381 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2382 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2384 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2385 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2387 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2388 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2390 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2391 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2392 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2393 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2394 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2399 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2400 initial_commitment_tx,
2403 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2404 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2407 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2408 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2411 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2412 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2413 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2414 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2415 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2416 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2417 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2418 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2419 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2420 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2421 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2422 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2424 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2426 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2428 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2429 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2430 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2431 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2433 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2435 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2438 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2439 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2441 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2442 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2443 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2444 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2446 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2449 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2450 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2451 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2454 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2455 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2456 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2457 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2458 // when routing outbound payments.
2459 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2463 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2465 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2466 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2467 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2468 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2469 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2470 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2471 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2472 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2473 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2475 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2476 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2477 let expected_point =
2478 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2479 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2481 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2483 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2484 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2485 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2486 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2487 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2489 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2490 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2497 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2498 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2500 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2502 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2505 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2506 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2507 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2508 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2514 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2515 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2516 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2517 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2518 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2519 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2520 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2521 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2522 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2525 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2528 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2529 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2530 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2532 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2533 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2534 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2535 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2536 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2537 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2539 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2540 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2546 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2547 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2548 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2549 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2550 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2551 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2552 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2553 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2554 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2557 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2560 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2561 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2562 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2564 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2565 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2566 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2567 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2568 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2569 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2571 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2572 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2576 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2577 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2578 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2579 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2580 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2581 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2582 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2584 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2585 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2587 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2594 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2595 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2596 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2597 /// corner case properly.
2598 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2599 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2600 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2602 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2603 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2604 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2605 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2608 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2610 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2611 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2612 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2615 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2616 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2617 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2618 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2620 outbound_capacity_msat,
2621 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2622 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2623 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2629 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2630 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2633 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2634 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2635 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2636 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2637 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2638 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2641 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2642 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2644 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2645 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2648 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2649 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2650 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2652 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2653 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2655 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2658 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2659 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2661 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2662 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2664 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2665 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2667 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2668 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2672 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2673 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2679 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2680 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2681 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2684 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2685 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2686 included_htlcs += 1;
2689 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2690 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2697 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2698 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2699 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2704 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2706 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2707 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2712 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2713 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2717 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2718 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2719 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2722 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2723 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2725 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2726 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2727 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2729 total_pending_htlcs,
2730 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2731 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2732 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2734 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2735 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2736 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2738 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2740 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2745 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2746 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2747 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2749 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2750 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2752 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2755 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2756 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2758 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2759 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2761 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2762 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2764 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2769 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2770 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2776 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2777 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2778 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2779 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2780 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2781 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2784 included_htlcs += 1;
2787 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2788 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2791 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2792 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2794 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2795 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2796 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2801 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2802 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2807 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2809 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2810 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2812 total_pending_htlcs,
2813 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2817 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2821 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2823 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2828 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2829 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2830 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2831 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2832 if local_sent_shutdown {
2833 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2835 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2836 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2837 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2840 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2843 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2846 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2849 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2853 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2854 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2855 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2858 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2861 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2862 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2863 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2864 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2865 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2866 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2867 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2868 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2869 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2870 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2871 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2873 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2874 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2875 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2876 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2877 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2878 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2882 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2885 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2886 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2887 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2889 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2890 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2891 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2892 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2893 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2894 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2895 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2899 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2900 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2901 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2902 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2903 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2904 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2905 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2909 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2910 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2911 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2912 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2913 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2917 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2918 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2919 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2920 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2921 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2923 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2927 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2931 if !self.is_outbound() {
2932 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2933 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2934 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2935 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2936 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2937 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2938 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2939 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2940 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2941 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2942 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2943 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2944 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2945 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2946 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2949 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2950 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2951 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2952 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2956 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2959 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2963 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2964 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2965 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2969 // Now update local state:
2970 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2971 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2972 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2973 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2974 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2975 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2976 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2981 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2983 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2984 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2985 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2986 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2987 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2988 None => fail_reason.into(),
2989 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2990 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2991 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2994 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2998 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3000 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3001 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3003 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3009 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3012 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3013 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3020 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3023 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3024 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3025 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3027 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3031 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3035 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3036 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3039 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3043 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3047 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3048 where L::Target: Logger
3050 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3051 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3053 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3054 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3056 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3057 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3060 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3062 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3064 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3065 let commitment_txid = {
3066 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3067 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3068 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3070 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3071 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3072 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3073 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3074 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3075 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3079 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3081 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3082 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3083 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3084 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3087 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3088 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3089 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3090 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3093 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3095 if self.is_outbound() {
3096 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3097 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3098 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3099 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3100 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3101 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3102 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3103 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3104 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3105 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3111 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3112 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3115 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3116 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3117 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3118 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3119 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3120 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3121 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3123 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3124 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3125 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3126 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3127 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3128 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3129 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3130 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3132 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3134 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3138 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3139 commitment_stats.tx,
3141 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3142 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3143 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3146 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3147 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3148 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3149 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3151 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3152 let mut need_commitment = false;
3153 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3154 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3155 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3156 need_commitment = true;
3160 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3161 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3162 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3163 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3164 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3165 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3169 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3170 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3171 Some(forward_info.clone())
3173 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3174 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3175 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3176 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3177 need_commitment = true;
3180 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3181 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3182 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3183 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3184 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3185 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3186 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3187 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3188 need_commitment = true;
3192 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3193 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3194 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3195 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3197 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3198 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3199 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3200 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3201 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3202 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3203 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3204 // includes the right HTLCs.
3205 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3206 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3207 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3208 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3209 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3210 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3212 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3213 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3214 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3217 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3218 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3219 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3220 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3221 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3222 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3223 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3224 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3225 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3229 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3230 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3232 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3233 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3234 per_commitment_secret,
3235 next_per_commitment_point,
3236 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3239 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3240 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3241 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3242 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3243 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3244 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3245 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3246 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3249 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3250 /// for our counterparty.
3251 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3252 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3253 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3254 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3255 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3257 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3258 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3259 updates: Vec::new(),
3262 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3263 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3264 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3265 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3266 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3267 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3268 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3269 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3270 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3271 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3272 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3273 // to rebalance channels.
3274 match &htlc_update {
3275 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3276 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3277 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3280 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3281 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3282 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3283 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3284 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3285 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3286 // into the holding cell without ever being
3287 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3288 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3289 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3292 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3298 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3299 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3300 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3301 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3302 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3303 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3304 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3305 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3306 (msg, monitor_update)
3307 } else { unreachable!() };
3308 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3309 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3311 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3312 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3313 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3314 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3315 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3316 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3317 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3318 // for a full revocation before failing.
3319 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3322 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3324 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3331 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3332 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3334 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3335 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3340 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3341 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3342 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3343 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3344 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3346 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3347 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3348 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3350 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3352 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3354 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3357 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3359 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3363 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3364 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3365 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3366 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3367 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3368 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3369 where L::Target: Logger,
3371 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3374 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3377 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3381 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3383 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3384 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3389 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3390 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3391 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3392 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3393 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3394 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3395 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3396 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3400 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3402 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3403 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3406 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3407 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3409 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3411 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3412 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3413 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3414 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3415 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3416 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3417 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3418 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3422 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3423 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3424 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3425 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3426 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3427 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3428 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3429 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3431 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3432 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3435 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3436 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3437 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3438 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3439 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3440 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3441 let mut require_commitment = false;
3442 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3445 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3446 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3447 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3449 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3450 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3451 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3452 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3453 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3454 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3459 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3460 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3461 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3462 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3463 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3465 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3466 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3467 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3472 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3473 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3475 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3479 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3480 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3482 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3483 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3484 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3485 require_commitment = true;
3486 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3487 match forward_info {
3488 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3489 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3490 require_commitment = true;
3492 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3493 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3494 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3496 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3497 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3498 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3502 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3503 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3504 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3505 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3511 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3512 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3513 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3514 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3516 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3517 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3518 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3519 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3520 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3521 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3522 require_commitment = true;
3526 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3528 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3529 match update_state {
3530 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3531 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3532 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3533 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3534 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3536 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3537 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3538 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3540 require_commitment = true;
3541 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3542 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3547 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3548 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3549 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3550 if require_commitment {
3551 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3552 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3553 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3554 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3555 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3556 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3557 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3558 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3559 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3561 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3562 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3563 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3564 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3565 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3566 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3567 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3569 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3573 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3574 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3575 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3576 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3577 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3579 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3580 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3581 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3584 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3585 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3586 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3587 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3590 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3591 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3592 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3593 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3595 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3598 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3599 if require_commitment {
3600 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3602 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3603 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3604 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3605 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3607 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3608 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3610 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3611 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3612 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3614 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3618 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3619 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3620 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3623 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3625 commitment_update: None,
3626 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3627 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3628 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3635 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3636 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3637 /// commitment update.
3638 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3639 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3640 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3643 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3644 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3645 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3646 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3648 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3649 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3650 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3651 if !self.is_outbound() {
3652 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3654 if !self.is_usable() {
3655 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3657 if !self.is_live() {
3658 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3661 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3662 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3663 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3664 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3665 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3666 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3667 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3668 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3669 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3670 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3674 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3675 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3676 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3677 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3678 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3681 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3682 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3686 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3687 force_holding_cell = true;
3690 if force_holding_cell {
3691 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3695 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3696 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3698 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3699 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3704 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3705 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3707 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3709 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3710 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3711 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3712 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3716 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3717 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3718 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3722 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3723 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3726 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3727 // will be retransmitted.
3728 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3729 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3730 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3732 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3733 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3735 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3736 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3737 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3738 // this HTLC accordingly
3739 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3742 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3743 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3744 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3745 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3748 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3749 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3750 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3751 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3752 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3753 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3758 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3760 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3761 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3762 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3763 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3767 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3768 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3769 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3770 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3771 // the update upon reconnection.
3772 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3776 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3777 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3780 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3781 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3782 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3783 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3784 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3785 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3787 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3788 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3789 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3790 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3791 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3792 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3794 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3795 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3796 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3797 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3798 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3799 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3800 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3803 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3804 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3805 /// to the remote side.
3806 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3807 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3808 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3809 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3812 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3814 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3815 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3817 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3818 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3819 // first received the funding_signed.
3820 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3821 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3822 self.funding_transaction.take()
3824 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3825 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3826 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3827 funding_broadcastable = None;
3830 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3831 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3832 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3833 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3834 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3835 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3836 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3837 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3838 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3839 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3840 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3841 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3842 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3843 next_per_commitment_point,
3844 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3848 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3850 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3851 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3852 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3853 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3854 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3855 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3857 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3858 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3859 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3860 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3861 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3862 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3866 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3867 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3869 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3870 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3873 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3874 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3875 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3876 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3877 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3878 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3879 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3880 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3881 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3885 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3886 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3888 if self.is_outbound() {
3889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3891 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3894 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3895 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3897 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3898 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3899 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3900 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3901 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3902 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3903 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3904 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3905 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3906 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3907 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3909 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3911 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3913 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3919 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3920 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3921 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3922 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3923 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3924 per_commitment_secret,
3925 next_per_commitment_point,
3929 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3930 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3931 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3932 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3933 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3935 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3936 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3937 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3938 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3939 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3940 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3941 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3942 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3943 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3948 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3949 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3951 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3952 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3953 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3954 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3955 reason: err_packet.clone()
3958 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3959 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3960 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3961 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3962 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3963 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3966 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3967 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3968 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3969 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3970 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3977 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3978 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3979 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3980 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3984 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3985 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3986 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3987 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3988 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3989 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3993 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3994 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3996 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3997 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3998 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3999 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4000 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4001 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4002 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4003 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4006 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4008 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4009 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4010 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4011 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4012 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4015 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4016 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4020 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4021 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4022 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4023 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4024 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4025 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4026 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4027 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4029 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4030 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4031 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4032 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4033 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4036 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4037 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4038 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4039 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4040 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4041 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4042 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4043 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4046 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4050 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4051 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4052 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4053 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4055 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4059 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4060 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4061 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4063 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4064 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4065 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4066 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4067 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4071 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4073 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4074 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4075 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4076 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4077 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4080 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4081 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4082 channel_ready: None,
4083 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4084 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4085 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4089 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4090 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4091 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4092 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4093 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4094 next_per_commitment_point,
4095 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4097 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4098 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4099 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4103 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4104 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4105 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4107 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4108 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4109 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4112 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4118 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4119 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4120 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4121 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4122 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4124 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4125 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4126 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4127 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4128 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4129 next_per_commitment_point,
4130 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4134 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4135 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4136 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4138 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4141 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4142 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4143 raa: required_revoke,
4144 commitment_update: None,
4145 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4147 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4148 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4149 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4151 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4154 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4155 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4156 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4157 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4158 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4159 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4162 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4163 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4164 raa: required_revoke,
4165 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4166 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4170 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4174 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4175 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4176 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4177 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4179 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4181 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4183 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4184 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4185 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4186 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4187 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4188 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4190 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4191 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4192 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4193 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4194 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4196 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4197 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4198 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4199 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4202 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4203 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4204 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4205 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4206 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4207 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4208 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4209 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4210 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4211 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4212 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4213 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4214 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4215 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4216 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4218 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4221 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4222 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4225 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4226 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4227 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4228 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4229 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4230 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4231 self.channel_state &
4232 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4233 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4234 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4235 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4238 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4239 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4240 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4241 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4242 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4243 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4246 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4252 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4253 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4254 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4255 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4257 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4258 return Ok((None, None));
4261 if !self.is_outbound() {
4262 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4263 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4265 return Ok((None, None));
4268 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4270 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4271 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4272 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4273 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4275 let sig = self.holder_signer
4276 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4277 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4279 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4280 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4281 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4282 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4284 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4285 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4286 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4291 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4292 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4293 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4294 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4296 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4299 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4300 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4301 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4302 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4305 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4306 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4310 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4312 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4316 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4317 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4321 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4324 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4325 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4326 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4327 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4329 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4332 assert!(send_shutdown);
4333 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4334 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4337 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4342 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4344 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4345 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4347 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4348 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4349 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4350 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4351 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4352 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4356 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4357 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4358 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4359 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4363 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4364 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4365 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4366 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4367 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4368 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4370 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4371 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4378 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4379 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4381 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4384 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4385 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4387 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4389 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4390 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4391 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4392 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4393 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4394 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4395 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4396 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4397 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4399 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4400 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4403 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4407 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4408 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4409 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4410 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4412 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4415 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4418 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4421 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4425 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4429 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4430 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4431 return Ok((None, None));
4434 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4435 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4436 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4439 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4441 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4444 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4445 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4446 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4447 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4448 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4452 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4453 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4458 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4459 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4460 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4461 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4462 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4463 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4464 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4468 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4470 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4471 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4472 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4473 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4475 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4478 let sig = self.holder_signer
4479 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4482 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4483 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4484 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4485 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4489 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4490 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4491 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4492 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4494 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4495 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4496 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4502 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4503 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4504 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4506 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4507 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4509 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4513 if !self.is_outbound() {
4514 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4515 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4516 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4517 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4519 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4521 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4523 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4524 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4527 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4528 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4529 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4530 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4531 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4533 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4534 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4539 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4540 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4541 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4542 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4544 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4548 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4549 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4550 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4551 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4553 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4559 // Public utilities:
4561 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4565 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4569 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4570 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4571 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4575 /// Gets the channel's type
4576 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4580 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4581 /// is_usable() returns true).
4582 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4583 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4584 self.short_channel_id
4587 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4588 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4589 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4592 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4593 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4594 self.outbound_scid_alias
4596 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4597 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4598 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4599 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4600 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4603 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4604 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4605 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4606 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4609 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4610 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4611 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4614 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4615 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4616 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4617 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4621 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4624 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4625 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4628 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4629 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4632 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4633 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4634 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4637 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4638 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4641 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4642 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4643 self.counterparty_node_id
4646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4647 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4648 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4651 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4652 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4653 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4657 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4659 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4660 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4661 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4662 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4664 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4668 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4669 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4670 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4673 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4674 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4675 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4678 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4679 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4680 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4682 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4683 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4688 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4689 self.channel_value_satoshis
4692 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4693 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4696 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4697 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4700 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4701 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4704 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4705 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4706 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4709 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4710 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4711 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4714 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4715 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4716 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4719 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4720 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4721 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4722 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4723 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4726 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4728 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4729 self.prev_config = None;
4733 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4734 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4738 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4739 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4740 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4741 let did_channel_update =
4742 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4743 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4744 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4745 if did_channel_update {
4746 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4747 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4748 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4749 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4751 self.config.options = *config;
4755 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4756 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4757 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4758 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4759 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4760 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4761 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4763 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4764 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4767 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4769 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4770 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4776 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4777 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4778 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4779 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4780 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4781 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4782 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4784 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4785 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4792 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4796 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4797 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4798 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4799 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4800 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4801 // which are near the dust limit.
4802 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4803 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4804 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4805 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4806 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4808 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4809 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4811 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4814 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4815 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4818 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4819 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4822 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4823 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4827 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4832 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4834 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4835 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4836 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4837 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4838 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4839 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4841 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4843 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4851 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4852 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4856 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4857 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4858 self.update_time_counter
4861 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4862 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4865 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4866 self.config.announced_channel
4869 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4870 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4873 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4874 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4875 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4876 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4879 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4880 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4881 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4884 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4885 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4886 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4887 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4888 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4891 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4892 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4893 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4894 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4895 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4898 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4899 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4900 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4901 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4904 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4905 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4908 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4909 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4910 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4913 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4914 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4915 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4917 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4918 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4919 if self.channel_state &
4920 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4921 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4922 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4923 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4924 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4927 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4928 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4929 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4930 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4931 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4932 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4934 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4935 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4936 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4938 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4939 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4940 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4941 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4942 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4943 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4949 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4950 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4951 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4954 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4955 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4956 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4959 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4960 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4961 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4964 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4965 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4966 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4967 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4968 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4969 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4974 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4975 self.channel_update_status
4978 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4979 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4980 self.channel_update_status = status;
4983 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4985 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4986 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4987 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4991 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4992 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4993 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4996 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5000 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5001 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5002 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5004 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5005 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5006 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5008 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5009 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5012 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5013 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5014 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5015 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5016 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5017 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5018 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5019 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5020 self.channel_state);
5022 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5026 if need_commitment_update {
5027 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5029 let next_per_commitment_point =
5030 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5031 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5032 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5033 next_per_commitment_point,
5034 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5038 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5044 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5045 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5046 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5047 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5048 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5049 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5050 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5052 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5055 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5056 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5057 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5058 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5059 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5060 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5061 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5062 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5063 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5064 if self.is_outbound() {
5065 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5066 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5067 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5068 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5069 // channel and move on.
5070 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5071 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5073 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5074 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5075 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5077 if self.is_outbound() {
5078 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5079 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5080 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5081 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5082 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5083 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5087 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5088 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5089 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5090 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5091 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5095 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5096 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5097 // may have already happened for this block).
5098 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5099 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5100 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5101 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5104 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5105 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5106 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5107 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5115 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5116 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5117 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5118 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5120 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5121 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5124 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5126 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5127 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5128 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5129 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5131 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5134 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5137 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5138 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5139 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5140 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5142 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5145 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5146 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5147 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5149 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5150 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5152 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5153 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5154 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5162 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5164 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5165 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5166 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5168 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5169 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5172 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5173 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5174 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5175 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5176 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5177 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5178 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5179 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5180 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5183 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5184 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5185 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5186 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5188 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5189 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5190 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5192 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5193 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5194 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5195 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5197 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5198 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5199 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5200 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5201 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5202 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5203 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5206 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5207 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5209 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5212 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5213 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5214 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5215 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5216 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5217 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5218 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5219 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5220 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5221 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5222 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5223 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5224 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5225 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5226 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5227 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5228 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5234 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5239 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5240 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5242 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5243 if !self.is_outbound() {
5244 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5246 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5247 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5250 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5251 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5254 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5255 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5259 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5260 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5261 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5262 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5263 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5264 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5265 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5266 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5267 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5268 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5269 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5270 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5271 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5272 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5273 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5274 first_per_commitment_point,
5275 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5276 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5277 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5278 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5280 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5284 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5285 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5288 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5289 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5290 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5291 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5294 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5295 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5297 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5298 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5299 if self.is_outbound() {
5300 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5302 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5303 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5305 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5306 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5308 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5309 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5312 self.user_id = user_id;
5313 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5315 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5318 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5319 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5320 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5322 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5323 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5324 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5325 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5327 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5328 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5329 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5330 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5331 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5332 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5333 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5334 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5335 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5336 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5337 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5338 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5339 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5340 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5341 first_per_commitment_point,
5342 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5343 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5344 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5346 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5350 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5351 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5353 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5355 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5356 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5359 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5360 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5361 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5362 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5363 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5367 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5368 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5369 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5370 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5371 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5372 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5373 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5374 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5375 if !self.is_outbound() {
5376 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5378 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5379 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5381 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5382 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5383 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5384 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5387 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5388 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5390 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5393 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5394 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5399 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5401 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5403 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5404 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5405 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5407 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5408 temporary_channel_id,
5409 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5410 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5415 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5416 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5417 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5418 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5420 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5423 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5424 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5425 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5426 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5427 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5428 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5430 if !self.is_usable() {
5431 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5434 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5435 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5436 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5437 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5439 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5440 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5442 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5443 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5444 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5445 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5446 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5447 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5453 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5454 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5455 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5456 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5458 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5461 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5465 if !self.is_usable() {
5469 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5470 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5474 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5478 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5479 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5482 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5486 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5488 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5493 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5495 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5500 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5502 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5503 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5504 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5505 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5506 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5510 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5512 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5513 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5514 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5515 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5516 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5517 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5518 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5520 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5521 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5522 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5523 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5524 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5525 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5526 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5527 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5528 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5529 contents: announcement,
5532 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5536 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5537 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5538 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5539 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5540 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5541 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5542 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5543 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5545 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5547 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5548 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5549 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5550 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5552 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5554 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5555 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5558 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5559 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5560 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5561 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5564 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5567 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5568 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5569 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5570 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5571 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5572 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5575 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5577 Err(_) => return None,
5579 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5580 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5585 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5586 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5587 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5588 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5589 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5590 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5591 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5592 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5593 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5594 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5595 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5596 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5597 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5598 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5599 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5600 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5601 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5602 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5603 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5606 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5607 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5608 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5609 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5612 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5613 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5614 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5615 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5616 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5617 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5618 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5619 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5621 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5622 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5623 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5624 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5625 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5626 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5627 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5628 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5629 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5631 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5637 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5639 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5640 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5641 /// commitment update.
5643 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5644 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5645 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5646 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5648 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5649 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5651 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5652 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5657 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5658 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5660 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5662 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5663 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5665 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5666 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5667 /// regenerate them.
5669 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5670 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5672 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5673 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5674 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5675 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5676 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5677 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5679 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5680 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5681 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5684 if amount_msat == 0 {
5685 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5688 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5689 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5692 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5693 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5694 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5695 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5696 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5697 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5698 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5699 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5702 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5703 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5704 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5705 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5707 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5708 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5709 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5712 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5713 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5714 if !self.is_outbound() {
5715 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5716 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5717 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5718 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5719 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5720 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5724 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5727 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5728 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5729 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5731 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5732 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5733 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5734 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5735 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5736 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5740 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5741 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5742 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5743 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5744 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5745 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5749 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5750 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5751 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5754 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5755 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5756 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5757 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5759 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5760 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5763 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5764 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5765 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5766 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5767 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5770 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5771 force_holding_cell = true;
5774 // Now update local state:
5775 if force_holding_cell {
5776 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5781 onion_routing_packet,
5786 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5787 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5789 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5791 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5795 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5796 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5797 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5801 onion_routing_packet,
5803 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5808 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection.
5809 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5810 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5811 match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5812 Ok((commitment_signed, _)) => Ok((commitment_signed, monitor_update)),
5817 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5818 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5819 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5820 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5822 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5823 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5824 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5826 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5827 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5831 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5832 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5833 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5834 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5835 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5836 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5837 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5840 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5841 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5842 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5843 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5844 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5845 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5848 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5850 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5851 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5852 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5854 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5855 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5858 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5859 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5860 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5861 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5862 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5863 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5864 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5865 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5868 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5872 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5873 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5874 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5875 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5877 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5879 if !self.is_outbound() {
5880 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5881 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5882 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5883 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5884 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5885 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5886 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5887 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5888 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5889 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5895 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5898 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5899 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5900 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5901 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5903 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5905 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5906 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5907 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5908 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5911 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5912 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5916 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5917 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5919 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5921 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5922 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5923 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5924 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5926 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5927 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5928 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5929 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5930 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5931 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5935 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5936 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5939 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5942 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5943 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5945 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5946 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5947 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5948 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5949 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5950 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5951 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5957 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5958 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5959 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5962 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5963 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5966 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5967 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5968 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5969 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5975 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5976 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5977 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5978 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5979 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5980 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5981 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5985 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5986 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5987 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5989 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5990 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5993 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5995 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5998 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6001 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6002 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6003 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6005 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6010 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6011 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6012 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6013 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6015 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6017 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6019 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6020 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6021 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6022 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6023 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6024 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6028 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6029 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6030 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6033 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6034 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6035 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6036 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6037 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6039 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6040 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6047 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6050 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6051 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6052 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6053 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6054 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6055 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6056 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6057 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6058 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6059 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6060 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6062 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6063 // return them to fail the payment.
6064 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6065 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6066 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6068 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6069 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6074 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6075 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6076 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6077 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6078 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6079 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6080 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6081 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6082 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6083 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6084 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6085 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6086 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6091 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6092 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6093 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6096 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6097 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6098 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6100 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6101 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6105 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6109 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6110 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6112 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6118 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6119 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6120 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6121 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6122 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6124 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6125 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6126 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6127 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6133 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6134 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6135 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6136 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6137 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6138 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6143 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6144 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6145 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6146 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6148 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6149 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6150 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6151 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6156 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6157 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6158 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6159 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6160 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6161 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6166 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6167 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6168 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6171 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6173 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6174 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6175 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6176 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6177 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6179 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6180 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6181 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6182 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6184 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6185 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6186 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6188 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6190 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6191 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6192 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6193 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6194 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6195 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6197 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6198 // deserialized from that format.
6199 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6200 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6201 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6203 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6205 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6206 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6207 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6209 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6210 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6211 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6212 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6215 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6216 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6217 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6220 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6221 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6222 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6223 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6225 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6226 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6228 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6230 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6232 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6234 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6237 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6239 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6244 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6246 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6247 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6248 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6249 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6250 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6251 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6252 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6254 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6256 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6258 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6261 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6262 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6263 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6266 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6268 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6269 preimages.push(preimage);
6271 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6272 reason.write(writer)?;
6274 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6276 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6277 preimages.push(preimage);
6279 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6280 reason.write(writer)?;
6285 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6286 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6288 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6290 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6291 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6292 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6293 source.write(writer)?;
6294 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6296 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6298 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6299 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6301 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6303 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6304 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6309 match self.resend_order {
6310 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6311 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6314 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6315 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6316 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6318 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6319 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6320 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6321 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6324 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6325 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6326 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6327 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6328 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6331 if self.is_outbound() {
6332 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6333 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6334 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6336 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6337 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6338 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6340 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6342 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6343 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6344 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6345 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6347 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6348 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6349 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6350 // consider the stale state on reload.
6353 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6354 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6355 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6357 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6358 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6359 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6361 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6362 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6364 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6365 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6366 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6368 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6369 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6371 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6374 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6375 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6376 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6378 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6381 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6382 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6384 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6385 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6386 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6388 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6390 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6392 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6394 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6395 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6396 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6397 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6398 htlc.write(writer)?;
6401 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6402 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6403 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6405 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6406 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6408 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6409 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6410 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6411 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6412 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6413 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6414 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6416 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6417 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6418 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6419 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6420 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6422 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6424 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6425 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6426 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6427 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6429 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6430 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6431 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6432 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6433 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6434 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6435 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6437 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6438 (2, chan_type, option),
6439 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6440 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6441 (5, self.config, required),
6442 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6443 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6444 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6445 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6446 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6447 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6448 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6449 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6450 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6451 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6452 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6453 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6460 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6461 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6463 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6464 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6466 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6467 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6468 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6470 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6471 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6472 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6473 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6477 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6478 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6484 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 let mut keys_data = None;
6495 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6496 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6497 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6499 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6500 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6501 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6502 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6503 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6504 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6508 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6509 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6510 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6513 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6515 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6517 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6521 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6522 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6523 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6524 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6525 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6526 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6527 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6528 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6529 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6530 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6531 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6532 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6537 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6539 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6540 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6541 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6543 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6545 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6546 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6547 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6548 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6550 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6554 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6558 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6561 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6566 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6568 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6569 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6570 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6571 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6572 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6573 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6574 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6575 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6577 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6578 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6579 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6581 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6582 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6583 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6585 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6589 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6590 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6591 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6592 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6595 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6601 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6602 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6605 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6607 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6608 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6611 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6617 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6621 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6622 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6623 // consider the stale state on reload.
6624 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6627 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6628 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6631 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6634 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6636 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6638 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6639 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6641 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6643 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6644 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6646 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6647 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6655 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6656 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6658 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6659 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6664 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6665 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6666 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6667 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6669 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6672 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6673 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6680 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6681 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6685 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6686 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6689 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6691 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6695 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6696 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6697 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6699 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6705 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6706 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6707 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6708 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6709 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6710 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6711 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6712 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6713 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6714 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6716 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6717 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6718 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6719 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6720 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6721 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6723 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6724 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6726 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6727 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6728 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6729 (2, channel_type, option),
6730 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6731 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6732 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6733 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6734 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6735 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6736 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6737 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6738 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6739 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6740 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6741 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6742 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6743 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6744 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6747 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6748 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6749 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6750 // required channel parameters.
6751 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6752 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6753 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6755 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6757 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6758 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6759 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6760 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6763 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6764 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6765 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6767 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6768 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6770 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6771 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6776 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6777 if iter.next().is_some() {
6778 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6782 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6783 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6784 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6785 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6786 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6789 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6790 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6792 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6793 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6794 // separate u64 values.
6795 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6800 config: config.unwrap(),
6804 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6805 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6806 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6810 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6812 channel_value_satoshis,
6814 latest_monitor_update_id,
6817 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6820 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6821 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6824 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6825 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6826 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6830 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6831 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6832 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6833 monitor_pending_forwards,
6834 monitor_pending_failures,
6835 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6838 holding_cell_update_fee,
6839 next_holder_htlc_id,
6840 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6841 update_time_counter,
6844 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6845 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6846 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6847 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6849 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6850 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6851 closing_fee_limits: None,
6852 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6854 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6856 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6857 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6859 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6861 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6862 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6863 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6864 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6865 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6866 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6867 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6868 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6869 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6872 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6874 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6875 funding_transaction,
6877 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6878 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6879 counterparty_node_id,
6881 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6885 channel_update_status,
6886 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6891 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6893 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6895 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6897 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6898 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6899 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6901 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6903 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6904 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6906 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6909 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6917 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6918 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6919 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6920 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6921 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6923 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6924 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6926 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6927 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6928 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6929 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6930 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6931 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6932 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6933 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6934 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6935 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6936 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6937 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6938 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6939 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6940 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6941 use crate::util::test_utils;
6942 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6943 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6944 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6945 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6946 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6947 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6948 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6949 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6950 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6951 use crate::prelude::*;
6953 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6956 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6957 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6963 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6964 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6965 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6966 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6970 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6971 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6972 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6973 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6974 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6975 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6976 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6980 signer: InMemorySigner,
6983 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6984 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6987 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6988 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6990 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6991 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6994 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6998 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7000 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7001 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7002 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7003 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7004 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7007 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7008 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7009 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7010 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7014 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7015 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7016 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7020 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7021 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7022 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7023 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7025 let seed = [42; 32];
7026 let network = Network::Testnet;
7027 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7028 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7029 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7032 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7033 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7034 let config = UserConfig::default();
7035 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7036 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7037 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7039 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7040 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7044 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7045 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7047 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7048 let original_fee = 253;
7049 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7050 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7051 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7052 let seed = [42; 32];
7053 let network = Network::Testnet;
7054 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7056 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7057 let config = UserConfig::default();
7058 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7060 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7061 // same as the old fee.
7062 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7063 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7064 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7068 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7069 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7070 // dust limits are used.
7071 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7072 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7073 let seed = [42; 32];
7074 let network = Network::Testnet;
7075 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7076 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7078 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7079 // they have different dust limits.
7081 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7082 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7083 let config = UserConfig::default();
7084 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7086 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7087 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7088 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7089 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7090 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7092 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7093 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7094 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7095 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7096 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7098 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7099 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7100 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7102 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7103 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7104 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7105 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7108 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7110 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7111 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7112 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7113 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7114 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7116 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7117 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7118 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7119 payment_secret: None,
7120 payment_params: None,
7124 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7125 // the dust limit check.
7126 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7127 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7128 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7129 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7131 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7132 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7133 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7134 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7135 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7136 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7137 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7141 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7142 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7143 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7144 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7145 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7146 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7147 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7148 let seed = [42; 32];
7149 let network = Network::Testnet;
7150 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7152 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7153 let config = UserConfig::default();
7154 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7156 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7157 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7159 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7160 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7161 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7162 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7163 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7164 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7166 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7167 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7168 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7169 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7170 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7172 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7174 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7175 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7176 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7177 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7178 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7180 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7181 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7182 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7183 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7184 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7188 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7189 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7190 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7191 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7192 let seed = [42; 32];
7193 let network = Network::Testnet;
7194 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7195 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7196 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7198 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7200 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7201 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7202 let config = UserConfig::default();
7203 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7205 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7206 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7207 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7208 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7210 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7211 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7212 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7214 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7215 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7216 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7217 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7219 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7220 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7221 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7223 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7224 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7226 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7227 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7228 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7229 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7230 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7231 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7232 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7233 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7234 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7239 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7241 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7242 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7243 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7244 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7245 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7246 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7247 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7254 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7255 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7256 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7257 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 let seed = [42; 32];
7259 let network = Network::Testnet;
7260 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7261 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7262 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7264 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7265 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7266 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7267 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7268 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7269 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7270 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7271 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7273 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7274 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7275 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7276 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7277 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7278 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7280 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7281 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7282 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7283 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7285 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7287 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7288 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7289 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7290 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7291 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7292 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7294 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7295 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7296 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7297 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7299 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7300 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7301 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7302 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7303 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7305 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7306 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7308 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7309 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7310 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7312 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7313 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7314 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7315 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7316 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7318 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7319 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7321 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7322 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7323 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7327 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7329 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7330 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7331 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7333 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7334 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7335 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7336 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7338 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7339 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7340 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7342 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7344 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7345 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7348 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7349 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7350 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7351 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7352 let seed = [42; 32];
7353 let network = Network::Testnet;
7354 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7355 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7356 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7359 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7360 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7361 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7363 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7364 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7366 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7367 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7368 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7370 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7371 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7373 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7375 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7376 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7378 // Channel Negotiations failed
7379 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7380 assert!(result.is_err());
7385 fn channel_update() {
7386 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7388 let seed = [42; 32];
7389 let network = Network::Testnet;
7390 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7391 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7393 // Create a channel.
7394 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7395 let config = UserConfig::default();
7396 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7397 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7398 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7399 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7401 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7402 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7403 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7405 short_channel_id: 0,
7408 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7409 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7410 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7412 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7413 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7415 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7417 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7419 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7420 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7421 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7422 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7424 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7425 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7426 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7428 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7432 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7434 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7435 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7436 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7437 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7438 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7439 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7440 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7441 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7442 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7443 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7444 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7445 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7446 use crate::sync::Arc;
7448 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7449 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7450 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7451 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7453 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7455 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7456 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7457 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7458 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7459 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7461 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7462 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7467 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7468 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7469 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7471 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7473 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7474 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7475 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7476 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7478 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7480 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7481 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7482 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7483 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7484 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7485 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7487 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7488 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7489 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7490 selected_contest_delay: 144
7492 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7493 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7495 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7496 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7498 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7499 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7501 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7502 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7504 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7505 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7506 // build_commitment_transaction.
7507 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7508 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7509 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7510 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7511 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7513 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7514 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7515 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7516 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7520 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7521 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7522 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7523 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7527 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7528 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7529 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7531 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7532 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7534 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7535 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7537 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7539 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7540 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7541 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7542 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7543 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7544 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7545 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7547 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7548 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7549 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7550 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7552 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7553 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7554 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7556 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7558 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7559 commitment_tx.clone(),
7560 counterparty_signature,
7561 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7562 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7563 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7565 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7566 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7568 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7569 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7570 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7572 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7573 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7576 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7577 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7579 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7580 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7581 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7582 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7583 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7584 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7585 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7586 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7588 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7591 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7592 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7593 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7597 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7600 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7601 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7602 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7604 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7605 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7606 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7607 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7608 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7609 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7610 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7611 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7613 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7617 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7618 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7620 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7621 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7622 "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", {});
7624 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7625 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7626 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7627 "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", {});
7629 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7630 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7632 amount_msat: 1000000,
7634 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7635 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7637 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7640 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7641 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7643 amount_msat: 2000000,
7645 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7646 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7648 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7651 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7652 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7654 amount_msat: 2000000,
7656 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7657 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7658 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7660 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7663 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7664 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7666 amount_msat: 3000000,
7668 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7669 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7670 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7672 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7675 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7676 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7678 amount_msat: 4000000,
7680 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7681 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7683 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7687 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7688 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7689 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7691 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7692 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7693 "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", {
7696 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7697 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7698 "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" },
7701 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7702 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7703 "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" },
7706 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7707 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7708 "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" },
7711 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7712 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7713 "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" },
7716 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7717 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7718 "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" }
7721 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7722 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7723 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7725 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7726 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7727 "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", {
7730 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7731 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7732 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7735 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7736 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7737 "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" },
7740 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7741 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7742 "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" },
7745 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7746 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7747 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7750 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7751 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7752 "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" }
7755 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7756 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7757 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7759 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7760 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7761 "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", {
7764 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7765 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7766 "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" },
7769 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7770 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7771 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7774 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7775 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7776 "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" },
7779 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7780 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7781 "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" }
7784 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7785 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7786 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7787 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7789 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7790 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7791 "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", {
7794 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7795 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7796 "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" },
7799 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7800 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7801 "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" },
7804 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7805 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7806 "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" },
7809 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7810 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7811 "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" }
7814 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7815 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7816 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7817 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7819 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7820 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7821 "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", {
7824 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7825 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7826 "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" },
7829 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7830 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7831 "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" },
7834 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7835 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7836 "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" },
7839 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7840 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7841 "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" }
7844 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7845 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7846 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7848 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7849 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7850 "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", {
7853 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7854 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7855 "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" },
7858 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7859 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7860 "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" },
7863 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7864 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7865 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7868 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7869 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7870 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7872 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7873 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7874 "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", {
7877 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7878 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7879 "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" },
7882 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7883 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7884 "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" },
7887 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7888 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7889 "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" }
7892 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7893 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7894 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7896 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7897 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7898 "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", {
7901 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7902 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7903 "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" },
7906 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7907 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7908 "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" }
7911 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7912 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7913 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7914 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7916 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7917 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7918 "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", {
7921 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7922 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7923 "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" },
7926 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7927 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7928 "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" }
7931 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7932 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7933 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7934 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7936 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7937 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7938 "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", {
7941 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7942 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7943 "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" },
7946 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7947 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7948 "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" }
7951 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7952 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7953 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7955 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7956 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7957 "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", {
7960 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7961 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7962 "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" }
7965 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7966 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7967 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7968 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7970 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7971 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7972 "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", {
7975 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7976 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7977 "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" }
7980 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7981 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7982 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7983 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7985 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7986 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7987 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7990 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7991 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7992 "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" }
7995 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7996 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7997 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7998 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8000 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8001 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8002 "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", {});
8004 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8005 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8006 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8007 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8009 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8010 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8011 "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", {});
8013 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8014 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8015 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8016 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8018 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8019 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8020 "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", {});
8022 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8023 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8024 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8026 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8027 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8028 "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", {});
8030 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8031 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8032 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8033 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8035 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8036 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8037 "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", {});
8039 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8040 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8041 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8042 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8044 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8045 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8046 "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", {});
8048 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8049 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8050 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8051 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8052 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8053 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8055 amount_msat: 2000000,
8057 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8058 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8060 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8063 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8064 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8065 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8067 amount_msat: 5000000,
8069 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8070 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8071 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8073 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8076 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8077 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8079 amount_msat: 5000000,
8081 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8082 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8083 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8085 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8089 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8090 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8091 "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", {
8094 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8095 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8096 "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" },
8098 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8099 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8100 "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" },
8102 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8103 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8104 "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" }
8107 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8108 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8109 "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", {
8112 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8113 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8114 "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" },
8116 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8117 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8118 "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" },
8120 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8121 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8122 "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" }
8127 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8128 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8130 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8131 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8132 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8133 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8135 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8136 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8137 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8139 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8140 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8142 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8143 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8145 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8146 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8147 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8151 fn test_key_derivation() {
8152 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8153 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8155 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8156 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8158 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8159 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8161 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8162 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8164 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8165 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8167 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8168 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8170 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8171 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8173 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8174 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8178 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8179 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8180 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8181 let seed = [42; 32];
8182 let network = Network::Testnet;
8183 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8184 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8186 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8187 let config = UserConfig::default();
8188 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8189 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8191 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8192 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8194 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8195 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8196 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8197 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8198 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8199 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8200 assert!(res.is_ok());
8205 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8206 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8207 // resulting `channel_type`.
8208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8209 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8210 let network = Network::Testnet;
8211 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8212 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8214 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8215 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8217 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8218 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8220 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8221 // need to signal it.
8222 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8223 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8224 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8227 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8229 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8230 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8231 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8233 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8234 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8235 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8238 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8239 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8240 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8241 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8242 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8245 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8246 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8251 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8252 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8253 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8254 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8255 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8256 let network = Network::Testnet;
8257 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8258 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8260 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8261 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8263 let config = UserConfig::default();
8265 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8266 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8267 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8268 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8269 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8271 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8272 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8273 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8276 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8277 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8278 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8280 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8281 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8282 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8283 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8284 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8285 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8287 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8292 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8293 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8295 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8296 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8297 let network = Network::Testnet;
8298 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8299 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8301 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8302 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8304 let config = UserConfig::default();
8306 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8307 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8308 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8309 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8310 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8311 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8312 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8313 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8315 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8316 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8317 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8318 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8319 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8320 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8323 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8324 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8326 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8327 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8328 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8329 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8331 assert!(res.is_err());
8333 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8334 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8335 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8337 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8338 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8339 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8342 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8344 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8345 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8346 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8347 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8350 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8351 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8353 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8354 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8356 assert!(res.is_err());