1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
438 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
439 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
440 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
441 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
442 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
443 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
444 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
445 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
446 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
447 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
448 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
449 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
451 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
453 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
454 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
455 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
456 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
458 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
459 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
460 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
461 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
463 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
464 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
465 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
466 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
467 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
469 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
470 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
471 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
472 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
474 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
475 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
476 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
478 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
479 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
480 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
481 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
482 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
484 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
485 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
486 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
487 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
488 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
490 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
494 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
495 (0, update, required),
496 (2, blocked, required),
499 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
500 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
501 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
504 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
505 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
506 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
507 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
509 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
510 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
511 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
512 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
514 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
518 channel_id: [u8; 32],
519 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
522 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
523 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
525 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
526 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
527 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
529 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
530 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
531 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
532 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
534 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
535 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
537 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
539 holder_signer: Signer,
540 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
541 destination_script: Script,
543 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
544 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
545 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
547 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
548 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
549 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
550 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
551 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
552 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
554 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
555 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
556 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
557 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
558 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
559 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
561 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
563 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
564 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
565 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
567 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
568 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
569 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
570 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
571 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
572 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
573 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
575 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
577 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
578 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
579 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
580 // HTLCs with similar state.
581 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
582 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
583 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
584 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
585 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
586 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
587 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
588 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
589 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
592 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
593 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
594 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
596 update_time_counter: u32,
598 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
599 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
600 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
602 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
603 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
605 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
606 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
608 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
609 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
610 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
611 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
613 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
614 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
616 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
620 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
621 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
622 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
623 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
624 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
625 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
627 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
628 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
629 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
630 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
631 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
633 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
634 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
635 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
636 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
637 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
638 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
639 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
640 channel_creation_height: u32,
642 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
650 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
652 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
660 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
663 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
667 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
670 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
673 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
674 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
676 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
678 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
679 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
681 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
682 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
683 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
685 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
687 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
689 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
690 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
691 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
692 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
694 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
695 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
696 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
698 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
699 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
700 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
702 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
703 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
704 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
705 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
711 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
712 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
713 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
714 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
715 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
717 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
718 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
721 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
722 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
723 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
724 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
725 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
726 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
727 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
729 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
730 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
732 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
733 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
734 // the channel's funding UTXO.
736 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
737 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
738 // associated channel mapping.
740 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
741 // to store all of them.
742 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
744 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
745 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
746 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
747 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
748 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
750 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
751 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
753 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
754 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
756 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
757 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
758 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
760 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
761 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
762 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
763 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
764 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
767 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
768 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
770 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
771 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
772 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
776 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
778 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
779 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
780 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
781 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
785 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
789 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
791 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
792 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
793 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
794 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
795 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
797 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
798 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
800 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
802 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
803 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
805 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
806 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
807 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
808 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
809 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
810 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
812 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
813 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
815 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
816 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
817 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
818 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
819 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
821 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
822 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
824 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
825 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
827 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
828 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
829 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
830 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
836 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
837 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
839 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
840 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
841 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
846 macro_rules! secp_check {
847 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
850 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
855 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
856 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
857 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
858 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
860 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
862 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
863 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
864 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
866 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
869 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
871 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
874 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
875 /// required by us according to the configured or default
876 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
878 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
880 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
881 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
882 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
883 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
884 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
887 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
888 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
889 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
890 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
891 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
892 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
893 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
896 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
897 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
900 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
901 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
902 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
903 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
904 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
905 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
906 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
907 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
908 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
909 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
912 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
913 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
914 // `only_static_remotekey`.
916 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
917 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
918 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
919 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
926 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
927 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
928 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
929 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
930 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
931 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
932 // We've exhausted our options
935 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
936 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
939 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
940 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
941 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
942 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
944 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
945 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
946 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
947 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
948 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
949 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
951 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
953 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
957 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
958 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
959 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
960 outbound_scid_alias: u64
961 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
962 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
963 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
966 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
967 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
968 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
969 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
971 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
974 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
977 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
978 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
981 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
984 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
985 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
986 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
987 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
991 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
992 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
994 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
996 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
997 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
998 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
999 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1002 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1003 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1005 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1006 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1007 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1008 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1012 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1013 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1014 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1018 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1019 Ok(script) => script,
1020 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1023 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1028 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1029 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1030 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1031 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1036 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1038 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1039 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1040 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1041 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1043 channel_value_satoshis,
1045 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1048 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1051 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1052 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1055 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1057 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1058 pending_update_fee: None,
1059 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1060 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1061 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1062 update_time_counter: 1,
1064 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1066 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1067 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1068 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1069 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1070 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1071 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1075 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1076 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1078 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1079 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1080 closing_fee_limits: None,
1081 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1083 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1085 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1086 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1087 short_channel_id: None,
1088 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1090 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1091 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1092 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1093 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1094 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1095 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1096 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1097 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1098 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1099 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1100 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1101 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1103 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1105 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1106 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1107 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1108 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1109 counterparty_parameters: None,
1110 funding_outpoint: None,
1111 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1112 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1114 funding_transaction: None,
1116 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1117 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1118 counterparty_node_id,
1120 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1122 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1124 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1125 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1127 announcement_sigs: None,
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1132 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1134 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1136 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1137 outbound_scid_alias,
1139 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1140 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1142 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1143 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1148 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1152 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1153 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1154 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1156 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1157 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1158 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1159 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1160 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1161 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1162 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1165 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1166 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1167 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1168 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1169 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1170 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1171 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1172 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1174 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1175 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1184 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1185 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1186 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1187 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1188 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1189 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1190 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1191 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1192 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1193 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1197 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1199 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1200 // support this channel type.
1201 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1202 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1206 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1207 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1208 // `static_remote_key`.
1209 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1212 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1213 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1216 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1219 channel_type.clone()
1221 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1222 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1227 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1229 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1230 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1231 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1232 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1233 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1234 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1235 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1236 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1237 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1240 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1244 // Check sanity of message fields:
1245 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1248 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1254 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1255 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1261 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1264 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1266 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1267 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1270 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1273 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1277 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1278 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1281 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1284 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1287 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1293 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1296 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1300 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1302 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1303 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1308 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1309 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1310 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1311 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1314 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1317 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1318 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1319 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1321 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1325 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1326 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1327 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1328 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1329 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1333 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1334 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1335 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1336 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1340 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1341 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1342 &Some(ref script) => {
1343 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1344 if script.len() == 0 {
1347 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1348 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1350 Some(script.clone())
1353 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1360 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1361 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1362 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1363 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1367 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1368 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1369 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1373 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1374 Ok(script) => script,
1375 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1378 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1379 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1381 let chan = Channel {
1384 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1385 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1387 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1392 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1394 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1395 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1396 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1397 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1400 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1403 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1406 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1407 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1408 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1410 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1412 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1413 pending_update_fee: None,
1414 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1415 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1416 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1417 update_time_counter: 1,
1419 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1421 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1422 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1423 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1424 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1425 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1426 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1430 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1431 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1433 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1434 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1435 closing_fee_limits: None,
1436 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1438 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1440 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1441 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1442 short_channel_id: None,
1443 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1445 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1446 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1447 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1448 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1449 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1450 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1451 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1452 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1453 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1454 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1455 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1456 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1457 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1459 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1461 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1462 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1463 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1464 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1465 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1466 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1467 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1469 funding_outpoint: None,
1470 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1471 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1473 funding_transaction: None,
1475 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1476 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1477 counterparty_node_id,
1479 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1481 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1483 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1484 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1486 announcement_sigs: None,
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1491 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1493 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1495 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1496 outbound_scid_alias,
1498 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1499 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1502 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1507 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1513 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1514 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1515 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1516 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1517 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1519 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1520 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1521 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1522 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1523 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1524 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1525 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1527 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1528 where L::Target: Logger
1530 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1531 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1532 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1534 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1535 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1536 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1537 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1539 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1540 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1541 if match update_state {
1542 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1543 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1544 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1545 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1546 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1548 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1552 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1553 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1554 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1555 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1557 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1558 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1559 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1561 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1562 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1563 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1564 transaction_output_index: None
1569 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1570 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1571 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1572 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1573 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1576 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1578 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1580 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1582 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1583 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1586 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1587 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1590 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1592 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1593 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1594 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1596 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1597 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1603 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1604 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1605 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1608 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1609 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1613 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1614 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1616 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1618 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1619 if generated_by_local {
1620 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1621 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1630 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1632 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1633 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1634 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1637 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1641 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1642 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1644 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1648 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1649 preimages.push(preimage);
1653 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1654 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1656 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1658 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1659 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1661 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1662 if !generated_by_local {
1663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1671 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1672 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1673 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1674 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1675 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1676 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1677 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1678 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1682 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1683 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1684 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1685 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1691 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1692 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1695 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1696 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1697 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1700 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1703 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1704 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1705 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1706 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1708 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1711 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1712 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1717 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1718 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1723 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1725 let channel_parameters =
1726 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1727 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1728 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1731 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1736 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1739 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1740 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1741 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1742 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1744 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1745 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1746 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1754 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1755 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1761 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1762 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1763 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1764 // outside of those situations will fail.
1765 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1769 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1774 1 + // script length (0)
1778 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1779 2 + // witness marker and flag
1780 1 + // witness element count
1781 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1782 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1783 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1784 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1785 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1786 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1788 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1789 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1790 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1796 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1797 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1798 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1799 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1801 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1802 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1803 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1805 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1806 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1807 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1808 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1809 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1810 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1813 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1814 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1817 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1818 value_to_holder = 0;
1821 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1822 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1823 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1824 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1826 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1827 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1830 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1831 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1835 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1836 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1837 /// our counterparty!)
1838 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1839 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1840 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1841 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1842 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1850 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1851 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1852 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1853 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1854 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1855 //may see payments to it!
1856 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1857 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1858 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1860 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1863 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1864 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1865 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1866 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1867 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1870 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1873 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1874 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1876 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1878 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1879 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1880 where L::Target: Logger {
1881 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1882 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1883 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1884 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1885 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1886 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1887 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1888 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1892 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1893 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1894 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1895 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1897 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1898 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1900 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1902 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1904 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1905 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1906 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1908 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1909 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1910 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1911 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1912 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1914 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1915 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1916 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1918 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1919 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1925 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1929 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1933 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1935 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1936 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1937 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1938 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1941 // Now update local state:
1943 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1944 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1945 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1946 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1947 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1948 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1949 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1953 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1954 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1955 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1956 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1957 // do not not get into this branch.
1958 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1959 match pending_update {
1960 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1961 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1962 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1963 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1964 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1965 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1966 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1969 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1970 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1971 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1972 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1973 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1974 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1975 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1981 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1982 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1983 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1986 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1987 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1990 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1993 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1994 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1996 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1997 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1999 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2000 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2003 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2006 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2007 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2008 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2009 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2014 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2015 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2016 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2017 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2018 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2019 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2020 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2021 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2022 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2023 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2024 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2025 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2026 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2027 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2028 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2029 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2030 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2032 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2034 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2035 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2036 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2037 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2038 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2039 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2040 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2042 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2043 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2046 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2047 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2048 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2049 update, blocked: true,
2054 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2055 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2056 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2057 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2061 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2065 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2066 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2067 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2068 /// before we fail backwards.
2070 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2071 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2072 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2073 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2074 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2075 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2076 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2079 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2080 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2081 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2082 /// before we fail backwards.
2084 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2085 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2086 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2087 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2088 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2089 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2090 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2092 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2094 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2095 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2096 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2098 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2099 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2100 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2102 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2103 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2104 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2106 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2111 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2118 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2120 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2121 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2122 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2126 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2127 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2128 force_holding_cell = true;
2131 // Now update local state:
2132 if force_holding_cell {
2133 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2134 match pending_update {
2135 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2136 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2138 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2143 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2144 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2151 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2152 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2153 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2159 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2161 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2162 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2165 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2166 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2167 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2172 // Message handlers:
2174 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2175 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2177 // Check sanity of message fields:
2178 if !self.is_outbound() {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2181 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2184 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2187 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2190 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2193 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2195 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2197 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2198 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2201 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2202 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2205 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2212 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2213 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2216 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2219 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2222 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2225 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2228 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2231 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2235 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2236 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2239 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2240 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2242 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2243 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2246 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2249 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2250 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2251 &Some(ref script) => {
2252 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2253 if script.len() == 0 {
2256 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2259 Some(script.clone())
2262 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2269 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2270 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2271 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2272 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2273 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2275 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2278 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2281 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2282 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2283 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2284 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2285 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2286 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2289 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2290 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2291 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2294 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2295 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2297 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2298 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2303 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2304 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2306 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2307 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2309 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2310 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2311 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2312 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2313 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2314 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2315 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2316 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2317 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2320 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2321 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2323 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2324 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2325 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2326 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2328 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2329 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2331 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2332 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2335 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2336 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2339 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2340 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2341 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2343 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2346 if self.is_outbound() {
2347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2349 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2350 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2351 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2355 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2358 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2359 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2360 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2361 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2364 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2366 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2367 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2368 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2370 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2372 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2373 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2377 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2378 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2379 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2383 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2384 initial_commitment_tx,
2387 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2388 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2391 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2394 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2396 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2397 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2398 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2399 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2400 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2401 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2402 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2403 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2404 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2405 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2406 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2408 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2410 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2412 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2413 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2414 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2417 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2419 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2420 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2422 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2423 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2426 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2427 }, channel_monitor))
2430 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2431 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2432 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2433 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2434 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2436 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2439 if !self.is_outbound() {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2442 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2445 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2446 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2447 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2448 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2451 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2453 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2454 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2455 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2456 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2458 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2459 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2461 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2462 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2464 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2465 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2466 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2467 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2468 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2469 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2473 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2474 initial_commitment_tx,
2477 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2478 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2481 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2482 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2485 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2486 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2487 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2488 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2489 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2490 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2491 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2492 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2493 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2494 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2495 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2496 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2498 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2500 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2502 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2503 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2504 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2507 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2509 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2510 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2514 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2515 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2517 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2518 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2519 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2520 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2522 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2525 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2526 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2530 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2531 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2532 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2533 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2534 // when routing outbound payments.
2535 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2539 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2541 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2542 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2543 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2544 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2545 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2546 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2547 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2548 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2549 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2551 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2552 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2553 let expected_point =
2554 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2555 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2557 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2558 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2559 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2560 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2561 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2562 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2564 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2565 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2566 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2567 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2568 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2570 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2578 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2579 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2581 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2583 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2586 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2587 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2588 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2589 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2595 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2596 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2597 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2598 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2599 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2600 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2602 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2603 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2606 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2609 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2610 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2611 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2613 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2614 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2615 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2616 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2617 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2618 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2621 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2627 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2628 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2629 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2630 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2631 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2632 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2634 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2635 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2638 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2641 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2642 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2643 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2645 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2646 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2647 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2648 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2649 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2650 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2652 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2653 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2657 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2658 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2659 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2660 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2661 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2662 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2663 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2665 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2668 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2675 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2676 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2677 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2678 /// corner case properly.
2679 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2680 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2681 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2682 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2684 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2685 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2686 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2687 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2690 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2692 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
2693 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2695 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2697 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2699 if self.is_outbound() {
2700 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2701 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2703 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2704 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2706 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2707 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2708 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2709 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2712 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2713 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2714 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2715 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2717 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2718 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2719 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2720 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2721 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2722 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2723 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2724 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2725 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2726 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2728 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2731 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2732 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2733 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2734 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2735 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2738 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2739 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2741 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2742 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat)
2743 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2745 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
2746 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2747 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2748 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2752 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2753 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2755 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2756 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2760 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2761 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2762 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2763 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2765 outbound_capacity_msat,
2766 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2767 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2772 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2773 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2776 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2777 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2778 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2779 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2780 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2781 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2784 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2785 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2787 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2788 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2791 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2792 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2793 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2795 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2796 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2798 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2801 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2802 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2804 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2805 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2807 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2808 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2810 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2811 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2816 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2822 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2823 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2824 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2827 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2828 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2829 included_htlcs += 1;
2832 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2837 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2838 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2839 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2840 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2841 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2842 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2847 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2849 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2850 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2855 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2856 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2860 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2861 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2862 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2865 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2866 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2868 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2869 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2870 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2872 total_pending_htlcs,
2873 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2874 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2875 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2877 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2878 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2879 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2881 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2883 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2888 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2889 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2890 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2892 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2893 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2895 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2898 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2899 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2901 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2902 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2904 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2905 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2907 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2908 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2912 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2919 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2920 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2921 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2922 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2923 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2927 included_htlcs += 1;
2930 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2931 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2934 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2935 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2937 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2938 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2939 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2944 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2945 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2946 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2949 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2950 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2952 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2953 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2955 total_pending_htlcs,
2956 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2957 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2958 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2960 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2961 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2962 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2964 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2966 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2971 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2972 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2973 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2974 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2975 if local_sent_shutdown {
2976 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2978 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2979 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2980 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2983 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2986 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2989 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2992 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2996 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2997 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2998 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3001 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3004 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3005 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3006 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3007 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3008 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3009 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3010 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3011 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3012 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3013 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3014 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3016 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3017 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3018 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3019 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3020 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3021 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3025 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
3028 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3029 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3030 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3032 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3033 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3034 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3035 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3036 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3037 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3038 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3042 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3043 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3044 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3045 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3046 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3047 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3048 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3052 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3053 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3054 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3055 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3056 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3060 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3061 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3062 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3063 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3064 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3066 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3070 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3074 if !self.is_outbound() {
3075 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3076 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3077 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3078 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3079 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3080 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3081 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3082 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3083 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3084 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3085 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3086 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3087 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3088 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3089 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3092 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3093 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3094 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3095 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3099 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3102 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3106 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3107 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3108 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3112 // Now update local state:
3113 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3114 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3115 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3116 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3117 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3118 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3119 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3124 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3126 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3127 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3128 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3129 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3130 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3131 None => fail_reason.into(),
3132 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3133 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3134 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3137 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3141 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3143 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3144 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3146 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3152 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3155 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3156 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3159 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3163 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3166 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3167 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3170 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3174 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3178 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3179 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3182 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3186 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3190 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3191 where L::Target: Logger
3193 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3196 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3199 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3203 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3205 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3207 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3208 let commitment_txid = {
3209 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3210 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3211 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3213 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3214 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3215 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3216 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3217 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3222 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3224 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3225 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3226 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3227 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3230 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3231 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3232 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3238 if self.is_outbound() {
3239 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3240 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3241 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3242 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3243 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3244 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3245 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3246 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3247 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3248 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3254 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3258 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3259 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3260 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3261 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3262 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3263 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3264 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3265 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3266 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3267 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3268 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3269 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3270 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3273 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3274 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3275 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3276 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3277 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3278 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3279 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3281 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3282 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3283 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3284 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3285 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3286 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3287 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3290 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3291 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3294 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3296 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3297 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3298 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3301 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3304 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3305 commitment_stats.tx,
3307 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3308 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3309 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3312 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3315 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3316 let mut need_commitment = false;
3317 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3318 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3319 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3320 need_commitment = true;
3324 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3325 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3326 Some(forward_info.clone())
3328 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3329 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3330 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3331 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3332 need_commitment = true;
3335 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3336 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3337 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3338 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3339 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3340 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3341 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3342 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3343 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3344 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3345 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3346 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3347 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3348 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3350 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3352 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3353 need_commitment = true;
3357 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3358 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3359 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3360 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3361 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3362 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3364 nondust_htlc_sources,
3368 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3369 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3370 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3371 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3373 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3374 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3375 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3376 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3377 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3378 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3379 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3380 // includes the right HTLCs.
3381 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3382 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3383 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3384 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3385 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3386 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3388 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3389 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3390 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3393 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3394 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3395 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3396 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3397 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3398 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3399 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3400 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3401 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3405 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3406 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3407 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3408 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3411 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3412 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3413 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3414 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3415 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3416 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3417 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3418 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3421 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3422 /// for our counterparty.
3423 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3424 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3425 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3426 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3427 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3429 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3430 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3431 updates: Vec::new(),
3434 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3435 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3436 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3437 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3438 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3439 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3440 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3441 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3442 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3443 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3444 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3445 // to rebalance channels.
3446 match &htlc_update {
3447 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3448 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3449 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3452 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3453 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3454 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3455 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3456 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3457 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3458 // into the holding cell without ever being
3459 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3460 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3461 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3464 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3470 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3471 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3472 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3473 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3474 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3475 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3476 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3477 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3478 (msg, monitor_update)
3479 } else { unreachable!() };
3480 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3481 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3483 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3484 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3485 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3486 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3487 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3488 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3489 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3490 // for a full revocation before failing.
3491 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3494 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3496 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3503 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3504 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3506 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3507 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3512 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3513 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3514 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3515 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3516 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3518 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3519 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3520 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3522 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3523 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3529 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3530 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3531 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3532 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3533 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3534 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3535 where L::Target: Logger,
3537 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3538 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3540 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3543 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3547 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3549 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3550 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3555 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3556 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3557 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3558 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3559 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3560 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3561 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3562 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3566 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3568 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3569 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3572 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3573 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3575 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3577 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3578 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3579 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3580 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3581 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3582 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3583 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3584 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3588 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3589 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3590 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3591 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3592 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3593 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3594 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3595 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3597 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3598 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3601 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3602 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3603 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3604 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3605 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3606 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3607 let mut require_commitment = false;
3608 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3611 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3612 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3613 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3615 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3616 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3617 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3618 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3619 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3620 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3625 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3626 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3627 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3628 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3629 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3631 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3632 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3633 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3638 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3639 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3641 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3645 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3646 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3648 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3649 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3650 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3651 require_commitment = true;
3652 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3653 match forward_info {
3654 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3655 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3656 require_commitment = true;
3658 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3659 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3660 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3662 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3663 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3664 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3668 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3669 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3670 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3671 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3677 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3678 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3679 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3680 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3682 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3683 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3684 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3685 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3686 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3687 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3688 require_commitment = true;
3692 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3694 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3695 match update_state {
3696 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3697 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3698 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3699 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3700 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3702 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3703 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3704 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3705 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3706 require_commitment = true;
3707 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3708 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3713 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3714 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3715 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3716 if require_commitment {
3717 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3718 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3719 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3720 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3721 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3722 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3723 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3724 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3725 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3727 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3728 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3729 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3730 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3731 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3734 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3735 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3736 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3737 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3738 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3739 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3740 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3742 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3743 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3745 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3746 if require_commitment {
3747 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3749 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3750 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3751 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3752 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3754 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3755 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3756 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3757 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3759 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3760 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3761 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3767 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3768 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3769 /// commitment update.
3770 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3771 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3772 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3775 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3776 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3777 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3778 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3780 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3781 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3782 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3783 if !self.is_outbound() {
3784 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3786 if !self.is_usable() {
3787 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3789 if !self.is_live() {
3790 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3793 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3794 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3795 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3796 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3797 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3798 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3799 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3800 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3801 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3802 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3806 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3807 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3808 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3809 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3810 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3813 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3814 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3818 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3819 force_holding_cell = true;
3822 if force_holding_cell {
3823 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3827 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3828 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3830 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3831 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3836 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3837 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3839 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3841 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3842 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3843 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3844 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3848 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3849 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3850 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3854 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3855 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3858 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3859 // will be retransmitted.
3860 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3861 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3862 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3864 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3865 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3867 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3868 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3869 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3870 // this HTLC accordingly
3871 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3874 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3875 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3876 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3877 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3880 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3881 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3882 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3883 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3884 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3885 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3890 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3892 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3893 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3894 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3895 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3899 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3900 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3901 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3902 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3903 // the update upon reconnection.
3904 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3908 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3909 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3912 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3913 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3914 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3915 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3916 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3917 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3918 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3920 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3921 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3922 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3923 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3924 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3925 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3926 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3928 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3929 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3930 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3931 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3932 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3933 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3934 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3937 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3938 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3939 /// to the remote side.
3940 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3941 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3942 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3943 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3946 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3948 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3949 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3950 let mut found_blocked = false;
3951 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3952 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3953 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3957 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3958 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3959 // first received the funding_signed.
3960 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3961 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3962 self.funding_transaction.take()
3964 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3965 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3966 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3967 funding_broadcastable = None;
3970 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3971 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3972 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3973 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3974 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3975 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3976 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3977 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3978 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3979 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3980 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3981 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3982 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3983 next_per_commitment_point,
3984 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3988 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3990 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3991 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3992 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3993 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3994 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3995 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3997 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3998 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3999 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4000 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4001 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4002 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4006 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4007 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4009 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4010 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4013 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4014 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4015 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
4016 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4017 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4018 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4019 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4020 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4021 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4025 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4026 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4028 if self.is_outbound() {
4029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4031 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4034 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4035 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4037 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4038 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4039 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4040 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4041 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4042 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4043 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4044 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4045 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4046 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4047 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4049 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4051 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4053 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4059 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4060 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4061 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4062 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4063 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4064 per_commitment_secret,
4065 next_per_commitment_point,
4067 next_local_nonce: None,
4071 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4072 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4073 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4074 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4075 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4077 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4078 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4079 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4080 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4081 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4082 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4083 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4084 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4085 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4090 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4091 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4093 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4094 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4095 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4096 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4097 reason: err_packet.clone()
4100 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4101 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4102 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4103 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4104 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4105 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4108 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4109 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4110 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4111 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4112 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4119 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4120 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4121 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4122 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4126 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4127 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4128 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4129 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4130 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4131 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4135 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4136 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4138 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4139 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4140 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4141 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4142 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4143 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4144 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4145 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4148 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4150 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4151 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4152 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4153 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4157 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4158 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4162 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4163 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4164 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4165 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4166 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4169 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4170 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4171 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4172 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4173 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4176 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4177 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4178 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4179 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4180 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4181 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4182 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4183 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4187 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4188 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4189 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4190 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4192 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4196 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4197 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4198 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4200 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4201 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4202 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4203 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4204 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4208 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4210 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4211 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4212 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4213 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4214 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4217 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4218 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4219 channel_ready: None,
4220 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4221 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4222 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4226 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4227 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4228 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4229 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4230 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4231 next_per_commitment_point,
4232 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4234 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4235 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4236 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4240 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4241 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4242 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4244 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4245 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4246 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4249 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4255 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4256 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4257 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4258 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4259 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4261 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4262 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4263 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4264 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4265 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4266 next_per_commitment_point,
4267 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4271 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4272 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4273 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4275 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4278 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4279 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4280 raa: required_revoke,
4281 commitment_update: None,
4282 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4284 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4285 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4286 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4288 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4291 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4292 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4293 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4294 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4295 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4296 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4299 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4300 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4301 raa: required_revoke,
4302 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4303 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4307 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4311 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4312 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4313 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4314 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4316 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4318 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4320 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4321 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4322 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4323 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4324 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4325 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4327 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4328 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4329 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4330 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4331 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4333 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4334 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4335 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4336 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4339 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4340 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4341 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4342 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4343 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4344 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4345 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4346 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4347 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4348 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4349 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4350 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4351 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4352 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4353 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4355 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4358 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4359 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4362 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4363 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4364 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4365 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4366 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4367 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4368 self.channel_state &
4369 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4370 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4371 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4372 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4375 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4376 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4377 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4378 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4379 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4380 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4383 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4389 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4390 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4391 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4392 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4394 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4395 return Ok((None, None));
4398 if !self.is_outbound() {
4399 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4400 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4402 return Ok((None, None));
4405 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4407 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4408 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4409 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4410 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4412 let sig = self.holder_signer
4413 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4414 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4416 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4417 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4418 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4419 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4421 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4422 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4423 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4428 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4429 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4430 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4431 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4433 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4436 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4437 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4438 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4439 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4442 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4443 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4447 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4449 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4453 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4454 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4455 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4458 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4461 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4462 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4463 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4464 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4466 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4469 assert!(send_shutdown);
4470 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4471 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4472 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4474 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4477 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4482 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4484 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4485 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4487 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4488 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4489 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4490 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4491 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4492 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4495 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4496 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4497 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4500 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4501 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4502 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4503 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4507 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4508 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4509 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4510 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4511 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4512 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4514 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4515 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4522 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4523 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4525 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4528 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4529 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4531 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4533 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4534 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4535 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4536 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4537 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4538 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4539 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4540 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4541 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4543 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4544 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4547 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4551 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4552 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4553 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4554 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4556 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4559 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4562 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4565 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4569 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4573 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4574 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4575 return Ok((None, None));
4578 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4579 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4580 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4581 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4583 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4585 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4588 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4589 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4590 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4591 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4592 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4596 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4597 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4602 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4603 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4604 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4605 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4606 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4607 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4608 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4612 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4614 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4615 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4616 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4617 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4619 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4622 let sig = self.holder_signer
4623 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4624 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4626 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4627 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4628 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4629 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4633 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4634 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4635 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4636 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4638 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4639 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4640 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4646 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4647 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4648 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4650 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4651 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4653 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4654 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4657 if !self.is_outbound() {
4658 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4659 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4660 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4661 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4663 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4665 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4667 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4668 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4671 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4672 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4673 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4674 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4675 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4676 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4677 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4678 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4683 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4684 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4685 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4686 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4692 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4693 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4694 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4695 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4697 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4703 // Public utilities:
4705 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4709 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4711 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4712 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4713 self.temporary_channel_id
4716 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4720 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4721 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4722 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4726 /// Gets the channel's type
4727 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4731 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4732 /// is_usable() returns true).
4733 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4734 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4735 self.short_channel_id
4738 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4739 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4740 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4743 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4744 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4745 self.outbound_scid_alias
4747 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4748 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4749 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4750 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4751 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4754 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4755 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4756 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4757 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4760 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4761 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4762 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4765 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4766 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4767 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4768 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4772 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4775 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4776 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4779 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4780 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4783 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4784 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4785 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4788 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4789 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4792 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4793 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4794 self.counterparty_node_id
4797 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4798 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4799 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4802 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4803 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4804 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4807 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4808 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4810 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4811 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4812 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4813 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4815 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4819 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4820 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4821 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4824 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4825 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4826 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4829 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4830 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4831 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4833 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4834 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4839 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4840 self.channel_value_satoshis
4843 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4844 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4847 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4848 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4851 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4852 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4855 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4856 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4857 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4860 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4861 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4862 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4865 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4866 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4867 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4870 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4871 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4872 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4875 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4876 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4877 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4880 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4881 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4882 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4885 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4886 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4887 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4888 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4889 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4892 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4894 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4895 self.prev_config = None;
4899 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4900 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4904 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4905 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4906 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4907 let did_channel_update =
4908 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4909 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4910 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4911 if did_channel_update {
4912 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4913 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4914 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4915 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4917 self.config.options = *config;
4921 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4922 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4923 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4924 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4925 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4926 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4927 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4929 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4930 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4933 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4935 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4936 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4942 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4943 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4944 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4945 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4946 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4947 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4948 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4950 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4951 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4958 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4962 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4963 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4964 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4965 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4966 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4967 // which are near the dust limit.
4968 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4969 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4970 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4971 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4972 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4974 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4975 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4977 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4980 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4981 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4984 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4985 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4988 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4989 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4993 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4998 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5000 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
5001 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5002 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5003 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5004 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5005 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5007 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5009 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5017 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5018 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5022 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5023 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5024 self.update_time_counter
5027 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5028 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5031 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5032 self.config.announced_channel
5035 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5036 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5039 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5041 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5042 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5045 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5046 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5047 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5050 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5051 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5052 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5053 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5054 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5057 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5058 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5059 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5060 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5061 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5064 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5065 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5066 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5067 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5070 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5071 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5072 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5075 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5076 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5077 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5078 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5079 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5080 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5081 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5082 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5088 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5089 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5090 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5091 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5092 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5093 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5098 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5099 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5101 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5102 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5103 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5104 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5107 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5108 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5111 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5112 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5115 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5116 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5117 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5120 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5121 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5122 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5124 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5125 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5126 if self.channel_state &
5127 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5128 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5129 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5130 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5131 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5134 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5135 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5136 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5137 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5138 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5139 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5141 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5142 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5143 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5145 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5146 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5147 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5148 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5149 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5150 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5156 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5157 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5158 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5161 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5162 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5163 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5166 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5167 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5168 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5171 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5172 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5173 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5174 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5175 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5176 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5181 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5182 self.channel_update_status
5185 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5186 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5187 self.channel_update_status = status;
5190 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5192 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5193 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5194 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5198 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5199 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5200 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5203 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5207 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5208 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5209 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5211 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5212 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5213 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5215 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5216 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5219 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5220 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5221 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5222 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5223 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5224 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5225 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5226 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5227 self.channel_state);
5229 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5233 if need_commitment_update {
5234 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5235 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5236 let next_per_commitment_point =
5237 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5238 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5239 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5240 next_per_commitment_point,
5241 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5245 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5251 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5252 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5253 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5254 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5255 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5256 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5257 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5259 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5262 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5263 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5264 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5265 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5266 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5267 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5268 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5269 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5270 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5271 if self.is_outbound() {
5272 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5273 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5274 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5275 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5276 // channel and move on.
5277 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5278 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5280 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5281 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5282 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5284 if self.is_outbound() {
5285 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5286 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5287 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5288 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5289 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5290 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5294 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5295 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5296 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5297 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5298 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5302 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5303 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5304 // may have already happened for this block).
5305 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5306 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5307 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5308 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5311 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5312 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5313 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5314 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5322 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5323 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5324 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5325 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5327 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5328 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5331 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5333 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5334 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5335 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5336 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5338 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5341 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5344 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5345 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5346 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5347 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5349 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5352 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5353 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5354 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5356 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5357 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5359 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5360 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5361 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5369 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5371 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5372 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5373 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5375 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5376 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5379 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5380 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5381 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5382 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5383 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5384 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5385 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5386 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5387 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5390 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5391 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5392 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5393 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5395 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5396 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5397 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5399 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5400 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5401 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5402 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5404 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5405 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5406 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5407 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5408 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5409 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5410 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5413 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5414 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5416 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5419 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5420 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5421 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5422 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5423 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5424 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5425 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5426 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5427 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5428 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5429 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5430 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5431 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5432 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5433 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5434 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5435 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5441 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5446 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5447 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5449 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5450 if !self.is_outbound() {
5451 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5453 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5454 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5457 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5458 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5461 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5462 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5466 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5467 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5468 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5469 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5470 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5471 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5472 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5473 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5474 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5475 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5476 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5477 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5478 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5479 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5480 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5481 first_per_commitment_point,
5482 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5483 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5484 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5485 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5487 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5491 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5492 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5495 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5496 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5497 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5498 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5501 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5502 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5504 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5505 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5506 if self.is_outbound() {
5507 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5509 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5510 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5512 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5513 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5515 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5516 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5519 self.user_id = user_id;
5520 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5522 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5525 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5526 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5527 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5529 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5530 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5531 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5532 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5534 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5535 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5536 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5537 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5538 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5539 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5540 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5541 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5542 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5543 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5544 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5545 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5546 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5547 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5548 first_per_commitment_point,
5549 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5550 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5551 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5553 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5555 next_local_nonce: None,
5559 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5560 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5562 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5564 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5565 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5568 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5569 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5570 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5571 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5572 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5573 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5576 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5577 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5578 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5579 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5580 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5581 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5582 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5583 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5584 if !self.is_outbound() {
5585 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5587 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5588 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5590 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5591 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5592 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5593 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5596 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5597 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5599 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5602 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5603 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5608 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5610 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5612 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5613 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5614 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5616 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5617 temporary_channel_id,
5618 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5619 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5622 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5624 next_local_nonce: None,
5628 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5629 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5630 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5631 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5633 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5636 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5637 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5638 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5639 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5640 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5641 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5643 if !self.is_usable() {
5644 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5647 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5648 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5649 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5650 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5652 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5653 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5655 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5656 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5657 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5658 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5659 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5660 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5666 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5667 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5668 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5669 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5674 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5678 if !self.is_usable() {
5682 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5683 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5687 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5691 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5692 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5695 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5699 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5701 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5706 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5708 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5713 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5715 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5716 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5717 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5718 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5719 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5723 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5725 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5726 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5727 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5728 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5729 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5730 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5731 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5733 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5734 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5735 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5736 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5737 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5738 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5739 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5740 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5741 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5742 contents: announcement,
5745 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5749 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5750 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5751 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5752 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5753 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5754 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5755 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5756 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5758 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5760 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5761 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5762 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5763 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5765 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5767 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5768 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5771 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5772 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5773 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5774 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5777 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5780 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5781 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5782 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5783 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5784 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5785 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5788 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5790 Err(_) => return None,
5792 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5793 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5798 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5799 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5800 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5801 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5802 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5803 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5804 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5805 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5806 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5807 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5808 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5809 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5810 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5811 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5812 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5813 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5816 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5819 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5820 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5821 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5822 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5823 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5824 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5825 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5826 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5828 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5829 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5830 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5831 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5832 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5833 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5834 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5835 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5836 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5838 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5839 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5840 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5841 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5842 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5843 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5844 next_funding_txid: None,
5849 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5851 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5852 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5853 /// commitment update.
5855 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5856 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5857 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5858 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5860 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5861 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5863 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5864 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5869 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5870 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5872 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5874 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5875 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5877 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5878 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5879 /// regenerate them.
5881 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5882 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5884 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5885 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5886 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5887 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5888 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5889 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5891 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5892 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5893 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5896 if amount_msat == 0 {
5897 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5900 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5904 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5905 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5906 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5907 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5908 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5909 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5910 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5914 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5915 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5916 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5917 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5918 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5920 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5921 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5922 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5926 if !self.is_outbound() {
5927 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5928 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5929 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5930 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5931 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat).saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5932 if remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5933 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5934 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5938 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5941 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5942 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5943 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5945 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5946 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5947 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5948 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5950 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5954 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5955 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5956 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5957 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5959 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5963 let holder_balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
5964 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5965 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5966 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5970 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5971 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5972 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5973 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5975 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5976 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5977 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5980 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5981 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5982 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5983 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5984 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5988 let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5989 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5990 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5991 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5992 else { "to peer" });
5994 if need_holding_cell {
5995 force_holding_cell = true;
5998 // Now update local state:
5999 if force_holding_cell {
6000 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6005 onion_routing_packet,
6010 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6011 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6013 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6015 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6019 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6020 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6021 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6025 onion_routing_packet,
6027 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6032 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6033 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6034 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6035 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6037 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6038 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6039 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6041 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6042 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6046 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6047 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6048 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6049 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6050 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6051 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6052 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6055 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6056 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6057 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6058 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6059 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6060 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6063 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6065 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6066 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6067 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6069 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6070 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6073 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6074 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6075 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6076 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6077 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6078 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6079 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6080 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6083 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6087 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6088 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6089 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6090 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6094 if !self.is_outbound() {
6095 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6096 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6097 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6098 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6099 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6100 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6101 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6102 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6103 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6104 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6110 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6113 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6114 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6115 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6116 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6118 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6120 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6121 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6122 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6123 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6126 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6127 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6131 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6132 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6134 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6136 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6137 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6138 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6139 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6141 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6142 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6143 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6144 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6145 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6146 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6150 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6151 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6155 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6156 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6159 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6160 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6162 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6163 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6164 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6165 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6166 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6169 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6170 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6171 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6177 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6178 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6179 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6182 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6183 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6186 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6187 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6188 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6189 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6195 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6196 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6198 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6199 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6200 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6201 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6202 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6203 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6204 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6205 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6206 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6209 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6210 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6211 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6213 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6214 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6217 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6218 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6220 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6221 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6222 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6225 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6226 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6227 let mut chan_closed = false;
6228 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6232 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6234 None if !chan_closed => {
6235 // use override shutdown script if provided
6236 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6237 Some(script) => script,
6239 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6240 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6241 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6242 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6246 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6247 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6249 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6255 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6256 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6257 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6258 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6260 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6262 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6264 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6265 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6266 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6267 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6268 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6269 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6272 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6273 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6274 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6277 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6278 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6279 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6282 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6283 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6284 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6285 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6286 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6288 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6289 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6296 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6297 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6299 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6302 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6303 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6304 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6305 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6306 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6307 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6308 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6309 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6310 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6311 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6312 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6314 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6315 // return them to fail the payment.
6316 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6317 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6318 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6320 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6321 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6326 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6327 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6328 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6329 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6330 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6331 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6332 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6333 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6334 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6335 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6336 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6337 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6338 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6344 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6345 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6348 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6349 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6350 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6352 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6353 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6357 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6361 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6362 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6364 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6370 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6371 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6372 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6373 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6374 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6376 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6377 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6378 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6379 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6385 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6386 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6387 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6388 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6389 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6390 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6395 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6396 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6397 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6398 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6400 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6401 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6402 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6403 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6408 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6409 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6410 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6411 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6412 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6413 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6418 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6419 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6420 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6423 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6425 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6426 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6427 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6428 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6429 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6431 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6432 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6433 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6434 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6436 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6437 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6438 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6440 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6442 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6443 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6444 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6445 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6446 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6447 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6449 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6450 // deserialized from that format.
6451 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6452 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6453 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6455 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6457 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6458 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6459 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6461 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6462 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6463 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6464 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6467 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6468 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6469 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6472 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6473 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6474 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6475 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6477 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6478 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6480 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6482 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6484 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6486 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6489 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6491 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6496 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6498 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6499 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6500 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6501 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6502 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6503 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6504 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6506 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6508 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6510 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6513 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6514 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6515 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6518 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6520 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6521 preimages.push(preimage);
6523 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6524 reason.write(writer)?;
6526 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6528 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6529 preimages.push(preimage);
6531 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6532 reason.write(writer)?;
6537 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6538 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6540 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6542 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6543 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6544 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6545 source.write(writer)?;
6546 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6548 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6550 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6551 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6553 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6555 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6556 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6561 match self.resend_order {
6562 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6563 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6566 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6567 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6568 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6570 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6571 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6572 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6573 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6576 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6577 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6578 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6579 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6580 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6583 if self.is_outbound() {
6584 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6585 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6586 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6588 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6589 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6590 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6592 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6594 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6595 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6596 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6597 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6599 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6600 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6601 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6602 // consider the stale state on reload.
6605 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6606 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6607 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6609 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6610 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6611 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6613 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6614 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6616 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6617 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6618 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6620 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6621 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6623 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6626 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6627 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6628 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6630 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6633 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6634 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6636 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6637 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6638 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6640 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6642 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6644 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6646 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6647 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6648 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6649 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6650 htlc.write(writer)?;
6653 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6654 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6655 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6657 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6658 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6660 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6661 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6662 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6663 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6664 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6665 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6666 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6668 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6669 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6670 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6671 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6672 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6674 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6675 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6677 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6678 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6679 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6680 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6682 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6684 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6685 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6686 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6687 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6688 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6689 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6690 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6692 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6693 (2, chan_type, option),
6694 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6695 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6696 (5, self.config, required),
6697 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6698 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6699 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6700 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6701 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6702 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6703 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6704 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6705 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6706 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6707 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6708 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6709 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6710 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6711 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6712 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6719 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6720 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6722 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6723 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6725 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6726 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6727 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6729 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6730 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6731 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6732 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6734 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6736 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6737 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6743 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6747 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6748 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6750 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6752 let mut keys_data = None;
6754 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6755 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6756 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6757 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6758 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6759 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6760 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6761 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6762 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6763 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6767 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6768 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6769 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6772 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6780 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6781 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6782 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6783 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6785 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6786 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6787 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6788 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6789 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6790 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6791 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6792 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6797 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6799 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6800 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6801 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6802 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6803 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6804 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6805 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6806 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6807 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6808 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6810 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6814 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6815 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6818 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6821 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6826 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6828 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6829 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6830 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6831 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6832 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6833 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6834 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6835 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6837 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6838 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6839 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6841 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6842 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6843 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6845 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6849 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6850 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6851 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6852 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6855 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6861 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6862 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6865 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6867 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6868 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6871 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6881 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6882 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6883 // consider the stale state on reload.
6884 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6887 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6894 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6900 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6901 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6903 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6904 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6906 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6907 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6911 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6915 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6916 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6918 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6919 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6924 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6925 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6929 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6932 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6943 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6946 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6947 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6949 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6951 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6955 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6956 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6957 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6959 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6965 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6966 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6967 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6968 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6969 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6970 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6971 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6972 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6973 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6974 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6976 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6977 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6978 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6979 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6980 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6981 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6982 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6984 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6985 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6986 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6987 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6989 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6991 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6992 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6993 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6994 (2, channel_type, option),
6995 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6996 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6997 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6998 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6999 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7000 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7001 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7002 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7003 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7004 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7005 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7006 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7007 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7008 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7009 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7010 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7011 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7012 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7013 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7016 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7017 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7018 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7019 // required channel parameters.
7020 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7021 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7022 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7024 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7026 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7027 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7028 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7029 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7032 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7033 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7034 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7036 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7037 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7039 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7040 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7045 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7046 if iter.next().is_some() {
7047 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7051 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7052 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7053 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7054 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7055 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7058 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7059 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7061 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7062 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7063 // separate u64 values.
7064 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7066 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7071 config: config.unwrap(),
7075 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7076 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7077 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7080 temporary_channel_id,
7082 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7084 channel_value_satoshis,
7086 latest_monitor_update_id,
7089 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7092 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7093 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7096 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7097 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7098 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7099 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7103 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7104 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7105 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7106 monitor_pending_forwards,
7107 monitor_pending_failures,
7108 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7111 holding_cell_update_fee,
7112 next_holder_htlc_id,
7113 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7114 update_time_counter,
7117 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7118 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7119 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7120 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7122 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7123 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7124 closing_fee_limits: None,
7125 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7127 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7129 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7130 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7132 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7134 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7135 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7136 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7137 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7138 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7139 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7140 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7141 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7142 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7145 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7147 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7148 funding_transaction,
7150 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7151 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7152 counterparty_node_id,
7154 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7158 channel_update_status,
7159 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7163 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7164 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7165 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7166 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7168 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7170 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7171 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7172 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7174 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7175 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7177 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7178 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7180 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7183 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7191 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7192 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7193 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7194 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7195 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7197 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7198 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7200 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7201 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7202 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7203 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7204 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7205 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7206 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7207 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7208 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7209 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7210 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7211 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7212 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7213 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7214 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7215 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7216 use crate::util::test_utils;
7217 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7218 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7219 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7220 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7221 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7222 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7223 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7224 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7225 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7226 use crate::prelude::*;
7228 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7231 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7232 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7238 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7239 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7240 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7241 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7245 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7246 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7247 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7248 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7249 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7250 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7251 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7255 signer: InMemorySigner,
7258 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7259 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7262 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7263 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7265 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7266 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7269 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7273 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7275 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7277 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7278 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7279 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7282 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7284 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7285 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7289 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7290 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7291 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7295 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7296 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7297 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7298 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7300 let seed = [42; 32];
7301 let network = Network::Testnet;
7302 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7303 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7304 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7307 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7308 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7309 let config = UserConfig::default();
7310 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7311 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7312 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7314 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7315 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7319 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7320 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7322 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7323 let original_fee = 253;
7324 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7325 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7326 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7327 let seed = [42; 32];
7328 let network = Network::Testnet;
7329 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7331 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7332 let config = UserConfig::default();
7333 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7335 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7336 // same as the old fee.
7337 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7338 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7339 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7343 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7344 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7345 // dust limits are used.
7346 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7348 let seed = [42; 32];
7349 let network = Network::Testnet;
7350 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7351 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7353 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7354 // they have different dust limits.
7356 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7357 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7358 let config = UserConfig::default();
7359 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7361 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7362 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7363 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7364 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7365 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7367 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7368 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7369 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7370 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7371 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7373 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7374 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7375 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7377 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7378 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7379 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7380 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7383 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7385 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7386 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7387 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7388 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7389 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7390 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7391 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7392 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7393 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7397 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7398 // the dust limit check.
7399 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7400 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7401 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7402 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7404 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7405 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7406 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7407 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7408 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7409 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7410 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7414 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7415 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7416 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7417 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7418 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7419 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7420 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7421 let seed = [42; 32];
7422 let network = Network::Testnet;
7423 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7425 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7426 let config = UserConfig::default();
7427 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7429 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7430 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7432 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7433 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7434 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7435 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7436 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7437 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7439 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7440 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7441 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7442 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7443 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7445 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7447 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7448 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7449 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7450 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7451 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7453 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7454 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7455 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7456 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7457 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7461 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7462 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7463 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7464 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7465 let seed = [42; 32];
7466 let network = Network::Testnet;
7467 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7468 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7471 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7473 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7474 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7475 let config = UserConfig::default();
7476 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7478 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7479 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7480 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7481 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7483 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7484 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7485 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7487 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7488 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7489 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7490 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7492 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7493 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7494 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7496 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7497 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7499 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7500 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7501 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7502 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7503 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7504 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7505 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7507 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7509 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7510 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7511 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7512 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7513 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7517 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7518 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7519 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7521 let seed = [42; 32];
7522 let network = Network::Testnet;
7523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7524 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7525 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7527 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7528 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7529 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7530 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7531 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7532 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7533 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7534 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7536 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7537 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7538 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7539 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7540 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7541 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7543 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7544 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7545 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7546 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7548 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7550 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7551 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7552 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7553 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7554 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7555 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7557 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7558 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7559 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7560 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7562 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7563 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7564 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7565 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7566 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7568 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7569 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7571 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7572 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7573 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7575 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7576 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7577 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7578 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7579 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7581 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7582 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7584 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7585 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7586 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7590 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7592 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7593 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7594 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7596 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7597 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7598 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7599 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7601 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7602 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7603 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7605 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7607 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7608 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7611 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7612 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7613 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7614 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7615 let seed = [42; 32];
7616 let network = Network::Testnet;
7617 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7618 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7619 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7622 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7623 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7624 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7626 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7627 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7629 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7630 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7631 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7633 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7634 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7636 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7638 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7639 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7641 // Channel Negotiations failed
7642 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7643 assert!(result.is_err());
7648 fn channel_update() {
7649 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7651 let seed = [42; 32];
7652 let network = Network::Testnet;
7653 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7654 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7656 // Create a channel.
7657 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7658 let config = UserConfig::default();
7659 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7660 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7661 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7662 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7664 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7665 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7666 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7668 short_channel_id: 0,
7671 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7672 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7673 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7675 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7676 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7678 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7680 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7682 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7683 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7684 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7685 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7687 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7688 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7689 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7691 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7695 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7697 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7698 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7699 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7700 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7701 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7702 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7703 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7704 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7705 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7706 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7707 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7708 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7709 use crate::sync::Arc;
7711 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7712 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7713 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7714 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7716 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7718 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7719 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7720 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7721 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7722 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7724 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7725 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7731 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7732 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7733 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7735 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7736 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7737 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7738 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7739 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7740 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7742 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7744 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7745 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7746 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7747 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7748 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7749 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7751 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7752 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7753 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7754 selected_contest_delay: 144
7756 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7757 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7759 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7760 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7762 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7763 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7765 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7766 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7768 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7769 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7770 // build_commitment_transaction.
7771 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7772 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7773 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7774 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7775 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7777 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7778 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7779 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7780 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7784 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7785 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7786 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7787 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7791 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7792 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7793 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7795 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7796 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7798 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7799 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7801 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7803 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7804 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7805 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7806 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7807 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7808 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7809 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7811 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7812 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7813 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7814 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7816 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7817 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7818 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7820 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7822 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7823 commitment_tx.clone(),
7824 counterparty_signature,
7825 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7826 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7827 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7829 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7830 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7832 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7833 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7834 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7836 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7837 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7840 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7841 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7843 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7844 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7845 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7846 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7847 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7848 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7849 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7850 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7852 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7855 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7856 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7857 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7861 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7864 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7865 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7866 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7868 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7869 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7870 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7871 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7872 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7873 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7874 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7875 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7877 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7881 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7882 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7883 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7884 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7886 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7887 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7889 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7890 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7891 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7893 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7894 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7895 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7896 "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", {});
7898 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7899 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7901 amount_msat: 1000000,
7903 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7904 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7906 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7909 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7910 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7912 amount_msat: 2000000,
7914 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7915 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7917 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7920 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7921 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7923 amount_msat: 2000000,
7925 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7926 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7927 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7929 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7932 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7933 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7935 amount_msat: 3000000,
7937 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7938 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7939 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7941 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7944 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7945 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7947 amount_msat: 4000000,
7949 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7950 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7952 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7956 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7957 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7958 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7960 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7961 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7962 "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", {
7965 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7966 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7967 "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" },
7970 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7971 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7972 "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" },
7975 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7976 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7977 "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" },
7980 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7981 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7982 "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" },
7985 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7986 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7987 "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" }
7990 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7991 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7992 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7994 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7995 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7996 "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", {
7999 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8000 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8001 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8004 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8005 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8006 "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" },
8009 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8010 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8011 "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" },
8014 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8015 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8016 "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" },
8019 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8020 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8021 "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" }
8024 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8025 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8026 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8028 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8029 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8030 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8033 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8034 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8035 "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" },
8038 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8039 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8040 "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" },
8043 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8044 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8045 "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" },
8048 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8049 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8050 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8053 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8054 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8055 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8056 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8058 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8059 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8060 "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", {
8063 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8064 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8065 "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" },
8068 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8069 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8070 "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" },
8073 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8074 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8075 "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" },
8078 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8079 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8080 "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" }
8083 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8084 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8085 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8086 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8088 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8089 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8090 "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", {
8093 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8094 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8095 "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" },
8098 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8099 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8100 "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" },
8103 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8104 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8105 "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" },
8108 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8109 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8110 "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" }
8113 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8114 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8115 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8117 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8118 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8119 "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", {
8122 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8123 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8124 "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" },
8127 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8128 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8129 "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" },
8132 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8133 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8134 "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" }
8137 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8138 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8139 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8141 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8142 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8143 "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", {
8146 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8147 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8148 "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" },
8151 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8152 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8153 "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" },
8156 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8157 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8158 "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" }
8161 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8162 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8163 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8165 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8166 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8167 "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", {
8170 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8171 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8172 "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" },
8175 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8176 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8177 "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" }
8180 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8181 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8182 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8183 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8185 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8186 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8187 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8190 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8191 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8192 "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" },
8195 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8196 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8197 "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" }
8200 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8201 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8202 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8203 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8205 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8206 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8207 "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", {
8210 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8211 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8212 "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" },
8215 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8216 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8217 "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" }
8220 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8221 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8222 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8224 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8225 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8226 "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", {
8229 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8230 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8231 "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" }
8234 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8235 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8236 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8237 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8239 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8240 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8241 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8244 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8245 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8246 "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" }
8249 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8250 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8251 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8252 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8254 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8255 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8256 "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", {
8259 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8260 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8261 "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" }
8264 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8265 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8266 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8267 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8269 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8270 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8271 "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", {});
8273 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8274 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8275 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8276 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8278 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8279 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8280 "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", {});
8282 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8283 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8284 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8285 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8287 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8288 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8289 "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", {});
8291 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8292 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8293 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8295 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8296 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8297 "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", {});
8299 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8300 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8301 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8302 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8304 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8305 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8306 "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", {});
8308 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8309 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8310 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8311 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8313 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8314 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8315 "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", {});
8317 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8318 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8319 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8320 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8321 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8322 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8324 amount_msat: 2000000,
8326 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8327 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8329 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8332 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8333 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8334 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8336 amount_msat: 5000001,
8338 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8339 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8340 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8342 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8345 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8346 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8348 amount_msat: 5000000,
8350 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8351 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8352 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8354 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8358 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8359 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8360 "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", {
8363 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8364 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8365 "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" },
8367 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8368 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8369 "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" },
8371 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8372 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8373 "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" }
8376 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8377 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8378 "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", {
8381 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8382 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8383 "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" },
8385 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8386 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8387 "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" },
8389 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8390 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8391 "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" }
8396 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8397 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8399 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8400 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8401 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8402 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8404 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8405 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8406 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8408 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8409 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8411 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8412 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8414 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8415 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8416 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8420 fn test_key_derivation() {
8421 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8424 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8425 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8427 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8428 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8430 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8431 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8433 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8434 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8436 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8437 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8439 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8440 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8442 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8443 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8447 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8448 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8450 let seed = [42; 32];
8451 let network = Network::Testnet;
8452 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8453 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8455 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8456 let config = UserConfig::default();
8457 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8458 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8460 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8461 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8463 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8464 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8465 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8466 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8467 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8468 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8469 assert!(res.is_ok());
8474 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8475 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8476 // resulting `channel_type`.
8477 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8478 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8479 let network = Network::Testnet;
8480 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8481 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8483 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8484 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8486 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8487 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8489 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8490 // need to signal it.
8491 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8492 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8493 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8496 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8498 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8499 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8500 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8502 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8503 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8504 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8507 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8508 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8509 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8510 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8511 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8514 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8515 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8520 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8521 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8522 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8524 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8525 let network = Network::Testnet;
8526 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8527 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8529 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8530 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8532 let config = UserConfig::default();
8534 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8535 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8536 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8537 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8538 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8540 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8541 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8542 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8545 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8546 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8547 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8549 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8550 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8551 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8552 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8553 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8554 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8556 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8561 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8562 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8565 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8566 let network = Network::Testnet;
8567 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8568 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8570 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8571 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8573 let config = UserConfig::default();
8575 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8576 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8577 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8578 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8579 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8580 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8581 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8582 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8584 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8585 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8586 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8587 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8588 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8589 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8592 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8593 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8595 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8596 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8597 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8598 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8600 assert!(res.is_err());
8602 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8603 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8604 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8606 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8607 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8608 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8611 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8613 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8614 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8615 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8616 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8619 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8620 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8622 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8623 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8625 assert!(res.is_err());