1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
436 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
437 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
438 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
441 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
442 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
443 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
444 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
445 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
446 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
447 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
448 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
449 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
450 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
451 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
452 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
453 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
454 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
455 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
457 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
458 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
459 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
460 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
462 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
463 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
464 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
465 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
467 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
468 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
469 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
470 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
471 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
473 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
474 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
475 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
476 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
478 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
479 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
480 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
482 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
483 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
484 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
485 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
486 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
488 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
489 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
490 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
491 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
492 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
494 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
498 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
499 (0, update, required),
500 (2, blocked, required),
503 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
504 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
505 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
508 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
509 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
510 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
511 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
513 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
514 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
515 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
516 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
518 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
522 channel_id: [u8; 32],
523 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
526 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
527 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
529 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
530 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
531 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
533 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
534 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
535 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
536 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
538 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
539 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
541 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
543 holder_signer: Signer,
544 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
545 destination_script: Script,
547 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
548 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
549 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
551 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
552 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
553 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
554 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
555 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
556 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
558 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
559 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
560 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
561 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
562 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
563 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
565 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
567 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
568 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
569 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
571 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
572 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
573 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
574 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
575 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
576 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
577 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
579 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
581 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
582 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
583 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
584 // HTLCs with similar state.
585 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
586 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
587 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
588 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
589 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
590 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
591 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
592 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
593 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
596 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
597 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
598 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
600 update_time_counter: u32,
602 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
603 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
604 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
606 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
607 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
609 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
610 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
612 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
613 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
614 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
615 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
617 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
618 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
620 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
622 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
624 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
625 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
626 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
627 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
628 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
629 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
631 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
632 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
633 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
634 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
635 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
637 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
638 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
639 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
640 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
641 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
642 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
643 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
644 channel_creation_height: u32,
646 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
649 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
651 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
654 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
656 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
661 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
663 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
664 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
667 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
669 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
671 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
672 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
674 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
676 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
677 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
678 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
680 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
682 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
683 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
685 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
686 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
687 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
689 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
691 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
693 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
694 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
695 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
696 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
698 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
699 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
700 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
702 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
703 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
704 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
706 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
707 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
708 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
709 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
713 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
715 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
716 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
717 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
718 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
719 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
721 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
722 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
724 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
725 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
726 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
727 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
728 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
729 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
730 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
731 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
733 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
734 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
736 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
737 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
738 // the channel's funding UTXO.
740 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
741 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
742 // associated channel mapping.
744 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
745 // to store all of them.
746 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
748 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
749 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
750 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
751 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
752 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
754 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
755 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
757 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
758 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
760 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
761 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
762 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
764 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
765 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
766 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
767 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
768 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
771 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
772 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
774 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
775 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
776 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
780 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
782 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
784 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
785 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
789 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
791 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
793 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
795 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
796 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
797 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
798 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
799 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
801 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
802 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
804 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
806 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
807 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
809 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
810 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
811 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
812 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
813 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
814 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
816 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
817 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
819 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
820 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
821 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
822 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
823 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
825 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
826 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
828 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
829 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
831 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
832 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
833 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
834 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
840 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
841 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
843 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
844 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
845 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
850 macro_rules! secp_check {
851 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
854 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
859 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
860 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
861 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
862 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
864 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
866 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
867 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
868 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
870 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
873 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
875 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
878 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
879 /// required by us according to the configured or default
880 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
882 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
884 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
885 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
886 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
887 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
888 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
891 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
892 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
893 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
894 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
895 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
896 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
897 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
900 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
901 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
904 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
905 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
906 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
907 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
908 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
909 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
910 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
911 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
912 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
913 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
916 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
917 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
918 // `only_static_remotekey`.
920 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
921 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
922 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
923 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
930 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
931 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
932 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
933 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
934 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
935 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
936 // We've exhausted our options
939 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
940 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
943 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
944 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
945 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
946 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
948 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
949 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
950 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
951 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
952 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
953 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
955 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
957 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
961 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
962 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
963 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
964 outbound_scid_alias: u64
965 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
966 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
967 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
970 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
971 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
972 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
973 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
975 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
976 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
978 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
981 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
982 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
983 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
985 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
988 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
989 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
990 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
991 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
995 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
996 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
998 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1000 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1001 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1002 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1003 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1006 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1007 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1009 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1010 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1011 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1012 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1016 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1017 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1018 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1022 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1023 Ok(script) => script,
1024 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1027 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1032 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1033 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1034 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1035 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1040 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1042 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1043 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1044 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1045 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1047 channel_value_satoshis,
1049 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1052 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1055 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1056 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1059 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1060 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1061 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1062 pending_update_fee: None,
1063 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1064 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1065 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1066 update_time_counter: 1,
1068 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1070 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1071 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1072 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1073 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1074 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1075 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1077 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1078 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1079 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1080 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1082 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1083 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1084 closing_fee_limits: None,
1085 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1087 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1089 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1090 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1091 short_channel_id: None,
1092 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1094 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1095 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1096 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1097 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1098 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1099 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1100 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1101 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1102 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1103 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1104 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1105 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1107 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1109 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1110 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1111 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1112 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1113 counterparty_parameters: None,
1114 funding_outpoint: None,
1115 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1116 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1118 funding_transaction: None,
1120 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1121 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1122 counterparty_node_id,
1124 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1126 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1128 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1129 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1131 announcement_sigs: None,
1133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1134 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1136 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1138 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1140 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1141 outbound_scid_alias,
1143 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1144 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1146 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1147 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1152 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1156 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1157 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1158 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1160 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1161 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1162 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1163 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1164 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1165 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1166 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1169 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1170 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1171 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1172 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1173 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1174 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1175 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1176 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1178 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1179 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1188 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1189 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1190 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1191 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1192 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1193 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1194 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1195 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1196 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1197 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1201 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1203 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1204 // support this channel type.
1205 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1206 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1210 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1211 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1212 // `static_remote_key`.
1213 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1216 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1217 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1220 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1223 channel_type.clone()
1225 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1226 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1231 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1233 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1234 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1235 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1236 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1237 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1238 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1239 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1240 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1241 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1244 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1248 // Check sanity of message fields:
1249 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1252 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1258 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1259 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1265 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1268 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1270 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1271 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1274 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1277 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1281 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1282 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1285 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1288 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1291 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1294 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1297 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1300 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1304 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1306 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1307 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1312 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1313 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1314 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1315 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1318 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1321 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1322 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1323 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1325 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1329 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1330 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1331 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1332 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1333 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1337 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1338 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1339 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1340 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1344 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1345 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1346 &Some(ref script) => {
1347 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1348 if script.len() == 0 {
1351 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1354 Some(script.clone())
1357 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1364 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1365 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1366 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1367 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1371 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1372 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1377 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1378 Ok(script) => script,
1379 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1382 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1385 let chan = Channel {
1388 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1389 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1391 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1396 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1398 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1399 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1400 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1401 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1404 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1407 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1410 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1411 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1412 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1414 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1415 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1416 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1417 pending_update_fee: None,
1418 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1419 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1420 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1421 update_time_counter: 1,
1423 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1425 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1426 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1427 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1428 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1429 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1430 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1432 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1433 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1434 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1435 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1437 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1438 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1439 closing_fee_limits: None,
1440 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1442 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1444 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1445 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1446 short_channel_id: None,
1447 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1449 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1450 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1451 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1452 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1453 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1454 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1455 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1456 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1457 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1458 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1459 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1460 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1461 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1463 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1465 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1466 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1467 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1468 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1469 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1470 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1471 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1473 funding_outpoint: None,
1474 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1475 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1477 funding_transaction: None,
1479 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1480 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1481 counterparty_node_id,
1483 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1485 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1487 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1488 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1490 announcement_sigs: None,
1492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1493 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1494 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1495 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1497 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1499 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1500 outbound_scid_alias,
1502 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1503 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1505 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1506 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1511 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1517 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1518 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1519 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1520 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1521 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1523 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1524 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1525 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1526 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1527 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1528 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1529 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1531 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1532 where L::Target: Logger
1534 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1535 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1536 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1538 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1539 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1540 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1541 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1543 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1544 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1545 if match update_state {
1546 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1547 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1548 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1549 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1550 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1552 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1556 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1557 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1558 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1559 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1561 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1562 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1563 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1565 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1566 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1567 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1568 transaction_output_index: None
1573 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1574 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1575 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1576 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1577 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1580 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1582 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1583 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1584 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1586 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1587 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1590 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1591 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1594 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1596 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1597 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1598 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1600 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1601 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1607 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1608 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1609 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1610 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1611 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1612 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1613 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1617 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1618 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1620 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1622 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1623 if generated_by_local {
1624 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1625 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1634 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1636 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1637 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1638 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1639 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1640 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1642 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1645 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1646 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1647 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1648 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1652 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1653 preimages.push(preimage);
1657 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1658 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1660 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1662 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1665 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1666 if !generated_by_local {
1667 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1675 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1676 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1677 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1678 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1679 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1680 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1681 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1682 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1686 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1687 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1688 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1689 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1691 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1693 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1694 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1695 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1696 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1699 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1700 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1701 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1702 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1704 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1707 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1708 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1709 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1710 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1712 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1715 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1721 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1722 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1727 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1729 let channel_parameters =
1730 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1731 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1732 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1735 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1740 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1743 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1744 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1745 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1746 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1748 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1749 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1750 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1758 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1759 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1765 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1766 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1767 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1768 // outside of those situations will fail.
1769 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1773 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1778 1 + // script length (0)
1782 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1783 2 + // witness marker and flag
1784 1 + // witness element count
1785 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1786 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1787 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1788 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1789 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1790 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1792 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1793 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1794 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1800 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1801 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1802 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1803 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1805 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1806 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1807 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1809 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1810 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1811 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1812 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1813 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1814 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1817 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1818 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1821 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1822 value_to_holder = 0;
1825 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1826 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1827 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1828 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1830 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1831 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1834 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1835 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1839 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1840 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1841 /// our counterparty!)
1842 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1843 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1844 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1845 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1846 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1847 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1848 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1850 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1854 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1855 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1856 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1857 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1858 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1859 //may see payments to it!
1860 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1861 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1862 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1864 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1867 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1868 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1869 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1870 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1871 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1874 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1877 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1878 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1880 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1882 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1883 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1884 where L::Target: Logger {
1885 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1886 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1887 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1888 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1889 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1890 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1891 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1892 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1896 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1897 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1898 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1899 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1901 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1902 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1904 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1906 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1908 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1909 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1910 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1912 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1913 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1914 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1915 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1916 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1918 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1919 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1920 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1922 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1923 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1925 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1928 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1929 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1933 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1937 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1939 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1940 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1941 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1945 // Now update local state:
1947 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1948 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1949 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1950 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1951 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1952 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1953 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1957 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1958 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1959 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1960 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1961 // do not not get into this branch.
1962 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1963 match pending_update {
1964 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1965 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1966 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1967 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1968 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1969 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1970 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1974 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1975 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1976 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1977 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1978 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1979 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1985 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1986 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1987 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1990 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1991 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1994 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1997 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1998 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2000 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2001 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2003 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2004 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2007 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2010 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2011 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2012 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2013 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2018 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2019 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2020 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2021 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2022 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2023 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2024 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2025 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2026 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2027 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2028 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2029 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2030 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2031 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2032 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2033 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2034 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2036 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2038 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2039 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2040 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2041 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2042 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2043 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2044 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2046 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2047 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2050 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2051 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2052 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2053 update, blocked: true,
2058 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2059 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2060 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2061 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2065 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2069 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2070 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2071 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2072 /// before we fail backwards.
2074 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2075 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2076 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2077 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2078 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2079 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2080 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2083 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2084 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2085 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2086 /// before we fail backwards.
2088 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2089 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2090 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2091 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2092 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2093 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2094 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2096 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2098 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2099 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2100 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2102 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2103 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2104 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2106 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2107 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2108 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2110 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2115 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2122 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2123 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2124 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2125 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2126 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2130 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2131 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2132 force_holding_cell = true;
2135 // Now update local state:
2136 if force_holding_cell {
2137 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2138 match pending_update {
2139 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2140 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2141 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2142 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2146 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2147 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2148 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2155 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2156 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2157 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2163 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2165 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2166 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2169 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2170 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2171 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2176 // Message handlers:
2178 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2179 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2181 // Check sanity of message fields:
2182 if !self.is_outbound() {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2185 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2188 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2194 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2197 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2199 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2201 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2202 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2205 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2206 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2209 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2212 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2216 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2217 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2220 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2223 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2226 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2229 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2235 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2239 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2240 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2243 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2244 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2246 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2247 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2250 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2253 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2254 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2255 &Some(ref script) => {
2256 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2257 if script.len() == 0 {
2260 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2263 Some(script.clone())
2266 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2273 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2274 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2275 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2276 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2277 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2279 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2280 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2282 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2285 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2286 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2287 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2288 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2289 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2290 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2293 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2294 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2295 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2298 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2299 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2301 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2302 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2307 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2308 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2310 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2311 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2313 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2314 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2315 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2316 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2317 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2318 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2319 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2320 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2321 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2324 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2325 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2327 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2328 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2329 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2330 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2332 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2333 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2335 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2336 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2339 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2340 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2343 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2344 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2345 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2347 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2350 if self.is_outbound() {
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2353 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2354 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2355 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2359 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2362 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2363 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2364 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2365 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2368 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2369 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2370 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2371 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2372 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2374 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2376 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2378 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2381 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2382 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2383 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2387 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2388 initial_commitment_tx,
2391 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2392 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2395 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2396 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2398 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2400 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2401 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2402 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2403 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2404 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2405 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2406 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2407 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2408 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2409 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2410 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2412 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2414 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2416 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2417 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2418 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2421 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2423 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2424 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2426 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2427 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2430 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2431 }, channel_monitor))
2434 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2435 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2436 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2437 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2438 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2440 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2443 if !self.is_outbound() {
2444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2446 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2449 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2450 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2451 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2452 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2455 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2457 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2458 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2459 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2460 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2462 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2463 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2465 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2466 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2468 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2469 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2470 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2471 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2472 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2477 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2478 initial_commitment_tx,
2481 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2482 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2485 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2486 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2489 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2490 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2491 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2492 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2493 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2494 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2495 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2496 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2497 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2498 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2499 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2500 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2502 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2504 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2506 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2507 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2508 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2509 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2511 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2513 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2514 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2518 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2519 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2521 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2522 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2523 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2524 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2526 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2529 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2530 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2534 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2535 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2536 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2537 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2538 // when routing outbound payments.
2539 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2543 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2545 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2546 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2547 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2548 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2549 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2550 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2551 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2552 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2553 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2555 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2556 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2557 let expected_point =
2558 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2559 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2561 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2562 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2563 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2564 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2565 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2566 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2568 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2569 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2570 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2571 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2572 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2574 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2582 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2583 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2585 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2587 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2590 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2591 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2592 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2593 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2599 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2600 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2601 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2602 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2603 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2604 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2605 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2606 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2607 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2610 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2613 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2614 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2615 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2617 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2618 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2619 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2620 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2632 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2633 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2634 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2635 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2636 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2637 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2638 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2639 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2642 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2645 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2646 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2647 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2649 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2650 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2651 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2652 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2653 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2654 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2656 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2657 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2661 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2662 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2663 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2664 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2665 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2666 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2667 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2669 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2670 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2672 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2679 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2680 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2681 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2682 /// corner case properly.
2683 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2684 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2685 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2687 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2688 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2689 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2690 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2693 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2695 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2696 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2697 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2700 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2701 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2702 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2703 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2705 outbound_capacity_msat,
2706 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2707 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2708 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2714 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2715 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2718 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2719 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2720 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2721 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2722 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2723 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2726 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2727 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2729 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2730 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2733 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2734 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2735 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2737 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2738 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2740 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2743 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2744 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2746 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2747 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2749 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2750 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2752 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2753 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2757 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2758 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2764 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2765 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2766 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2769 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2770 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2771 included_htlcs += 1;
2774 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2779 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2780 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2781 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2782 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2783 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2784 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2789 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2791 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2792 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2797 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2798 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2802 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2803 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2807 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2808 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2810 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2811 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2812 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2814 total_pending_htlcs,
2815 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2816 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2817 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2819 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2820 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2821 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2823 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2825 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2830 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2831 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2832 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2834 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2835 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2837 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2840 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2841 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2843 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2844 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2846 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2847 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2849 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2850 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2854 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2855 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2861 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2862 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2863 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2864 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2865 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2866 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2869 included_htlcs += 1;
2872 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2876 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2877 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2879 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2880 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2881 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2886 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2887 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2891 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2892 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2894 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2895 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2897 total_pending_htlcs,
2898 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2899 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2900 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2902 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2903 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2904 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2906 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2908 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2913 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2914 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2915 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2916 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2917 if local_sent_shutdown {
2918 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2920 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2921 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2922 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2928 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2931 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2932 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2934 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2938 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2939 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2940 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2943 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2946 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2947 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2948 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2949 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2950 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2951 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2952 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2953 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2954 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2955 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2956 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2958 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2959 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2960 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2961 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2962 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2963 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2967 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2970 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2971 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2972 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2974 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2975 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2976 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2977 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2978 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2979 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2980 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2984 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2985 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2986 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2987 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2988 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2989 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2990 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2994 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2995 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2996 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2997 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2998 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3002 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3003 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3004 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3005 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3006 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3008 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3009 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3012 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3016 if !self.is_outbound() {
3017 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3018 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3019 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3020 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3021 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3022 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3023 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3024 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3025 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3026 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3027 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3028 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3029 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3030 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3031 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3034 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3035 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3036 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3037 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3041 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3044 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3048 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3049 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3050 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3054 // Now update local state:
3055 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3056 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3057 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3058 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3059 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3060 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3061 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3066 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3068 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3069 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3070 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3071 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3072 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3073 None => fail_reason.into(),
3074 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3075 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3076 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3079 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3083 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3085 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3086 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3088 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3094 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3097 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3098 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3101 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3105 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3108 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3109 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3112 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3116 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3120 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3121 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3124 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3128 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3132 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3133 where L::Target: Logger
3135 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3138 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3141 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3145 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3147 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3149 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3150 let commitment_txid = {
3151 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3152 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3153 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3155 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3156 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3157 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3158 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3159 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3164 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3166 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3167 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3168 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3169 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3172 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3173 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3174 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3178 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3180 if self.is_outbound() {
3181 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3182 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3183 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3184 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3185 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3186 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3187 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3188 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3189 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3190 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3196 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3200 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3201 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3202 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3203 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3204 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3205 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3206 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3207 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3208 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3209 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3210 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3211 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3212 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3215 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3216 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3217 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3218 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3219 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3220 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3221 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3223 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3224 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3225 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3226 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3227 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3228 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3229 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3232 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3233 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3236 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3238 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3239 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3240 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3243 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3246 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3247 commitment_stats.tx,
3249 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3250 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3251 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3254 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3255 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3257 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3258 let mut need_commitment = false;
3259 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3260 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3261 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3262 need_commitment = true;
3266 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3267 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3268 Some(forward_info.clone())
3270 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3271 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3272 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3273 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3274 need_commitment = true;
3277 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3278 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3279 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3280 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3281 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3282 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3283 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3284 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3285 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3286 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3287 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3288 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3289 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3290 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3292 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3294 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3295 need_commitment = true;
3299 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3300 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3301 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3302 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3303 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3304 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3306 nondust_htlc_sources,
3310 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3311 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3312 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3313 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3315 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3316 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3317 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3318 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3319 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3320 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3321 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3322 // includes the right HTLCs.
3323 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3324 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3325 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3326 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3327 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3328 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3330 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3331 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3332 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3335 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3336 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3337 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3338 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3339 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3340 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3341 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3342 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3343 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3347 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3348 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3349 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3350 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3353 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3354 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3355 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3356 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3357 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3358 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3359 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3360 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3363 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3364 /// for our counterparty.
3365 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3366 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3367 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3368 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3369 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3371 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3372 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3373 updates: Vec::new(),
3376 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3377 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3378 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3379 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3380 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3381 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3382 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3383 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3384 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3385 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3386 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3387 // to rebalance channels.
3388 match &htlc_update {
3389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3390 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3391 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3394 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3395 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3396 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3397 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3398 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3399 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3400 // into the holding cell without ever being
3401 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3402 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3403 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3406 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3412 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3413 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3414 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3415 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3416 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3417 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3418 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3419 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3420 (msg, monitor_update)
3421 } else { unreachable!() };
3422 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3423 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3425 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3426 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3427 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3428 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3429 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3430 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3431 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3432 // for a full revocation before failing.
3433 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3436 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3438 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3445 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3446 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3448 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3449 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3454 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3455 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3456 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3457 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3458 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3460 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3461 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3462 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3464 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3465 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3471 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3472 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3473 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3474 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3475 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3476 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3477 where L::Target: Logger,
3479 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3482 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3485 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3489 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3491 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3492 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3493 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3497 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3498 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3499 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3500 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3501 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3502 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3503 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3504 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3505 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3508 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3510 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3511 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3514 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3515 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3517 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3519 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3520 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3521 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3522 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3523 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3524 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3525 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3526 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3530 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3531 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3532 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3533 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3534 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3535 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3536 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3537 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3539 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3540 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3543 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3544 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3545 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3546 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3547 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3548 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3549 let mut require_commitment = false;
3550 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3553 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3554 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3555 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3557 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3558 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3559 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3560 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3561 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3562 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3567 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3568 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3569 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3570 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3571 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3573 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3574 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3575 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3580 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3581 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3583 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3587 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3588 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3590 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3591 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3592 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3593 require_commitment = true;
3594 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3595 match forward_info {
3596 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3597 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3598 require_commitment = true;
3600 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3601 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3602 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3604 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3605 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3606 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3610 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3611 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3612 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3613 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3619 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3620 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3621 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3624 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3625 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3626 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3627 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3628 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3629 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3630 require_commitment = true;
3634 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3636 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3637 match update_state {
3638 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3639 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3640 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3641 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3642 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3644 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3645 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3646 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3647 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3648 require_commitment = true;
3649 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3650 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3655 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3656 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3657 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3658 if require_commitment {
3659 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3660 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3661 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3662 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3663 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3664 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3665 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3666 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3667 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3669 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3670 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3671 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3672 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3673 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3676 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3677 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3678 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3679 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3680 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3681 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3682 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3684 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3685 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3687 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3688 if require_commitment {
3689 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3691 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3692 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3693 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3694 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3696 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3697 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3698 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3699 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3701 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3702 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3703 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3709 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3710 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3711 /// commitment update.
3712 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3713 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3714 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3717 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3718 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3719 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3720 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3722 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3723 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3724 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3725 if !self.is_outbound() {
3726 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3728 if !self.is_usable() {
3729 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3731 if !self.is_live() {
3732 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3735 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3736 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3737 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3738 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3739 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3740 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3741 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3742 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3743 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3744 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3748 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3749 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3750 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3751 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3752 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3755 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3760 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3761 force_holding_cell = true;
3764 if force_holding_cell {
3765 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3769 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3770 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3772 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3773 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3778 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3779 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3781 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3783 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3784 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3785 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3786 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3790 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3791 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3792 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3796 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3797 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3800 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3801 // will be retransmitted.
3802 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3803 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3804 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3806 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3807 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3809 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3810 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3811 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3812 // this HTLC accordingly
3813 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3816 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3817 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3818 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3819 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3822 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3823 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3824 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3825 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3826 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3827 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3832 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3834 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3835 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3836 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3837 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3841 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3842 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3843 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3844 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3845 // the update upon reconnection.
3846 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3850 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3851 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3854 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3855 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3856 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3857 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3858 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3859 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3860 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3862 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3863 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3864 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3865 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3866 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3867 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3868 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3870 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3871 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3872 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3873 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3874 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3875 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3876 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3879 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3880 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3881 /// to the remote side.
3882 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3883 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3884 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3885 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3888 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3890 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3891 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3892 let mut found_blocked = false;
3893 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3894 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3895 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3899 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3900 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3901 // first received the funding_signed.
3902 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3903 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3904 self.funding_transaction.take()
3906 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3907 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3908 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3909 funding_broadcastable = None;
3912 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3913 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3914 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3915 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3916 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3917 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3918 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3919 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3920 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3921 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3922 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3923 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3924 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3925 next_per_commitment_point,
3926 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3930 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3932 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3933 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3934 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3935 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3936 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3937 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3940 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3941 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3942 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3943 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3944 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3948 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3949 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3951 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3952 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3955 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3956 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3957 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3958 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3959 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3960 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3961 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3962 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3963 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3967 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3968 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3970 if self.is_outbound() {
3971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3973 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3976 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3977 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3979 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3980 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3981 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3982 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3983 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3984 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3985 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3986 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3987 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3988 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3989 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3991 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3993 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3995 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4001 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4002 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4003 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4004 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4005 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4006 per_commitment_secret,
4007 next_per_commitment_point,
4009 next_local_nonce: None,
4013 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4014 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4015 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4016 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4017 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4019 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4020 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4021 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4022 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4023 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4024 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4025 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4026 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4027 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4032 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4033 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4035 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4036 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4037 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4038 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4039 reason: err_packet.clone()
4042 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4043 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4044 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4045 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4046 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4047 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4050 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4051 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4052 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4053 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4054 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4061 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4062 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4063 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4064 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4068 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4069 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4070 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4071 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4072 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4073 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4077 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4078 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4080 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4081 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4082 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4083 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4084 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4085 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4086 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4087 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4090 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4092 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4093 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4094 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4095 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4099 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4100 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4104 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4105 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4106 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4107 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4108 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4111 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4112 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4113 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4114 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4115 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4118 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4119 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4120 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4121 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4122 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4123 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4124 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4125 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4129 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4130 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4131 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4132 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4134 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4138 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4139 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4140 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4142 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4143 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4144 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4145 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4146 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4150 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4152 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4153 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4154 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4155 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4156 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4159 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4160 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4161 channel_ready: None,
4162 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4163 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4164 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4168 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4169 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4170 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4171 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4172 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4173 next_per_commitment_point,
4174 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4176 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4177 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4178 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4182 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4183 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4184 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4186 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4187 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4188 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4191 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4197 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4198 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4199 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4200 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4201 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4203 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4204 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4205 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4206 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4207 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4208 next_per_commitment_point,
4209 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4213 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4214 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4215 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4217 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4220 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4221 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4222 raa: required_revoke,
4223 commitment_update: None,
4224 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4226 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4227 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4228 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4230 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4233 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4234 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4235 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4236 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4237 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4238 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4241 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4242 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4243 raa: required_revoke,
4244 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4245 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4249 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4253 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4254 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4255 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4256 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4258 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4260 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4262 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4263 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4264 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4265 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4266 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4267 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4269 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4270 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4271 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4272 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4273 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4275 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4276 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4277 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4278 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4281 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4282 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4283 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4284 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4285 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4286 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4287 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4288 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4289 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4290 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4291 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4292 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4293 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4294 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4295 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4297 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4300 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4301 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4304 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4305 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4306 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4307 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4308 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4309 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4310 self.channel_state &
4311 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4312 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4313 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4314 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4317 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4318 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4319 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4320 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4321 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4322 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4325 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4331 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4332 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4333 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4334 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4336 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4337 return Ok((None, None));
4340 if !self.is_outbound() {
4341 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4342 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4344 return Ok((None, None));
4347 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4349 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4350 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4351 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4352 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4354 let sig = self.holder_signer
4355 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4356 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4358 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4359 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4360 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4361 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4363 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4364 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4365 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4370 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4371 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4372 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4373 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4375 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4378 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4379 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4380 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4381 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4384 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4385 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4389 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4391 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4395 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4396 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4400 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4403 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4404 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4405 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4406 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4408 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4411 assert!(send_shutdown);
4412 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4413 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4416 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4419 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4424 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4426 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4427 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4429 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4430 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4431 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4432 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4433 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4434 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4437 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4438 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4439 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4442 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4443 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4444 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4445 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4449 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4450 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4451 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4452 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4453 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4454 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4456 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4457 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4464 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4465 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4467 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4470 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4471 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4473 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4475 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4476 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4477 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4478 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4479 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4480 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4481 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4482 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4483 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4485 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4486 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4489 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4493 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4494 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4495 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4496 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4498 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4501 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4504 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4505 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4507 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4511 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4515 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4516 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4517 return Ok((None, None));
4520 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4521 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4522 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4523 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4525 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4527 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4530 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4531 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4532 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4533 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4534 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4538 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4539 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4544 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4545 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4546 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4547 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4548 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4549 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4550 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4554 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4556 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4557 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4558 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4559 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4561 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4564 let sig = self.holder_signer
4565 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4566 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4568 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4569 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4570 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4571 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4575 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4576 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4577 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4578 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4580 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4581 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4582 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4588 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4589 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4592 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4593 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4595 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4599 if !self.is_outbound() {
4600 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4601 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4602 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4603 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4605 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4606 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4607 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4609 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4610 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4613 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4614 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4615 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4616 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4617 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4618 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4619 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4620 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4622 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4625 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4626 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4627 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4628 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4634 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4635 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4636 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4637 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4639 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4645 // Public utilities:
4647 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4651 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4653 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4654 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4655 self.temporary_channel_id
4658 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4662 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4663 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4664 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4668 /// Gets the channel's type
4669 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4673 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4674 /// is_usable() returns true).
4675 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4676 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4677 self.short_channel_id
4680 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4681 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4682 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4685 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4686 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4687 self.outbound_scid_alias
4689 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4690 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4691 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4692 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4693 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4696 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4697 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4698 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4699 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4702 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4703 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4704 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4707 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4708 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4709 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4710 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4714 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4717 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4718 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4721 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4722 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4725 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4726 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4727 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4730 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4731 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4734 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4735 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4736 self.counterparty_node_id
4739 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4740 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4741 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4744 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4745 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4746 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4749 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4750 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4752 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4753 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4754 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4755 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4757 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4761 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4762 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4763 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4766 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4767 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4768 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4771 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4772 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4773 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4775 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4776 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4781 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4782 self.channel_value_satoshis
4785 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4786 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4789 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4790 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4793 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4794 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4797 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4798 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4799 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4802 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4803 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4804 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4807 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4808 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4809 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4812 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4813 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4814 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4817 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4818 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4819 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4822 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4823 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4824 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4827 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4828 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4829 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4830 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4831 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4834 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4836 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4837 self.prev_config = None;
4841 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4842 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4846 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4847 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4848 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4849 let did_channel_update =
4850 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4851 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4852 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4853 if did_channel_update {
4854 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4855 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4856 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4857 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4859 self.config.options = *config;
4863 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4864 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4865 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4866 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4867 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4868 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4869 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4871 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4872 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4875 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4877 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4878 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4884 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4885 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4886 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4887 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4888 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4889 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4890 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4892 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4893 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4900 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4904 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4905 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4906 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4907 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4908 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4909 // which are near the dust limit.
4910 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4911 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4912 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4913 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4914 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4916 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4917 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4919 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4922 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4923 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4926 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4927 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4930 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4931 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4935 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4940 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4942 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4943 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4944 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4945 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4946 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4947 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4949 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4959 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4960 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4964 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4965 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4966 self.update_time_counter
4969 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4970 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4973 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4974 self.config.announced_channel
4977 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4978 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4981 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4982 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4983 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4984 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4987 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4988 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4989 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4992 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4994 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4995 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4996 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4999 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5000 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5001 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5002 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5003 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5006 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5008 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5009 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5012 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5013 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5014 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5017 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5018 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5019 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5020 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5021 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5022 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5023 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5024 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5030 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5031 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5032 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5033 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5034 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5035 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5040 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5041 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5043 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5044 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5045 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5046 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5049 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5050 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5053 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5054 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5057 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5058 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5059 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5062 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5063 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5064 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5066 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5067 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5068 if self.channel_state &
5069 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5070 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5071 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5072 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5073 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5076 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5077 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5078 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5079 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5080 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5081 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5083 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5084 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5085 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5087 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5088 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5089 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5090 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5091 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5092 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5098 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5099 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5100 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5103 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5104 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5105 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5108 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5109 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5110 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5113 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5114 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5115 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5116 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5117 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5118 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5123 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5124 self.channel_update_status
5127 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5128 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5129 self.channel_update_status = status;
5132 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5134 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5135 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5136 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5140 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5141 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5142 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5145 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5149 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5150 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5151 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5153 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5154 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5155 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5157 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5158 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5161 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5162 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5163 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5164 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5165 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5166 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5167 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5168 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5169 self.channel_state);
5171 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5175 if need_commitment_update {
5176 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5177 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5178 let next_per_commitment_point =
5179 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5180 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5181 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5182 next_per_commitment_point,
5183 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5187 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5193 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5194 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5195 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5196 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5197 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5198 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5199 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5201 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5204 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5205 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5206 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5207 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5208 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5209 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5210 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5211 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5212 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5213 if self.is_outbound() {
5214 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5215 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5216 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5217 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5218 // channel and move on.
5219 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5220 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5222 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5223 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5224 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5226 if self.is_outbound() {
5227 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5228 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5229 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5230 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5231 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5232 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5236 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5237 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5238 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5239 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5240 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5244 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5245 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5246 // may have already happened for this block).
5247 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5248 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5249 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5250 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5253 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5254 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5255 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5256 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5264 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5265 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5266 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5267 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5269 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5270 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5273 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5275 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5276 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5277 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5278 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5280 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5283 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5286 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5287 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5288 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5289 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5291 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5294 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5295 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5296 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5298 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5299 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5301 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5302 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5303 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5311 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5313 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5314 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5315 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5317 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5318 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5321 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5322 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5323 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5324 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5325 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5326 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5327 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5328 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5329 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5332 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5333 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5334 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5335 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5337 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5338 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5339 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5341 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5342 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5343 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5344 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5346 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5347 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5348 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5349 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5350 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5351 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5352 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5355 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5356 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5358 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5361 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5362 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5363 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5364 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5365 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5366 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5367 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5368 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5369 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5370 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5371 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5372 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5373 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5374 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5375 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5376 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5377 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5383 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5388 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5389 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5391 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5392 if !self.is_outbound() {
5393 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5395 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5396 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5399 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5400 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5403 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5404 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5408 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5409 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5410 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5411 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5412 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5413 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5414 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5415 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5416 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5417 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5418 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5419 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5420 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5421 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5422 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5423 first_per_commitment_point,
5424 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5425 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5426 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5427 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5429 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5433 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5434 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5437 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5438 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5439 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5440 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5443 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5444 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5446 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5447 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5448 if self.is_outbound() {
5449 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5451 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5452 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5454 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5455 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5457 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5458 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5461 self.user_id = user_id;
5462 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5464 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5467 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5468 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5469 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5471 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5472 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5473 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5474 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5476 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5477 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5478 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5479 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5480 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5481 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5482 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5483 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5484 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5485 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5486 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5487 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5488 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5489 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5490 first_per_commitment_point,
5491 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5492 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5493 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5495 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5497 next_local_nonce: None,
5501 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5502 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5504 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5506 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5507 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5510 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5511 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5512 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5513 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5514 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5515 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5518 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5519 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5520 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5521 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5522 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5523 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5524 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5525 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5526 if !self.is_outbound() {
5527 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5529 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5530 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5532 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5533 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5534 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5535 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5538 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5539 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5541 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5544 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5545 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5550 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5552 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5554 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5555 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5556 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5558 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5559 temporary_channel_id,
5560 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5561 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5564 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5566 next_local_nonce: None,
5570 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5571 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5572 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5573 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5575 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5578 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5579 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5580 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5581 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5582 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5583 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5585 if !self.is_usable() {
5586 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5589 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5590 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5591 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5592 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5594 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5595 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5597 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5598 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5599 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5600 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5601 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5602 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5608 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5609 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5610 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5611 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5613 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5616 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5620 if !self.is_usable() {
5624 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5625 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5629 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5633 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5634 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5637 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5641 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5643 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5648 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5650 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5655 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5657 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5658 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5659 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5660 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5661 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5665 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5667 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5668 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5669 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5670 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5671 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5672 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5673 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5675 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5676 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5677 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5678 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5679 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5680 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5681 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5682 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5683 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5684 contents: announcement,
5687 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5691 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5692 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5693 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5694 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5695 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5696 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5697 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5698 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5700 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5702 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5704 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5705 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5707 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5709 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5710 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5713 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5714 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5716 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5719 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5722 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5723 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5724 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5725 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5726 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5727 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5730 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5732 Err(_) => return None,
5734 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5735 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5740 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5741 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5742 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5743 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5744 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5745 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5746 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5747 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5748 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5749 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5750 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5751 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5752 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5753 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5754 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5755 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5758 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5761 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5762 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5763 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5764 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5765 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5766 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5767 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5768 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5770 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5771 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5772 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5773 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5774 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5775 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5776 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5777 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5778 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5780 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5781 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5782 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5783 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5784 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5785 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5786 next_funding_txid: None,
5791 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5793 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5794 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5795 /// commitment update.
5797 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5798 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5799 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5800 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5802 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5803 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5805 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5806 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5811 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5812 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5814 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5816 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5817 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5819 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5820 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5821 /// regenerate them.
5823 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5824 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5826 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5827 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5828 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5829 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5830 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5833 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5834 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5838 if amount_msat == 0 {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5842 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5846 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5847 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5848 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5849 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5850 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5851 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5852 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5853 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5856 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5857 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5858 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5859 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5861 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5862 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5866 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5867 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5868 if !self.is_outbound() {
5869 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5870 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5871 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5872 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5873 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5874 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5878 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5881 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5882 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5883 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5885 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5886 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5887 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5888 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5889 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5890 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5894 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5895 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5896 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5897 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5898 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5899 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5903 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5904 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5908 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5909 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5910 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5911 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5913 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5914 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5917 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5918 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5919 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5920 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5921 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5924 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5925 force_holding_cell = true;
5928 // Now update local state:
5929 if force_holding_cell {
5930 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5935 onion_routing_packet,
5940 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5941 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5943 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5945 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5949 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5950 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5951 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5955 onion_routing_packet,
5957 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5962 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5963 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5964 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5965 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5967 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5968 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5969 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5971 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5972 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5976 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5977 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5978 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5979 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5980 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5981 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5982 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5985 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5986 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5987 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5988 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5989 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5990 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5993 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5995 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5996 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5997 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5999 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6000 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6003 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6004 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6005 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6006 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6007 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6008 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6009 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6010 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6013 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6017 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6018 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6019 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6020 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6022 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6024 if !self.is_outbound() {
6025 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6026 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6027 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6028 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6029 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6030 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6031 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6032 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6033 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6034 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6040 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6043 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6044 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6045 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6046 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6047 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6048 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6050 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6051 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6052 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6053 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6056 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6057 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6061 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6062 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6064 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6066 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6067 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6068 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6069 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6071 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6072 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6073 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6074 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6075 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6076 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6080 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6081 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6085 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6086 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6089 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6090 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6092 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6093 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6094 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6095 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6096 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6099 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6100 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6101 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6107 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6108 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6109 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6112 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6113 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6116 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6117 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6118 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6119 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6125 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6126 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6128 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6129 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6130 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6131 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6132 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6133 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6134 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6135 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6136 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6139 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6140 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6143 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6144 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6147 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6148 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6150 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6151 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6152 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6155 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6156 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6157 let mut chan_closed = false;
6158 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6162 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6164 None if !chan_closed => {
6165 // use override shutdown script if provided
6166 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6167 Some(script) => script,
6169 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6170 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6171 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6172 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6176 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6177 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6179 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6185 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6186 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6187 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6188 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6190 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6192 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6194 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6195 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6196 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6197 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6198 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6199 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6202 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6203 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6204 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6207 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6208 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6209 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6212 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6213 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6214 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6215 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6216 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6218 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6219 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6226 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6227 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6229 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6232 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6233 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6234 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6235 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6236 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6237 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6238 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6239 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6240 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6241 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6242 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6244 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6245 // return them to fail the payment.
6246 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6247 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6248 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6250 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6251 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6256 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6257 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6258 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6259 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6260 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6261 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6262 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6263 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6264 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6265 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6266 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6267 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6268 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6273 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6274 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6275 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6278 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6279 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6280 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6282 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6283 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6287 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6291 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6292 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6294 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6300 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6301 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6302 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6303 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6304 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6306 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6307 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6308 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6309 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6315 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6316 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6317 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6318 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6319 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6320 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6325 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6326 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6327 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6328 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6330 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6331 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6332 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6333 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6338 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6339 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6340 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6341 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6342 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6343 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6348 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6349 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6350 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6353 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6355 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6356 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6357 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6358 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6359 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6361 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6362 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6363 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6364 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6366 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6367 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6368 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6370 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6372 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6373 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6374 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6375 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6376 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6377 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6379 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6380 // deserialized from that format.
6381 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6382 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6383 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6385 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6387 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6388 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6389 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6391 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6392 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6393 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6394 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6397 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6398 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6399 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6402 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6403 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6404 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6405 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6407 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6408 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6410 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6412 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6414 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6416 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6419 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6421 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6426 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6428 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6429 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6430 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6431 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6432 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6433 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6434 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6436 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6438 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6440 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6443 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6444 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6445 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6448 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6450 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6451 preimages.push(preimage);
6453 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6454 reason.write(writer)?;
6456 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6458 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6459 preimages.push(preimage);
6461 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6462 reason.write(writer)?;
6467 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6468 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6470 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6472 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6473 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6474 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6475 source.write(writer)?;
6476 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6478 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6480 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6481 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6483 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6485 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6486 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6491 match self.resend_order {
6492 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6493 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6496 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6497 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6498 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6500 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6501 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6502 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6503 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6506 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6507 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6508 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6509 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6510 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6513 if self.is_outbound() {
6514 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6515 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6516 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6518 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6519 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6520 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6522 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6524 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6525 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6526 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6527 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6529 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6530 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6531 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6532 // consider the stale state on reload.
6535 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6536 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6537 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6539 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6540 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6541 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6543 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6544 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6546 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6547 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6548 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6550 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6551 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6553 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6556 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6557 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6558 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6560 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6563 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6564 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6566 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6567 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6568 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6570 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6572 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6574 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6576 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6577 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6578 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6579 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6580 htlc.write(writer)?;
6583 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6584 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6585 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6587 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6588 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6590 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6591 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6592 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6593 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6594 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6595 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6596 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6598 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6599 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6600 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6601 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6602 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6604 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6605 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6607 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6608 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6609 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6610 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6612 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6614 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6615 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6616 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6617 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6618 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6619 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6620 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6622 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6623 (2, chan_type, option),
6624 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6625 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6626 (5, self.config, required),
6627 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6628 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6629 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6630 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6631 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6632 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6633 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6634 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6635 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6636 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6637 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6638 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6639 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6640 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6641 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6642 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6649 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6650 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6652 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6653 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6655 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6656 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6657 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6659 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6660 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6661 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6662 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6666 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6667 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6669 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6670 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6672 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6673 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6680 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6682 let mut keys_data = None;
6684 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6685 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6686 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6688 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6689 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6690 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6691 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6692 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6693 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6697 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6698 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6699 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6702 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6704 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6705 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6708 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6710 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6711 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6712 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6713 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6714 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6715 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6716 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6717 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6718 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6719 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6720 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6721 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6722 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6727 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6728 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6729 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6730 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6731 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6732 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6733 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6734 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6735 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6736 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6737 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6738 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6740 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6744 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6748 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6751 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6756 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6757 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6758 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6759 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6760 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6761 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6763 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6764 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6765 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6767 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6768 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6769 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6771 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6772 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6773 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6775 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6779 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6780 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6781 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6782 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6785 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6789 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6791 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6792 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6795 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6796 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6797 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6798 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6801 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6803 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6805 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6807 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6810 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6811 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6812 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6813 // consider the stale state on reload.
6814 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6817 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6824 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6830 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6833 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6834 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6836 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6837 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6839 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6845 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6846 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6848 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6849 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6854 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6855 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6856 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6857 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6859 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6862 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6876 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6877 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6879 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6881 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6885 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6886 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6887 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6889 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6895 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6896 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6897 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6898 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6899 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6900 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6901 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6902 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6903 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6904 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6906 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6907 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6908 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6909 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6910 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6911 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6912 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6914 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6915 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6916 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6917 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6919 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6921 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6922 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6923 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6924 (2, channel_type, option),
6925 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6926 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6927 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6928 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6929 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6930 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6931 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6932 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6933 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6934 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6935 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6936 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6937 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6938 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6939 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6940 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6941 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6942 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6943 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6946 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6947 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6948 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6949 // required channel parameters.
6950 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6951 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6952 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6954 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6956 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6957 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6958 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6959 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6962 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6963 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6964 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6966 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6967 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6969 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6970 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6975 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6976 if iter.next().is_some() {
6977 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6981 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6982 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6983 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6984 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6985 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6988 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6989 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6991 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6992 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6993 // separate u64 values.
6994 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6996 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7001 config: config.unwrap(),
7005 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7006 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7007 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7010 temporary_channel_id,
7012 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7014 channel_value_satoshis,
7016 latest_monitor_update_id,
7019 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7022 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7023 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7026 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7027 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7028 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7029 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7033 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7034 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7035 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7036 monitor_pending_forwards,
7037 monitor_pending_failures,
7038 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7041 holding_cell_update_fee,
7042 next_holder_htlc_id,
7043 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7044 update_time_counter,
7047 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7048 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7049 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7050 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7052 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7053 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7054 closing_fee_limits: None,
7055 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7057 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7059 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7060 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7062 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7064 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7065 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7066 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7067 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7068 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7069 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7070 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7071 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7072 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7075 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7077 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7078 funding_transaction,
7080 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7081 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7082 counterparty_node_id,
7084 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7088 channel_update_status,
7089 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7093 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7094 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7096 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7098 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7100 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7101 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7102 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7104 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7105 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7107 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7108 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7110 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7113 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7121 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7122 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7123 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7124 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7125 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7127 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7128 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7130 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7131 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7132 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7133 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7134 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7135 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7136 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7137 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7138 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7139 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7140 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7141 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7142 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7143 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7144 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7145 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7146 use crate::util::test_utils;
7147 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7148 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7149 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7150 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7151 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7152 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7153 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7154 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7155 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7156 use crate::prelude::*;
7158 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7161 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7162 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7168 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7169 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7170 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7171 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7175 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7176 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7177 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7178 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7179 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7180 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7181 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7185 signer: InMemorySigner,
7188 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7189 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7192 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7193 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7195 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7196 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7199 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7203 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7205 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7207 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7208 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7209 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7212 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7213 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7214 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7215 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7219 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7220 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7221 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7225 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7226 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7227 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7228 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7230 let seed = [42; 32];
7231 let network = Network::Testnet;
7232 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7233 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7234 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7237 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7238 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7239 let config = UserConfig::default();
7240 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7241 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7242 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7244 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7245 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7249 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7250 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7252 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7253 let original_fee = 253;
7254 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7255 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7256 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7257 let seed = [42; 32];
7258 let network = Network::Testnet;
7259 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7261 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7262 let config = UserConfig::default();
7263 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7265 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7266 // same as the old fee.
7267 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7268 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7269 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7273 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7274 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7275 // dust limits are used.
7276 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7277 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7278 let seed = [42; 32];
7279 let network = Network::Testnet;
7280 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7281 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7283 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7284 // they have different dust limits.
7286 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7287 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7288 let config = UserConfig::default();
7289 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7291 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7292 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7293 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7294 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7295 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7297 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7298 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7299 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7300 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7301 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7303 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7304 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7305 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7307 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7308 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7309 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7310 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7313 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7315 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7316 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7317 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7318 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7319 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7320 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7321 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7322 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7323 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7327 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7328 // the dust limit check.
7329 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7330 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7331 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7332 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7334 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7335 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7336 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7337 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7338 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7339 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7340 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7344 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7345 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7346 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7347 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7348 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7349 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7350 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7351 let seed = [42; 32];
7352 let network = Network::Testnet;
7353 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7355 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7356 let config = UserConfig::default();
7357 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7359 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7360 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7362 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7363 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7364 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7365 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7366 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7367 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7369 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7370 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7371 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7372 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7373 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7375 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7377 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7378 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7379 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7380 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7381 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7383 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7384 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7385 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7386 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7387 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7391 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7392 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7393 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7394 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7395 let seed = [42; 32];
7396 let network = Network::Testnet;
7397 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7398 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7399 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7401 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7403 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7404 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7405 let config = UserConfig::default();
7406 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7408 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7409 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7410 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7411 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7413 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7414 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7415 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7417 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7418 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7419 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7420 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7422 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7423 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7424 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7426 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7427 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7429 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7430 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7431 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7432 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7433 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7434 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7435 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7437 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7439 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7440 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7441 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7442 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7443 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7447 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7448 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7449 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7450 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7451 let seed = [42; 32];
7452 let network = Network::Testnet;
7453 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7454 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7455 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7457 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7458 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7459 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7460 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7461 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7462 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7463 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7464 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7466 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7467 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7468 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7469 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7470 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7471 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7473 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7474 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7475 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7476 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7478 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7480 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7481 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7482 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7483 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7484 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7485 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7487 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7488 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7489 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7490 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7492 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7493 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7494 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7495 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7496 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7498 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7499 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7501 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7502 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7503 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7505 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7506 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7507 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7508 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7509 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7511 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7512 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7514 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7515 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7516 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7520 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7522 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7523 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7524 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7526 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7527 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7528 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7529 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7531 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7532 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7533 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7535 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7537 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7538 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7541 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7542 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7543 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7544 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7545 let seed = [42; 32];
7546 let network = Network::Testnet;
7547 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7548 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7549 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7552 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7553 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7554 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7556 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7557 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7559 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7560 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7561 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7563 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7564 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7566 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7568 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7569 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7571 // Channel Negotiations failed
7572 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7573 assert!(result.is_err());
7578 fn channel_update() {
7579 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7580 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7581 let seed = [42; 32];
7582 let network = Network::Testnet;
7583 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7584 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7586 // Create a channel.
7587 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7588 let config = UserConfig::default();
7589 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7590 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7591 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7592 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7594 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7595 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7596 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7598 short_channel_id: 0,
7601 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7602 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7603 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7605 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7606 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7608 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7610 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7612 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7613 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7614 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7615 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7617 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7618 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7619 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7621 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7625 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7627 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7628 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7629 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7630 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7631 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7632 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7633 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7634 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7635 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7636 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7637 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7638 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7639 use crate::sync::Arc;
7641 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7642 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7643 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7644 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7646 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7648 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7649 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7650 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7651 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7652 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7654 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7655 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7661 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7662 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7663 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7665 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7666 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7667 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7668 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7669 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7670 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7672 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7674 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7675 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7676 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7677 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7678 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7679 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7681 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7682 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7683 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7684 selected_contest_delay: 144
7686 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7687 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7689 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7690 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7692 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7693 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7695 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7696 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7698 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7699 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7700 // build_commitment_transaction.
7701 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7702 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7703 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7704 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7705 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7707 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7708 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7709 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7710 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7714 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7715 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7716 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7717 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7721 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7722 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7723 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7725 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7726 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7728 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7729 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7731 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7733 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7734 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7735 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7736 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7737 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7738 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7739 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7741 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7742 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7743 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7744 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7746 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7747 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7748 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7750 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7752 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7753 commitment_tx.clone(),
7754 counterparty_signature,
7755 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7756 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7757 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7759 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7760 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7762 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7763 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7764 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7766 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7767 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7770 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7771 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7773 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7774 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7775 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7776 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7777 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7778 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7779 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7780 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7782 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7785 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7786 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7787 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7791 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7794 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7795 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7796 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7798 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7799 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7800 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7801 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7802 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7803 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7804 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7805 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7807 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7811 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7812 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7813 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7814 "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", {});
7816 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7817 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7819 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7820 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7821 "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", {});
7823 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7824 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7825 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7826 "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", {});
7828 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7829 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7831 amount_msat: 1000000,
7833 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7834 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7836 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7839 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7840 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7842 amount_msat: 2000000,
7844 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7845 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7847 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7850 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7851 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7853 amount_msat: 2000000,
7855 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7856 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7857 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7859 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7862 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7863 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7865 amount_msat: 3000000,
7867 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7868 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7869 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7871 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7874 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7875 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7877 amount_msat: 4000000,
7879 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7880 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7882 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7886 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7887 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7888 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7890 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7891 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7892 "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", {
7895 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7896 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7897 "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" },
7900 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7901 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7902 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7905 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7906 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7907 "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" },
7910 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7911 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7912 "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" },
7915 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7916 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7917 "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" }
7920 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7921 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7922 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7924 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7925 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7926 "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", {
7929 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7930 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7931 "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" },
7934 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7935 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7936 "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" },
7939 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7940 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7941 "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" },
7944 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7945 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7946 "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" },
7949 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7950 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7951 "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" }
7954 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7955 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7956 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7958 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7959 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7960 "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", {
7963 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7964 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7965 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7968 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7969 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7970 "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" },
7973 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7974 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7975 "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" },
7978 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7979 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7980 "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" }
7983 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7984 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7985 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7986 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7988 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7989 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7990 "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", {
7993 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7994 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7995 "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" },
7998 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7999 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8000 "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" },
8003 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8004 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8005 "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" },
8008 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8009 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8010 "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" }
8013 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8014 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8015 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8016 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8018 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8019 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8020 "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", {
8023 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8024 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8025 "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" },
8028 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8029 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8030 "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" },
8033 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8034 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8035 "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" },
8038 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8039 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8040 "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" }
8043 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8044 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8045 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8047 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8048 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8049 "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", {
8052 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8053 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8054 "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" },
8057 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8058 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8059 "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" },
8062 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8063 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8064 "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" }
8067 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8068 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8069 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8071 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8072 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8073 "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", {
8076 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8077 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8078 "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" },
8081 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8082 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8083 "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" },
8086 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8087 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8088 "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" }
8091 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8092 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8093 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8095 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8096 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8097 "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", {
8100 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8101 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8102 "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" },
8105 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8106 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8107 "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" }
8110 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8111 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8112 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8113 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8115 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8116 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8117 "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", {
8120 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8121 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8122 "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" },
8125 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8126 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8127 "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" }
8130 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8131 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8132 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8133 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8135 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8136 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8137 "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", {
8140 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8141 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8142 "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" },
8145 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8146 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8147 "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" }
8150 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8151 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8152 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8154 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8155 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8156 "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", {
8159 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8160 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8161 "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" }
8164 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8165 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8166 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8167 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8169 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8170 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8171 "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", {
8174 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8175 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8176 "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" }
8179 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8180 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8181 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8182 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8184 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8185 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8186 "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", {
8189 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8190 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8191 "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" }
8194 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8195 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8196 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8197 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8199 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8200 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8201 "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", {});
8203 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8204 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8205 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8206 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8208 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8209 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8210 "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", {});
8212 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8213 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8214 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8215 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8217 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8218 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8219 "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", {});
8221 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8222 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8223 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8225 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8226 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8227 "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", {});
8229 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8230 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8231 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8232 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8234 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8235 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8236 "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", {});
8238 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8239 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8240 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8241 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8243 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8244 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8245 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8247 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8248 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8249 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8250 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8251 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8252 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8254 amount_msat: 2000000,
8256 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8257 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8259 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8262 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8263 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8264 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8266 amount_msat: 5000001,
8268 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8269 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8270 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8272 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8275 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8276 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8278 amount_msat: 5000000,
8280 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8281 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8282 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8284 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8288 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8289 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8290 "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", {
8293 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8294 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8295 "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" },
8297 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8298 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8299 "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" },
8301 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8302 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8303 "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" }
8306 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8307 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8308 "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", {
8311 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8312 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8313 "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" },
8315 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8316 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8317 "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" },
8319 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8320 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8321 "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" }
8326 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8327 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8329 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8330 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8331 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8332 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8334 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8335 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8336 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8338 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8339 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8341 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8342 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8344 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8345 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8346 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8350 fn test_key_derivation() {
8351 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8354 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8355 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8357 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8358 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8360 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8361 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8363 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8364 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8366 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8367 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8369 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8370 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8372 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8373 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8377 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8378 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8379 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8380 let seed = [42; 32];
8381 let network = Network::Testnet;
8382 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8383 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8385 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8386 let config = UserConfig::default();
8387 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8388 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8390 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8391 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8393 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8394 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8395 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8396 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8397 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8398 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8399 assert!(res.is_ok());
8404 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8405 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8406 // resulting `channel_type`.
8407 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8408 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8409 let network = Network::Testnet;
8410 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8411 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8413 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8414 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8416 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8417 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8419 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8420 // need to signal it.
8421 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8422 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8423 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8426 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8428 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8429 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8430 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8432 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8433 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8434 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8437 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8438 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8439 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8440 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8441 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8444 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8445 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8450 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8451 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8452 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8453 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8454 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8455 let network = Network::Testnet;
8456 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8457 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8459 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8460 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8462 let config = UserConfig::default();
8464 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8465 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8466 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8467 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8468 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8470 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8471 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8472 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8475 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8476 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8477 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8479 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8480 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8481 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8482 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8483 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8484 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8486 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8491 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8492 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8494 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8495 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8496 let network = Network::Testnet;
8497 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8498 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8500 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8501 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8503 let config = UserConfig::default();
8505 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8506 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8507 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8508 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8509 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8510 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8511 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8512 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8514 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8515 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8516 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8517 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8518 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8519 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8522 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8523 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8525 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8526 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8527 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8528 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8530 assert!(res.is_err());
8532 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8533 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8534 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8536 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8537 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8538 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8541 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8543 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8544 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8545 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8546 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8549 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8550 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8552 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8553 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8555 assert!(res.is_err());