1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
196 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
199 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
203 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
208 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
217 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
222 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
227 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
228 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
247 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
248 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
249 /// move on to ChannelReady.
250 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
251 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
252 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
255 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
256 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
257 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
258 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
259 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
260 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
263 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
264 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
267 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
268 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
274 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
277 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
278 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
279 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
280 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
281 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
282 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
283 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
284 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
287 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
288 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
289 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
290 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
291 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
292 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
293 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
294 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
295 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
296 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
297 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
300 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
305 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
306 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
307 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
308 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
311 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
321 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
324 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
325 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
328 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
331 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
332 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
333 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
334 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
337 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
341 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
347 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
350 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
351 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 holding_cell_msat: u64,
354 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
357 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
358 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
359 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
360 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
361 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
362 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
363 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
364 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
369 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
370 struct HTLCCandidate {
372 origin: HTLCInitiator,
376 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
384 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
389 htlc_value_msat: u64,
390 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
395 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
396 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
397 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
398 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
399 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
402 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
403 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
404 htlc_value_msat: u64,
405 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
406 /// in the holding cell).
407 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
416 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
419 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
420 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
421 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
422 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
425 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
426 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
427 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
428 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
429 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
430 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
431 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
432 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
433 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
434 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
435 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
438 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
439 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
440 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
441 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
442 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
443 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
562 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
563 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
564 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
565 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
566 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
567 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
568 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
570 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
572 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
573 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
574 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
575 // HTLCs with similar state.
576 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
577 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
578 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
579 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
580 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
581 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
582 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
583 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
584 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
587 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
588 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
589 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
591 update_time_counter: u32,
593 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
594 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
595 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
596 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
597 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
598 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
600 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
601 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
603 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
604 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
605 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
606 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
608 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
609 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
611 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
613 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
615 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
616 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
617 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
618 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
619 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
620 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
622 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
623 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
624 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
625 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
626 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
628 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
629 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
630 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
631 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
632 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
633 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
634 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
635 channel_creation_height: u32,
637 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
642 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
652 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
654 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
655 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
658 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
660 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
662 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
663 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
665 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
667 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
668 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
669 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
671 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
673 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
674 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
676 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
677 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
678 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
680 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
682 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
684 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
685 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
686 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
687 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
689 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
690 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
691 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
693 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
694 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
695 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
697 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
698 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
699 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
700 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
702 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
704 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
706 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
707 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
708 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
709 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
710 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
712 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
713 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
716 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
717 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
718 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
719 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
720 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
721 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
722 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
724 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
725 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
727 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
728 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
729 // the channel's funding UTXO.
731 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
732 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
733 // associated channel mapping.
735 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
736 // to store all of them.
737 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
739 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
740 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
741 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
742 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
743 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
745 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
746 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
748 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
749 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
750 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
752 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
753 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
754 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
755 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
756 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
760 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
762 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
763 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
764 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
768 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
770 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
771 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
772 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
773 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
777 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
779 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
781 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
783 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
784 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
785 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
786 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
787 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
789 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
790 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
792 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
794 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
795 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
797 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
798 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
799 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
800 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
801 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
802 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
804 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
805 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
807 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
808 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
809 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
810 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
811 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
813 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
814 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
816 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
817 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
819 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
820 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
821 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
822 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
828 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
829 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
831 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
832 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
833 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
838 macro_rules! secp_check {
839 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
842 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
847 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
848 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
849 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
850 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
852 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
855 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
856 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
858 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
861 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
863 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
866 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
867 /// required by us according to the configured or default
868 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
870 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
872 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
873 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
874 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
875 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
876 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
879 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
880 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
881 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
882 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
883 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
884 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
885 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
888 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
889 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
892 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
893 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
894 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
895 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
896 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
897 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
898 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
899 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
900 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
901 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
904 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
905 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
906 // `only_static_remotekey`.
908 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
909 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
910 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
911 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
918 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
919 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
920 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
921 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
922 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
923 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
924 // We've exhausted our options
927 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
928 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
931 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
932 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
933 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
934 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
936 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
937 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
938 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
939 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
940 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
941 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
943 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
945 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
949 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
950 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
951 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
952 outbound_scid_alias: u64
953 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
954 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
955 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
956 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
958 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
959 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
960 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
961 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
963 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
964 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
966 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
969 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
970 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
973 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
974 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
976 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
977 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
978 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
979 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
983 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
984 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
986 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
988 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
989 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
990 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
994 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
995 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
997 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
998 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1001 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1002 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1003 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1010 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1011 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1012 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1013 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1018 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1020 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1021 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1022 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1024 channel_value_satoshis,
1026 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1029 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1030 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1032 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1033 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1036 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1037 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1038 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1039 pending_update_fee: None,
1040 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1041 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1042 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1043 update_time_counter: 1,
1045 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1047 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1048 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1049 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1050 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1051 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1052 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1054 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1055 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1056 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1057 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1059 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1060 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1061 closing_fee_limits: None,
1062 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1064 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1066 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1067 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1068 short_channel_id: None,
1069 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1071 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1072 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1073 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1074 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1075 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1076 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1077 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1078 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1079 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1080 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1081 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1083 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1085 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1086 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1087 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1088 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1089 counterparty_parameters: None,
1090 funding_outpoint: None,
1091 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1092 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1094 funding_transaction: None,
1096 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1097 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1098 counterparty_node_id,
1100 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1102 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1104 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1105 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1107 announcement_sigs: None,
1109 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1110 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1111 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1112 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1114 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1116 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1117 outbound_scid_alias,
1119 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1121 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1122 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1127 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1131 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1132 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1133 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1135 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1136 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1137 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1138 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1139 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1140 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1141 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1144 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1145 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1146 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1147 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1148 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1149 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1150 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1151 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1153 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1154 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1163 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1164 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1165 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1167 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1168 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1169 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1170 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1171 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1172 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1173 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1176 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1178 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1179 // support this channel type.
1180 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1181 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1185 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1186 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1187 // `static_remote_key`.
1188 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1191 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1192 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1195 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1198 channel_type.clone()
1200 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1201 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1206 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1208 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1209 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1210 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1211 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1212 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1213 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1214 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1215 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1216 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1219 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1223 // Check sanity of message fields:
1224 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1230 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1233 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1234 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1237 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1240 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1243 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1245 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1246 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1249 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1252 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1256 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1257 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1260 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1263 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1266 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1269 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1272 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1275 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1281 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1282 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1287 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1288 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1289 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1290 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1293 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1296 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1297 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1298 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1300 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1304 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1305 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1306 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1307 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1308 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1312 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1313 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1314 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1315 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1319 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1320 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1321 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1322 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1323 if script.len() == 0 {
1326 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1329 Some(script.clone())
1332 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1333 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1339 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1340 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1343 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1344 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1349 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1350 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1352 let chan = Channel {
1355 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1356 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1358 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1363 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1365 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1366 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1367 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1370 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1373 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1374 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1376 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1377 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1378 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1380 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1381 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1382 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1383 pending_update_fee: None,
1384 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1385 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1386 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1387 update_time_counter: 1,
1389 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1391 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1392 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1393 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1394 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1395 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1396 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1398 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1399 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1400 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1401 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1403 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1404 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1405 closing_fee_limits: None,
1406 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1408 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1410 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1411 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1412 short_channel_id: None,
1413 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1415 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1416 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1417 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1418 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1419 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1420 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1421 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1422 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1423 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1424 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1425 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1426 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1428 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1430 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1431 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1432 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1433 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1434 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1435 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1436 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1438 funding_outpoint: None,
1439 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1440 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1442 funding_transaction: None,
1444 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1445 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1446 counterparty_node_id,
1448 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1450 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1452 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1453 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1455 announcement_sigs: None,
1457 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1458 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1459 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1460 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1462 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1464 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1465 outbound_scid_alias,
1467 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1469 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1470 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1475 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1481 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1482 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1483 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1484 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1485 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1487 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1488 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1489 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1490 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1491 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1492 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1493 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1495 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1496 where L::Target: Logger
1498 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1499 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1500 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1502 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1503 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1504 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1505 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1507 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1508 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1509 if match update_state {
1510 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1511 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1512 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1513 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1514 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1516 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1520 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1521 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1522 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1523 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1525 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1526 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1527 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1529 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1530 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1531 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1532 transaction_output_index: None
1537 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1538 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1539 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1540 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1541 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1544 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1546 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1550 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1551 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1554 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1555 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1558 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1560 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1561 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1562 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1564 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1565 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1571 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1572 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1573 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1574 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1575 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1576 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1577 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1581 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1582 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1584 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1586 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1587 if generated_by_local {
1588 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1589 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1598 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1600 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1601 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1602 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1603 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1604 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1605 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1606 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1609 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1610 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1611 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1612 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1616 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1617 preimages.push(preimage);
1621 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1622 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1624 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1626 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1627 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1629 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1630 if !generated_by_local {
1631 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1639 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1640 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1641 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1642 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1643 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1644 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1645 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1646 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1648 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1650 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1651 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1652 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1653 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1655 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1657 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1658 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1659 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1660 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1663 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1664 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1665 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1666 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1668 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1671 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1672 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1673 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1674 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1676 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1679 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1680 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1685 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1686 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1691 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1693 let channel_parameters =
1694 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1695 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1696 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1699 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1704 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1707 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1708 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1709 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1710 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1712 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1713 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1714 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1722 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1723 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1729 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1730 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1731 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1732 // outside of those situations will fail.
1733 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1737 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1742 1 + // script length (0)
1746 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1747 2 + // witness marker and flag
1748 1 + // witness element count
1749 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1750 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1751 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1752 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1753 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1754 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1756 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1757 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1758 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1764 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1765 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1766 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1767 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1769 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1770 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1771 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1773 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1774 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1775 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1776 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1777 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1778 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1781 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1782 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1785 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1786 value_to_holder = 0;
1789 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1790 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1791 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1792 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1794 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1795 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1798 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1799 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1803 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1804 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1805 /// our counterparty!)
1806 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1807 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1808 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1809 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1810 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1811 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1812 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1814 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1818 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1819 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1820 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1821 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1822 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1823 //may see payments to it!
1824 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1825 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1826 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1828 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1831 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1832 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1833 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1834 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1835 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1838 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1841 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1842 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1844 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1846 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1847 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1848 where L::Target: Logger {
1849 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1850 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1851 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1852 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1853 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1854 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1855 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1856 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1860 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1861 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1862 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1863 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1865 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1866 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1868 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1870 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1872 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1873 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1874 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1876 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1877 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1878 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1879 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1880 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1882 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1883 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1884 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1886 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1887 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1889 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1892 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1893 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1897 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1901 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1903 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1904 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1905 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1906 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1909 // Now update local state:
1911 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1912 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1913 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1914 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1915 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1916 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1917 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1921 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1922 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1923 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1924 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1925 // do not not get into this branch.
1926 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1927 match pending_update {
1928 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1929 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1930 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1931 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1933 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1934 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1937 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1938 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1939 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1940 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1941 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1942 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1943 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1949 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1950 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1951 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1953 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1954 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1955 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1957 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1958 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1961 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1962 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1964 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1965 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1967 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1968 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1971 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1974 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1975 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1976 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1977 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1982 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1983 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1984 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1985 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1986 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1989 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1990 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1991 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1992 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1993 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1995 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1996 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1997 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
2001 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2002 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2003 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2004 /// before we fail backwards.
2006 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2007 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2008 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2009 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2010 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2011 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2012 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2015 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2016 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2017 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2018 /// before we fail backwards.
2020 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2021 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2022 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2023 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2024 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2025 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2026 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2028 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2030 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2031 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2032 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2034 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2035 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2036 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2038 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2039 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2040 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2047 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2054 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2055 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2056 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2057 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2058 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2062 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2063 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2064 force_holding_cell = true;
2067 // Now update local state:
2068 if force_holding_cell {
2069 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2070 match pending_update {
2071 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2072 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2073 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2074 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2078 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2079 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2080 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2087 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2088 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2089 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2095 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2097 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2098 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2101 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2102 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2103 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2108 // Message handlers:
2110 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2111 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2113 // Check sanity of message fields:
2114 if !self.is_outbound() {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2117 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2120 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2123 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2126 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2129 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2131 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2133 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2134 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2137 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2138 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2141 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2144 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2148 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2149 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2152 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2155 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2158 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2161 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2164 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2167 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2171 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2172 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2175 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2176 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2178 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2179 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2182 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2185 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2186 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2187 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2188 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2189 if script.len() == 0 {
2192 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2195 Some(script.clone())
2198 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2199 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2205 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2206 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2207 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2208 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2209 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2211 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2212 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2214 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2217 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2218 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2219 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2220 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2221 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2222 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2225 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2226 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2227 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2230 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2231 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2233 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2234 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2239 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2240 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2242 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2243 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2245 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2246 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2247 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2248 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2249 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2250 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2251 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2252 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2253 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2256 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2257 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2259 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2260 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2261 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2262 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2264 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2265 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2267 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2268 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2271 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2272 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2275 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2276 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2277 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2279 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2282 if self.is_outbound() {
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2285 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2286 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2287 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2291 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2294 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2295 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2296 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2297 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2300 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2301 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2302 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2303 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2304 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2306 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2308 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2309 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2313 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2314 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2315 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2319 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2320 initial_commitment_tx,
2323 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2324 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2327 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2328 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2330 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2332 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2333 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2334 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2335 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2336 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2337 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2338 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2339 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2340 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2341 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2342 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2344 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2346 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2348 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2349 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2350 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2351 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2353 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2355 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2356 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2358 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2361 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2362 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2363 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2364 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2365 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2367 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2370 if !self.is_outbound() {
2371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2373 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2376 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2377 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2378 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2379 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2382 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2384 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2385 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2386 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2387 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2389 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2390 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2392 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2393 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2395 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2396 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2397 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2398 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2399 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2404 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2405 initial_commitment_tx,
2408 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2409 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2412 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2413 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2416 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2417 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2418 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2419 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2420 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2421 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2422 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2423 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2424 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2425 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2426 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2427 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2429 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2431 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2433 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2434 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2435 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2436 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2438 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2440 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2443 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2444 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2446 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2447 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2448 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2449 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2454 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2455 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2456 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2459 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2460 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2461 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2462 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2463 // when routing outbound payments.
2464 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2468 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2470 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2471 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2472 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2475 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2476 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2477 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2478 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2480 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2481 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2482 let expected_point =
2483 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2484 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2486 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2488 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2489 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2490 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2491 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2492 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2494 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2502 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2503 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2505 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2507 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2510 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2511 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2512 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2513 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2519 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2520 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2521 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2522 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2523 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2524 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2525 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2526 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2527 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2530 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2533 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2534 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2535 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2537 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2538 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2539 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2540 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2541 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2542 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2544 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2545 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2551 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2552 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2553 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2554 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2555 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2556 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2557 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2558 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2559 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2562 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2565 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2566 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2567 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2569 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2570 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2571 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2572 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2573 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2574 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2576 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2577 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2581 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2582 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2583 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2584 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2585 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2586 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2587 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2589 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2590 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2592 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2599 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2600 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2601 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2602 /// corner case properly.
2603 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2604 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2605 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2607 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2608 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2609 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2610 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2615 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2616 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2617 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2620 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2621 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2622 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2623 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2625 outbound_capacity_msat,
2626 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2627 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2628 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2634 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2635 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2638 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2639 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2640 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2641 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2642 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2643 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2646 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2647 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2649 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2650 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2653 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2654 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2655 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2657 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2658 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2660 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2663 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2664 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2666 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2667 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2669 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2670 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2672 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2673 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2677 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2684 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2685 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2686 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2690 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2691 included_htlcs += 1;
2694 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2695 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2699 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2700 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2701 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2702 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2703 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2704 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2709 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2711 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2712 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2717 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2718 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2722 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2723 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2724 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2727 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2728 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2730 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2731 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2732 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2734 total_pending_htlcs,
2735 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2736 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2737 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2739 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2740 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2741 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2743 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2745 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2750 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2751 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2752 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2754 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2755 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2757 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2760 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2761 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2763 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2764 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2766 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2767 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2769 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2770 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2774 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2781 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2782 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2783 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2784 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2785 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2786 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2789 included_htlcs += 1;
2792 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2796 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2797 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2799 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2800 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2801 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2806 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2807 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2808 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2811 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2812 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2814 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2815 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2817 total_pending_htlcs,
2818 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2822 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2823 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2824 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2826 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2828 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2833 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2834 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2835 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2836 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2837 if local_sent_shutdown {
2838 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2840 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2841 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2842 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2845 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2848 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2851 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2854 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2858 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2859 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2860 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2863 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2866 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2867 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2868 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2869 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2870 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2871 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2872 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2873 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2874 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2875 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2876 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2878 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2879 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2880 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2881 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2882 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2883 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2887 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2890 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2891 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2892 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2894 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2895 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2896 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2897 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2898 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2899 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2900 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2904 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2905 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2906 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2907 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2908 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2909 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2910 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2914 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2915 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2916 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2917 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2918 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2922 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2923 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2924 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2925 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2926 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2928 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2932 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2936 if !self.is_outbound() {
2937 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2938 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2939 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2940 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2941 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2942 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2943 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2944 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2945 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2946 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2947 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2948 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2949 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2950 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2951 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2954 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2955 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2956 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2957 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2961 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2964 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2968 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2969 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2970 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2974 // Now update local state:
2975 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2976 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2977 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2978 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2979 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2980 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2981 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2986 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2988 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2989 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2990 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2991 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2992 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2993 None => fail_reason.into(),
2994 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2995 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2996 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2999 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3003 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3005 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3006 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3008 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3014 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3017 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3018 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3019 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3025 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3028 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3029 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3032 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3036 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3040 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3041 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3044 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3048 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3052 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3053 where L::Target: Logger
3055 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3056 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3058 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3059 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3061 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3062 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3065 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3067 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3069 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3070 let commitment_txid = {
3071 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3072 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3073 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3075 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3076 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3077 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3078 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3079 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3080 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3084 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3086 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3087 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3088 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3089 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3092 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3093 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3094 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3095 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3100 if self.is_outbound() {
3101 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3102 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3103 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3104 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3105 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3106 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3107 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3108 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3109 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3110 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3116 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3117 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3120 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3121 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3122 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3123 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3124 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3125 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3126 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3128 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3129 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3130 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3131 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3132 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3133 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3134 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3135 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3137 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3139 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3143 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3144 commitment_stats.tx,
3146 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3147 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3148 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3151 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3152 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3153 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3154 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3156 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3157 let mut need_commitment = false;
3158 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3159 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3160 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3161 need_commitment = true;
3165 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3166 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3167 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3168 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3169 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3170 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3174 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3175 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3176 Some(forward_info.clone())
3178 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3179 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3180 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3181 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3182 need_commitment = true;
3185 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3186 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3187 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3188 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3189 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3190 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3191 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3192 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3193 need_commitment = true;
3197 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3198 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3199 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3200 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3202 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3203 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3204 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3205 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3206 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3207 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3208 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3209 // includes the right HTLCs.
3210 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3211 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3212 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3213 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3214 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3215 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3217 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3218 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3219 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3222 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3223 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3224 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3225 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3226 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3227 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3228 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3229 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3230 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3234 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3235 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3237 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3238 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3239 per_commitment_secret,
3240 next_per_commitment_point,
3241 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3244 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3245 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3246 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3247 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3248 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3249 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3250 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3251 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3254 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3255 /// for our counterparty.
3256 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3257 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3258 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3259 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3260 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3262 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3263 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3264 updates: Vec::new(),
3267 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3268 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3269 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3270 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3271 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3272 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3273 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3274 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3275 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3276 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3277 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3278 // to rebalance channels.
3279 match &htlc_update {
3280 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3281 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3282 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3285 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3286 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3287 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3288 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3289 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3290 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3291 // into the holding cell without ever being
3292 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3293 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3294 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3297 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3303 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3304 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3305 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3306 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3307 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3308 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3309 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3310 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3311 (msg, monitor_update)
3312 } else { unreachable!() };
3313 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3314 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3316 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3317 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3318 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3319 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3320 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3321 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3322 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3323 // for a full revocation before failing.
3324 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3327 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3329 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3336 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3337 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3339 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3340 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3345 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3346 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3347 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3348 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3349 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3351 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3352 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3353 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3355 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3357 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3359 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3362 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3364 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3368 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3369 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3370 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3371 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3372 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3373 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3374 where L::Target: Logger,
3376 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3379 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3382 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3386 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3388 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3389 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3394 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3395 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3396 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3397 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3398 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3399 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3400 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3401 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3407 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3408 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3411 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3412 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3414 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3416 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3417 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3418 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3419 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3420 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3421 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3422 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3423 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3427 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3428 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3429 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3430 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3431 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3432 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3433 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3434 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3436 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3437 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3440 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3441 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3442 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3443 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3444 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3445 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3446 let mut require_commitment = false;
3447 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3450 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3451 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3452 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3454 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3455 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3456 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3457 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3458 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3459 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3464 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3465 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3466 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3467 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3468 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3470 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3471 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3472 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3477 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3478 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3480 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3484 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3485 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3487 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3488 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3489 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3490 require_commitment = true;
3491 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3492 match forward_info {
3493 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3494 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3495 require_commitment = true;
3497 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3498 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3499 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3501 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3502 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3503 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3507 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3508 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3509 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3510 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3516 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3517 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3518 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3519 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3521 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3522 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3523 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3524 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3525 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3526 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3527 require_commitment = true;
3531 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3533 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3534 match update_state {
3535 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3536 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3537 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3538 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3539 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3541 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3542 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3543 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3544 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3545 require_commitment = true;
3546 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3547 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3552 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3553 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3554 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3555 if require_commitment {
3556 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3557 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3558 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3559 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3560 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3561 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3562 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3563 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3564 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3566 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3567 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3568 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3569 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3570 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3571 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3572 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3574 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3578 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3579 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3580 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3581 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3582 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3584 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3585 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3586 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3589 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3590 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3591 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3592 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3595 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3596 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3597 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3598 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3600 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3603 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3604 if require_commitment {
3605 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3607 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3608 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3609 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3610 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3612 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3613 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3615 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3616 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3617 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3619 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3623 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3624 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3625 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3630 commitment_update: None,
3631 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3632 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3633 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3640 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3641 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3642 /// commitment update.
3643 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3644 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3645 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3648 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3649 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3650 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3651 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3653 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3654 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3655 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3656 if !self.is_outbound() {
3657 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3659 if !self.is_usable() {
3660 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3662 if !self.is_live() {
3663 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3666 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3667 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3668 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3669 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3670 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3671 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3672 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3673 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3674 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3675 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3679 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3680 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3681 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3682 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3683 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3686 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3687 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3691 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3692 force_holding_cell = true;
3695 if force_holding_cell {
3696 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3700 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3701 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3703 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3704 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3709 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3710 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3712 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3714 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3715 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3716 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3717 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3721 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3722 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3723 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3727 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3728 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3731 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3732 // will be retransmitted.
3733 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3734 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3735 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3737 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3738 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3740 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3741 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3742 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3743 // this HTLC accordingly
3744 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3747 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3748 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3749 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3750 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3753 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3754 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3755 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3756 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3757 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3758 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3763 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3765 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3766 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3767 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3768 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3772 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3773 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3774 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3775 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3776 // the update upon reconnection.
3777 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3781 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3782 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3785 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3786 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3787 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3788 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3789 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3790 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3792 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3793 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3794 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3795 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3796 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3797 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3799 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3800 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3801 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3802 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3803 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3804 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3805 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3808 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3809 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3810 /// to the remote side.
3811 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3812 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3813 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3814 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3817 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3819 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3820 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3822 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3823 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3824 // first received the funding_signed.
3825 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3826 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3827 self.funding_transaction.take()
3829 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3830 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3831 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3832 funding_broadcastable = None;
3835 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3836 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3837 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3838 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3839 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3840 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3841 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3842 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3843 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3844 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3845 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3846 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3847 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3848 next_per_commitment_point,
3849 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3853 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3855 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3856 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3857 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3858 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3859 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3860 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3862 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3863 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3864 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3865 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3866 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3867 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3871 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3872 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3874 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3875 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3878 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3879 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3880 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3881 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3882 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3883 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3884 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3885 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3886 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3890 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3891 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3893 if self.is_outbound() {
3894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3896 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3899 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3900 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3902 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3903 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3904 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3905 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3906 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3907 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3908 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3909 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3910 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3911 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3912 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3914 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3916 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3918 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3924 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3925 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3926 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3927 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3928 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3929 per_commitment_secret,
3930 next_per_commitment_point,
3934 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3935 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3936 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3937 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3938 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3940 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3941 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3942 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3943 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3944 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3945 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3946 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3947 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3948 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3953 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3954 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3956 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3957 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3958 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3959 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3960 reason: err_packet.clone()
3963 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3964 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3965 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3966 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3967 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3968 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3971 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3972 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3973 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3974 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3975 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3982 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3983 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3984 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3985 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3989 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3990 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3991 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3992 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3993 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3994 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3998 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3999 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4001 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4002 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4003 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4004 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4005 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4006 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4007 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4008 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4011 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4013 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4014 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4015 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4016 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4020 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4021 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4025 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4026 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4027 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4028 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4029 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4030 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4031 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4034 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4035 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4036 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4037 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4038 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4041 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4042 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4043 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4044 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4045 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4046 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4047 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4048 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4051 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4055 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4056 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4057 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4058 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4060 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4064 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4065 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4066 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4068 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4069 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4070 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4071 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4072 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4076 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4078 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4079 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4080 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4081 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4082 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4085 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4086 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4087 channel_ready: None,
4088 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4089 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4090 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4094 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4095 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4096 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4097 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4098 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4099 next_per_commitment_point,
4100 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4102 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4103 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4104 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4108 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4109 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4110 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4112 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4113 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4114 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4117 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4123 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4124 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4125 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4126 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4127 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4129 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4130 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4131 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4132 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4133 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4134 next_per_commitment_point,
4135 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4139 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4140 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4141 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4143 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4146 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4147 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4148 raa: required_revoke,
4149 commitment_update: None,
4150 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4152 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4153 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4154 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4156 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4159 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4160 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4161 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4162 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4163 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4164 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4167 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4168 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4169 raa: required_revoke,
4170 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4171 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4175 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4179 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4180 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4181 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4182 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4184 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4186 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4188 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4189 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4190 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4191 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4192 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4193 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4195 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4196 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4197 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4198 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4199 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4201 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4202 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4203 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4204 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4207 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4208 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4209 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4210 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4211 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4212 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4213 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4214 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4215 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4216 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4217 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4218 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4219 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4220 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4221 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4223 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4226 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4227 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4230 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4231 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4232 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4233 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4234 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4235 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4236 self.channel_state &
4237 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4238 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4239 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4240 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4243 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4244 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4245 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4246 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4247 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4248 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4251 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4257 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4258 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4259 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4260 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4262 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4263 return Ok((None, None));
4266 if !self.is_outbound() {
4267 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4268 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4270 return Ok((None, None));
4273 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4275 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4276 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4277 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4278 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4280 let sig = self.holder_signer
4281 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4282 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4284 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4285 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4286 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4287 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4289 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4290 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4291 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4296 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4297 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4298 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4299 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4301 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4304 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4305 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4306 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4307 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4310 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4311 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4315 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4317 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4321 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4322 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4326 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4329 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4330 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4331 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4332 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4334 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4337 assert!(send_shutdown);
4338 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4339 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4342 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4347 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4349 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4350 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4352 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4353 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4354 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4355 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4356 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4357 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4361 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4362 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4363 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4364 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4368 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4369 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4370 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4371 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4372 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4373 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4375 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4376 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4383 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4384 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4386 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4389 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4390 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4392 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4394 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4395 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4396 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4397 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4398 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4399 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4400 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4401 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4402 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4404 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4405 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4408 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4412 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4413 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4414 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4415 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4417 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4420 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4423 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4426 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4430 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4434 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4435 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4436 return Ok((None, None));
4439 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4440 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4441 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4444 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4446 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4449 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4450 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4451 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4452 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4453 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4457 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4458 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4459 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4463 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4464 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4465 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4466 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4467 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4468 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4469 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4473 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4475 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4476 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4477 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4478 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4480 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4483 let sig = self.holder_signer
4484 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4485 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4487 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4488 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4489 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4490 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4494 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4495 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4496 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4497 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4499 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4500 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4501 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4507 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4508 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4511 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4514 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4515 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4518 if !self.is_outbound() {
4519 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4520 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4521 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4522 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4524 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4525 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4526 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4528 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4529 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4532 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4533 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4534 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4535 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4536 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4537 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4538 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4539 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4544 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4545 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4546 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4547 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4553 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4554 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4555 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4556 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4558 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4564 // Public utilities:
4566 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4570 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4574 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4575 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4576 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4580 /// Gets the channel's type
4581 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4585 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4586 /// is_usable() returns true).
4587 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4588 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4589 self.short_channel_id
4592 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4593 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4594 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4597 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4598 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4599 self.outbound_scid_alias
4601 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4602 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4603 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4604 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4605 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4608 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4609 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4610 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4611 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4614 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4615 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4616 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4619 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4620 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4621 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4622 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4626 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4629 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4630 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4633 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4634 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4637 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4638 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4639 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4642 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4643 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4647 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4648 self.counterparty_node_id
4651 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4652 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4653 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4657 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4658 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4661 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4662 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4664 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4665 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4666 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4667 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4669 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4673 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4674 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4675 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4678 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4679 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4680 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4683 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4684 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4685 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4687 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4688 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4693 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4694 self.channel_value_satoshis
4697 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4698 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4701 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4702 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4705 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4706 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4709 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4710 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4711 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4714 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4715 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4716 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4719 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4720 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4721 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4724 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4725 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4726 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4727 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4728 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4731 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4733 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4734 self.prev_config = None;
4738 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4739 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4743 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4744 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4745 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4746 let did_channel_update =
4747 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4748 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4749 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4750 if did_channel_update {
4751 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4752 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4753 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4754 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4756 self.config.options = *config;
4760 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4761 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4762 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4763 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4764 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4765 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4766 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4768 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4769 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4772 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4774 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4775 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4781 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4782 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4783 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4784 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4785 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4786 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4787 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4789 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4790 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4797 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4801 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4802 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4803 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4804 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4805 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4806 // which are near the dust limit.
4807 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4808 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4809 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4810 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4811 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4813 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4814 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4816 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4819 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4820 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4823 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4824 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4827 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4828 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4832 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4837 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4839 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4840 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4841 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4842 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4843 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4844 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4846 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4848 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4856 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4857 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4861 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4862 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4863 self.update_time_counter
4866 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4867 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4870 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4871 self.config.announced_channel
4874 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4875 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4878 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4879 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4880 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4881 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4884 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4885 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4886 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4889 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4890 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4891 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4892 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4893 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4896 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4897 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4898 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4899 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4900 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4903 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4904 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4905 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4906 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4909 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4910 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4913 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4914 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4915 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4918 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4919 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4920 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4922 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4923 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4924 if self.channel_state &
4925 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4926 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4927 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4928 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4929 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4932 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4933 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4934 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4935 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4936 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4937 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4939 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4940 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4941 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4943 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4944 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4945 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4946 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4947 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4948 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4954 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4955 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4956 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4959 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4960 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4961 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4964 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4965 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4966 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4969 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4970 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4971 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4972 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4973 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4974 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4979 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4980 self.channel_update_status
4983 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4984 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4985 self.channel_update_status = status;
4988 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4990 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4991 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4992 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4996 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4997 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4998 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5001 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5005 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5006 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5007 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5009 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5010 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5011 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5013 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5014 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5017 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5018 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5019 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5020 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5021 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5022 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5023 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5024 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5025 self.channel_state);
5027 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5031 if need_commitment_update {
5032 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5033 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5034 let next_per_commitment_point =
5035 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5036 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5037 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5038 next_per_commitment_point,
5039 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5043 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5049 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5050 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5051 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5052 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5053 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5054 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5055 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5057 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5060 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5061 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5062 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5063 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5064 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5065 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5066 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5067 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5068 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5069 if self.is_outbound() {
5070 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5071 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5072 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5073 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5074 // channel and move on.
5075 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5076 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5078 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5079 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5080 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5082 if self.is_outbound() {
5083 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5084 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5085 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5086 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5087 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5088 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5092 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5093 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5094 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5095 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5096 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5100 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5101 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5102 // may have already happened for this block).
5103 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5104 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5105 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5106 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5109 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5110 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5111 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5112 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5120 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5121 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5122 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5123 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5125 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5126 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5129 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5131 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5132 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5133 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5134 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5136 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5139 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5142 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5143 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5144 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5145 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5147 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5150 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5151 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5152 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5154 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5155 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5157 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5158 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5159 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5167 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5169 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5170 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5171 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5173 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5174 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5177 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5178 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5179 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5180 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5181 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5182 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5183 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5184 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5185 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5188 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5189 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5190 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5191 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5193 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5194 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5195 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5197 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5198 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5199 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5200 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5202 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5203 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5204 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5205 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5206 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5207 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5208 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5211 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5212 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5214 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5217 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5218 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5219 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5220 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5221 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5222 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5223 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5224 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5225 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5226 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5227 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5228 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5229 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5230 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5231 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5232 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5233 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5239 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5244 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5245 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5247 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5248 if !self.is_outbound() {
5249 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5251 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5252 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5255 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5256 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5259 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5260 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5264 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5265 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5266 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5267 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5268 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5269 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5270 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5271 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5272 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5273 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5274 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5275 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5276 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5277 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5278 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5279 first_per_commitment_point,
5280 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5281 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5282 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5283 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5285 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5289 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5290 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5293 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5294 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5295 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5296 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5299 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5300 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5302 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5303 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5304 if self.is_outbound() {
5305 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5307 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5308 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5310 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5311 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5313 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5314 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5317 self.user_id = user_id;
5318 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5320 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5323 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5324 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5325 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5327 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5328 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5329 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5330 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5332 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5333 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5334 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5335 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5336 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5337 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5338 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5339 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5340 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5341 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5342 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5343 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5344 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5345 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5346 first_per_commitment_point,
5347 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5348 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5349 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5351 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5355 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5356 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5358 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5360 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5361 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5364 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5365 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5366 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5367 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5368 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5369 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5372 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5373 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5374 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5375 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5376 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5377 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5378 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5379 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5380 if !self.is_outbound() {
5381 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5383 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5384 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5386 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5387 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5388 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5389 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5392 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5393 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5395 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5398 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5399 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5404 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5406 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5408 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5409 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5410 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5412 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5413 temporary_channel_id,
5414 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5415 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5420 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5421 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5422 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5423 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5425 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5428 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5429 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5430 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5431 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5432 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5433 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5435 if !self.is_usable() {
5436 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5439 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5440 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5441 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5442 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5444 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5445 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5447 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5448 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5449 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5450 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5451 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5452 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5458 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5459 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5460 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5461 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5463 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5466 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5470 if !self.is_usable() {
5474 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5475 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5479 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5483 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5484 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5487 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5491 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5493 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5498 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5500 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5505 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5507 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5508 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5509 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5510 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5511 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5515 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5517 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5518 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5519 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5520 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5521 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5522 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5523 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5525 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5526 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5527 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5528 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5529 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5530 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5531 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5532 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5533 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5534 contents: announcement,
5537 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5541 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5542 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5543 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5544 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5545 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5546 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5547 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5548 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5550 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5552 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5554 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5555 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5557 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5558 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5559 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5560 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5563 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5564 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5565 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5566 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5569 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5572 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5573 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5574 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5575 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5576 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5577 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5580 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5582 Err(_) => return None,
5584 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5585 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5590 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5591 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5592 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5593 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5594 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5595 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5596 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5597 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5598 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5599 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5600 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5601 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5602 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5603 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5604 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5605 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5606 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5607 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5608 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5611 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5612 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5613 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5614 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5617 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5618 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5619 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5620 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5621 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5622 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5623 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5624 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5626 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5627 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5628 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5629 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5630 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5631 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5632 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5633 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5634 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5636 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5642 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5644 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5645 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5646 /// commitment update.
5648 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5649 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5650 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5651 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5653 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5654 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5656 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5657 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5662 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5663 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5665 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5667 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5668 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5670 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5671 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5672 /// regenerate them.
5674 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5675 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5677 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5678 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5679 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5680 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5681 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5682 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5684 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5685 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5686 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5689 if amount_msat == 0 {
5690 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5693 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5694 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5697 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5698 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5699 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5700 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5701 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5702 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5703 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5704 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5707 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5708 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5709 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5710 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5712 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5713 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5714 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5717 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5718 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5719 if !self.is_outbound() {
5720 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5721 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5722 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5723 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5724 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5725 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5729 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5732 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5733 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5734 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5736 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5737 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5738 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5739 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5740 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5741 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5745 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5746 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5747 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5748 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5749 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5750 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5754 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5755 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5759 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5760 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5761 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5762 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5764 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5765 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5768 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5769 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5770 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5771 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5772 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5775 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5776 force_holding_cell = true;
5779 // Now update local state:
5780 if force_holding_cell {
5781 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5786 onion_routing_packet,
5791 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5792 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5794 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5796 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5800 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5801 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5802 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5806 onion_routing_packet,
5808 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5813 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection.
5814 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5815 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5816 match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5817 Ok((commitment_signed, _)) => Ok((commitment_signed, monitor_update)),
5822 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5823 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5824 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5825 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5827 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5828 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5829 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5831 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5832 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5836 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5837 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5839 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5840 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5841 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5842 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5845 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5846 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5847 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5848 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5849 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5850 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5853 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5855 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5856 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5857 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5859 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5860 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5863 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5864 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5865 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5866 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5867 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5868 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5869 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5870 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5873 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5877 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5878 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5879 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5880 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5882 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5884 if !self.is_outbound() {
5885 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5886 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5887 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5888 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5889 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5890 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5891 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5892 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5893 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5894 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5900 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5903 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5904 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5905 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5906 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5907 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5908 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5910 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5911 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5912 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5913 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5916 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5917 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5921 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5922 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5924 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5926 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5927 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5928 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5929 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5931 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5932 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5933 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5934 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5935 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5936 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5940 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5941 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5944 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5947 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5948 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5950 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5951 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5952 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5953 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5954 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5955 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5956 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5962 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5963 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5964 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5967 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5968 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5971 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5972 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5973 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5974 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5980 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5981 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5982 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5983 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5984 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5985 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5986 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5987 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5990 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5991 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5994 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5995 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5998 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5999 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6000 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6003 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6006 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6007 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6008 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6010 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6015 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6016 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6017 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6018 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6020 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6022 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6024 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6025 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6026 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6027 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6028 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6029 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6033 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6034 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6035 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6038 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6039 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6040 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6041 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6042 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6044 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6045 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6052 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6055 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6056 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6057 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6058 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6059 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6060 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6061 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6062 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6063 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6064 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6065 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6067 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6068 // return them to fail the payment.
6069 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6070 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6071 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6073 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6074 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6079 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6080 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6081 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6082 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6083 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6084 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6085 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6086 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6087 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6088 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6089 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6090 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6091 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6096 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6097 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6098 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6101 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6102 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6103 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6105 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6106 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6110 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6114 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6115 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6117 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6123 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6124 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6125 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6126 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6127 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6129 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6130 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6131 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6132 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6138 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6139 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6140 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6141 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6142 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6143 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6148 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6149 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6150 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6151 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6153 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6154 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6155 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6156 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6161 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6162 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6163 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6164 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6165 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6166 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6171 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6172 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6173 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6176 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6178 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6179 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6180 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6181 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6182 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6184 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6185 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6186 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6187 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6189 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6190 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6191 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6193 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6195 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6196 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6197 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6198 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6199 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6200 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6202 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6203 // deserialized from that format.
6204 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6205 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6206 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6208 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6210 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6211 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6212 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6214 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6215 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6216 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6217 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6220 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6221 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6222 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6225 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6226 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6227 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6228 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6230 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6231 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6233 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6235 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6237 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6239 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6242 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6244 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6249 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6251 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6252 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6253 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6254 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6255 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6256 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6257 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6259 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6261 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6263 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6266 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6267 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6268 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6271 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6273 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6274 preimages.push(preimage);
6276 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6277 reason.write(writer)?;
6279 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6281 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6282 preimages.push(preimage);
6284 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6285 reason.write(writer)?;
6290 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6291 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6293 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6295 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6296 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6297 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6298 source.write(writer)?;
6299 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6301 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6303 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6304 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6306 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6308 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6309 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6314 match self.resend_order {
6315 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6316 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6319 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6320 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6321 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6323 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6324 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6325 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6326 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6329 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6330 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6331 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6332 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6333 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6336 if self.is_outbound() {
6337 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6338 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6339 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6341 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6342 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6343 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6345 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6347 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6348 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6349 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6350 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6352 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6353 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6354 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6355 // consider the stale state on reload.
6358 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6359 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6360 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6362 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6363 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6364 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6366 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6367 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6369 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6370 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6371 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6373 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6374 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6376 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6379 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6380 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6381 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6383 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6386 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6387 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6389 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6390 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6391 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6393 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6395 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6397 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6399 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6400 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6401 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6402 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6403 htlc.write(writer)?;
6406 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6407 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6408 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6410 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6411 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6413 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6414 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6415 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6416 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6417 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6418 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6419 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6421 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6422 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6423 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6424 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6425 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6427 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6429 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6430 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6431 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6432 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6434 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6435 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6436 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6437 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6438 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6439 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6440 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6442 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6443 (2, chan_type, option),
6444 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6445 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6446 (5, self.config, required),
6447 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6448 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6449 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6450 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6451 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6452 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6453 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6454 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6455 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6456 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6457 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6458 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6465 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6466 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6468 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6469 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6471 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6472 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6473 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6475 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6476 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6477 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6478 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6482 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6483 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6489 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let mut keys_data = None;
6500 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6501 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6502 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6504 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6505 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6506 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6507 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6508 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6509 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6513 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6514 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6515 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6518 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6525 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6526 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6527 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6528 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6529 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6530 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6531 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6532 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6533 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6534 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6535 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6536 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6537 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6542 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6543 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6544 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6545 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6546 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6547 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6548 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6549 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6550 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6551 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6552 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6553 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6555 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6559 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6563 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6566 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6571 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6572 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6573 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6574 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6575 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6576 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6577 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6578 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6579 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6580 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6582 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6583 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6584 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6586 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6587 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6588 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6590 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6594 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6595 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6596 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6597 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6600 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6602 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6604 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6606 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6607 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6610 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6612 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6613 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6616 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6626 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6627 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6628 // consider the stale state on reload.
6629 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6632 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6634 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6636 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6639 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6641 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6643 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6648 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6651 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6652 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6658 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6660 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6661 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6663 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6664 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6669 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6670 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6671 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6672 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6674 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6677 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6680 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6682 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6685 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6688 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6691 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6694 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6695 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6696 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6700 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6701 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6702 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6704 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6710 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6711 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6712 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6713 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6714 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6715 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6716 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6717 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6718 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6719 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6721 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6722 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6723 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6724 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6725 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6726 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6728 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6729 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6731 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6732 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6733 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6734 (2, channel_type, option),
6735 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6736 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6737 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6738 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6739 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6740 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6741 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6742 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6743 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6744 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6745 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6746 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6747 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6748 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6749 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6752 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6753 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6754 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6755 // required channel parameters.
6756 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6757 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6758 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6760 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6762 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6763 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6764 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6765 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6768 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6769 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6770 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6772 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6773 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6775 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6776 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6781 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6782 if iter.next().is_some() {
6783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6787 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6788 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6789 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6790 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6791 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6794 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6795 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6797 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6798 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6799 // separate u64 values.
6800 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6805 config: config.unwrap(),
6809 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6810 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6811 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6815 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6817 channel_value_satoshis,
6819 latest_monitor_update_id,
6822 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6825 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6826 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6829 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6830 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6831 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6835 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6836 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6837 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6838 monitor_pending_forwards,
6839 monitor_pending_failures,
6840 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6843 holding_cell_update_fee,
6844 next_holder_htlc_id,
6845 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6846 update_time_counter,
6849 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6850 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6851 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6852 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6854 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6855 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6856 closing_fee_limits: None,
6857 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6859 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6861 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6862 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6864 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6866 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6867 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6868 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6869 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6870 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6871 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6872 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6873 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6874 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6877 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6879 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6880 funding_transaction,
6882 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6883 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6884 counterparty_node_id,
6886 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6890 channel_update_status,
6891 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6896 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6898 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6900 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6902 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6903 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6904 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6906 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6909 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6911 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6914 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6922 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6923 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6924 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6925 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6926 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6928 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6929 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6931 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6932 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6933 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6934 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6935 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6936 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6937 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6938 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6939 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6940 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6941 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6942 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6943 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6944 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6945 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6946 use crate::util::test_utils;
6947 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6948 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6949 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6950 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6951 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6952 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6953 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6954 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6955 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6956 use crate::prelude::*;
6958 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6961 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6962 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6968 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6969 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6970 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6971 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6975 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6976 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6977 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6978 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6979 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6980 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6981 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6985 signer: InMemorySigner,
6988 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6989 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6992 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6993 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6995 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6996 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6999 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7003 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7005 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7007 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7008 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7009 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7012 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7013 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7014 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7015 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7019 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7020 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7021 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7025 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7026 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7027 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7028 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7030 let seed = [42; 32];
7031 let network = Network::Testnet;
7032 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7033 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7034 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7037 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7038 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7039 let config = UserConfig::default();
7040 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7041 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7042 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7044 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7045 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7049 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7050 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7052 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7053 let original_fee = 253;
7054 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7055 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7056 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7057 let seed = [42; 32];
7058 let network = Network::Testnet;
7059 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7061 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7062 let config = UserConfig::default();
7063 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7065 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7066 // same as the old fee.
7067 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7068 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7069 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7073 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7074 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7075 // dust limits are used.
7076 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7077 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7078 let seed = [42; 32];
7079 let network = Network::Testnet;
7080 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7081 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7083 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7084 // they have different dust limits.
7086 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7087 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7088 let config = UserConfig::default();
7089 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7091 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7092 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7093 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7094 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7095 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7097 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7098 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7099 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7100 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7101 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7103 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7104 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7105 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7107 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7108 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7109 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7110 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7113 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7115 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7116 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7117 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7118 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7119 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7121 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7122 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7123 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7124 payment_secret: None,
7125 payment_params: None,
7129 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7130 // the dust limit check.
7131 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7132 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7133 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7134 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7136 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7137 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7138 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7139 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7140 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7141 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7142 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7146 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7147 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7148 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7149 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7150 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7151 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7153 let seed = [42; 32];
7154 let network = Network::Testnet;
7155 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7157 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7158 let config = UserConfig::default();
7159 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7161 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7162 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7164 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7165 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7166 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7167 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7168 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7169 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7171 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7172 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7173 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7174 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7175 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7177 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7179 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7180 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7181 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7182 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7183 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7185 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7186 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7187 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7188 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7189 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7193 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7194 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7195 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7196 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7197 let seed = [42; 32];
7198 let network = Network::Testnet;
7199 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7200 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7201 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7203 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7205 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7206 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7207 let config = UserConfig::default();
7208 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7210 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7211 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7212 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7213 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7215 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7216 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7217 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7219 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7220 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7221 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7222 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7224 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7225 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7226 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7228 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7229 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7231 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7232 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7233 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7234 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7235 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7236 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7237 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7238 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7239 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7244 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7246 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7247 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7248 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7249 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7250 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7251 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7252 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7259 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7260 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7261 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7262 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7263 let seed = [42; 32];
7264 let network = Network::Testnet;
7265 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7266 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7267 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7269 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7270 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7271 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7272 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7273 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7274 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7275 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7276 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7278 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7279 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7280 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7281 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7282 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7283 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7285 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7286 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7287 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7288 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7290 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7292 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7293 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7294 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7295 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7296 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7297 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7299 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7300 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7301 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7302 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7304 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7305 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7306 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7307 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7308 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7310 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7311 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7313 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7314 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7315 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7317 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7318 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7319 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7320 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7321 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7323 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7324 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7326 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7327 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7328 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7332 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7334 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7335 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7336 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7338 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7339 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7340 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7341 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7343 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7344 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7345 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7347 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7349 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7350 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7353 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7354 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7355 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7357 let seed = [42; 32];
7358 let network = Network::Testnet;
7359 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7360 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7361 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7364 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7365 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7366 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7368 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7369 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7371 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7372 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7373 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7375 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7376 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7378 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7380 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7381 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7383 // Channel Negotiations failed
7384 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7385 assert!(result.is_err());
7390 fn channel_update() {
7391 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7392 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7393 let seed = [42; 32];
7394 let network = Network::Testnet;
7395 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7396 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7398 // Create a channel.
7399 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7400 let config = UserConfig::default();
7401 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7402 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7403 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7404 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7406 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7407 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7408 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7410 short_channel_id: 0,
7413 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7414 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7415 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7417 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7418 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7420 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7422 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7424 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7425 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7426 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7427 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7429 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7430 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7431 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7433 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7437 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7439 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7440 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7441 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7442 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7443 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7444 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7445 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7446 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7447 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7448 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7449 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7450 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7451 use crate::sync::Arc;
7453 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7454 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7455 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7458 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7460 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7461 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7462 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7463 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7464 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7466 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7467 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7472 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7473 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7474 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7476 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7477 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7478 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7479 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7480 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7481 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7483 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7485 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7486 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7487 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7488 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7489 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7490 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7492 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7493 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7494 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7495 selected_contest_delay: 144
7497 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7498 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7500 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7501 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7503 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7504 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7506 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7507 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7509 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7510 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7511 // build_commitment_transaction.
7512 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7513 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7514 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7515 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7516 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7518 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7519 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7520 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7521 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7525 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7526 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7527 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7528 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7532 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7533 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7534 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7536 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7537 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7539 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7540 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7542 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7544 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7545 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7546 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7547 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7548 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7549 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7550 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7552 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7553 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7554 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7555 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7557 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7558 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7559 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7561 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7563 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7564 commitment_tx.clone(),
7565 counterparty_signature,
7566 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7567 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7568 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7570 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7571 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7573 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7574 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7575 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7577 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7578 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7581 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7582 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7584 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7585 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7586 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7587 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7588 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7589 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7590 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7591 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7593 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7596 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7597 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7598 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7602 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7605 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7606 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7607 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7609 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7610 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7611 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7612 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7613 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7614 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7615 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7616 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7618 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7622 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7623 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7625 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7626 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7627 "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", {});
7629 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7630 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7631 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7632 "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", {});
7634 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7635 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7637 amount_msat: 1000000,
7639 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7640 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7642 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7645 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7646 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7648 amount_msat: 2000000,
7650 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7651 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7653 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7656 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7657 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7659 amount_msat: 2000000,
7661 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7662 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7663 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7665 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7668 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7669 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7671 amount_msat: 3000000,
7673 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7674 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7675 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7677 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7680 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7681 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7683 amount_msat: 4000000,
7685 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7686 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7688 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7692 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7693 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7694 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7696 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7697 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7698 "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", {
7701 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7702 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7703 "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" },
7706 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7707 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7708 "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" },
7711 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7712 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7713 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7716 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7717 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7718 "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" },
7721 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7722 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7723 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7726 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7727 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7728 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7730 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7731 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7732 "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", {
7735 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7736 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7737 "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" },
7740 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7741 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7742 "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" },
7745 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7746 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7747 "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" },
7750 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7751 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7752 "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" },
7755 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7756 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7757 "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" }
7760 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7761 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7762 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7764 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7765 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7766 "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", {
7769 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7770 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7771 "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" },
7774 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7775 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7776 "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" },
7779 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7780 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7781 "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" },
7784 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7785 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7786 "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" }
7789 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7790 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7791 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7792 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7794 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7795 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7796 "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", {
7799 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7800 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7801 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
7804 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7805 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7806 "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" },
7809 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7810 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7811 "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" },
7814 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7815 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7816 "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" }
7819 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7822 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7824 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7825 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7826 "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", {
7829 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7830 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7831 "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" },
7834 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7835 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7836 "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" },
7839 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7840 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7841 "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" },
7844 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7845 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7846 "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" }
7849 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7853 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7854 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7855 "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", {
7858 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7859 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7860 "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" },
7863 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7864 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7865 "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" },
7868 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7869 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7870 "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" }
7873 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7874 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7875 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7877 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7878 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7879 "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", {
7882 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7883 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7884 "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" },
7887 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7888 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7889 "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" },
7892 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7893 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7894 "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" }
7897 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7898 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7899 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7901 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7902 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7903 "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", {
7906 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7907 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7908 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7911 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7912 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7913 "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" }
7916 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7917 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7918 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7919 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7921 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7922 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7923 "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", {
7926 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7927 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7928 "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" },
7931 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7932 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7933 "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" }
7936 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7939 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7941 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7942 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7943 "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", {
7946 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7947 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7948 "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" },
7951 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7952 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7953 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7956 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7957 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7958 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7960 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7961 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7962 "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", {
7965 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7966 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7967 "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" }
7970 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7971 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7972 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7973 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7975 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7976 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7977 "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", {
7980 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7981 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7982 "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" }
7985 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7986 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7987 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7988 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7990 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7991 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7992 "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", {
7995 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7996 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7997 "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" }
8000 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8001 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8002 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8003 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8005 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8006 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8007 "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", {});
8009 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8010 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8011 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8012 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8014 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8015 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8016 "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", {});
8018 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8019 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8020 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8021 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8023 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8024 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8025 "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", {});
8027 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8028 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8029 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8031 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8032 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8033 "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", {});
8035 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8036 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8037 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8038 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8040 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8041 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8042 "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", {});
8044 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8045 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8046 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8047 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8049 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8050 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8051 "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", {});
8053 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8054 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8055 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8056 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8057 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8058 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8060 amount_msat: 2000000,
8062 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8063 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8065 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8068 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8069 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8070 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8072 amount_msat: 5000000,
8074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8075 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8076 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8078 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8081 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8082 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8084 amount_msat: 5000000,
8086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8087 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8088 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8094 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8095 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8096 "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", {
8099 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8100 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8101 "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" },
8103 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8104 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8105 "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" },
8107 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8108 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8109 "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" }
8112 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8113 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8114 "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", {
8117 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8118 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8119 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe2902000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec8347304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8121 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8122 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8123 "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" },
8125 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8126 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8127 "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" }
8132 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8133 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8135 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8136 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8137 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8138 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8140 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8141 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8142 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8144 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8145 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8147 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8148 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8150 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8151 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8152 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8156 fn test_key_derivation() {
8157 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8158 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8160 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8161 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8163 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8164 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8166 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8167 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8169 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8170 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8172 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8173 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8175 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8176 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8178 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8179 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8183 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8184 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8185 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8186 let seed = [42; 32];
8187 let network = Network::Testnet;
8188 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8189 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8191 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8192 let config = UserConfig::default();
8193 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8194 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8196 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8197 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8199 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8200 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8201 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8202 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8203 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8204 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8205 assert!(res.is_ok());
8210 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8211 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8212 // resulting `channel_type`.
8213 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8214 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8215 let network = Network::Testnet;
8216 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8217 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8219 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8220 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8222 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8223 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8225 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8226 // need to signal it.
8227 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8228 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8229 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8232 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8234 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8235 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8236 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8238 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8239 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8240 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8243 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8244 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8245 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8246 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8247 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8250 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8251 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8256 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8257 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8258 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8260 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8261 let network = Network::Testnet;
8262 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8263 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8265 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8266 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8268 let config = UserConfig::default();
8270 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8271 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8272 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8273 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8274 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8276 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8277 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8278 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8281 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8282 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8283 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8285 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8286 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8287 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8288 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8289 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8290 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8292 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8297 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8298 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8301 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8302 let network = Network::Testnet;
8303 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8304 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8306 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8307 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8309 let config = UserConfig::default();
8311 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8312 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8313 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8314 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8315 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8316 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8317 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8318 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8320 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8321 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8322 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8323 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8324 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8325 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8328 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8329 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8331 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8332 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8333 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8334 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8336 assert!(res.is_err());
8338 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8339 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8340 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8342 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8343 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8344 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8347 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8349 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8350 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8351 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8352 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8355 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8356 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8358 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8359 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8361 assert!(res.is_err());